Outline of Operations

Before the final assault into inner GERMANY across the RHINE could take place it was necessary to clear the area between the MAAS and the RHINE.

This process was achieved by three operations entitled BLACKCOCK, VERITABLE and GRENADE.

Operation BLACKCOCK commenced on 16 January with an attack NORTH from the road GEILENKIRCHEN—SITTARD by 12 Corps.

It was carried out under conditions of hard frosts, sudden thaws and thick fog but in spite of the weather the area SOUTH of the ROER was completely cleared in ten days except for a small bridgehead SW of ROERMOND. 

Meanwhile preparations for operation VERITABLE were being carried out by First Canadian Army under whose command 30 Corps had been placed.

The latter corps had been built up to a strength of seven divisions, three independent armoured brigades, eleven regiments of 79 Armoured Division grouped under a brigade headquarters and five AGsRA.

The attack was to be carried out initially by 30 Corps but subsequently 2 Canadian Corps would take over the left sector and the attack would continue on a two-corps front.

1 Corps to the WEST would continue to hold its 125 mile front along the MAAS.

The attack began on 8 February after excellent artillery support although the weather interferedwith the programme for air support.

By midnight all objectives for the first day had been attained. The SIEGFRIED defences were pierced on 9 February and the outskirts of CLEVE entered.

NORTH of the road CLEVE—NIJMEGEN 3 Canadian Division was successfully carrying out amphibious operations.

The floods, however, were rapidly becoming a serious handicap to the operation.

An attempt to lessen their eifects was made by blowing certain dykes NE of NIJMEGEN but the GERMANS in turn blew other dykes which let in about the same quantity of water as was being drained away.

As the valley of the ROER was also flooded it was clear that the AMERICAN attack, (operation GRENADE), would have to be postponed.

By 13 February, however, the SIEGFRIED line had been completely breached and the REICHSWALD was cleared.

The right flank of 30 Corps had reached the MAAS, three miles SOUTH of GENNEP and the construction of the bridge had begun.

On the left flank the CANADIANS had come opposite to EMMERICH.

During the next nine days with the extension of the front SOUTH and EAST of the REICHSWALD, GOCH was captured and operations developed against CALCAR.

On 23 February Ninth US Army, which still formed part of 21 Army Group although First US Army had reverted to under command 12 US Army Group on 18 January, launched operation GRENADE across the ROER towards DUSSELDORF and MUNCHEN GLADBACH.

By early morning 24 February six class 40 treadway bridges and other infantry bridges had been erected.

Within three days a bridge-head sixteen miles wide and six to eight miles deep had been established.

Meanwhile regrouping was being carried out in the BRITISH sector preparatory to an assault by 2 Canadian Corps to break through theenemy defences between UDEM and CALCAR and exploit to XANTEN.

That operation began on 26 February and met desperate resistance and appalling conditions underfoot.

By the night of 27 February however, a gap had been made between the HOCHWALD and BALBERGER forests near the railway line at A 0441.

Co-incident with this attack, opposition on 30 Corps front showed signs of lessening. WELL E82, WEEZE E93 and KEVELAER E93 were captured and a link-up was effected at GELDERN with Ninth US Army.

The AMERICAN advance had been rapid and by 2 March MUNCHEN GLADBACH, NEUSS, ROERMOND and VENLO had been secured.

The US forces continued to advance along the Westbank of the RHINE through KREFELD A10 and ORSOY A22 while 2 Canadian Corps cleared the XANTEN area.

By 10 March the enemy still in the bend SW of WESEL was finally mopped up and 2l Army Group was now ranged along the WEST bank of the RHINE from DUSSELDORF to ARNHEM.

The assault across the RHINE was to be by means of two operations, PLUNDER to be carried outby the ground troops, and VARSITY which was the airborne drop across the RHINE. D-day was to be 24 March for both these operations but a postponement of up to five days would be accepted if weather delayed the airborne operation.

The intention was to establish a bridgehead over the RHINE, isolate the RUHR from the rest of GERMANY in conjunction with First US Army and break into the NORTH GERMAN plain.

Briefly, Ninth US Army was to assault across the RHINE near RHINEBERG, Second British Army was to assault in the area of XANTEN and REES while First Canadian Army was to carry out feints along the RHINE on the left flank of Second Army.

The role of 18 US Airborne Corps consisting of 17 US Airborne Division and 6 British Airborne Division was to seize the high ground and certain bridges about five miles NORTH of WESEL, to speed the capture of WESEL, and assist the RHINE crossings.

Force U of the Royal Navy consisting of forty-five LCM and forty-five LCVP brought overland on transporters was to support the crossings of Second Army.

The weather, both for the operation and the days immediately preceding it, was ideal and by D-day for the operation 24,983 tons of bombs had been dropped by Bomber Command while Eight and Ninth US AAFs had dropped 24,500 tons of bombs.

After intense artillery preparation the assault began at 2100 hours on 23 Marsh by four battalions of 51 Division.

Seven minutes later a report was received that the first wave was across.

Good progress was made during the night and the outskirts of REES were reached.

By 0300 hours 1 Commando Brigade was well established in the town of WESEL.

Ninth US Army assaulted near OSSENBURG and despite strong resistance bridging operations were soon under way.

At 1000 hours on 24 March the airborne operation began with over 1,700 aircraft and 1,300 glidersbeing employed ; 14,000 troops were delivered with the loss of under four per cent of the gliders. All the airborne troops’ objectives were taken by nightfall with the exception of the heavily wooded high ground NORTH of DIERSFORDT which was captured during the night.

Five bridges over the River ISSELwere seized intact.

Ground troops progressed rapidly and in the AMERICAN sector the general line of the road DINSLAKEN—WESEL was reached. Elements crossed the LIPPE-SEITEN canal near LIPPENDORF A2388 and class 40 bridges were opened.

HAFFEN and MEHR A1248 were captured by 15 Division who also made contact with 6 British Airborne Division.

Opposition at REES from paratroops, who held out until early on 26 March, was very stubborn but the exploitation of the bridgehead and the build-upproceeded well.

By 28 March US troops had captured GLADBACH, GAHLEN and DORSTEN while17 US Airborne Division with 6 Guards Armoured Brigade and 1 Commando Brigade captured HALTERN A64.

12 Corps reached BORKEN A36 and RHEDE A26 on the same day while 30 Corps secured the line HALDERN A15—ISSELBURG A16—ANHOLT and 2 Canadian Corps had almost cleared EMMERICH.

The break-out could be said to have started on this date and 18 US Airborne Corps, 8 Corps and 12 Corps advanced rapidly meeting the first organised resistance on the line of the DORTMUND-EMS canal where fighting went on from 31 March to 6 April.

Meanwhile elements of the Ninth US Army reached the River WESER SE of MINDEN on 3 April on which date Ninth US Army reverted to under command 12 US Army group.

The advance of 30 Corps was held up at LINGEN until 6 April but 8 Corps crossed the WESER on 7 April and four days later was attacking CELLE.

This place was taken the next day and the advance continued to UELZEN where four days hard fighting took place.

LUNEBURG was captured on 18 April and six days later 8 Corps had cleared the WEST bank of the River ELBE in this sector.

Meanwhile 12 Corps having cleared RHEIN E crossed the WESER against opposition in the HOYA area and eventually captured SOLTAU on 24 April.

After turning NORTH towards HAMBURG they reached their sector of the ELBE on 26 April.

30 Corps was meanwhile being stubbornly opposed by desperate SS troops but despite this and many inundations they captured BREMEN by 28 April thereafter continuing NORTH and NW to clear the peninsula to CUXHAVEN.

Meanwhile 2 Canadian Corps reverted to under command First Canadian Army after the capture of EMMERICH.

It then advanced rapidly NORTH to the outskirts of DOESBURG and ZUTPHEN while1 Canadian Corps attacked from the NIJMEGEN bridgehead to clear the area up to the NEDERRIJN. This was completed by 5 April.

2 Canadian Corps advanced towards OLDENBURG and secured bridgeheads across the EMS but after the capture of ZUTPHEN and DEVENTER 1 Canadian Division had turned WEST on 11 April to assault across the River ISSEL towards APELDOORN.

In conjunction with this attack ARNHEM was cleared by 1 Canadian Corps on 15 April and the ZUIDER ZEE was reached on 18 April. 2 Canadian Corps’ advance continued from OLDENBURG to GRONINGEN and LEEUWARDEN reaching the SOUTH bank of the EMS estuary opposite EMDEN.

By 26 April withthe exception of a small strip of coast on the EMS estuary the whole of NE HOLLAND had been cleared.

Having captured OLDENBURG 2 Canadian Corps moved towards WILHELMSHAVEN and EMDEN while SOUTH of the ZUIDERZEE 1 Canadian Corps progressed WEST towards HILVERSUM and UTRECHT. 

While 30 Corps was completing the clearance of the CUXHAVEN peninsula the final stage of the operation on the remainder of the Second Army front began with attacks across the ELBE by 8 Corps on 29 April and 18 US Airborne Corps on 30 April, in both of which rapid progress was made.

18 US Airborne Corps secured the line DOMITZ-LUDWIGSLUST-SCHWERIN and 6 British Airborne Division on their left advanced forty miles to make contact with the RUSSIANS on the BALTIC coast at WISMAR.

On 2 May, 11 Armoured Division of 8 Corps entered LUBECK and the advance continued NORTH towards KIEL and the KIEL canal.

On the next day 12 Corps entered HAMBURG which surrendered without a fight.

At 1820 hours on 4 Way plenipotentiaries of the GERMAN High Command surrendered to the Commander-in-Chief 21 Army Group at LUNEBURG HEATH and the order to cease fire became effective at 0800 hours on 5 May 1945.

The “Q” Background

By the end of the second week in January the GERMAN offensive in the ARDENNES had been liquidated.

On 15 January therefore stock piling began for operation VERITABLE which was timed to commence on 8 February.

This operation was to be the first blow of what the C-in-C 21 Army Group inhis personal message of 7 February characterised as “the last round”.

In that same message the C-in-C continued by emphasizing that the last round would continue until the final count and that there could be no relaxation until the knock-out blow had been delivered. These were the principles on which the whole of the administration in this phase was based.

Before the assault across the RHINE into inner GERMANY could take place the obstacle of the River MAAS had to be crossed, and the country between the two rivers cleared of the enemy until 21 Army Group could close up all along the RHINE from DUSSELDORF to ARNHEM with its right flank secured by the US armies.

From that moment the time taken for the build-up of the vast quantities of stores and bridging material required for the assault had to be reduced to a minimum in order to allow the enemy no opportunity to recover and regroup behind the protection of that great river obstacle.

Despite the fact that the date for the assault was brought forward by five days from that originally planned the wholebuild-up was completed the day before the attack.

From the moment that the signal “21 Army Group will now cross the RHINE” was put into effect the weight of the attack and the momentum of the pursuit had to be maintained until final victory.

As in the previous swift advance across FRANCE and BELGIUM the exertion of continual pressure on there treating and broken enemy depended on the necessary supplies and stores being constantly and instantly available to the fighting troops.

This object was achieved until the final count took place on LUNEBURG HEATH on 5 May.

It can be said, perhaps, that the administrative built-up for these operations was the setting in front of which the operational role of the fighting formations was enacted.

But just as no stage can be set without thorough and painstaking preparations behind the scene, so these administrative achievements could not have been brought about had not the work in the advance base and on the Lof C been carefully co-ordinated and directed to the final end of ensuring that the operations continued without pause untilfinal victory.

The various aspects of this ground work peculiar to each service will be found in appropriate service paragraphs but it may be advisable to consider briefly some of the major policies, decisions and circumstances that contributed to the successful support of the armies before examining the administrative plans for the actual operations.

Organisation of the L of C

One of the first steps taken by HQ 21 Army Group to provide more administrative formations and units for the support of the advance into GERMANY was the implementation of the decision mentioned in the last phase to shorten the L of C and to close down the RMA.

The first programme for this had allowed until 20 March for the transfer of stores from the RMA to the advance base.

Early in February this plan was cancelled and a decision was taken to close the RMA from 20 February.

After that date the RMA would be placed on a care and maintenance basis and no further stocks would be transferred to theadvance base with the exception of ten train loads of vital ordnance stores.

The depots in the RMA and the stores remaining in them would be handed over to War Office control and shipments to and from CAEN would then be restricted to the maintenance requirements for the personnel remaining in the RMA, the export to the UK of certain repairable assemblies and unwanted stores, and the import of coal.

As from 15 February the BRITISH controlled area SOUTH of the River SEINE, then administered by 5 L of C Sub Area, and 101 Beach Sub Area would be condensed to a smaller area containing the actual depots and the ports of CAEN and OUISTREHAM.

On the same date the whole of the area administeredby 6 L of C Sub Area SOUTH of the SOMME would be handed over to the US Communications Zone with the exception of the city of AMIENS.

Lastly, the area administered by 9 L of C Sub Area would also be transferred to the AMERICANS.

As units and formations were freed from their commitments.

In the RMA they would be moved to the advance base as soon as accommodation could be found for them.

On 15 February HQ 5 L of C Sub Area assumed overall control of the whole of the reduced area of the RMA and 101 Beach Sub Area went to under command Second Army for employment in the forth-coming operation PLUNDER.

HQ 9 L of C Sub Area was transferred to PARIS to assist HQ Communications Zone with the administrative arrangements in connection with operation GOLDFLAKE.

The administrative layout at this time is shown at Appendix “J-2”.

It was now decided to make HQ 11 L of C Area responsible for the administration of the whole advance base area and its ports and thus to free HQ 12 L of C Area for future L of C commitments particularly in HOLLAND.

It was estimated that seven new sub area HQ’s would shortly be required, of which three would be used to free existing HQ in BELGIUM for duties elsewhere, one would take over BELGIAN territory at present in the army area, two would be employed in GERMANY and one in NE HOLLAND.

Of this number HQ 21 Army Group could only make available HQ 9 L of C Sub Area after the GOLDFLAKE commitment was completed, HQ 5 L of C Sub Area when released from the RMA, and HQ 101Beach Sub Area when no longer required by Second Army.

In March, therefore, War Office agreed to provide a HQ Garrison (eventually called HQ 25 Garrison) to relieve HQ L of C Sub Area in the RMA, and approved the formation of HQ 17, 18, 19 and 20 L of C Sub Areas.

HQ 101 Beach Sub Area was then made available to the L of C by Second Army and upgraded to HQ 21 L of C Sub Area.

By the end of March the remainder of the department of the SOMME was handed over to Com Z, and HQ 6 L of C Sub Area moved to TILBURG early in April coming under command of HQ NETHERLANDS District in readiness to administer ROTTERDAM when it was captured. ’

It was planned that the L of C would extend as far as the WEST bank of the RHINE and 1 Corps subsequently renamed HQ 1 Corps District under command of Second Army was allotted HQ 15 L of CSub Area (which had been relieved at LILLE on 6 April by HQ 17 L of C Sub Area) and later HQ 19L of C Sub Area to administer the area between the rivers MEUSE and RHINE.

HQ L of C would be responsible for the administration of the areas up to the MEUSE.

On 2 April HQ 25 Garrison replaced HQ 5 L of C Sub Area in the RMA and the latter took over the western part of NORTH BRABANT.

In the BRUSSELS district HQ 20 L of C Sub Area took over on 10 April from 4 L of C Sub Area which went to under command First Canadian Army and administered the area North-East of NIJMEGEN.

HQ 12 L of C Area moved to HELMOND and on 15 April assumed command of HQ 5 L of C Sub Area and HQ 21 L of C Sub Area, the latter having taken over all territory behind Second Army up to the River MAAS.

HQ 18 L of C Sub Area was formed by 25 April and was placed under command First CanadianArmy. The administrative layout of the L of C at the cessation of hostilities is shown at Appendix “J-3”.

Coal

Apart from the day to day requirements of coal for military domestic use and transport purposes, the productive capacity of factories in the advance base and the fulfilment of the contracts placed locally depended on sufficient coal being available to supply the necessary power.

The loss of the pitwood supplies of the ARDENNES mentioned in the previous phase caused considerable shortage of coal at the beginning of the year.

Arrangements were made with SHAEF to import twenty-five thousand tons of wood and steel pitprops from UK and this amount was brought in through GHENT commencing at the end of January.

It was distributed under HQ 21 Army Group arrangements.

Towards the end of January the coal situation further deteriorated owing to strikes and the freezing of canals.

Second Army drew its requirements of coal by road direct from the mines and was fortunate in having its demands met in full, but First Canadian Army and L of C who had to rely on rail and canal transportation received only half of their January allocation.

A transfer of one thousand tons was made by Second Army to First Canadian Army to mitigate their shortage.

At one time the BRUSSELS power station was reduced to a reserve of only two days and was consuming 150 tons more coal per day than it was receiving.

Drastic measures for effecting economy in consumption of electricity were put in hand by the BELGIAN Government under pressure from HQ 21 Army Group and some saving of coal was thereby eifected.

The overthrow of the BELGIAN Government in February and its replacement by a new Cabinet which was largely Socialist in representation, coupled with the personal assumption of responsibility for coal by the new Prime Minister, led to a general resumption of work and the situation began to improve.

In order to combat the losses of coal that were occurring through theft and illegal drawings by civilians, orders were issued that coal would be drawn direct from the mines only on written authority of SHAEF or HQ 21 Army Group and military guards were placed at the principal unloading points.

At the beginning of February it was arranged that the co-ordination of pitwood production for the BELGIAN mines would be the responsibility of the Directorate of Works, 21 Army Group. Although the ARDENNES source of pitwood had been cleared of the enemy considerable mine clearance was necessary before the Wood could again be cut.

The target figure for delivery to the BELGIAN mines from indigenous production was again made 1,400 tons per day until the beginning of May and it was hoped that this, coupled with the imports already planned, would raise the coal output capacity of the BELGIANmines to 50,000 tons per day.

An extra 300 tons of pitwood per day, making a total of 1,700 tons in all,would be provided for the DUTCH mines.

The main sources of supply were the SOUTH ARDENNES,the BOURG LEOPOLD area and a small quantity from the CHARLEROI area for the BELGIAN mines,while the amount required for the DUTCH mines would be obtained from LUXEMBOURG.

It was represented to SHAEF that this last commitment should be an AMERICAN responsibility as LUXEMBOURG was in their zone.

Movement of pitwood to the mines was to be carried out as far aspossible by rail and barge when the canals again become open. Two ten-ton GT coys were also employedin moving pitwood by road.

In March negotiations were initiated to relieve 21 Army Group of their responsibility for the provision of pitwood for the BELGIAN mines, in order that the forestry companies and transport units employed on it could be released for work in GERMANY.

On 10 April the BELGIAN Government agreed to release the two transport companies and the forestry companies by 15 May provided that certain clothing and stores were supplied for the forestry units that they were to form in lieu and that four hundred lorries were also handed over to enable the pitwood to be transported to the mines.

After the advance into GERMANY an assessment of coal production estimated that 360,300 tons could be produced from COLOGNE, AACHEN, SAAR and the WEST RUHR district during the monthof May.

The stock position of coal at these places totalled 147,000 tons on 1 April.

BRITISH military requirements in GERMANY were estimated at 7,600 tons of coal for May and BRITISH Military Government requirements would be 198,000 tons approximately for the same month.

Forestry companies were moved up into GERMANY and the utmost use made of captured sawmills to increase the production ofpitwood.

Theatre Reserves

At the beginning of February a policy to increase the theatre reserve of supplies from twenty-eight" days to fifty-one days was approved and represented to the War Office.

This was desirable for three reasons.

• Firstly, now that ANTWERP was open many of the shipments were coming direct from AMERICA necessitating an increased working margin of thirty days as compared with the previous oneof fourteen days.
• Secondly, as the advance progressed a rapidly increasing demand would arise for the feeding and accommodation of ex-PW, Displaced Persons and PW.
• Thirdly, as in the previous autumn,the increased holding of reserves would enable imports to be restricted when an advance occurred and thusrelease transport from the rear areas to support the momentum of the pursuit.

It was impossible to increase the imports of ammunition in order to augment the reserve as the maximum quantities possible were already being received in the theatre.

In the case of POL the bulk reserves were sufficiently great to cover both US and BRITISH requirements.

At the request of SHAEF 73,000 tons of the reserve MT 80 were earmarked for AMERICAN use and it was not considered necessary to increase the stocks.

At the end of February heads of Services were requested to have instantly ready the minimum figures for necessary imports in each ten day shipping period so that arrangements could be made for an immediate restriction to be applied when the appropriate moment arrived.

Civil Relief

The commitments for supplies on Civil Affairs (CA) account were increasing steadily and would become still greater as the armies liberated further portions of HOLLAND.

In order to achieve co-ordinationin the shipping and handling of supplies it was therefore arranged for the Services of 21 Army Groupto assume control over all CA depots in the advance base by 15 February.

Forward estimates for CA requirements were submitted by CA, in conjuction with the SHAEF Military Mission and the National Government concerned, to SHAEF who then made allocations from stocks available, notifying CA of allocations granted.

In the case of those supplies allocated from stocks in UK, CA submitted their demands to the Services concerned who called them forward by the normal bidding procedure.

In the case of supplies allocated from stocks in the US and imported direct to the theatre, the Services had no responsibility for calling forward but CA were responsible for notifying those Services of the expected amounts and dates of arrival of the commodities.

In order to obtain the maximum use for 21 Army Group of all available transport it was also decided that the CA transport companies would become a S and T responsibility under the direction of Q (Maint). This was put into effect on 12 March and meant that the CA allied transport units, with the exception of the FRENCH MT coys, could be used either for CA/Mil Gov purposes or for normal military tasks asdirected by “Q”.

Meanwhile the problem of civil relief in WEST HOLLAND was causing the gravest concern and aspecial organisation was formed called HQ WEST HOLLAND District. This HQ whose name was laterchanged to HQ NETHERLANDS District, began planning in February for their task of relief and rehabilitation immediately their area of responsibility, known as the B2 area, should be liberated. In actual fact the course of operations precluded very much of their work being carried out until after the surrender so no attempt will be made to do more than outline the tasks they carried out prior to VE day.

During April the HQ which had moved to TILBURG was placed under command First Canadian Army but retained direct access to HQ 21 Army Group on all matters affecting the civil relief of HOLLAND.

Two L of C Sub Areas, Nos 6 and 18, were placed under their command for deployment in WEST HOLLAND.

Large stocks of supplies were built up in depots for relief purposes and thirty thousand tons of food were stock piled at ANTWERP by early April under arrangements of HQ 21 ArmyGroup.

The main CA depot was at ’s HERTOGENBOSCH and an agreement was reached with the GERMANS just before the cessation of hostilities whereby convoys of food from there passed through the GERMAN lines to RHENEN where they were met by DUTCH vehicles which collected the supplies for distribution throughout HOLLAND.

At the same time two coasters and eight LCT were pre-loaded in ANTWERP with four thousand tons of food stuifs and medical supplies, while further shipping was loaded and subsequently despatched direct from UK to ROTTERDAM.

It was also arranged for one 2,500 ton collier to be despatched from ANTWERP to ROTTERDAM every six days loaded with coal of which the first consignment would be provided from ten thousand tons already loaded in barges in ANTWERP.

Plans were made to divert for the relief of the DUTCH three million of the rations suitable for free dropping from the air that had been pre-packed in the UK and originally were designed to be dropped in PW camps in GERMANY.

This relief operation commenced before the final surrenderafter prolonged negotiations had taken place With the GERMAN commander.

A detailed account of the relief measures applied by the army in HOLLAND through Army Servicesand CA has been prepared by SHAEF G5 Historical Section and is available at the Offices of the War Cabinet.

Operation GOLDFLAKE

Operation GOLDFLAKE was the move of 1 Canadian Corps complete and 5 British Infantry Division from 15 Army Group in ITALY to the BLA theatre.

It began during February and was carried out under the overall direction of SHAEF but HQ 21 Army Group was made responsible for providing staffsand units to assist HQ Com Z in planning and administering the GOLDFLAKE L of C which ran from MARSEILLES to dispersal points at CAMBRAI and ATH in BELGIUM.

HQ 9 L of C Sub Area was sent to PARIS for this purpose and movement control staffs were despatched to MARSEILLES and to allroad and rail staging camps and halts, where administrative staffs were also provided by 21 Army Group.

The whole operation involved the transfer of a force of the same size as the original assault forces for operation OVERLORD and had to be planned in a matter of twelve days.

Staging camps were set up at various points for the benefit of units moving by road and arrangements were made to provide hot meals and haversack rations for personnel travelling by rail.

The rail journey was planned to take three days with three halts per day.

The journey by road took five days to complete and was divided up into distances of approximately 130 miles for each day’s travelling.

The help and co-operation given by HQ Com Z contributed largely to the success of the operation. The movement started on 18 February and was completed in the second Week in April.

Air Freight

Pre-packed supplies representing five days maintenance for a division were held in UK for the supply by air either of airborne troops or, in an emergency, of isolated forward troops.

In January it was decided that two days reserve for an infantry or armoured brigade group should be brought to NIVELLES airfield from these stocks so that unfavourable flying conditions in UK would not necessarily rule out the possibility of supply by air being carried out.

At the end of February a further two days supply for an airborne brigade group was flown in. It was thought that air supply might well be requiredfor the troops taking part in the airborne operation VARSITY but in actual fact it never became necessary as the ground forces in PLUNDER rapidly made contact with the airborne troops and theL of C there after was never out.

During the later stages of operations the carriage of petrol and supplies by air to the forward areasin the advance assumed greater importance due to the extension of the L of C.

Difficulties were encountered in obtaining sufficient aircraft for this purpose as first priority for transport aircraft was allotted by SHAEF to the evacuation and repatriation of allied PW.

Air transport was closely controlled by Combined Air Transport Operations Room (CATOR) at SHAEF.

All demands for air freight had to be submitted to CATOR who then made the allocations of aircraft to fit in with the following day’s arrangements for evacuating our PW.

The bulk of any transport aircraft not required for this evacuation was almost invariably allotted to the AMERICANS to support their thrust into GERMANY.

The fact that the allocation of air supply was combined with the requirements for evacuation of PW meant that from the supply point of view the best use was not made of the available air lift. In addition, on occasion the priorities for supply laid down by the “Q” staff were not taken into account by CATOR in their allocations which caused further waste of the air freight potential.

As a result the demands of 21 Army Group were never fully met and it became necessary to plan without relying on air freight and to accept any granted as a welcome bonus. Insufficient aircraft were allotted to 21 Army Group for the transportof Naval parties, transportation teams etc. to the captured GERMAN ports and Naval establishments and although the movement of these parties had originally been planned to take place by air, eventuallyroad transport from the already strained resources of MT had to be utilised.

Movements Aspect

STAFFS

Early in January further increases to the staff of Q(Mov) at HQ 21 Army Group were made to assist the Control Commission planning, although in actual fact these personnel werenot absorbed into 21 Army Group until the end of June.

As soon as it became clear that the cessation of hostilities was imminent the equivalent of a further movement control group was brought over from ENGLAND to deal with the increased commitments (including staffs for NORWAY) occasioned by the larger area and the movement of allied prisoners of war and displaced persons.

In order to release BRITISH personnel from the rear areas, two BELGIAN Movement Control Groups were formed on BRITISH WEs, one early in January and the second in the middle of March. These groups worked satisfactorily along side the existing BRITISH area staffs.

By 1 March, the restoration of the BELGIAN civil IWT organisation had advanced sufficiently for it to assume full responsibility for the execution of barge programmes under the direction of Q(Mov).

Certain technical and financial matters remained, however, the responsibility of Tn. This re-organisation enabled considerable economy in manpower to be effected.

For the initial crossings of the RHINE a special organisation was established to control the movement of personnel and vehicles across the river by amphibians and rafts before the bridges were complete. This organisation was modelled on the lines of the beach group without the service elements except for Medical, Provost and REME and was known as the “Bank Control Group”.

Bank control groups were formed on the basis of one per assaultcorps and controlled all movement forward from the marshalling areas to dispersal areas onthe far bank. As soon as bridges were available to take operational and maintenance trafic, which was about seventy-two hours after the beginning of the crossing, bank control groupsceased to function.

The Movement Control Report Centre now re-named the Movement Control Depot remained in BRUSSELS during the whole period until moving into GERMANY at the sametime as HQ 21 Army Group in June.

PORTS

The employment of civilian labour to operate the ports was found to be highly successful.

Due to a shortage of manpower certain BELGIAN units were formed so as to release BRITISH units.

In February port operating personnel were sent down to MARSEILLES to assist in the disembarkation of the units engaged in operation GOLDFLAKE.

The best day’s tonnage discharge in the theatre occurred on 25 February, when the discharge at allports on BRITISH account was 31,000 tons, including 20,000 tons at ANTWERP.

CAEN

During most of this period CAEN was used chiefly for outward shipment of storesfrom the RMA to ANTWERP and the return of major assemblies and empty ammunition boxes to UK. During the peak period as many as three thousand tons per daywere loaded.

CALAIS

The development of CALAIS for personnel traffic proceeded satisfactorily and the leave trafiic which had increased to four thousand a day at the beginning of March was again increased to six thousand a day at the beginning of April. The service of LCI(L) which had been operated from DOVER for the conveyance of reinforcements ceased during April, the LCI (L) being diverted to the TILBURY-OSTEND route. Meanwhile LCT traffic which had been going to BOULOGNE was switched to CALAIS at the beginning of May, thus enabling BOULOGNE to be closed for military traffic.

OSTEND

The import of stores steadily declined whilst personnel and vehicle traffic was increased. In April 102,000 personnel including reinforcements and duty personnel arrived in the theatre through this port in addition to six thousand vehicles.

GHENT

The tonnages imported on BRITISH account were reduced during this period andon 22 April the use of the port was discontinued for BRITISH military traffic.

ANTWERP

The port continued to handle all the maintenance traffic of the BRITISH forces, apart from some special items which were imported through CALAIS and OSTEND. Early in April over seventy per cent of the BRITISH stores tonnages were cleared by IWT to the advance base. By the end of April exports from this port began to increase.

RAIL

On 4 February the rail bridge at RAVENSTEIN was completed and traffic was run through almost immediately to railheads around NIJMEGEN. Two deviations were constructed.

One, which was completed by 16 February, ran SOUTH of NIJMEGEN enabling rail traffic to reach MOOK and VIERLINGSBEEK and the other, completed by 20 March was from MOOK to GENNEP which enabled railheads to be opened in the area of GOCH.

Repairs to existing lines were directed principally to the opening up of as many railheads as possible, both EAST and WEST of the MAAS. Al together ten were in operation EAST of the MAAS by the end of March.

With the move of Second Army roadhead to EAST of the MAAS the main flow of traffic for both armies was switched to the more northerly routes and was regulated at ROOSENDAAL.

This action freed the railwaynetwork in SOUTH BELGIUM for the clearance of AMERICAN traffic from ANTWERP.

Some idea of the burden on the railways for the build-up of operation PLUNDER during March may be gained from the fact that in the Second Army area, a total of 37 railheads were being used into which 432 trains carrying 230,000 tons of stores were moved, in addition to approximately 60 leave trains.

The GENNEP rail bridge was completed on 1 April thus giving two bridges over the MAAS, the other being at RAVENSTEIN.

It was necessary to repair the rail system EAST of the RHINE in order to operate a railhead and railtail organisation until a railway bridge across the RHINE could be constructed. The general aim was to develop a rail L of C as far forward as possible in order to economise in transport and enable the armies to advance further and faster. The site for the RHINE bridge in the BRITISH zone was selected at SPYCK and work on the bridge commenced on 7 April.

It was completed by 8 May and two days later the railway line from BELGIUM to the BREMEN area was open.

Trains EAST of the RHINE were initially run by BRITISH troops but were soon handed over to the GERMANS for operating under BRITISH supervision.

By the end of March the flow of BRITISH military traffic over the FRENCH railways had virtually ceased, except from the port of CALAIS and from other installations at LILLE in northern FRANCE. The rail move of GOLDFLAKE from the SOUTH of FRANCE was carried out under the direction of the HQ specially set up in PARIS in conjunction with Com Z.

Trains were run from MARSEILLES to ATH in BELGIUM which was the railhead for the dispersal areas.

The flow of leave and duty personnel after the New Year steadily increased and by theend of April sixteen personnel trains were being run daily.

IWT

The SOUTH BEVELAND canal was opened on 19 February so that when western HOLLAND was liberated barge traffic could pass from ANTWERP into the DUTCH canals.

During the same month the MEUSE-ESCAUT canal was also opened and by the end of March the ZUIDWILLENS VAART and MAAS-WAAL canals were almost in operation.

This meant that the major network in BELGIUM and HOLLAND up to the WAAL was practically clear.

In March the daily average tonnages rose to 47,000 tons per day as compared with 27,000 tons and 34,000 tons in January and February respectively.

During April an average of 55,000 tons per day was carried, excluding bulk petrol, and this figurere mained constant for the next three months.

It is interesting to compare the diiference inthe utilisation of the BELGIAN barge system by the GERMANS and the BRITISH.

During the occupation a total of 6,000 craft averaged 30,000 tons per day as against May1945 when the Allies averaged 48,000 tons per day, both on military and civil account with 3,500 craft.

ROADS

As operation VERITABLE developed the plan to extend routes across the MAAS was implemented.

By the time operation PLUNDER was due to start, eleven one-way routes were open across the MAAS, of which six, including the only class 70 route, were within Canadian Army area, and the remaining five in the Second Army area.

In addition, running rights were obtained over the VENLO bridge, although this was primarily for the use of the AMERICANS.

Two of the bridges at MOOK and GENNEP were built on the existing piers of the old railway bridges.

Crossings over the RHINE were developed initially with rafts and amphibious vehicles, followed by low classification Bailey pontoon bridges, then by class 40 Bailey bridges and ultimately semi-permanent piled bridges.

Four bridges in the XANTEN area and four in the REES area had been erected by about the fourth day after the assault, although somewere completed within twenty-four hours of the crossing.

When the break-out from the bridgehead occurred, bridges were built at EMMERICH to supply the CANADIANS and to enable a start to be made on establishing No. 15 Roadhead at ALMELO until a route from ARNHEM could be opened. This route, which proceeded via ZUTPHEN, was opened in the third week in April and made semi-permanent, thus simplifying the movement of stores from the roadhead at NIJMEGEN.

During April when the operational traflic over the RHINE had considerably eased, the number of bridges was reduced so that only the semi-permanent piled bridges at XANTENand REES remained.

The bridges at EMMERICH were lifted at the end of April with the exception of one which was retained for local traffic.

The road-net EAST of the RHINE was more than adequate to carry the necessary traffic. There were, however, bottlenecks over various rivers and canals, but sufficient bridges were constructed to carry three main two-way routes for operational and maintenance trafiic as the advance progressed.

AIR

There were no major changes in the air movement organisation of both personnel and freight as the existing airfields were sufficient to cater for all requirements until a major move forward EAST of the RHINE.

As the armies advanced every effort was made to restrict the number of transport airfields to a minimum in order to simplify passenger services and thus reduce the demands made on the Movements staff with the result that only three personnel airfields were in operation EAST of the RHINE by 8 May.

The Operations WEST of the RHINE

In order to concentrate the large number of forces involved in operation VERITABLE a complete programme of road development was undertaken, one hundred miles of new roads being constructed including several by-passes while four hundred miles of existing roads had to be repaired and reconstructed.

Four main maintenance routes were available with three road bridges over the River MAAS at MOOK, GRAVE and RAVENSTEIN.

The capacity each way of these roads was estimated at a total of 7,000 vehicles a day under freezing conditions and 4,800 a day under conditions of thaw.

In order to ensurethat formations coming under command of First Canadian Army from Second Army could be moved within the shortest possible time as they became available from operations in the ROER area, it was essential to observe the closest control of movement.

A series of trafific check points was set up, each with telecommunication to HQ First Canadian Army.

Also a joint office was established called “Grouping Control” which co-ordinated the movement between the two armies. .

The programme involved 35,000 vehicles (mainly of 30 Corps) moving approximately eighty miles within a period of nineteen days.

No major delays occurred in the assembly in spite of the fact that sudden thaws caused large stretches of the main forward routes to break up and become impassable, and the concentration was completed as planned by first light on 8 February.

There was great difficulty in accommodating the large number of formations which had to be concentrated in such a small area. Due to the bad weather and considerable snow falls, covered accommodation became more of a necessity than ever before. Widespread floods further increased the difficulties.

Also, a number of GHQ AA troops had to be sited in the area WEST of TURNHOUT to deal with the V1 threat while the opening of the petrol pipehead in the EINDHOVEN area took up accommodation earmarked for a complete armoured brigade.

Consequently, there was a large demand for all types of huts and canvas to supplement the existing accommodation.

HQ 21 Army Group released huts to the limit of available stocks and railed them to ’s HERTOGENBOSCH and MILL.

Exclusive of the RAF requirements, a total of 343 huts of various types was released during this period and more than1,600 160-lb. tents and 3,500 bivouacs were provided for forward troops of 30 Corps for use in the REICHSWALD forest during the operation.

It was eventually found possible to accommodate between 300,000 and 400,000 fully equipped troops in the concentration area without having to evacuate any civilians for the purpose.

In the meantime the build-up of stocks and dumping of ammunition had been continuing. Because of the heavy road movement programme already involved it was essential to move as much as possibleby rail.

Fortunately the railways in the army area were well developed and a large number of rail headswere available. The rail heads between the two rivers were reached by way of the railway bridge at RAVENSTEIN which was completed on 4 February.

The tonnages off-loaded at First Canadian Army railheads during February reached the very high figure of 343,838 tons, of which 223,000 tons represented the build-up and required 446 special freight trains, some of which were off-loaded at railheads within three miles of the front line.

The ammunition dumping programme was completed on 4 February, 14,200 tons being dumped at gun positions and 22,700 tons divided between the FMC’s of 2 Canadian and 30 British Corps.

More than 2,500,000 rounds of 25-pr were released by HQ, 21 Army Group for the operation with other natures in proportion. Towards the end of the operation which lasted thirty-two days compared with the estimated thirty, it was possible to commence the stocking of No. 13 Canadian Army Roadhead over the MAAS in the NIJMEGEN area in order to ensure that First Canadian Army was administratively prepared to undertake further advances.

This was carried out both by road and rail asN IJ MEGEN was then open as arailhead area.

Space was thus freed on the GRAVE bridges for traffic move-ment to complete the final stages of the operation and to assist in the build-up for operation PLUNDER.

In order to maintain the Ninth US Army’s operation GRENADE and the subsequent crossing of theRHINE, Com Z considered it essential for their depot areas to be expanded northwards into the HASSELT area.

After discussion with Com Z and Ninth US Army it was agreed that Second Army would relinquish HASSELT, whilst retaining some running rights through it, and the southern portion of No. 8 Roadhead,which entailed some re-organisation of the roadhead ammunition dump.

The Operations across the RHINE

Meanwhile Second Army was engaged in the administrative planning for the assault across theRHINE (operation PLUNDER) as well as assisting First Canadian Army in the concentration of the forces, the maintenance of routes and also in the provision of certain additional administrative units required for VERITABLE.

During the later stages of operation VERITABLE the build-up for the assault commenced.As soon as operations permitted.

Second Army No. 10 Roadhead was opened in the area GOCH—WEEZE—KEVELAER—GELDERN—VENLO, between the MAAS and the RHINE, so that when the assault took place maintenance problems would not be complicated by having two rivers between the army and its roadhead. 8, 12 and 30 Corps were based on this No. 10 Roadhead, whilst the CANADIAN formations under command Second Army were maintained for all purposes by First CanadianArmy.

21 Army Group had no maintenance responsibility for the BRITISH and US airborne forces in operation VARSITY until the ground forces joined up with the airborne forces. The responsibility forre-supply before that time fell upon First Allied Airborne Army.

After the ground forces made contact Second Army became responsible for the maintenance of BRITISH airborne troops and Ninth US Army for 17 US AB Division, sufficient territory and road space for a service area EAST of the RHINE beingallotted to Ninth US Army in the planning.

On 8 March the build-up began in earnest and proceeded at full speed until 23 March. The target stocks for the various commodities to be dumped in No. 10 Roadhead before D day for the operation,which was 24 March, were :—

• Ammunition . . . . . . 60,000 tons
• POL . . . . . . . 18,000 tons
• Supplies . . . . . . 5,000 tons
• RE stores . . . . . . 30,000 tons
• Ordnance and miscellaneous stores . . 5,400 tons

The very large ammunition build-up which included an allotment of more than 1,500 rounds per gun of 25-pr ammunition alone, was assisted by corps drawing some of their ammunition direct from the ammunition railhead and dumping it at gun positions and formation dumps.

In addition 30 Corps drew sixhundred tons of ammunition a day direct from the advance base.

In spite of these aids the receipts andissues of ammunition handled by No. 10 Army Roadhead ammunition depot amounted to a total of 85,000 tons during the build-up.

A large proportion of the tonnages of all stores had to be moved by road in spite of the limitations imposed by routes and bridges.

There was only one two-way class 40 bridge at GENNEP and three one-way class 40 bridges at LOTTEM, WELL and MOOK in the whole of the army area. Arrangements were therefore made with First Canadian Army and Ninth US Army respectively for running rights over theclass 70 bridges at GRAVE and VENLO.

The bridges at WELL, LOTTEM and GENNEP were reserved for maintenance traffic by day and operational traffic by night.

Three additional GT coys were allotted to Second Army by HQ 21 Army Group and on 23 March the MT lift available to that army, excluding all corps transport and bridging companies but including TCVs, was 10,470 tons.

The control of movement by road necessitated the most careful co-ordination as both road and rail capacities were strictly limited and undue road congestion would have had an immediate effect on rail clearance.

During the three weeksprior to D-day the railways brought an average of 10,000 tons a day to the railheads WEST of the MAAS.

All road movement was controlled by Q(Mov) Second Army and during this time over 70,000 vehicleswere co-ordinated by them.

The closest co-operation between Movements and Provost was essential ifthis volume of traffic was to be satisfactorily handled.

The traffic control companies worked continuously at high pressure controlling the maintenance and build-up traific by day and the operational moves bynight.

They were greatly assisted, however, by the loan of L of C sections for traffic control on the MAAS bridges.

In the week preceding D-day the operational moves by road in the Second Army area totalled over 32,000 wheeled vehicles, 662 tanks and 4,050 tank transporters.

By 23 March not only had the target figures quoted above for No. 10 Army Roadhead been reached but in most cases they had been exceeded. Three corps had been concentrated and the movement of something like 130,000 tons of stores, in addition to the ordinary daily maintenance requirements, into an area of approximately four hundred square miles had been accomplished in sixteen days.

The operations EAST of the RHINE

After the successful crossing of the RHINE, Second Army commenced the break-out from the bridgehead.

From the administrative point of view this operation was considerably simpler than the break-out from NORMANDY across FRANCE to BELGIUM as there was a well-developed base behind the force and a roadhead was established right up to the RHINE with stocks built up and transport resources allocated well before hand. In view of this it was not necessary to direct operations to the capture and opening of a port such as EMDEN to supplement the L of C.

Convoys of army transport and also pre-loaded transport released to Second Army by HQ 21 Army Group were employed in assisting corps in the establishment of their FMCs EAST of the river.

Between 27 March and 3 April HQ 21 Army Group placed 2,160 tons lift of transport under Second Army command,while 630 tons lift of transport from First Canadian Army and 71/2 platoons made available from 100 AA Bde made it possible further to augment the transport resources of corps.

Stocking of No.12 Army Roadhead in the RHEINE area commenced on 3 April and the first drawing by corps were made on 9 April.

Between the 6th and the 8th of that month HQ 21 Army Group released a further lift of 4,560 tonsof transport as well as two DUKW companies converted to 3-ton companies.

These and all subsequent releases of GT coys by HQ 21 Army Group were effected when required as a result of a pre-planned reorganisation of L of C commitments taking into account the arrival in operation GOLDFLAKE of additional GT coys from ITALY.

In order to make sure that there was no slackening in the speed of theadvance HQ 21 Army Group placed an air composite platoon under command of Second Army capable of receiving and controlling up to 500 tons of air freight a day.

HQ 21 Army Group had expected a daily lift of three hundred tons by air but as previously mentioned this figure was never reached. The averagefor the month of April was 143 tons per day.

At the end of the first Week in April 1 Corps came under command of Second Army and assumed control of the area between the rivers MAAS and RHINE taking over the responsibility for the railheads and depots of No. 10 Army Roadhead.

Until the construction of rail bridges over the RHINE all maintenance traffic was by road but on 16 April the first train arrived in No. 12 Army Roadhead having used the AMERICAN bridge over the River RHINE at WESEL. The stocking of No.14 Army Roadhead in the SULINGEN area was commenced from No. 10 Army Roadhead on 13 April.

There was no rail available to No. 14 Army Roadhead until traffic started running from the railtails in the BOCHOLT area to the railheads in the RHEINE area on 16 April. HQ 21 Army Group therefore made available yet a further 11,280 tons of transport lift.

Excluding basic corps transport, Second Army now had a total lift of 31,080 tons.

The 30 Corps assault on BREMEN gave rise to some anxiety as to whether the heavy ammunition demands could be met. However, the situation was eased by the arrival of 4,600 tons of ammunition pre-loaded on some of the transport provided by HQ 21 Army Group.

The expenditure of ammunition on that operation was not high, however, and this enabled the 12 Corps demands for the projected assaulton HAMBURG to be met in full.

1 Corps had now extended their area of responsibility to include No. 12 Army Roadhead, thus relieving Second Army from having to administer a long L of C.

On 3 May, 8 Corps FMC at LUNEBURG was taken over by Second Army and used as an advanced roadhead until the end of the campaign.

In the meantime First Canadian Army’s operations after VERITABLE were maintained on twoL of C. 1 Cdn Corps’ thrust toward UTRECHT was supported from No. 13 Roadhead in the NIJMEGEN area which was being stocked by rail while 2 Cdn Corps’ operations in the direction of ZUTPHEN, HENGELO and LINGEN were maintained from No. 15 Roadhead except for certain items drawn from NIJMEGEN. This roadhead was opened in the HENGELO-ALMELO area on 18 April and was stocked by road from the railhead at NIJMEGEN.

Preparation of Statistics

21 Army Group form 100 mentioned in the previous phase was now revised and new 21 Army Groupforms 103, 104, 111A and 111B for reporting of vehicles were designed and produced at the end of April insubstitution for War Office proformas which had now become out of date.

A statement showing the comparison between actual theatre wastage and the official FFC Wastage Rates was prepared to enable recommendations to be made to War Office that the official rates should berevised. The statement covered War Office controlled stores, “A” and “B” vehicles, artillery andammunition.

At the request of “A” branch the production of the daily “A” sitrep was undertaken by Q(AE) Stats and statements were prepared for A(Demob) showing the percentage of each arm of service in 21 Army Group which would be released by the calling forward of any combination of release groups from1 onwards. ’

Post Hostilities

Meanwhile concurrently with the planning for, and actual support of the operations, preparations and plans were being formulated for the post hostilities occupation of GERMANY. This was entitled operation ECLIPSE.

The bulk of the results of this planning and the measures that were put into effect occurred after the conclusion of hostilities and therefore will not be mentioned here, but certain aspects made themselves felt before the end of the campaign. The first was the evacuation of allied PW (also discussed elswhere), and of DPs.

Every preparation had to be made to provide stocks of food and clothing and other amenities for ex-PW and in order that they could receive them at the earliest opportunity the commodities had to be moved right up into the forward areas thus placing an additionalstrain on the transport resources.

DPs also had to be accommodated and a high proportion of the accommodation found in GERMANY was diverted to that use.

The administration of DPs was a CA/Mil Gov responsibility but their demands for supplies and transport again had to be provided at the expenseof military maintenance.

The control of captured enemy equipment became of greater importance once the armies had entered GERMANY. Apart from the necessity of preventing material dangerous to the Allies from getting into the hands of the enemy adequate control of captured enemy war material represented a large step towards undertaking the major post hostilities task of disarming GERMANY.

To assist the armies in their tasks of finding and reporting stocks of enemy war material a number of War Material Reconnaissance Teamswere formed, which were HQ staffs designed to co-ordinate Service reconnaissances and collate reports to HQ 21 Army Group.

These teams proved most valuable and were instrumental in uncovering andreporting on large stocks of enemy equipment, supplies, accommodation etc. throughout GERMANY.

Finally, it was possible that an operation into NORWAY entitled APOSTLE would have to takeplace and plans had to be made for the transfer and movement of 52 Infantry Division and many administrative units to that theatre. All preparations were made for this eventuality but after the surrender

it was finally decided by War Office that the units would not be required. Certain administrative units had to be despatched, however, and their removal led to improvised replacements having to be formed.

RE Works

AIRFIELDS

Progress of work on airfields was slow and difficult during January because of the snow and ice conditions. In addition to the normal maintenance new work was being carried outon fifteen airfields, and two airfields were being maintained in army areas by airfields construction personnel under the technical control of armies.

Airfield construction wings were spread out from AMIENS to EINDHOVEN and on three airfields, work, including in one case major repairs to a complete concrete air strip, was specially undertaken for the US forces.

During this phase six airfields were handed over to the BELGIANS and the DUTCH for maintenance under our technical control.

Five airfields in FRANCE, one of which Was under US technical control were now being maintained by the FRENCH.

BRIDGING

During the planning for the assault across the RHINE it was realised that the sub-sequent maintenance of the large number of long floating bridges required to support the operation would absorb many more engineer troops than could be spared.

It was therefore decided to build several high level semi-permanent bridges and the design, development and organisation for the bridges were entrusted to the Works Directorate.

Early in January the Engineer Staff was augmented by a Deputy Chief Engineer (Permanent Bridges) together with a small staff, whose function was to take over the technical side of this work.

Experiments and training with a specially designed Bailey cantilever rig for driving long timberpiles was undertaken at a site near BRUSSELS. This method proved satisfactory and several sets of the apparatus were prepared.

By the end of March all experiments were completed, designs and instructions were issued in elaborate book form, and during the last week of the month vast quantities of bridging stores were moved forward.

This included anestimated requirement of three thousand sixty-foot piles, and as no suitable road transport was available, a design was prepared for a special vehicle, twenty-five of which were producedin army base workshops.

Initial requirements for semi-permanent bridges across the RHINE (including NEDERRIJN) were six one-way class 40 and two one-way class 7 0.

Owing to the speed of operations these were later reduced to three one-way class 40 (at XANTEN, REES and ARNHEM) and two one-way class 70 (at REES and ARNHEM).

One timber pile bridge was constructed at XANTEN, the remainder being steel piled jetty bridges.

In addition one-way class 40,and one-way class 70 timber piled bridges were constructed at ZUTPHEN over the River IJSSEL.

A number of PC and R units were taken off port repair work and used to assist inthe construction of the bridges across the RHINE.

For the crossing of these rivers, a total length, including bridge approaches, of some 16,000 feet of class 40 and class 70 semi-permanent bridging was put over. Constructiondates were :—

In addition to these bridges, a total of sixteen class 9, 12, 15 and 40 floating bridges with an aggregate length of 19,000 feet, were built across these rivers within a few days of forcingeach crossing.

In spite of the great speed of our advance up to and beyond the RHINE the GERMANS were still able to carry out practically 100 per cent demolitions. This meant a continued demand for Bailey bridging and a number of Bailey bridges had to be taken down on the Lof C to make up for the temporary deficiency in army operational areas.

The necessity became evident for the early replacement of Bailey bridges by civilian bridges and a six months scheme for replacement was prepared and submitted to the BELGIAN Government for consideration.

Arrangements were made in April for handing over to the BELGIAN authorities the remainder of the Bailey bridges in BELGIUM. 

By the end of April DUTCH personnel had been trained to maintain the L of C Bailey pontoon bridges across the River MAAS at MOOK, GENNEP and VENLO.

FORESTRY

To meet the timber shortage, greatly aggravated by the loss of the ARDENNES at the beginning of the year, arrangements were completed to bring 10,000 metres cube of timber from SWITZERLAND and 12,000 metres cube from FRANCE.

Four forestry companies were deployed in BELGIUM on pitwood production in order to alleviate the acute coal shortage in BELGIUM caused partly by a shortage of pitprops.

A CRE (Works) organisationfor boosting civilian pitprop production proved effective.

By the end of March not only had the production of piles and bridging timbers been practically completed, but an average of some 600 tons per day of pitprops was being produced by military forestry companies.

Diagrams showing the production of timber by forestry units and sources of timber supplies for BLA are at Appendix “U”.

CONSTRUCTION

Construction work apart from maintenance at major depots ceased in the RMA early inthe New Year.

In January, however, the whole accommodation position for PW became acute when it was learnt that UK would not take any more PW from the theatre.

Accommodation, therefore, had to be provided in the L of C for some 200,000 DPs and PW. This meant an increase of 100,000 on the original plan.

Transit accommodation at CALAIS was completed by April and consisted of sleeping accommodation for 10,000 and feeding accommodation for 14,000 male personnel and 200 ATS.

The feeding accommodation was later increased to 22,000 male personnel and 300 ATS.

Major work on L of C and base installations continued in the areas of ANTWERP (where extensive damage was caused by V bombs), BRUSSELS and LOUVAIN, OSTEND, BRUGES and GHENT, BOULOGNE and LILLE.

By the end of February most major works in the base were nearing completion, including the majority of the accommodation on AA sites around BRUSSELS and ANTWERP.

Due to labour troubles, shortage of coal, and weather conditions, progress on the local manufacture of wooden huts to RE specifications was reduced to approximately fifty percent of the forecast and a sudden demand for 440 huts could not be met.

After the completion of the cutting of bridging timbers towards the end of March and with the restoration of power to sawmills, the production of wooden huts rose rapidly, until by the end of April a stock pile of hutting sufficient to accommodate 200,000 persons had been accumulated in the BRUSSELS area and no further contracts for local production in BELGIUM were placed.

After the crossing of the RHINE arrangements were made for local production of hutting under corps district arrangements in GERMANY.

An interesting task was the preparation for demolition of the “E” boat pen in OSTEND.

Forty-five reinforced concrete columns supporting the concrete roof were bored centrally and vertically with diamond drills and twelve pounds to fifteen pounds of explosive (808) were inserted in each.

The demolition took place on 1 May and was completely successful, no damage being done either to the port or to the town.

In order to conserve coal, projects for conversion of the larger central heating systems to oil consumption were executed. Two floating oil-driven power stations were installed at ANTWERP and GHENT during February and during their period of operation saved inall over 100,000 tons of coal.

OIL

By the end of January a further two lines of PLUTO making twelve in all had been laid and 1,400 tons were being pumped across the Channel daily.

Work was in hand to connect the PLUTO lines with the ANTWERP/EINDHOVEN pipe which was almost complete.

In February the pipeline from BOULOGNE to GHENT was completed and the ANTWERP/EINDHOVEN line was in operation.

The connection between GHENT and ANTWERP was made in March and a single line was laid NORTH from EINDHOVEN to ST ANTHONIS. PLUTO was now giving an average of 3,388 tons per day.

By the end of April two lines were laid across the RHINE to EMMERICH and one was already in operation.

The last length of pipe was fitted by the QMG at a ceremony near TERMONDE on 10 May 45, and from that day two lines were in operation to GERMANY from the fifteen PLUTO lines at BOULOGNE.

Later a further extension was laid to BOCHOLT.

In all 1,125 miles of six-inchpiping complete with pumping stations and storage tanks for 103,120 tons were laid in 351days at an average of three and one quarter miles per day.

The total weight of constructionstores was 91,920 tons.

A diagram illustrating the bulk POL construction progress is at Appendix “C”

ROADS

The heavy frost and thaw in the early part of the year caused great deterioration in the road conditions. This coincided with operations and the paved roads suffered badly from the abnormally heavy traffic.

BELGIAN repair teams were organised and large quantities of stone moved to army areas to assist in repair and maintenance.

An extensive road repair maintenance programme for which road construction companies (supplemented by army and divisional troops and the national road authorities) were deployed along themore vital routes, proved just sufficient to keep the main axis of advance open.

DE-WATERING HOLLAND

During the month of January de-watering of selected areas in NW HOLLAND was declared to be a 21 Army Group responsibility. This urgent relief task required pumping plant with an estimated capacity of four million tons per day, the priority area to be cleared of water being about sixty square miles.

The operation of emergency electricity, provision of water supply, and repair of sewers and sewage disposal plant in the priority area had also to be carried out. It was found that the pumping capacity held in 21 Army Group stores was about 1,500,000 tons per day.

Every effort was made to supplement this with pumps obtained locally. All plants were handed over to Chief Engineer NETHERLANDS District who arranged for collection of trailer fire pumps and for the training of six newly formed DUTCH engineer units in the use of this equipment.

STORES

The RMA closed down in February. It is worth noting that during this last phase the average monthly figures of engineer stores and materials handled by stores units and moved under Engineer Stores Branch arrangements during the period, amounted to some 300,000 tons, the highest proportion being for airfield construction and bridging stores respectively.

The closest liaison was maintained with the BELGIAN Office of Mutual Aid and this organisation proved of great assistance in the local procurement and production of engineerstores.

CONCLUSION

• It is possible that as a result of this history being divided into phases the magnitude of the total Engineer effort may not be realised. Some idea of the tonnages and work involved may be gained from the following figures :—
• From D-day to 5 May 1945, 1,445 Bailey bridges were erected, 750,000 tons of engineer stores and 25,000 items of engineer plant and machinery were imported, while the value of local production reached £3,250,000. 
• 250,000 tons of timber, one fifth of which was pitprops, were felled by forestry companies. 
• Over 180 miles of equivalent twenty-footspan hutting were erected and 30 miles of steel or timber huts were manufactured locally.
• 125 airfields were either constructed or repaired, equivalent to 2,020 miles of twenty-foot roadway. This figure was made up as follows :— 1,260 miles of new graded road unsurfaced and 360 miles of new graded roads surfaced. 260 miles of repairs were done to cratered road and 140 miles to cratered earth road. Immense quantities of stone were needed forall this work and over 2,000,000 tons were quarried.
• 420 electric generators a total equivalent of 10,000 horse-power were installed together with 280 miles of overhead cable and 3,000 miles of insulated cable.
• The amount of work lying behind the great achievement of the pipeline on the Continent can be gauged by the fact that the total weight of stores involved in these installations was 97,000 tons.
• 110 tanks of bulk storage with a capacity of 101,000 tons were erected, 330 high pressure pumps installed and 1,200 miles of piping laid.

Transportation

Poms

During this period the policy was to make the maximum use of civilian resources in order to free BRITISH troops for the time when we advanced into GERMANY.

More and more of the routine work of daily operating of ports was therefore handed over to civilians, under Tn control. At ANTWERP for instance civilian stevedores were employed inconsiderable numbers along side Tn personnel and worked excellently despite the attacksby “V” weapons.

The handing over of CAEN, BOULOGNE and DIEPPE to the FRENCH released more port operating units in readiness for employment in GERMANY.

Port construction and rehabilitation continued in CALAIS, OSTEND, ANTWERP and CAEN and heavy work was undertaken at FLUSHING. However, dilution with civil labour inthese ports achieved the release of some sixty per cent of port construction and repair units under the direction of the Chief Engineer, for employment on the construction of permanent road bridges across the RHINE later in the phase.

IWT

Following the same principle the working of traffic on the BELGIAN canals was handed over to civilians, under the direction of Q(illov), on 2 March. This released units for work on the RHINE and also for preparing the IWT movement required by the relief operation into HOLLAND which was then being mounted.

When the crossing of the RHINE took place IWT assisted in the construction of the floating road bridges, and other personnel moved to ZWOLLE in readiness to take food to AMSTERDAM across the ZUIDER ZEE.

Other Tn units moved forward to take control of craft on the RHINE and on the various GERMAN waterways. However, the scale of destruction on the GERMAN waterways was found to be so great that opening them for traffic was clearly a long term task.

The IWT units were therefore employed to safeguard essential Tn installations.

Some port construction and repair units were brought in on the task of canal clearance in GERMANY as well as continuing the clearance of waterways in HOLLAND to which they were already committed.

RAILWAYS

The primary object of the Railways branch throughout the winter was to assist the BELGIANS and the DUTCH to make the best use of their railways. The urgent needs for locomotive and wagon repairs and the provision of bridging and signal materials were met so far as was possible and the stores handed over to the civilian railway authorities.

In the case of the NETHERLANDS railways Transportation assisted largely in the actual repair work on locomotives and rolling stock and in the distribution of stores. The HQ of the NETHERLANDS State Railways is normally at UTRECHT which was in the GERMAN occupied zone and few senior DUTCH officials able to revive their railway organisation were in the liberated parts of HOLLAND.

However, the signal communications for the main L of C SOUTH of the RHINE in HOLLAND were completely re-installed and a large amount of railway reconstruction undertaken from military resources.

The very cold weather in January and February combined with a shortage of coal, food and clothing, and the “go slow” policy so successfully employed during the GERMAN occupation combined to reduce the standard of operating on the railways.

When the weather conditions improved, however, wagon turnround was accelerated and in February the pool of wagons in ANTWERP awaiting loading had been reduced to seven hundredas compared with eighteen hundred in December. This was the equivalent of only one-and-a-half days’ requirements and was attributable also to improvements in our own technique in the use of wagons on these railways.

By March it could be said that the problems in BELGIUM and in the liberated parts of HOLLAND were becoming easier, so that it was possible to withdraw more personnel in preparation for the move across the RHINE.

The build-up for VERITABLE involved the re-construction and redevelopment of two L of C: HERENTHALS-NEERPELT—EINDHOVEN and WEERT, and ROOSENDAAL—BREDA—TILBURG—’s HERTOGENBOSCH—RAVENSTEIN—NIJMEGEN.

Much reconstruction work was required and in particular a large bridging job was necessary at RAVENSTEIN. The build-up for PLUNDER necessitated a carefully planned combination of reconstruction work and railway operating. That this was achieved is shown by the fact that thirty-five trains per day were being run each way over this L of C operating to a large number of railheads.

Eleven of these railheads were established in the NIJMEGEN-GENNEP-CLEVE triangle despite the fact that the railway lines WEST of the RHINE had been badly destroyed by bombing, demolition and destruction and would present a continuous problem for a long period in the future.

For operation PLUNDER itself there was no real effective railway L of C in the BRITISH area. The main railway route over the WESEL bridge to MUNSTER, OSNABRUCK and HANNOVER was in the AMERICAN area and there was no site between WESEL and NIJMEGEN that had ever been bridged before.

On the WEST side of the RHINE the only lines available were single track. When work was begun on the line EMMERICH—BOCHOLT—RHEINE with the intention of inaugurating a L of C working from railtails EAST of the RHINE, it was found that it had been heavily damaged by bombing and practically all the larger and medium road bridges had been destroyed. The construction of a railway bridge was therefore put in hand at SPYCK and it was planned then to run the rail L of C forward over new bridges across the EMS canal and the EMS river to BREMEN. This L of C was operating satisfactorily by 10 May.

The bridge at SPYCK consisted of 24 spans, 27 piled piers and 6 trestle piers and was 2,680 ft in length of which 1,900 ft was of water gap.

In order to ensure that adequate information was got back quickly so that a correct appreciation of the railway situation EAST of the RHIN E could be arrived at, an advance railway HQ was organised and attached to 5 Railway Construction and Maintenance Group which had a Railway Survey Company close to it.

The advance railway HQ consisted of fifteen officers with interpreters, twenty other ranks and approximately twenty vehicles. Despite the fact that it was only able to assemble one week in advance of the operation the organisation proved quite successful.

To control and operate railways on the L of C an area railway HQ was left in BRUSSELS for BELGIUM and FRANCE and a second area HQ was formed and moved into GERMANY after the RHINE crossing for the L of C in HOLLAND and GERMANY. It was hoped to take over control of the GERMAN divisional organisation but owing to evacuation and bombing and shortage of BRITISH officers and NCOs it was not possible to do this to any appreciable degree until after the surrender.

However, by 8 May sufficient preparatory work had been accomplished to operate with GERMAN coal, locomotives, wagons and a high percentage of GERMAN personnel, all the railways in GERMANY that could physically be opened.

BRITISH materials had been imported only for railway construction, signalscommunications and plant for the line between EMMERICH and RHEINE.

STORES

The Tn stores organisation played a large part in ensuring that the necessary railway construction work in HOLLAND and GERMANY could be properly carried out. To achieve this, 107 Tn Stores Depot at ANTWERP was gradually expanded early in 1945.

Thirty-two sidings were renovated and put into use, 1,450,000 square feet of stacking space was available and a workshop for repairing all Tn plant was established.

When thearmy moved into GERMANY, stores were sent to selected sub depots in the country and in addition work was commenced on discovering and utilising captured stores to meet Tn needs.

Postal

Owing to the difficulties which were experienced in maintaining regular daily arrivals and departures of sea-borne mails through OSTEND, the port for this class of mails was changed to CALAIS on15 February, where an all-weather berth was allocated for this purpose.

On the same date a special postal train began to operate for the movement of surface mails between CALAIS and BOURG LEOPOLD stopping at various intermediate distribution points.

The terminal railhead was later extended to MILL and still later to BEDBURG.

The successful working of this train helped considerably in the maintenance of a regular parcel mail service, and enabled substantial reductions to be made in the amount of MT used for the conveyance of mail.

During January and early February bad flying conditions gave rise to anumber of short breaks in the day-to-day regularity of letter mails, but these were never so serious asto justify a change from the policy of adherence to air movement. In fact there were more interruptionsin the continuity of surface mails than in that of air mails during this period.

As the advance up to and beyond the RHINE progressed the airfield for the despatch and receiptof letter mails from UK for Second Army was changed in conformity with the general movement. Airfields at HELMOND, HEES, RHEINE, DIEPHOLZ and LUNEBURG were successively used.

On 8 March a V-1 caused the virtual destruction of the premises and postal organisation of 8 Base APO in ANTWERP. Steps were immediately taken to ensure the maintenance of the primary mailservices to and from UK by the opening up of a fresh installation in BRUSSELS.

There was very little loss of mail, and as a result of the measures taken no break occurred in the services to and from UK. Delay to inter-unit mail was limited to two or three days.

Part of ECLIPSE planning during January and February provided for mail facilities and newspapersfor liberated allied PW and mail facilities for DPs. No postal difficulties were encountered in the executionof these plans.

Supply and Transport

SUPPLIES

By the end of January storage accommodation for supplies (excluding cold storage) amounted to 37,000 tons in ANTWERP, 40,000 tons in GHENT and 27,000 tons in BRUSSELS and an additional 10,700 tons could be made available in GHENT if it was necessary to utilise that port owing to ANTWERP becoming untenable.

An additional 12,000 tons capacity in BRUSSELS became available later. Apart from ANTWERP, cold storage facilities in BRUSSELS, GHENT, OSTEND, LILLE and COURTRAI totalled 5,200 tons.

The power supply to the cold storage plant at ANTWERP had twice been cut by V-2 and it was arranged to reduce shipments of meat from 5,000 tons to 3,000 tons per fortnight. This made the remaining cold storage space outside ANTWERP sufficient to ensure the continued issue of frozen meat.

At the beginning of January the feeding strength in the RMA and in the area SOUTH of the SEINE was still approximately 90,000. It was arranged to maintain these L of C troops from stocks in the RMA balanced with fresh items imported from UK through CAEN.

Troops between the River SOMME and the BELGIAN border were maintained through CALAIS.

Arrangements were also made for some 12,000 tons of surplus supplies in the RMA to be brought forward by road, rail and sea to the advance base by 11 February.

Contracts for the manufacture of pork sausages which had commenced during December were gradually extended to factories throughout the L of C.

A large number of GERMAN esbit tablets were re-manufactured in February to conform with the BRITISH equivalentof hexamine tablets.

During the same month negotiations were made for the manufactureof baking powder which was now in short supply in the theatre. About the middle of February fresh vegetables, which had been in plentiful supply were threatening to become unobtainable and so plans were made to resume shipments from UK.

This, however, was only a temporary seasonal stoppage. Although many more bakeries were required due to the increasing military population the shortage of manpower would not permit any further units to be formed.

The organisation and equipment of army bakeries, however, was such that in a mobile field bakery a higher output of bread per individual could be produced than in the case of the static field bakery.

Accordingly it was decided to convert the existing eight static field bakeries to fourteen mobile field bakeries which was accomplished without any further increase of personnel.

Civil Affairs commitments had been increasing from the start of the campaign and it was clear that demands for food would become greater as the advance progressed into HOLLAND.

CA initially had been allotted a number of depot units on a lower War Establishment than normal supply units. These had proved inadequate for their task and by January two BSDS and one DID had to be loaned from 21 Army Group resources. The CA depots were unable to cope with the increasing responsibilities and mounting tonnages as they weredeficient in space and equipment.

On 15 February, therefore, as mentioned elsewhere, S and T took over the entire responsibility for handling CA supplies and a separate chain of depots was organised for the purpose.

Six DIDs, a CRASC supply unit and certain port detachments were made available to CA. The existing CA depot units were disbanded, and reformed into one DID.

The effect of this was that in addition to the fact that the personnel for two BSDs, seven DIDs and three field butcheries would not be available for disbandment as part of the scheme to make more manpower available, the HQ CRASC supply units which had been relied on to command additional supply units during the advance into GERMANY had been absorbed on these duties.

The main CA depot area was at ’s HERTOGENBOSCH where 42,000 tons could be stacked. Two BSDs and seven DIDs were earmarked for NETHERLANDS District to help in the liberation of WEST HOLLAND, but in actual fact only one BSD and three DIDs were required as the handling of all relief supplies was quickly taken over by the Dutch.

March was a period of intensive building up of stocks in preparation for the assault across the RHINE.

As soon as Second Army vacated the area of No. 8 Army Roadhead it became a GHQ supply depot. It was anticipated that a break-through into GERMANY would considerably increase the 21 Army Group feeding strength, as a result of the liberationof allied PW and DPs.

Apart from commencing to stock-pile 2,700,000 rations in this area, the stocks in No. 10 Army Roadhead by 24 March had risen to 1,746,000 FS and 935,000 Compo rations equivalent to approximately 5,000 tons.

The general plan for the meeting the additional commitments in GERMANY was to free units already employed in HOLLAND and BELGIUM for the final advance. The CA depots at SAS VAN GHENT, BOOM, WYNECHEM and ST AMAND were closed and their stocks placed in CA depots at CAPELLE and BRASSCHAET, the units released there by being held in readiness for any CA tasks in GERMANY. In addition the War Office provided four supply companies (light) each of four platoons, which were organised to carry out the duties of normal DIDs. Three field butcheries which arrived in the theatre at this time were re-equipped for employment as DIDs.

Four DIDs were allotted to cope with the feeding of DPs in the RHINE and RUHR areas and remained there until the cessation of hostilities.

The forecast for the total feeding strength for May and June was 1,920,000 and of this total it was estimated that 1,300,000 personnel would be entitled to FS rations.

Although adequate GERMAN stocks of food had been uncovered to feed large numbersof PW these stocks were either geographically inaccessible or there were no organisations set up for making the necessary distribution.

In consequence a special temporary rationscale of 1,100 calories was provided from 21 Army Group stocks.

Initially there was some confusion as to the commitments for feeding the various nationalities of PW and DPS including RUSSIANS. It was eventually decided that with the exception of BRITISH and US liberated PW who were to receive the normal field service ration scale the remainder would get the same scale of rations as mobile civilian labour. All these rations were drawn from S and T stocks.

SOLID FUEL

During this phase both loco and domestic coal continued to be imported into FRANCE through CAEN and, to the end of January, through DIEPPE.

In February this latter port which had been averaging an intake of 800 tons of coal a day was handed over to Communications Zone control.

Shipments into CAEN averaged 1,200 tons a day in January and February, rising to 1,400 tons daily in March.

The bulk of 21 Army Group’s requirements of solid fuel in FRANCE, however, were supplied from indigenous sources.

In BELGIUM and HOLLAND 21 Army Group had to rely entirely on local production of coal for all its demands. The very severe winter weather that was experienced in January caused a great increase in fuel consumption by all classes of user.

At the same time coal production declined sharply, partly due to the effect of the cold on the undernourished miners, but even more tothe difficulties of getting them to and from the mines.

In addition to these, serious strikestook place prior to the re-constitution of the BELGIAN Government.

Very great difficulties were experienced in the movement of any coal that was mined due to these severe weather conditions which reacted unfavourably on all means of transportation, but in particular on the canals which froze to such an extent that practically all barge movement ceased.

Stocks in BELGIUM at one time were reduced to the supply of only one to two days and issues in BRUSSELS for a complete week had to be restricted to hospitals only.

In March, however, the stock position had greatly improved although the demands for solid fuel placed on S and T by the Services for civilian contractors could only be met to the extent of twenty-five per cent in February and thirty-three and a half per cent in March.

Thus only contracts of the most urgent operational priority could be permitted to be fulfilled.

Pilferage of coal from rail wagons and from barges in transit from the mines to the depots reached serious proportions, due to the high prices obtainable in the black market.

Finally, it was decided to send a monthly summary of these losses to the Financial Adviser for consideration for financial adjustment. In March 7,300 tons of pitch were imported from UK for the manufacture of briquettes to augment the fuel necessary for the railways.

By the beginning of March the SHAEF Solid Fuels Section for GERMANY had established itself in AACHEN and ten mines were operating under allied control in the area.

Only three of these, however, produced coal surplus to colliery requirements.

It had been estimated that coal requirements for the NETHERLANDS for the first month after liberation would be 4,000 tons per day.

Although it was doubtful if this quantity could be moved in, a stockpile of 12,000 tons was established at ’s HERTOGENBOSCH.

Arrangements were made to send in three hundred tons per day in addition to other supplies shipped to ROTTERDAM from ANTWERP and the UK during the early part of the liberation.

After 1 April the issue of solid fuel for space-heating ceased and the scale was reduced from four lbs to one-a-half lbs per man per day for all purpose.

TRANSPORT

Allocation of Transport to Armies

At the beginning of this phase HQ L of C had under command eighty-two and a half equivalent three-ton companies, whilst First Canadian Army and Second Army had respectively nine and eight companies from the GHQ pool.

The 21 Army Grouppool of transport under direct control of GHQ was approximately twenty equivalent three-ton companies but these were committed on permanent employment such as haulage of timber, RE and airfield construction work.

Two DUKW companies which had been retained since the beginning of the campaign were placed under command First Canadian Army for operation VERITABLE.

With the forthcoming assault across the RHINE and owing to the flooded countryside it was essential to increase the number of DUKW companies.

Three GT coys which were originally DUKW companies were nominated for re-conversion and during theinitial period were issued with a few DUKWs for refresher training.

The number of DUKWs available in the theatre in the middle of February, however, was so limited that the conversion of the proposed companies could only be done slowly, but by the middle of March two additional companies making a total of four, were fully equipped.

During the period preceding the assault across the RHINE DUKWs were used not only on second line maintenance but also for evacuation of casualties over the flooded areas between the MAAS and the RHINE. Including these, First Canadian Army and Second Army had ten and twenty-two equivalent three-ton companies from the GHQ pool under command by 24 March.

As the armies advanced rapidly across GERMANY the daily demands for transport increased.

By 31 March the GHQ transport tonnage lift under command Second Army had jumped to over ten thousand tons.

One month later as the campaign was drawing to a close this GHQ lift alone had increased to twenty—three thousand tons or the equivalent of seventy-six three-ton companies which was the largest tonnage to be placed under army control at any time throughout the campaign.

Allied Liberated Manpower Units

The recruiting of BELGIAN and DUTCH personnel to form additional GT coys continued and by 15 January six BELGIAN GT coys had been despatched to UK for training.

Meanwhile, seven of the fourteen BELGIAN and two of the nine NETHERLANDS GT companies to be trained in the theatre had been raised by CA.

In order to employ this transport with the maximum officiency it was decided that CA should relinquish the control of all allied transport to S and T except a small number of FRENCH units.

S and T also undertook to raise and train the balance of the planned BELGIAN CA companies, including those that were already training in the UK.

Two problems arose in the latter part of January which affected the training and equipping of allied liberated manpower companies.

Firstly, War Office agreed that 21 Army Group should retain the seventeen GT coys originally only on loan which meant that the equipment from these companies was not available for the BELGIAN companies on their return from UK.

Secondly, it was discovered that personnel called up for duty by the BELGIAN Government to form these companies were in the majority of cases non-drivers. As a result the whole training scheme was re-cast and a primary training centre with a capacity of 2,500 all ranks staffed by BELGIANS and supervised by a BRITISH CRASC, augmented by BRITISH instructors, was established in BELGIUM.

Companies were called up weekly for one month’s primary regimental training before being despatched to UK.

This enabled all companies to train for a total period of fourteen weeks. These units were inter changeable with BRITISH companies and capable of carrying out work anywhere in the theatre.

By the last week in April seven BELGIAN and four NETHERLAND GT coys trained in the theatre were being employed on the L of C and in HOLLAND. The first six BELGIAN companies to be trained in the UK had by this time returned.

Five were employed on the L of C and one with Second Army giving a total lift of 8,100 tons. These allied GT coys under BRITISH control proved very successful.

Pitwood

The delivery of pitwood to the mines after the GERMAN offensive in the ARDENNES became a matter of the highest priority and two ten-ton companies were specially allocated for this purpose.

The new source of supply of pitwood came from the forests in northern BELGIUM and, during the period of acute shortage of supplies, turn rounds of two hundred miles were accomplished.

Tyres

At the end of January the shortage of tyres, especially in the case of Rogers forty-ton tank transporters and also ten-ton load carriers, became acute and four companies of ten-ton vehicles were withdrawn and three-ton vehicles issued in lieu until such time as the position improved.

This resulted in the loss of a lift of 2,400 tons but the companies could not be re-converted until the end of March.

Additional Units

In February two additional station maintenance companies were formed using personnel of two army transport companies which were made surplus consequent upon the re-organisation which took place in the previous phase. These two companies were allotted to the armies.

In the middle of March the original three station maintenance companies which were with the L of C were re-organised and doubled by theaddition of three extra sections.

On 13 April a further lift was added to the transport pool by the arrival from UK of a civilian transport company organised by the Ministry of War Transport. This particular unit with a five hundred ton lift capacity was employed on Civil Affairs tasks in HOLLAND, and although it was not a S and T responsibility it released other military transport for employment with the armies.

At the end of April GOLDFLAKE transport units began to arrive comprising, in addition to formation second line transport, three CRASC transport columns, eleven GT companies, seven artillery platoons, one transporter company, one bulk petroltransport company, one bridge company and one ambulance car company.

AIR FREIGHT

During January the air freight organisation was again modified. Previously reception was controlled by a CRASC transport column and three DIDs.

Two of these DIDs were converted to form two air composite platoons, designed to handle all types of stores and trained in airfield duties besides packing airborne stores.

The third DID which was previously engaged on air freight was sent back to UK for training in duties of air despatch.

By the first week in February this unit had returned to the theatre and was placed in charge of the two dumps established at NIVELLES airfield for air supply of brigade groups as mentioned elsewhere.

Supply by air for operation VARSITY was also planned to take place from the Continent in case all flying was temporarily stopped from the UK.

Four hundred and twenty RASC personnel and fifty-three sets of double roller runway were flown from the UK for the operation. In actual fact, however, in this particular operation, re-supply by airfrom the Continent never became necessary and the personnel were ultimately returned to UK.

POL

At the beginning of January the BRITISH bulk storage facilities for POL more than covered their requirements but the US were not so well off.

The OVERLORD maintenance plan had stipulated that thirty days’ reserve of POL should be kept for the whole force in the theatre: SHAEF laid down the tonnage figure that the reserve would represent.

It was found that BRITISH storage accommodation was well in excess of that figure and therefore it was agreed that as from 1 March eighty thousand tons would be regarded as being held on US account when the storage was full. This gave a reserve of thirty days to both the AMERICAN and BRITISH forces.

Another important decision made during this period was that in principle POL installations would be supplied and operated by the force in whose zonethey were located.

With the extension of the pipeline towards GERMANY it became vitally necessary to have more operating personnel. Fortunately pumping was able to be stopped on the CHERBOURG/ROUEN pipeline system on 9 January and by the end of that month personnel working on that stretch could be released.

First priority for the extension of the pipeline was the consideration of a line from ANTWERP to EINDHOVEN which was then to be the pipehead.

DUMBO was now working so satisfactorily that an increase of “offtake” facilities became essential and authority was therefore given for two lines to be constructed from CALAIS to GHENT and thence to ANTWERP.

Later the construction of a further forty miles from EINDHOVEN up to the RHINE was authorised.

At the end of April the pipe was extended across the RHINE to EMMERICH and arrangements were in hand for it to be continued to the filling area at BOCHOLT.

Previously POL had been brought across the river to BOCHOLT from EINDHOVEN by bulk petrol transport at a rate of one thousand tons per day.

Having been transferred to containers in the filling area at BOCHOLT it was then railed to No. 14 Army Roadhead from which Second Army was supplying 8, 12 and 30 Corps.

DUMBO continued to develop throughout the last months of the campaign.

In January it had an average output of 1,300 tons per day, which increased during February to an average of 1,600 tons per day.

In March and April the daily average maintained was 3,100 tons and on the last day of war the record delivery of 3,560 tons was given from its fifteen “pipelines under the ocean”, of which eleven were in actual operation.

A directive was received in April that RASC were to be responsible for pipeline maintenance and high pressure pumping. This could not be implemented owing to shortage of personnel,and the RE continued to operate the lines.

As mentioned elsewhere, FIDO was now operating at EPINOY. It proved very effective but its consumption was in the neighbourhood of ninety thousand gallons a night.

Early in January 616 Squadron operating from BRUSSELS was equipped with jet propelled aircraft which needed kerosene for fuel.

An initial stock of twenty thousand gallons was delivered and supplies continued at the rate of three thousand gallonsper day.

In February a FRENCH civilian installation at DOUAI was opened, primarily to supply fuel for the RAF airfields in the neighbourhood. Tankage totalling 2,700 tons was taken over and proved most useful as many of the aircraft of the airborne operation in conjunction with PLUNDER took off from these airfields.

At the end of March the RAF were requested to reduce their shipments of packed POL. This was compensated for by increasing shipments of bulk aviation petrol, and packing some six hundred tons per day for them in the installations of ANTWERP and GHENT. 

On 19 January a V-2 scored a direct hit on the BRITISH portion of the POL installation at ANTWERP, demolishing a train, igniting its contents and setting fire to three storagetanks.

The fire burned for approximately forty-eight hours but although 10,000 tons of storage were rendered useless, only 3,500 tons of petrol were destroyed.

As a result of this fire it was decided to remove camouflage from such installations as it proved not only inflammable, but a hindrance to fire fighting. It was also agreed with the AFS that the RASC should be responsible for the provision and maintenance in working order of waterlines within the compound, while the AFS should be responsible outside it.

When the fire brigade arrived the operation of the water system would be an AFS responsibility. This policy proved most effective in subsequent incidents and damage was quite insignificant.

It was decided early during this phase to place the bulk transport companies on a four platoon basis.

In consequence the eight three-platoon companies were formed into six, each of four platoons.

The 150 vehicles held by them surplus to WE were used to equip afurther company. Thus by the beginning of March, assuming that eighty per cent of thevehicles were running, 21 Army Group had a bulk petrol lift of 2,700 tons per day.

A further three platoon company arrived during operation GOLDFLAKE from ITALY.

From the composite platoon personnel of these companies, one Petrol Station Company, consisting of six platoons each of four sections, was formed for the L of C. It was estimated that each section, with the help of Pioneers or local civilians could operate a petrol station issuing ten thousand gallons per day.

A “C” type petrol depot also arrived in GOLDFLAKE during the first week in April.

Meanwhile the BELGIAN and FRENCH canal systems were being extensively utilised. Ten thousand tons of bulk POL barges were at the disposal of S and T and it was agreed that from 1 March the routing of these barges should be done entirely by S and T.

As time went on the Union Petroliere Belge were able to resume their normal activities,and certain of their services became available for military use; for instance, some five hundred tons of contaminated petrol and derv were treated by them, to produce a petroleum spirit suitable for military use, and derv acceptable to CA.

White spirit was also produced from kerosene (44) and bulk lubricants were being blended into a number of grades for industrial use in BELGIUM, FRANCE and HOLLAND.

When Second Army moved out of the DIEST area a third GHQ stock holding area for packed products was formed around the area DIEST/HASSELT/AERSCHOT where stocks for operation PLUNDER were accumulated.

Meanwhile Second Army opened No.10 Army Roadhead on 6 March and by 24 March stocks of POL there had reached a total of 23,600 tons.

By 15 March the pipehead at EINDHOVEN was for both armies the source of bulk POL which was coming into the theatre at a rate of 15,000 tons per day for the whole force, including 3,000 tons achieved by DUMBO.

Petrol supply during the final advance never caused any anxiety and by VE day GHQ stocks had only been depleted by twenty-five percent, although at the end 7,500 tons per day were being issued in the BRITISH area alone,of which 6,600 tons were for military requirements.

With the end of the campaign in sight War Office became anxious to divert the resources of jerrican production from EUROPE to the FAR EAST.

It was therefore agreed in April that until the end of operations only 250,000 new jerricans would be required each month for this theatre and that after VE day imports of jerricans would cease. A total of 15,000,000 jerricans had been imported during operation OVERLORD.

5,000,000 jerricans were therefore offered for export after VE day, provided shipping was made available.The total quantities of POL imported since 6 June 44 amounted to 476,646,000 gallons of which 381,317,000 gallons were MT 80.

Petrol bulk lorries alone covered nearly thirteen million miles.

The RASC were operating 300,000 tons of storage on V E day, most of which was interconnected by over six hundred miles of pipeline. 

Printing and Stationery

Throughout this phase the consumption of PSS stores generally increased, the average weekly intake of PSS stores into the theatre eventually reaching approximately two hundred tons.

To cope with the additional work a new WE for a Base Stationery Depot was approved on 21 March increasing the total personnel from forty-six to sixty-eight. Additional depots were requested from Central Mediterranean Forces under GOLDFLAKE and these arrived at the end of April. Meanwhile the three advanced stationery depots,with the help of civilians, served First Canadian Army, Second Army and L of C respectively. Second Army units had been collecting their stationery from BRUSSELS but in order to save unit transport a forward detachment of the advanced stationery depot was established at HELMOND on 5 April and another at VERDEN as the army moved forward.

Supply to L of C was on a sub area basis and in thecase of sub areas situated some distance from BRUSSELS, stores were sent to a central point from which units collected.

The shortage of electricity in BELGIUM hampered printing during January and February but this difficulty was solved at first by PSS printing presses working at night only and later by the installation of WD generators at the three presses operating in BRUSSELS.

Civilian contractors who had power feeders which were independent of the general supply were used mainly for overflow work.

PSS arranged the supply of paper and other materials as well as the contract for the printing of the army newspaper “Soldier”, the first edition of which appeared on 19 March.

Distribution of publications, especially those on the widest scale, continued to increase. In mid-April a distribution of postal voting forms had to be made at short notice direct to all units on the scale of one to every officer and man in the force.

“ECLIPSE” establishments were considered during this phase and as a result PSS was representedby a DADPSS at HQ Second Army and by a staff captain at each corps district HQ.

Ordnance

15 AOD continued to build up stocks despite the serious handicap of V weapon attacks. On 22 January it became responsible for supplying all units not previously based on it e.g. GHQ andL of C units.

As the number of AA units opposing the V weapons increased in the advance base an AA ordnance depot staffed by specially trained personnel from the UK was opened in conjunction with 14 FTS to hold equipment such as radar and spare parts which were peculiar to these units.

As the AA units were also based on 14 FTS for MT spare parts the siting of these two depots together proved most convenient. Towards the end of the campaign many of these AA units were disbanded or re-organised for other roles and a disused airfield adjacent to 15 AOD was used to accommodate the larger stores and equipment made surplus, while the remainder were returned to the normal RSDs of the AOD.

To enable 15 AOD to bring over replenishment stocks from UK more quickly to meet expected urgent demands the “Ord Ship” capacity was increased to three hundred tons a day from 21 February. This obviated the difficulty of forecasting demands several weeks in advance as was necessary with the normal shipping programme.

The increases in the tonnages of stores handled by 15 AOD from the beginning of the year to the end of the campaign are illustrated by the following figures :—

During March the load of items demanded reached a new peak of 18,000 items per day.

A gas producing detachment attached to 15 AOD produced inert gas for flame-throwing equipment which was much in use during the fighting between the MAAS and the RHINE.

Unfortunately a V-2 bomb made a direct hit on it, completely destroying the plant and killing all the senior NCOs. However, by improvising equipment borrowed from the RAF and by obtaining additional plant from the UK the unit was in operation again in ten days.

The first officers’ shop in the advance base opened at BRUSSELS in excellent premises. The turnover for the first day was £3,000 and there after the weekly average remained at approximately £5,000.

Ten static shops opened in BELGIUM and HOLLAND at leave centres and towns where there were large concentrations of troops. These produced a turnover of £20,000 a week. The armies were supplied through mobile officers’ shops on the basis of one to each corps, but as they operated from vehicles the range and quantity of the stores they held was necessarily limited.

Good use was made of the industrial capacity of BELGIUM for repairing stores and clothing returned by units.

In March 21,000 tons of general stores and clothing were received, sorted, repaired and re-issued by 17 RSD with the aid of civilian contractors.

Approximately 30,000 pairs of boots a month were also repaired and in some cases rebuilt by this unit.

The increasing number of allied liberated manpower units being formed necessitated the expansion of returned stores facilities as, although initial equipment was being obtained from UK for these units, subsequent maintenance had to be provided from theatre  resources.

This would not have been possible without using repaired clothing and equipment, as stocks of new clothing were only sufficient to meet the normal requirements of the force, making it impossible to issue other than part-worn clothing to the bulk of allied liberated manpower units.

On 15 February Ordnance assumed responsibility for holding CA ordnance stores in the advance base. However, this entailed little change in procedure or method of supply and the forward holdings with armies continued to be handled by CA/Mil Gov.

The arrival in the theatre of formations from ITALY during GOLDFLAKE involved a large re-equipment programme.

Security considerations made this task difficult but it was successfully accomplished by liaison with the Ordnance representatives of the formations concerned. Arrangements were made to earmark and ship the required stores, ammunition and vehicles from the UK before the arrival of the units.

Staging camps on the route from MARSEILLES to BELGIUM had to be equipped and accommodation stores provided.

To meet this commitment additional quantities of stores were shipped from UK, while stocks of tentage from the RMA were also utilised. Contracts were placed in LILLE and throughout BELGIUM for the repair of tentage to assist the military repair programme.

Shipments of“A” and “B” vehicles for GOLDFLAKE formations commenced to arrive at MARSEILLES on 20 February and as only fifty drivers accompanied the first arrivals a detachment of 141 Vehicle Park was despatched there direct from the RMA to establish a receipt park.

This unit was eventually relieved by a vehicle park from ITALY. A vehicle company was formed from reinforcements in the UK and BLA and quickly despatched to MARSEILLES by air and rail to ferry the vehicles to the advance base on a seven-day turnround, return trips of the drivers being made by air.

Al together approximately 3,271“B” vehicles and 667 “A” vehicles were received. Many of the “A” vehicles were in need of overhaul and modification before use in the theatre and as this additional task was beyond the resources of REME in the theatre, arrangements were made to evacuate them to UK. However, this problem had been foreseen and stocks of “A” vehicles had already been increased to meet it.

In January No. 3 Field Ammunition Repair Factory moved from the RMA to the advance base,leaving behind some 2,500 tons of “doubtful” ammunition which was later also cleared to the advance base.

After the final clearance of ammunition stocks from the RMA, 15 BAD moved up to the advancebase to relieve the pressure of work placed on 2, 3 and 17 BADs by the armies’ requirements for operation PLUNDER.

The ammunition build-up for operation PLUNDER was the largest ever undertaken by Second Army. The stocks required from No. 8 Army Roadhead for the operation were cleared by rail tothe ammunition railheads in No. 10 Army Roadhead by 18 March and a maximum of seven trains a day from the advance base were also received.

During the build-up the average tonnage of ammunition receipts and issues handled in the roadhead was 4,470 tons, the highest tonnage in any one day being 9,150 tons on 25 March.

To conceal the preparations for the operation a smoke screen was provided on the WEST bank of the RHINE and a very large number of smoke generators were used for this purpose, completely exhausting all stocks in the advance base so that it was found necessary to comb the AA gunpositions in the neighbourhood of ANTWERP to provide the amount required.

Following the break-out from the RHINE bridgehead the reserves of ammunition remaining in No. 10 Army Roadhead proved sufficient to maintain the remainder of Second Army’s operations in GERMANY and stock the tworoadheads, Nos. 12 and 14 subsequently formed.

Early in April, 1 and 12 BADs and certain port ammunition detachments and ordnance ammunition companies were disbanded to form Enemy Ammunition

Depot Control Units ready to take over dumps of enemy ammunition uncovered by the advance and during the occupation of GERMANY after fighting had finished.

For operation PLUNDER the units coming under command of Second Army from First Canadian Army had to be re-equipped in a very short space of time. Consequently a special train was arranged to convey controlled stores to Second Army ordnance railhead where they were received within forty-eighthours after the receipt of demands in the advance base.

All formations were fully equipped several days before the commencement of the operation, except for the Comet tanks of 29 Armoured Brigade which were reported operationally unfit owing to defects in the tensioner wheels. Arrangements were made with the War Office to provide new type wheels which were flown to the theatre in first priority air freight direct from the factory. Each day’s consignments were collected under brigade REME arrangements and fitted to the tanks within seven days in time for the operation.

The main body of 6 Airborne Division which had been withdrawn from the theatre was re-equipped for the operation in UK. However, the sea tail had to be re-equipped in the theatre which presented a problem as its special equipment was not normally held in 21 Army Group.

An ordnance sub park for which certain personnel were supplied from the theatre was specially formed in UK to support the divisional ordnance field park and arrived by sea a few days before the operation.

Special packs of airborne equipment were shipped from UK and held in the divisional ordnance field park, the sub park and in 15AOD. These arrangements for the maintenance of the division proved satisfactory.

A detachment of anair packing platoon was flown in from UK to supplement the RASC air transport platoons located at NIVELLES airfield holding pre-packed supplies for emergency maintenance by air. As already stated elsewhere, this was not in fact required during operation PLUNDER.

During February a re-organisation had taken place in the arrangements for receipt of air freight. Hitherto ordnance detachments from ordnance maintenance companies had been placed at receiving airfields but this became unnecessary on the formation of air composite platoons RASC which incorporated Ordnance detachments. After the crossing of the RHINE, Ordnance was again faced with the difficulties of distributing stores to widely dispersed units.

It was therefore decided to ground the stocks of corps ordnance subparks and other army store holding units in the rear areas. From the transport thus released an Ordnance Convoy Unit was formed to ferry forward stores from army roadheads to corps and divisions.

Vehicles in the army reserve parks were also formed into convoys driven by RASC personnel.

To meet the commitment of providing amenities for the increasing number of liberated ex-PW. DPS and internees of concentration camps, approximately 700 tons of blankets and clothing were flownfrom the advance base to the forward areas.

MLBUs were also sent forward to provide laundry and bathing facilities including a detachment for the concentration camp at BELSEN.

As a result of the experience gained during the advance through FRANCE and BELGIUM, MLBUs were re-organised before operation PLUNDER to enable blankets to be washed in addition to theirnormal washing capacity. ‘

As the laundries attached to CCSs were not normally fully employed they were withdrawn and attached to corps MLBUs to increase the corps laundry capacity.

REME

With the closure of the RMA it became necessary to find locations for the two remaining advance base workshops. These were eventually sited at LOTH, a few miles SOUTH of BRUSSELS, and at VILVORDE adjacent to 1 Base Armament and General Workshop and 1 Canadian Advance Base Workshop. The location at LOTH was very suitable as the premises had been used as a heavy engineering workshop by Krupps, but a four weeks delay was caused through having to clear the site of some three thousand tons of steel stock, machine tools and other material.

At the beginning of March, there fore, two advance base workshops were in ANTWERP, three in BRUSSELS together with a base armament and general workshop, and one was on the L of C at AREAS.

In accordance with normal policy, advance base workshops, wherever possible, specialised by types. For example 1 and 2 Canadian Advance Base Workshops dealt with “A” and “B” vehicles of US origin,whilst 21 and 22 Advance Base Workshops repaired those of BRITISH manufacture.

Although this was the principle it could not always be followed due to re-grouping of workshops, variations in repair loads and other causes.

1 Canadian Advance Base Workshop established an engine re-conditioning workshop for the complete overhaul of certain, mainly heavy, types of engines which were reconditioned in the theatre and not evacuated to UK as had formerly been the practice.

A repair and recovery organisation was established for operation GOLDFLAKE along the L of C from MARSEILLES to BELGIUM.

Operation VERITABLE for REME was largely a question of continual recovery of vehicles. The weather conditions during and prior to the operation had been extremely bad. The intense cold that prevailed at the beginning of February had resulted in many mechanical troubles such as hydraulic systems failing to function (especially in Cromwell tank steering systems) clutches burning out and bogie tyres freezing to tracks. The sudden thaw accompanied by much rain and the flooding by the enemy of the countryside during the operation resulted in many casualties to vehicles being caused through bogging quite apart from the large number caused by enemy mines.

In many cases the wheeled tractors could not approach close enough to the vehicles to be recovered, and there was a constant demand for tracked tractors. This difificulty, however, had been anticipated and D8 tractors from army resources had already been attached to recovery sections. Some army recovery sections worked between brigade Workshops and the corps back-loading points whilst others were employed continuously on back-loading from the CBPs to third line workshops.

Difficulty was experienced in finding suitable workshop sites during the concentration period in the NIJMEGEN area and hard standings were rare until GOCH and CLEVE had been captured. Even at these places it was necessary to bulldoze workshop sites clear of debris. Some second line workshops had to remain WEST of the River MAAS until the battle had made considerable progress, even though the evacuation of casualties over the limited number of bridges and along the crowded roads was most difficult.

In spite of this heavy back-loading across the River MAAS the only bad bottleneck was the class '70 bridge at MAASTRICHT in the US sector where close liaison was necessary with US Traffic Control as permission had to be obtained for each individual crossing. Corps installations were also kept WEST of the river, being fed with work from two corps back-loading points opened in the vicinity of GRAVE and GENKE. The latter CBP was intended to form a dump from which three third line work-shops could draw, but as two of the workshops already had several weeks work to complete at the beginning of the operation it was never used and finally went to the army back-loading point at BOURG LEOPOLD.

In spite of these heavy tank casualties second line workshops of the formations concerned competed with the bulk of the work, but tank troop workshops assisted armoured brigade workshops in urgent second line repair work.

At one moment during the operation one armoured brigade workshop had thirty-five Churchill tanks sent into it for repair, which, together with fifteen other tanks awaiting repair represented the equivalent of a complete armoured regiment out of action.

The gun workshop of corps troops workshops in support of the AGsRA were kept continuously at work on barrel changes and other jobs necessitated by the heavy barrages and concentrations fired by the medium artillery.

The brief pause that ensued between operations VERITABLE and PLUNDER was utilised to the full by REME. Equipment and vehicles were inspected and overhauled so that everything should be operationally fit for the final assault and advance.

All second line workshops were moved into the area between the MAAS and the RHINE in accordance with the policy that as many REME units as possible should be brought right forward preparatory to the advance into GERMANY. There was a large amount of REME work to be carried out as most of the vehicles in 21 Army Group, especially the amphibious types, had been operating for some time without adequate overhaul.

Just prior to the assault many of the second line workshops closed down so as to be ready to follow their formations closely over the RHINE.

A heavy strain was thrown on REME by overhauls and modifications to the specialist type vehicles and equipment of 79 Armoured Division. The two Buffalo (heavy tracked cargo carrier) regiments of the division were the first to be released for overhaul by a tank troops workshop. During the three months from January to March 569 Buffaloes were passed through this one workshop and it was possible completely to re-equip one of these regiments and one squadron of the other regiment. It had already been decided that the remaining squadrons of the latter should be re-organised as an AVRE regiment equipped with modified Churchill tanks mounting a spigot mortar.

During the same period a complete overhaul of the Kangaroos (armoured personnel carriers) of this division was accomplished by armoured troops workshops with the assistance of REME units from First Canadian Army.

REME had previously been approached by the Royal Navy with a request that some means should be devised to transport by road some Landing Craft Mechanised (LCM) from ANTWERP to the concentration area NORTH of NIJMEGEN.

The craft were some 50 ft in length and when mounted on the proposed trailer stood 15 ft high, which only gave a 3” clearance under some of the bridges along the route.

The base armament and general workshops designed a prototype trailer of which, after successful tests, the Navy ordered 25.

Five days before the operation began a request for 40 similar trailers for smaller landing craft was received and met with assistance from 25 ships’ chandlers.

For the actual operation REME was faced with three main problems.

The first was to provide an adequate bank recovery organisation for keeping exits and entrances to the crossing places clear, secondly to maintain an organisation in the marshalling areas capable not only of keeping the roads clear but also of carrying out minor repairs to vehicles in the area, and thirdly to make complete preparations for a rapid advance once the bridgehead was firmly established. The solution to the first was found by bringing forward a beach recovery section and a heavy recovery section which had taken part in the NORMANDY landings. These units were placed under the command of a bank control group which was to control bothbanks of the river, although technical control was exercised by REME. Recovery DUKWs were also held available to assist stranded amphibians or light craft.

The second difiiculty was overcome by arranging for the divisions which were not taking part in the actual assault to provide recovery and repair posts at suitable points in the marshalling areas.

For the last problem the experience gained in the previous advance from NORMANDY proved invaluable. CBP teams were held inreadiness to - move at a moment’s notice. Certain workshops were then allocated by corps to deal with any work left behind, while others were at short notice to move and take up positions near CBPs, as and when these were formed.

The first REME recce parties were across the river by H+6. A little later D4 and D8 tractors crossed, together with ARVs, and bank recovery was commenced without serious difficulty.

By D+3 recovery was reduced to maintaining watching briefs at bridges with occasional assistance to vehicles with stalled engines. Fine weather reduced the danger of bogging in the assembly areas, and the bridge approaches, DUKW exits, roads and tracks remained in good condition.

Brigade workshops followed their formations over the RHINE approximately three or four days after the fighting troops and began leap-frogging forward, while corps troops workshops followed some days later.

1 Corps REME who were to look after the area between the MAAS and the RHINE took over “crock parks” established by the advancing corps, and their recovery sections of third line workshops were brought well forward.

The latter sited themselves close to the dumps of vehicles and equipment left behind, but repairs to passing vehicles kept them so busy that they were unable to carry out work on them for some considerable period.

In some cases armoured divisions moved both their brigade workshops forward at the same time, but it was sometimes found that the speed of the advance and the accummulation of tank casualties made it better to bring up a third line workshops and then leap-frog the brigade workshops past it to catch up with the division again.

As in the advance to BRUSSELS armoured brigade workshops were unable to cope with all second line tank repairs and third line workshops had to be sited primarily to take the overflow. One independent armoured brigade obtained good results by using an advanced workshop detachment, then moving the main section of the workshops past it leaving it to become a rearward workshops detachment.

Every bridge, defile or other obstacle was liable to become a bottleneck in the advance and wherever possible recovery vehicles were held ready to assist. Recovery patrols often consisting of officers on motorcycles with tractors at call, were also organised along the routes.

For the crossing of the ELBE a beach recovery section was made available for recovery at the bridges. This proved very necessary at ARTLENBURG, where a long and exceptionally steep hill made the exit from the class 40 bridge one of the most serious bottlenecks of the campaign. D8s, ARVS and tractors werekept continuously busy.

A large number of vehicles used by PW and DPs were found abandoned on every road and the RAF had taken heavy toll of enemy vehicles.

In many cases this transport so blocked the roads that it was necessary to use bulldozers in addition to other recovery vehicles to clear them. An unusual job undertaken by the tractors of the recovery section during this period was the towing of ploughs for digging signal cable runs along the divisional and corps axes. A chart showing the output of REME workshopsthroughout the campaign is attached as appendix “R”.

Claims and Hirings

During the final phase additional district offices were opened in liberated territory at BREDA (subsequently moved to THE HAGUE), ROOSENDAAL (subsequently moved to BREDA), UTRECHT, APELDOORN and GRONINGEN. 

It was also found necessary to open a separate office in BAYEUX quite distinct from the district office covering the whole of that area, especially to deal with arrears of claims in NORMANDY. District offices were closed at DIEPPE, AMIENS and CAEN.

With the advance into GERMANY all matters affecting Claims and Hirings in liberated territory were placed under DD Claims and Hirings, HQ L of C, and the DD Claims and Hirings, then at HQ21 Army Group was made responsible for matters arising within occupied territory.

As DD Claims and Hirings (GERMANY) he set up a temporary HQ at NIJMEGEN. The first District Claims Office (GERMANY) was formed at BOXMEER but rapidly transferred to OSNABRUCK. District offices were opened at HAMBURG and subsequently NIENBURG to serve 8 Corps and 30 Corps respectively, and the office at OSNABRUCK was moved to ISERLOHN on the redeployment of 1 Corps. The DD Claims and Hirings (GERMANY) then moved to HERFORD before the arrival of HQ 21 Army Groupin order to be close to that HQ when it was established in GERMANY.

For the general handing over of administrative control in FRANCE from HQ 21 Army Group to the Channel Base Section of the US forces, agreement was reached where by the outgoing military administrative authority issued de-requisition notices in respect of all the properties it held, to take effect one month ahead.

This enabled the incoming force to form its accommodation plan, to re-requisition under its own arrangements such property as it was necessary to retain. The surplus was then relinquished in accordance with the derequisition notice already served without any further action being necessary. This system was subsequently adopted wherever similar circumstances arose in other countries.

In February the negotiations providing for the assumption of financial responsibility by the FRENCH Government under Mutual Aid for certain types of claims not involving moral turpitude were brought to a successful conclusion. This led to another agreement being concluded on the procedure where by claims should be transmitted to the FRENCH authorities.

In BELGIUM the arrangements relating to the acquisition of land and buildings proceeded quite smoothly, but complaints were received that the payment of compensation for premises requisitioned on behalf of BRITISH troops was not being promptly made. The matter was investigated in conjunction with the SHAEF Mission to BELGIUM and it was found that the difficulty was partly due to the fact that while complete instructions had been prepared by the Service des Requisitions, operating as a part of the Office of Mutual Aid, these instructions had not all reached the burgomasters in the more remote areas owing to bad communications.

Special steps were taken to rectify this and a system of progress reports was prepared by the OMA which was submitted to Claims and Hirings, HQ 21 Army Group, indicating the progress of payments made week by week.

Wherever possible properties held under requisition were released, although the existence of the advance base at ANTWERP and the continuation of the BRUSSELS leave scheme made any early and substantial reduction in the number of requisitioned properties difficult to achieve.

Although normally the US Claims Service would have processed claims against BRITISH personnel in the US area before passing them to the Claims and Hirings Directorate for final examination and payment the large number of claims arising as a result of BRITISH divisions assisting the US to repel the GERMAN ARDENNES offensive made it desirable to send a mobile BRITISH claims team to assist the US Claims Service in that area.

Efforts were made to conclude an agreement with the BELGIAN Government regarding the disposal of claims under Mutual Aid in the same manner as with the FRENCH Government.

After long negotiations agreement was reached on all points but owing to the disturbed political situation in the country the legal measures necessary to put the agreement into force could not be concluded and its implementation had to be deferred.

In HOLLAND the measures taken in the previous phase to ensure that burgomasters were fully acquainted with the procedure for the acquisition of land and buildings, proved successful and the procedure worked smoothly.

The NETHERLANDS authorities were themselves anxious that property owners should obtain early recompense for the properties that had been requisitioned from them, and burgomasters were given wide powers to enable them to make payments on account prior to the final assessment of compensation.

Negotiations were successfully concluded in LONDON with the NETHERLANDS authorities for the implementation of a claims agreement on substantially the same lines as that agreed with the FRENCH Government.

Owing to the shortage of manpower it was decided that it would be uneconomic to have other than one central recording office for both liberated and occupied territory, that the existing Records Section at Claims and Hirings, HQ L of C, should operate for the whole of 21 Army Group area and that therecords and returns in respect of GERMANY should be collated there.

The rapid advance of our forces into GERMANY, coupled with the complete breakdown of the GERMAN administrative services made it practically impossible to define the nationality or even the actual class of the perpetrators of the whole sale looting which was being carried out by freed slave labour, displaced persons, GERMAN civilians and also by allied troops.

It was agreed that the President of the Claims Commission should direct a minute to the Secretary of State for War, describing the situation and suggesting that no attempt should be made to investigate, record or assess, in the manner laid down by the War Office directive, any looting claims in GERMANY which arose out of incidents occurring before some future date to be fixed.

With the consequent temporary cessation of normal claims work in GERMANY certain of the Claims and Hirings officers were diverted to assist in the disposal of claims in liberated territory, while the remainder concentrated their efforts upon the regularisation of requisitions of real estate.

Claims and Hirings officers therefore, spent a considerable amount of time, both instructing Town Majors as to the way in which requisitioning procedure should be carried out and also in many cases physically undertaking this work themselves. At the same time, they were assisting both corps and divisions in the acquisitionof the necessary accommodation necessitated by the redeployment of these formations in the BRITISH zone.

One hundred and forty-seven Town Majors were contacted apart from those where the Claims and Hirings officer was actually working with the Town Major and very material assistance was givenin this connection. The final recording of these requisitions is the responsibility of the Claims and Hirings Directorate in GERMANY and during the whole period these records were being collated and indexed. .

With the arrival of BRITISH troops in DENMARK it was evident that it would be necessary to set up a small Claims and Hirings office in COPENHAGEN. This was actually opened on 24 May 45.

During the months of January to May inclusive 21,396 requisitions and 15,876 de-requisitions were recorded; 22,703 out of 23,367 claims received were disposed of during this period.

Labour

The enemy attempt to hamper the build-up of the advance base by attacking the ANTWERP area with V bombs failed partly because the effect on civilian morale was not sufficient to bring about evacuation on a scale large enough to diminish the supply of civilian labour.

At the end of January it was decided with the approval of the OMA to pay danger money at the rate of thirty francs a day to all civilians employed in the area and vicinity of the docks and installations. The number of civilians directly employed over the whole BRITISH area continued to increase at an average monthly figure of 19,000, from 105,208 at the end of January to 142,380 on 31 March.

The build up for operation VERITABLE and the programme of road and rail development involved forty-one and a half pioneer companies : of these twenty were employed on road construction and main-tenance, ten worked within No. 11 Canadian Army Roadhead, four and a half were employed with corps FMCs, six assisted on railway construction and one supervised the 11,000 civilians who worked at the various railheads.

During the three weeks prior to operation PLUNDER eighty-seven companies, including six BELGIAN and nine L of C companies were under command of Second Army. Four companies were responsible for the smoke screen which covered the operational moves and dumping of stores in the forward areas from 12 March onwards.

At the time of the assault there were twenty-six companies working at the army roadhead, while the allocation to each corps had been raised from four to between eight and ten companies. The latter were used on a variety of tasks which included preparing approaches to the river crossings, accompanyingthe assault divisions to handle ammunition and supplies, setting up FMCs on the EAST bank of the RHINE and helping to construct the bridges. The bank control group included a pioneer company for stretcher bearing, traffic control and guarding PW. The remaining companies were either used by the DCE on road maintenance or were employed in CCSs and general hospitals.

During the pursuit the number of companies employed in Second Army roadheads was only sixteen and the demands of corps for labour were correspondingly less.

The companies which were released were used for guarding depots and vulnerable points, operating ex-PW camps and guarding PW. Three companies each handled camps holding six thousand GERMAN prisoners of war, while another guarded a special camp in which SS guards were imprisoned. 

As the armies advanced into GERMANY PCLUs organised GERMAN labour exchanges to recruit civilian labour for military purposes; 16,689 GERMANS were so employed, making a total of 147,545 directly employed personnel in the entire theatre at the end of the campaign.

DPs were used in the area between the MAAS and the RHINE and on the EAST bank of the RHINE to overcome the shortage of civilian labour there. At first they were engaged on a day to day basis, but later a decision was made to form three Displaced Person Groups each over one thousandstrong and each administered by a pioneer company HQ.

In effect the adequate supply of military labour allotted to armies for the winter and spring operations was due to the successful organisation of civil labour in the L of C as a whole and the rear areas of the armies.

The civil labour organisation had worked well and was based on general experience including the following salient factors :—

Military and civilian labour was run on the pool basis in one channel and thereby pioneer work wascovered by indigenous labour at the earliest moment.

Pioneers were thus given an opportunity in the quieter periods to re-fit, train and rest.

The provision of the mid-shift meal was of paramount importance in gaining the goodwill of civil labour. In ANTWERP during the V bomb period it proved a greater incentive to the retention of labour there than was the danger money paid in late January 45.

After the RHINE crossing the availability of Pioneers for essential duties in guarding PW, organisation of PW camps and grouping of DPS was due in a large measure to the promptitude with which pioneergroup commanders (with the PCLUS) used local GERMAN civilian labour even while nearby operations were in progress.

Veterinary and Remount

On the closing down of the RMA No. 5 Veterinary Hospital was transferred from LE BECHELLOUIN to LILLE and No. 2 Field Remount Depot from ROUEN to BRUGES. These units were required to perform the dual functions of a veterinary hospital and remount depot for the horsed transport units in their respective areas. No. 6 Veterinary and Remount Conducting Section on handing over to 5 Veterinary Hospital came under command of Second Army and moved to VENLO where it was in a position to deal with animals captured during operations between the rivers MAAS and RHINE.

The formation of HT units in OSTEND and CALAIS in January and the loss of forty horses killed by a V2 at ANTWERP created demands for horses which were met by transfer from the RMA and also by collecting others from farmers in the WEST FLANDERS area. Lack of forage and the shortage of supervisory personnel made it necessary however, to effect a reduction in HT during March and the surplus horses were returned to the FRENCH remount authorities.

Arrangements were made with Ordnance for certain essential equipment to be consigned from the UK to 6 Veterinary and Remount Conducting Section which was responsible for issue to HT units underinstructions of V and RS at HQ 21 Army Group.

The procurement of drugs, serum and vaccine from local resources through the Office of Mutual Aid (BELGIUM) made it possible to cut down the quantities of veterinary supplies demanded from Army Veterinary Stores, ALDERSHOT.

The establishment for the Veterinary and Remount War Dogs Training Unit was passed by WEC but was not implemented as it had been decided to bring the War Dogs Training School from UK. This unit had detecting and VP dogs under training and thus could supply them both for dog platoons RE and for CMP (VP) companies.

V and RS were responsible for supplying this school with the required number of suitable dogs to be trained for police work and mine detecting. These dogs were obtained by requisitioning in FRANCE and GERMANY and borrowing from BELGIUM through the Office of Mutual Aid.

An increase in the number of veterinary officers and units was essential in order to enable V and RS to meet its commitments for the handling of WEHRMACHT forces and GERMAN veterinary units. Representation on the HQ staffs of Second Army, First Canadian Army and all corps plus a zone pool of six officers under the control of V and RS HQ 21 Army Group was sanctioned.

Authority was also obtained for the mobilisation in UK of three veterinary and remount conducting sections and the personnel element of two Base Depot Veterinary Stores.

It was considered improbable that these units would be available before VE day so arrangements were made to ensure that adequate Veterinary units would be available to go into GERMANY when required. No. 2 Field Remount Depot was moved from BRUGES to ANTWERP where it formed two detachments each consisting of one officer and forty ORs. These detachments were loaned to Second British and First Canadian Armies to be called forward by respective ADV and RSs when required.

Salvage

While salvage Work in the army areas continued on routine lines, activities in the RMA were limited by lack of transport, but it was possible to begin the clearance of the beaches. In particular, derelict Rhino ferries were broken down in order to obtain scrap steel and recover serviceable flotation tanks which were sent forward for use by Transportation.

PW labour was employed and some vehicles rescued from the derelict vehicle park at CORMELLES were found to be repairable by REWE, whilst the remaining scrap vehicles were broken down to furnace size steel. This was stock piled on the docks at CAEN and arrangements were made to clear it to UK in LCTS taken over from the Admiralty by the Ministry of Supply.

Steel scrap was recovered in BELGIUM by various means such as cutting up flying bomb ramps and apparatus, railway guns and their mountings and also steel obstructions obtained by clearing beach defences from the BELGIAN coast and coast roads. Another source was GERMAN ammunition which was broken down by a BELGIAN firm under contract, the explosive recovered being purified and made into standard demolition charges for subsequent use in GERMANY. All the scrap steel obtained from these various sources was despatched to ANTWERP for subsequent shipment to UK.

The breaking up of vehicles was also started in BELGIUM, particularly at the salvage depot at VILVORDE where all “written off ” vehicles from the advance base vehicle parks were brought for this purpose.

The battle of the rivers entailed heavy expenditure of ammunition and exceptionally large quantities of ammunition empties were received in the Salvage organisation, a high proportion of which had tobe stock piled for clearance at a later date.

After operation VERITABLE a battlefield clearance scheme was organised by First Canadian Army which resulted in the recovery of a considerable tonnage of material but the number of enemy small arms found was very small which indicated that some deliberate plan of concealment or destruction had been undertaken by the enemy.

It is interesting to note that the Salvage organisation in the British Army is a Service on its own, the personnel being members of the Pioneer Corps, where as in First Canadian Army the salvage units consisted of Ordnance personnel under the direction of DDOS and all returned stores were passed back through salvage units.

After the crossing of the RHINE a Salvage unit was sent to the area NORTH of WESEL to recover parachutes and other material dropped during the airborne landing. As had been the case in previous airborne operations the results achieved were disappointing as most of the parachutes had already disappeared during the three or four days between the landing and the arrival of the salvage unit.

The period of the advance through GERMANY proved difficult for effective salvage work and the salvage units with the armies concentrated mainly on recovering enemy stores required for immediate use and clearing others from railway wagons in order to release the wagons for maintenance of the armies.

Small temporary captured stores depots were established, pending the setting up of permanent captured stores depots under Service arrangements. Prior to this period a wide variety of enemy stores had been recovered and those required for Intelligence purposes were stocked at ANTWERP where they were packed and despatched to UK.

Scrap material not required in the theatre or in the UK was sold locally and up to the end of March £19,424 had been received from these sales.

The total tonnage of material reissued, shipped and sold upto the same date was 98,614 tons, although a large tonnage still remained awaiting disposal in base depots.

Fire

As operations progressed into HOLLAND and GERMANY AFS resources were strained to the limit because military fire defence was still required for installations in BELGIUM and FRANCE. Seventeen fire fighting companies and two fire boat companies provided fire defence for:-

• Army roadheads
• Corps FMCS
• Bridges over the rivers MAAS, RI-IINE,,WESER and ELBE(d) Important centres of communications in army areas
• ANTWERP, GHENT, OSTEND and CALAIS ports
• Advance base installations
• Bulk petrol pipelines
• Depots and installations in the RMA.

Thirty-one fire boats operated in the ports of CALAIS, OSTEND, GHENT and ANTWERP and inthe SCHELDT anchorages off TERNEUZEN. Personnel of these boats were controlled and administered by two HQ fire boat companies AFS each of which had its own workshop section for maintenance andrepair. For major repairs, however, return to UK was necessary.

Trailer fire pumps were now beginning to show signs of wear and as spare parts and replacementsbecame increasingly difficult, a pool of twelve new pumps was established in BRUSSELS for issue to AFS companies on loan while awaiting repairs to unit pumps.

In BRUSSELS a garage was requisitioned to which a large amount of captured enemy fire equipment was brought for inspection, test, repair when necessary and issue to units, depots etc. as recommended by AFS fire advisers.

In addition all fire equipment handed in to RSDs in and around BRUSSELS wasdealt with similarly by the AFS company stationed in the city.

At the beginning of February a DADAFS and his staff were added to the WES of HQ First Canadian Army and HQ Second Army, thus ending the ad hoc arrangement where by service control of AFS units under command of armies had been maintained by HQ 21 Army Group. Technical advice was immediately available to armies in planning operations, closer supervision of the deployment of AFS companies was possible and in general the AFS became effectively represented at Army HQ.

The addition of a Staff Capt AFS(Ports) to the WE of a HQ Base Sub Area as port fire officer eased the situation at ANTWERP as the DADAFS 7 Base Sub Area had been supervising the fire prevention arrangements for the port in addition to his other duties. By constant supervision of personnel and inspection of installations the port fire officer was able to acquire a knowledge of daily events within the port which enabled him to keep losses by fire to a minimum. Operation of the port was not interrupted for a single day during the height of its activity in spite of almost continuous attacks by enemy V-weapons.

Between 7 October and 30 March, 4,248 V1s and 1,712 V2s were recorded as falling within 7 Base Sub Areaand the central fire service control was put out of action and forced to move three times. V weapons were the cause of 105 fires of which one required thirty-two and another twelve AFS pumps, while the remainder required only five pumps or fewer. HE bombs caused three major fires, one requiring six AFS pumps andthe others five each. AFS casualties from V-bombs were one officer and twenty-four ORs injured.

The number of fires attended by AFS units during the period under review was 1,191 of which 22 were major fires and 188 due to enemy action. The most serious of these occured on 19 January when a V2 fell in HOBOKEN BPI, threatening a total of 102,658 tons of spirit.

The fire was extinguished within fifty hours of the first outbreak and resulted in a net loss of only 3,500 tons MT80 and AV gas.

A second V2 fell on HOBOKEN BPI on 14 February causing several fires while on the same day an explosion occurred on board a RN MTB moored at OSTEND and the ensuing fires required 19 AFS pumps and three fire boats for their extinction.

During the advance into GERMANY fires occurred from time to time to which the GERMAN civilian fire brigades were called to assist AFS units. In such cases the GERMAN firemen, as distinct from foreign firemen, showed great willingness and acted without question as directed by the AFS personnel in controlof the firegrounds.

Within a few hours after the GERMANS were driven out of ARNHEM by First Canadian Army on 15 April, thirty-six fires broke out in unoccupied buildings in widely separated parts of the town. In spite of careful enquiries and searches of unaffected buildings by AFS, RE and RCE personnel the cause was never determined but has been attributed to some form of delayed action incendiary bomb.

Immediately after the capture of HAMBURG two FF coys were deployed in the town and in the portand Fire Service Controls were established. These precautions were particularly necessary in that city as RAF bombings had caused extensive damage to communications and the civilian fire brigade was composed almost entirely of foreign labour who were under-nourished, untrained and in many cases unwilling to fight fires which had been set deliberately by their liberated countrymen.

The total number of fires attended by AFS units between D-day and VE day was 2,109 of which 48 were major fires and 351 were caused by enemy action.

NAAFI/EFI

NAAFI/EFI activities at this stage were concentrated mainly on preparations for the crossing of the RHINE. Suitable premises for use as depots had to be found in forward areas and these were inspected and if necessary repaired by EFI workshops branch. The special NAAFI packs used for the distribution of cigarettes etc. had been improved in accordance with suggestions made by the troops, and were stored in readiness for the major advance.

An emergency call on NAAFI resources was made when liberated allied PW began to pass through on the first stage of their journey home. Free supplies of such commodities as tooth brushes, shaving soap and tooth paste in addition to a complete range of all items on the same scale as issued to the troops,were made available for a total of up to 250,000 liberated prisoners. This demand was in addition to the supply and distribution arrangements for ISO static and 200 mobile canteens serving the troops of 21 Army Group.

During the campaign EFI conducted approximately four hundred establishments ranging from Advance Canteen Posts in the forward areas to the Montgomery Club in BRUSSELS, which was capable of handling ten thousand troops daily. Weekly supply of essential articles to units for sale to the men was made by bulk issue stores.

The following figures give some idea of the quantities of stores imported into BLA from UK and USAduring the period June 1944 - April 1945.

• Cigarettes 3,878,000,000
• Chocolate 83,000,000 2-oz bars
• Confectionery 3,141,475 lbs
• Razor blades 80,000,000
• Toilet soap 28,000,000 tablets
• Whisky 1,848,000 bottles
• Gin 910,000 bottles
• Bottled beer 25,258,000 reputed quarts

Imported beer was supplemented by beer brewed in the liberated countries from materials supplied by EFI.

Splendid work was done by the WVS attached for special duty to NAAFI/EFI. These ladies undertook the supervision of the amenities in all clubs, organised sight-seeing tours, concerts, libraries, games,etc., and operated mobile canteens at airstrips serving liberated PW being evacuated to UK.

By the end of the campaign 155 officers and 1,950 men were employed in the various branches of EFI in BLA and the supplementary force of ATS/EFI had grown to 13 oficers and 727 ORs.

In addition a total of 5,199 local civilian staff was employed in EFI establishments.

Reinforcements

REINFORCEMENT PROCEDURE

At the beginning of January it became obvious that immediate future operations would involve the placing of the majority of units in Second Army under command of First Canadian Army. This would make the existing allocation of a reinforcement group to each army an expensive and uneconomical arrangement.

It was therefore decided to withdraw 102 Rft Gp from First Canadian Army, placing it under command HQ 21 Army Group, and to forward all BRITISH reinforcements for both armies through 101 Rft Gp.

At the same time HQ,21 Army Group would nominate one of the two armies as “Reinforcement Control”, according to which was directing the major operations at the time. First Canadian Army was nominated as “control” for operation VERITABLE.

The Advance REFORSEC of the army in control was responsible for making the division of reinforcements between the two armies. The army not in control had always the right of appeal to Army Group but this right was never in fact used.

To assist in the forward movement of reinforcements and to keep the army not in control informed as regards the provision and despatch of personnel, the DAAG of its Advance REFORSEC was located as HQ 101 Rft Gp which remained at BOURG LEOPOLD until the advance into GERMANY made it necessary to step its RHUs forward one by one.

BRITISH REINFORCEMENTS

To reduce delays in the move of reinforcements, a change in procedure was made, in that personnel were delivered direct to the divisional maintenance areas instead of passing through CRCs.

As BRITISH divisions were not allotted a divisional reinforcement transit camp, each division was given at least twelve hours notice of the types and numbers of personnel under despatch, and also a list of the units for which they were intended.

Under this procedure drafts left 101 Rft Gp early in the morning, and arrived in the divisional maintenance areas on the same afternoon. There were, however, two exceptions to the general rule, for 11 Armoured Division made its own arrangements for collecting its infantry rein-forcements direct from 101 Rft Gp RHU, and Guards Armoured Division maintained are inforcement company (found from within its own resources), along side its forward delivery squadron.

CANADIAN REINFORCEMENTS

The original CANADIAN system of calling reinforcements forward against specific demands from units, resulted in there being a five-day delay between the date of the demand and the time of despatch from the CANADIAN personnel base area at GHENT.

To reduce the delay a change in procedure was made in January. Drafts were despatched daily from GHEN T, based on the information contained in the Daily Casualty and Strength States which were used as a guide to the numbers and categories of drafts required.

Divisional advanced reinforcement control officers compiled a list of the deficiencies each afternoon and sent an immediate TPM to the CANADIAN Section, Second Echelon, HQ 21 Army Group, who received these figures between 1600 hours and 2000 hours each day. Personnel drafts were then collected together during the night and despatched the following morning direct to the divisional reinforcement transit camps where they were met by unit transport and taken forward to “B” echelons. In this way deficiencies which were reported at dawn one morning were filled within thirty-six hours.

OPERATION VERITABLE

The following special arrangements were made, before the start of this operation, to deal with the possibility of high casualty figures. Each infantry battalion was posted from 50 to 100 ORs surplus to its WE before the opening of the operation. 101 Rft Gp was given by Second Army enough transport to lift 1100 men each day.

To build up the holdings inthe advance base reinforcements groups, and to remove the backlog of reinforcements in the UK which had been caused by bad weather, about 4,000 rfts, mainly infantry, were flown into the theatre between 9 and 12 February.

OPERATION PLUNDER

As Second Army was undertaking the more important task in this operation, it tookover the function of reinforcement control from First Canadian Army. As for operation VERITABLE, infantry battalions were overposted with ORs before the operation started.

As usual, 6 British Airborne Division was supplied with non-airborne reinforcements while it was operating in a ground role after the link-up.

After the initial RHINE crossing, in view of the diverging operations of the two armies, a reversion was made to the old system of having one reinforcement group under commandof each army. 102 Rft Gp therefore came under command First Canadian Army and was moved to NIJMEGEN.

As it had available capacity and accommodation, this group was also used to hold a cushion of reinforcements apart from its holding for BRITISH units in First Canadian Army. This cushion was available for either army and was under HQ 21 ArmyGroup control.

SUPPLY OF REINFORCEMENTS

The supply of OR reinforcements was, generally speaking, maintained during the last months of the campaign, although there were some shortages, but only in those trades and categories of which there was a World shortage.

The War Office exceeded its commitments before operation PLUNDER started, in giving 21 Army Group sufficient drafts to build up a total of about 12,000 infantry reinforcements, against the authorised holding of 8,000.

The position as regards officers was, however, as unsatisfactory as that of the OBs was reasonable.

Strenuous measures were taken in the Army Group and by the War Office to make the maximum number of officers available, particularly for infantry, but even so, there was a heavy deficiency when operation PLUNDER started. In actual fact, it never became necessary to break up formations or units through shortage of officers, but this would have been necessary if casualties had been sustained at the estimated rate.

Between January and May the following approximate number of reinforcements were despatched from UK to reinforcement groups in the theatre :——

• BRITISH — 67,600
• CANADIAN — 23,000
• ALLIED — 4,100

REINFORCEMENT GROUPS

104 and 105 Rft Gps remained throughout the period in the BRUSSELS and BRUGES area, dealing with non-technical and technical arms respectively. 103 Rft Gp moved from near AMIENS to near OSTEND in April, as soon as accommodation became available, thus avoiding unnecessary movement of drafts which had previously occurred.

OSTEND remained the base personnel port. At the end of the phase HQ 101 Rft Gp moved into GERMANY to EMSDETTEN, with its units echeloned back into HOLLAND.

At the end of the campaign, several RHUs were adapted to perform extraneous functions, such as the reorganisation and disbandment of units, the administering of displaced persons, as well as being used in the PWX chain of evacuation (see elsewhere).

GHQ SECOND ECHELON

After a long delay, due to the difficulties of accommodation, GHQ Second Echelon moved to BRUSSELS on 5/6 May. This move greatly helped in the administration of rein-forcements, and enabled REFORSEC, which had been in BRUSSELS since HQ 21 Army Group opened there, to be absorbed into the main part of Second Echelon.

Discipline

MILITARY PRISONS, DETENTION BARRACKS AND FIELD PUNISHMENT CAMPS

All the penal establishments of 21 Army Group were finally concentrated in BELGIUM when 26 Military Prison and 7 Field Punishment Camp Detention Barracks were set up in the ANTWERP area at the end of February.

Although the accommodation at this time wassufficient to hold 2,500 soldiers under sentence it would not have been adequate if sentences approximately 450 soldiers had not been suspended by a “Review of Sentences Board” operated in the Second Army area.

Additional accommodation was provided by increasing the establishment of No. 3 Military Prison to hold an extra hundred and by the arrival from ITALY of a field punishment camp for two hundred men as part of operation GOLDFLAKE.

Towards the end of the campaign much time was spent in re-organising the system of training and education carried out in military penal establishments, for it was then appreciated that the major task was no longer solely to train a soldier to resume his place in the army,but also to give him suitable instruction which would be of use in civilian life. An independent War Office observer visited all penal establishments in the theatre and agreed that the curriculum in each, based on the policy of individual rehabilitation, was correct and being satisfactorily put into practice.

ABSENTEES AND DESERTERS

The resources of the provost staff were not at any time sufficient to organise a thorough and constant comb-out of BELGIAN towns for absentees and deserters.

Apprehension of these individuals was made difficult because the hospitality and credulity of people in liberated countries assisted deserters to avoid detection and capture, while, at the same time, culprits themselves had become expert in forging false passes and documents.

The problem was tackled vigorously in February when a large scale check was organised. All troops in the L of C were confined to their unit locations for a period of twenty-four hours and short leave in BRUSSELS was stopped.

As a result of checking the identity of all service men who werefound in the streets and public places during this twenty-four hours more than fourhundred absentees and deserters were apprehended.

COURTS MARTIAL

Offences of desertion and absence without leave provided the largest number of trials duringthis period as the following figures show :-

The incidence of crime and disorderly behaviour was, however, remarkably low, when the number of troops in 21 Army Group is taken into account as the total of men convicted amounted to approximately only 1 per cent of the force each month.

PERMANENT PRESIDENTS

Recognition that the use of permanent presidents at courts martial resulted in a uniformity of punishment for similar crimes throughout the theatre, and the fact that a large number of cases were awaiting trial at the end of February, led to the pool of permanent presidents being increased from fifteen to twenty officers.

FRATERNISATION

All ranks were given a copy of a letter signed by the Commander-in-Chief 21 Army Groupoutlining the way in which the BRITISH armed forces were to behave in enemy country.In order to cause them a feeling of shame for the crimes they had committed and condoned, GERMAN civilians were to be ostracised, except when official business made contact with them necessary.

A memorandum was published in the shape of a confidential GRO, suggesting to commanding officers a graded scale of punishments appropriate for various breaches of the non-fraternisation order.

Prisoners of War

During the winter the problem of finding accommodation for PW was a major difficulty.

Although it was hard to get estimates of the numbers likely to be taken during the concluding stages of the campaign it was obvious that very large numbers would have to be handled. The inability of the UK to continue its function as a main base for holding PW, made it necessary for HQ, 21 Army Group to plan on making arrangements within its own resources.

At the end of April, accommodation had been found for 200,000.

This figure was reckoned to be capable of expansion by fifty per cent in emergency during the summer months. The number of PW camps was increased from six to thirteen, while to economise manpower the capacity of camps was varied (from the original 10,000) to 20,000 or 40,000 according to the locality.

55,000 PW were held in custody at the beginning of February and during operation VERITABLE.

20,000 more were captured. Soon after the crossing of the RHINE prisoners were being evacuated from the two armies at the rate of 3,500 each day, so that by the end of April the total number held in the L of C was approximately 200,000.

As a result of strong pressure the War Office agreed to take some PW in UK and to accept all officers.

It had been realised that the stage would be reached when, as the GERMAN army disintegrated, the evacuation of PW to camps in the L of C would have to stop.

Instructions had therefore been issued that HQs of Army level and above could, when the proper moment arose, instruct their troops that the enemy were not to be treated as PW, but rated as disarmed troops and held forward. Disarmed troops would not have PW status and were to be held as far as possible as organised bodies, under their own officers, and responsible for the main part of their own administration.

On 1 May the situation became such that orders were issued that no further PW were to be sent WEST across the RHINE.

On 5 May the plan for holding only disarmed enemy troops was put into force.

In an endeavour to reduce our holdings, negotiations had been taking place throughout the winter with the FRENCH and BELGIAN authorities as to the possibility of handing over PW to them. These negotiations proceeded slowly, owing to difficulties as regards the responsibility for feeding, clothing and other maintenance.

By the end of the campaign only 7,500 were in FRENCH custody, out of an agreed figure of 15,000, which was itself a first instalment. At the same time, arrangements were being completed to hand over 15,000 to the BELGIANS, mainly for work in the mines.

In March a separate section of the staff within HQ 21 Army Group was formed to co-ordinate all questions affecting prisoners of war, which up to this time had been dealt with by A(PS).

Leave

Neither short leave on the Continent nor privilege leave to UK were stopped during major operations.

By the end of April 460,000 officers and men had visited BRUSSELS and PARIS on short leave, while 412,000 had been despatched to UK on privilege leave.

In view of the long distance which men had now to travel in order to reach BRUSSELS, the short leave period was extended to seventy-two hours.

In April all the Princess de Ligne hostels in BRUSSELS, holding nearly 2,000 men, were temporarily given up to provide accommodation for BRITISH and US ex-PW in transit.

At this time considerable discussions took place with the AMERICANS who were building up a large short leave scheme in BRUSSELS regarding handing over hotels to them.

Capacity for 3,000 officers and ORs was eventually given up to them.

Marriages

During the Whole campaign HQ 21 Army Group approved 398 marriages between BRITISH service personnel and allied nationals.

All ranks who wished to marry found that no difficulty was placed in their way by the governments of liberated countries, provided that each case was brought forward and approved in accordance with the procedure for marriage to foreign nationals as outlined in 21 Army Group Standing Orders.

During the period fifty-five marriages between BRITISH nationals were also solemnized under the provisions of the Foreign Marriage Act.

PWX

A plan had been made by SHAEF, in the autumn of 1944, for the evacuation of United Nations PW who would be overrun by the advance into GERMANY.

The plan involved a central organisation run from SHAEF, called PWX (Prisoners of War Executive).

The name was eventually used in general terms for the organisation, its staff, and, eventually, for repatriated PW themselves.

The plan involved the provision of PWX Liaison Groups at major HQ, working through PWX Contact Officers who were intended to be sent forward by every possible means (possibly including air-dropping) to camps in which United Nations PW were held.

In 21 Army Group the PWX organisation was controlled by the “A” staffs of the various formations concerned.

The general policy on which PWX worked was that the personnel of overrun PW camps were to be instructed to remain in their camps until they could be evacuated in an orderly manner.

This principle was adopted to avoid the hampering of operations by any uncontrolled movement of PW, and to simplify the problems of maintenance and documentation.

It was realised that large numbers of PW would be found outside camps, and that these would be partly those who had been working away from main camps, and partly from those who would have broken camp as soon as an opportunity offered.

The psychological desire of PW to move away from their camp areas was realised, and instructions were issued by the dropping of leafiets and through subterranean channels in an endeavour to counteract this tendency. ‘

It was estimated that some 275,000 United Nations PXV would be uncovered by 21 Army Group during the advance into GERMANY, out of a total of about 21/4 million held in greater GERMANY in camps and hospitals.

Accurate figures of numbers and locations were hard to obtain and information became less and less accurate, and more delayed, as the GERMANS tried to move PW camps away from the front.

It was decided that United Nations PW should be dealt with in three priorities in the followingorder: -BRITISH COMMONWEALTH and US, RUSSIAN, and others.

Up to the end of hostilities, practically no action was taken except for those of the first category.

In view of the impossibility of ensuring that all PW would be found in camps and would stay “put”,it was realised that it would be necessary to set up a chain of evacuation, in the form of camps, to which individual PW could be directed.

This chain would also be used for the controlled evacuation of those found in camps. Armies and corps formed ad has units for this purpose, generally from pioneer companies.

In addition, to take care of the problem behind army boundaries, three new RHUs (X, Y and Z) were formed, one from each of Nos. 103, 104 and 105 Rft Gps.

A number of other RHUs, CRCs and transit camps were involved from time to time in the movement of PWX.

All units concerned with the move of PWX were given special dusting, bathing, clothing and medical facilities, and provided with Red Cross services; the latter included both personnel and special PW parcels of small necessities and luxuries, such as razors and chocolate, which had been prepared and stored in the UK in readiness for this operation.

The YMCA also gave much assistance, mainly by the provision of personnel to help organise amenities and in giving PWX an opportunity to talk to British men and women.

AEC Teams were provided to give up-to-date information on world and allied news, but this scheme was never fully developed however, as the move of PW was generally too quick for full advantage to be taken of it.

21 Army Group was provided with BRITISH COMMONWEALTH, Naval and Air Force, US and other nations liaison officers, who were employed in giving special care to their own categories.

The general principle of evacuation for BRITISH COMMONWEALTH/US PWX was by air. In the case of BRITISH PWX, some were flown direct to the UK and some were staged back, most of them through BRUSSELS.

US PWX were directed to collecting camps in the LE HAVRE area. In addition to dealing with the evacuation of those uncovered by 21 Army Group, the rear links in the evacuation chain, notably BRUSSELS, were used for staging some of the BRITISH PW uncovered by the AMERICAN armies.

The uncovering of PW’ camps, the collection of individual PW and evacuation were only just gettingunder weigh on a large scale by the end of the campaign.

Chaplains

Between January and May the six hundred candidates from BLA who offered themselves for ordination were interviewed and given special opportunities for study at St George’s House, BRUSSELS.

At the same time arrangements were made by Chaplains Branch, HQ 21 Army Group for the qualifications of these applicants to be considered by their respective church authorities.

Two Chaplain’s assistants (women) arrived early in April to take over duties among the ATS in the BRUSSELS area.

Refresher courses for all denominations other than RC were held at St George’s House, and proved ofgreat value in keeping chaplains in touch with the background and thought of their Churches in UK.

There was always an adequate supply of New Testaments but on occasions at the beginning of the phase there was a scarcity of army prayer books.

Towards the end of April thousands of Victory Service forms were printed and distributed to formations and units in preparation for the thanksgiving services to be held on VE day.

At the beginning of May casualties among chaplains in 21 Army Group amounted to :—

During the advance into GERMANY the SCF(RC) Second Army contacted the Bishops of AACHEN, OSNABRUCK and HILDESHEIM who offered their churches for the use of RC troops. In many cases the offer was accepted by RC chaplains who found the parish clergy friendly and co-operative.

In April contact was made with the Bishop of MUNSTER a confirmed and well known anti-Nazi,and in order that his influence could be used in restoring law and order among the GERMAN populationhe was given permission by Military Government to return to his work.35.

Medical

BUILD-UP AND HOLDING POLICY

Hospital bed accommodation was increased to the extent of one 1200 bed general hospital which arrived from UK in January and one BRITISH and two CANADIAN (600 bed) general hospitals which arrived in March as part of operation GOLDFLAKE.

At the end of the campaign there were 36,100 hospital beds in the theatre. The highest number which functioned in any one day in the L of C was 32,385 on 23 April.

The remaining beds were either forward with armies or closed waiting to move. On VE day beds in convales-cent depots in the theatre totalled 12,200.

The general manpower shortage was substantially overcome as far as the supply of medical personnel was concerned by employing VAD and ATS personnel who were posted to general hospitals in steadily increasing numbers from March onwards.

By 8 May the total number so employed was approximately 1,200 of which 450 were VAD members.

On 11 February the period for holding casualties and patients on the Continent was extended to forty-two days. It was never possible to institute the sixty day holding policy which had been envisaged in the original planning of OVERLORD.

L or C

HOSPITAL AREAS

Although a considerable number of units moved forward into GERMANY during the latter months of the campaign, BELGIUM continued to be the main medical base up to the close of operations. As the number of troops in the RMA diminished, the hospital accommodation was correspondingly reduced and the general hospital at BAYEUX was moved into BELGIUM by the end of March, leaving a FDS reinforced by certain specialists to supervise a 300 bed hospital.

A small camp reception station had been established in PARIS for BRITISH troops stationed there on leave. All those who required hospital treatment were sent to US hospitals.

AMIENS was cleared of hospitals in April leaving LILLE and ST OMER as the only hospital centres still in use in FRANCE. Casualties from the force containing DUNKIRK were evacuated direct to the CANADIAN hospital at ST OMER.

TURNHOUT was developed as a CANADIAN base hospital centre, initially with one 600 and one 1200 bed hospital, but in March the 600 bed hospital was replaced by another 1200 bed unit.

A convalescent depot for women’s services was set up in BRUSSELS early in March and the convalescent depot at ST POL moved to HASSELT early in April.

Medical arrangements for operation GOLDFLAKE consisted of medical officers and ambulance cars from the formations arriving from ITALY, being sited at various staging camps along the route to the BRITISH sector.

One FDS was established at MARSEILLES and another FDS formed two camp reception stations at the northern end of the route. MI room facilities were provided at the other camps, and casesrequiring hospital treatment were admitted to US army hospitals. One field sanitarysection and sets of medical equipment were provided from 21 Army Group sources.

EVACUATION

Evacuation from the L of C hospital areas to UK continued by sea from OSTEND and by air from BRUSSELS, MALDEGEM, and occasionally LILLE. Railway facilities within the theatre were such, that up to the time of the RHINE crossing casualties of the two armies could be despatched almost direct from the fighting fronts to the various L of C hospital centres.

There were eleven BRITISH ambulance trains and one BELGIAN Red Cross train connecting the main medical areas in the advance base. Within the L of C two diesel-engined ambulance rail cars, each with a capacity of about thirty patients, started to operate on 24 March and proved invaluable in collecting and distributing patients between the centres of air evacuation and outlying hospitals.

They also made journeys from BRUSSELS to deliver US patients to hospitals at LIEGE and to collect BRITISH personnel who had been evacuated through USmedical channels.

The majority of road evacuation immediately behind the armies was undertaken by two RASC ambulance car companies, assisted by a third manned by AMERICAN Field Service personnel which arrived from CMF in April.

A map illustrating the final layout of major medical units and centres of evacuationis shown at Appendix “L2”.

During the campaign 77,317 (including 89 PW) patients were evacuated to UK byair and 89,397 (including 18,911 PW) cases by sea. Within the theatre 39,335 caseswere moved by air 83,799 (including 11,676 PW’) by rail, and 450,7 71 by road.

SECOND ARMY

MEDICAL AREAS

There was no need to make major alterations in the main hospital areas at EINDHOVEN and HASSELT for operation VERITABLE. Medical facilities of 2 Cdn Corps and 30 Brit Corps were pooled for the operation, while a number of Second Army medical units, including three CCSs, eight FSUs and five FTUs were put at the disposal of First Canadian Army for 30 Corps.

An additional motor ambulance convoy was also lent for a period. As operation VERITABLE progressed the Second Army hospital areas at EINDHOVEN and HASSELT were reduced in size and a forward hospital area, consisting at the end of March of one 600 bed hospital and two of 200 bed capacity, was established at VENRAIJ. A blood bank and an advanced depot medicalstores were also sited in the area.

Ambulance evacuation from corps medical installations WEST of the RHINE in the early stages of operation PLUNDER presented no problems as the hospital area at VENRAIJ was easily accessible from the main traffic routes crossing the River MAAS.

For the crossing of the RHINE each assault corps was allotted one light field ambulance, to organise and control evacuation within the bank control group area. Before bridges were constructed over the river, evacuation from the EAST bank was achieved by specially allocated DUKWS, Buffaloes, Weasels and other available craft.

Casualties were evacuated to CCSs set up in the area of BEDBURG and KAPELLEN. Provision was made for casualty evacuation of US troops during operation VARSITY by a platoon of a US field hospital also sited at KAPELLEN. As it was impossible to sortout casualties into nationalities on the far bank of the RHINE it was arranged that casualties would be evacuated through joint BRITISH US channels until the CCS area was reached.

After the RHINE crossing there was continuous movement of one hospital after another, reminiscent of the advance through FRANCE, in an attempt to keep major medical facilities close to the fighting troops.

200 bed general hospitals and CCSs were moved forward in army transport, while the larger hospitals were sent forward under HQ 21 Army Group arrangements. The allotment of a GT coy for medical purposes,supplemented by various additional lifts and aided by rail movement for part of the way, meant that a much speedier move forward was possible than in the break-out in NORMANDY. The accommodation problem caused no difficulty for the weather was fine enough for tentage to be used when buildings were not available.

CHANNELS OF EVACUATION

An ambulance railhead moved forward to HELMOND on 18 March and to SEVEN UM, which was conveniently close to VENRAIJ, on 24 March. In addition to the normal allotment of one ambulance car company for casualty evacuation within the army and corps area, HQ 21 Army Group made two further platoons of ambulance cars available to Second Army for operation PLUNDER.

For evacuation by rail it was planned to make one ambulance train available at the railhead on D-day and, there after, two ambulance trains daily as long as required.

Successful air evacuation from HEES, which reached an average of four hundred daily, made it possible, however, to cut down the number of trains to one per day after four days. The railhead finally moved to BEDBURG in April. No ambulance trains crossed the RHINE before hostilities ceased but arrangements were made to have running rights across the US railway bridge at WESEL if required in an emergency.

From early in April the number of casualties evacuated by rail rapidly decreased because the long road journey back to ambulance railhead from the forward areas was a strain for even the lightly wounded. Evacuation from forward areas was achieved by air shuttle service direct to BRUSSELS.

Several ambulance trains with FRENCH and BELGIAN sick, ex-PW and DPs were run from BEDBURG.

At the end of March the air shuttle service had moved from EINDHOVEN to HEES and on 10 April was moved forward to RHEINE.

On 18 April air evacuation facilities were available from CELLE and DIEPHOLZ and on 1 May from LUNEBURG.

Casualties on the left flank of Second Army were evacuated from theCANADIAN airfield at ALHORN.

FIRST CANADIAN ARMY

MEDICAL AREAS

One  BRITISH 200 bed hospital at TILBURG, one 200 bed and one 600 bed CANADIAN hospital at ’s HERTOGENBOSCH, served as the main CANADIAN forward medical area during January and February. During operation PLUNDER a CCS was sited at BEDBURG to receive casualties from 2 Cdn Corps. After the crossing of the RHINE, CANADIAN medical units moved in support of First Canadian Army in a similar manner to Second Army hospitals.

EVACUATION

During operation VERITABLE the CLEVE-NIJMEGEN road, along which casualties were evacuated, was flooded.

From 13 February-18 February and to some extent until 28 February, casualties were therefore despatched to the CCS at CLEVE by DUKWS.

On 29 January a CANADIAN ambulance railhead had opened at ’sHERTOGENBOSCH. It was forced to close down on account of enemy action and re-opened at BOXTEL on 1 March. It moved again to NIJMEGEN on 4 April and remained there until the end of the campaign.

The main airfields used by the shuttle service in the advance into GERMANY were KLUIS, LINGEN and finally ALHORN

 OCCUPATIONAL PROBLEMS

Ex PW AND DISPLACED PERSONS

It was the responsibility of the Medical Services to examine all BRITISH and US PW and to dust them with de-lousing powder before they were evacuated to UK.

In addition, by 8 Way 919 ex-PW had been evacuated through medical channels. The responsibility for Displaced Persons was primarily that of the Military Government authorities, but great assistance was given by the military Medical Services in providing hospital. facilities and in supervising the hygiene and sanitation of DP camps.

In order to prevent the spread of disease in EUROPE, all DPs and ex-PW entering BELGIUM or southern HOLLAND from the EAST were detained in camps at the border, where they were examined and dusted with de-lousing powder before they were allowed to proceed. This sanitary cordon which was later extended to the RHINE-IJSSEL rivers, was so effective that few cases of disease were reported which could be traced to contact with repatriated persons.

THE GERMAN ARMY

The GERMAN military hospitals which were over-run in the advance were full of wounded.

No casualties were, however, evacuated from GERMANY after the RHINE had been crossed. As the GERMAN administrative system was completely disrupted, groups of WEHRMACHT hospitals were supervised by BRITISH medical units for purposes of control and organising supply.

Between five and twelve GERMAN military hospitals were put under the supervision of a field ambulance or FDS. The problem of controlling large numbers of captured GERMAN hospitals increased as the advance continued. Eventually MUNSTER LAGER, WINSEN, DELMENHORST and LUNEBURG became the main centres for holding GERMAN wounded.

The total number of prisoners of war in GERMAN hospitals in the army area amounted to 134,000 at the time of the ELBE assault. Two captured enemy medical equipment sections which had been formed earlier in the campaign and which had been sorting captured medical equipment in BELGIUM were brought into GERMANY to locate and concentrate the GERMAN medical store depots.

CONCENTRATION CAMPS

BRITISH medical units were called in to provide hospital, nursing and hygiene facilities at the concentration camps at SANDBOSTEL, FALLINGBOSTEL, NEUENGAMME and BELSEN which had been discovered in Second Army area.

The largest and most notorious camp, at BELSEN, was taken over on 15 April when the death rate was allegedly as much as five hundred cases per day.

One CCS, one light field ambulance, two field hygiene sections and a mobile bacteriological laboratory were sent there, followed later by a 600 bed general hospital, BRITISH Red Cross Society relief teams and other voluntary relief teams.

By 8 May accommodation had been found for nine thousand hospital cases and the death rate had fallen to approximately 110 per day.

MEDICAL SUPPLY

For most of the period medical units continued to be supplied from the advance base but base depot medical stores moved from TOURNAI to NEUENKIRCHEN early in April to be nearer both armies. The blood supply to the armies continued to be made from the base transfusion unit in BRUSSELS through advance blood banks with each army.

THE BRITISH RED CROSS SOCIETY

From the beginning of the campaign considerable assistance in providing extra comforts for the welfare of patients, was given to the Medical Services by the joint War Office organisation of the British Red Cross Society and the Order of St John of Jerusalem.

Lady welfare officers were attached to all hospitals, convalescent depots and, latterly, to CCSs. They provided an abundant supply of books, toilet requisites, cigarettes and games, as well as small articles of furniture, clothing and equipment which were not usually obtainable from army sources.

Three BRCS ambulance car platoons assisted RASC ambulance car companies in carrying on casualty evacuation in the L of areas. The work of a BRCS chiropody unit working in the OSTEND and ANTWERP areas was so valuable that arrangements were made for two more to besent from UK.

The BRCS Commission established two hostels, one in BRUSSELS and one in OSTEND to accommodate the relatives of dangerously ill patients. By agreement with the War Office a scheme for bringing relatives of dangerously ill patients into the theatre commenced on 15 March.

Two BRCS convalescent homes one for male and one for female officers were opened in BRUSSELS and two further convalescent homes were set up on theBELGIAN coast in the second half of May.

HOSPITAL VISITS

During February a scheme for local English speaking ladies to visit hospitals was inaugurated in BELGIUM under the auspices of the wife of the British Ambassador and had a considerable effect in raising morale of patients.

The scheme was later extended into FRANCE and HOLLAND.

Pay

The main operations of the Pay Service were those resulting from the move into GERMANY,which necessitated the introduction of Allied Military Marks and the use of small denomination reichs-marks. The highest denomination of the former Was 100 Marks, while the use of original GERMAN reichsmarks was limited to notes of not more than 50 Marks.

The Allied Military Mark ranked equal with the RM, and the exchange rate was fixed at forty marks to £1 as against the previous rate of fifteen RM.

All currencies held by troops moving into GERMANY were exchanged and this course was successful in that no illegal currency transactions were reported. A very considerable volume of exchanges was involved, as units and formations crossed and recrossed the frontier. As operations advanced into GERMANY it was necessary to establish a fourth command pay office which was located at RHEINE.

Operation GOLDFLAKE involved the setting up of an organisation at MARSEILLES at which lire were exchanged. For security reasons it was necessary to change into FRENCH currency and later into BELGIAN currency. This exchange also stopped the possibility of illegal currency transactions in FRANCE. To ensure that no lire were retained by the troops, their total holdings were exchanged, and the restriction limiting exchanges to sums derived from pay and allowances was waived.

Financial arrangements had to be made in anticipation of the large numbers of PWX and DPs likely to be liberated. Teams of cashiers were formed for the purpose of making immediate advances of pay to liberated prisoners, while all allied liaison officers, including ITALIANS, were given advances of funds to assist their own nationals.

Special financial arrangements were made with representatives of the USSR Government in connection with the repatriation of RUSSIAN citizens.

Forged notes found by a field cashier in receipts from an army post office led to the discovery that agang of civilian forgers was operating in PARIS and the FRENCH provinces. These notes were clever imitations of the FRENCH francs specially printed in AMERICA for the invasion forces. As a public warning of the existence of these forgeries would have had a damaging effect on the validity of the supplemental franc, secret measures had to be taken to withdraw the entire issue from circulation as quickly as possible. The gang of forgers was arrested by the PARIS police shortly afterwards.

Provost

In view of the short period between the end of operation BLACKCOCK and the beginning of operation VERITABLE strict trafic control was necessary to move and concentrate the required formations in time.

To achieve this a series of traffic check points was set up at intervals along the routes. Each post was connected by telephone with the Provost and Q(Mov) branches at HQ First Canadian Army, with the result that if any formation did not move to time, immediate notice could be given to Q(Mov), who altered the move of other units accordingly.

This meticulous control was a major contribution in moving 35,000 vehicles in such a short period.

The move into the forward areas North-East of the MAAS immediately prior to the assault, took place during five consecutive nights. Special traffic restrictions were imposed during those nights to ensure that incidental and administrative traffic did not interfere with operational moves and to make certain that all important movement was completed by first light.

To enforce these restrictions the Provost staff was lent the assistance of six hundred personnel of a CANADIAN LAA regiment, who were supplied with TC equipment and given temporary authority as regimental police.

HQ First Canadian Army was kept informed of the progress of the movement and also the state of the roads in the assembly area by a joint 30 Brit Corps and 2 Cdn Corps trafflc office which submitted reports on the situation every two hours.

As a result of these arrangements no major delays occurred in the marshalling area for the assault, despite the fact that sudden thaws caused large stretches of the main forward routes to break up and become impassable.

For the duration of operation GOLDFLAKE Provost staff officers from HQ 21 Army Group lived in PARIS with the AMERICAN Transportation and Provost Marshal branches to co-ordinate the trafficcontrol arrangements of the formations concerned.

Since the line of movement from MARSEILLES to CAMBRAI crossed the main US supply routes it was agreed that the US military police would sign the convoy route from the point of disembarkation to the dispersal point at CAMBRAI, but that the marshalling and guiding of the various convoys should be the responsibility of a BRITISH traffic control company.

At a later stage of the operation a L of C provost and a CANADIAN TC coy arrived from ITALY.

The build-up for operation PLUNDER did not present the Provost Service with any particular difficulties. Control of the main bridges at LOTTUM, WELL, GENNEP, VENLO and MOOK was exercised by an army traffic control company, assisted by experienced sections lent from L of C resources.

One traffic control company was allotted to each of 12 and 30 Corps bank control groups for duty in the bank area on both sides of the RHINE. The companies reported to corps early in March for thorough training and briefing. It was found that one company could only provide seventy per cent of the necessary control and consequently the remainder had to be improvised from pioneer or infantry resources.

At the time of the break-out from the RHINE bridgehead, Second Army had seven CMP (TC) coys and three CMP (VP) coys under command, while the Provost strength in First Canadian Army consisted of four CMP (TC) coys and one CMP (VP) coy, leaving a balance of nine CMP (TC) coys and eight CMP(VP) coys in the L of C.

The Provost resources of the two armies were sufficient to meet all requirements in GERMANY and NORTH HOLLAND, but it was necessary to ask for a further CMP (TC) coy and a CMP (VP) coy from UK for the L of C areas in order to carry out all the essential Provost commitments there.

During the advance liaison Provost staff officers of HQ 21 Army Group were attached to both the Ninth and Fifteenth US Armies.

Members of the provost section with Tac HQ, 21 Army Group escorted GERMAN officers through the BRITISH lines during the preliminary negotiations which led up to the final surrender.

The SIB continued to be fully occupied in investigating crimes connected with the disappearance of large quantities of all types of WD property which found their way into the black markets of the liberated countries.

After the entry into GERMANY military police helped in the search for suspects, enemy soldiers in hiding, and fire-arms, and also enforced the Military Government laws and ordinances, especially those relating to looting and curfew restrictions.

Sixty GERMAN civil police (Ordnungspolizei) were attached to the Provost Branch Second Army for a short course of instruction and afterwards assisted provost companies in enforcing law and order.

Education

NEWS BROADSHEETS

These continued without interruption and some innovations were introduced, such as weekly sports and athletic supplements.

In certain areas broadsheets were translated into French and posted in the windows of study centres so that local inhabitants could follow the course of the campaign from day to day.

Special editions of many broadsheetswere issued on VE day.

STUDY CENTRES

The permanent study centres proved very valuable during this phase, and additional centres were opened in GERMANY, at EMSDETTEN, LUNEBURG and HAMBURG.

Material for information rooms was received regularly from the War Office, and war maps, photographs and ABCA pictorial exhibitions were displayed in the windows of study centres in liberated countries.

Special arrangements were made for talks to former prisoners of warto bring them up-to-date on war news and home affairs.

ABCA

An increase of interest in ABCA by the troops was noted, especially at such units as RHUS, convalescent depots (particularly the ATS convalescent depot) hospitals and military prisons, to each of which AEC instructors were usually attached.

Advantage was taken of ABCA meetings to stress the reasons for the policy of non-fraternisation, and discussions also took place on some of the many problems which the soldier would have to meet on his return to civil life after release from the army.

ORGANISED CLASSES

Marked interest in continental ways of life and culture was shown and language classes were organised wherever conditions were sufficiently static.

Lecturers were made availableby the War Office, either from eminent people who were in the theatre or from the Central Advisory Council’s panel of lecturers for the Wartime Education Scheme.

Voluntary activities in ATS units included language classes, music groups, play-reading, dressmakingand child welfare.

PLANNING FOR ARMY EDUCATION SCHEME (RELEASE PERIOD)

By VE day preparations had been made for the army education scheme for the releaseperiod; additional study centres were planned, regimental instructors were trained and courses organised for part-time instructors.

A plan had been made to institute “Formation Colleges” at which advanced education could be taught during the release period, and accommodation for this purpose was earmarked at GOTTINGEN University.

SUPPLY OF BOOKS

Just before VE day 12,000 volumes of serious reading matter were received from the Services Central Book Depot and distributed in libraries of 500 books each.

Static and mobile libraries were, as always, great attractions for all troops.

Whole hearted co-operation was given by the CANADIAN education services in books, instructors, lecturers, attachment of BRITISH students to forestry units, tours and other educational activities.

Graves

During the months of January to May there were four BRITISH and one CANADIAN Graves

Registrating Units working in the L of C areas while four BRITISH and two CANADIAN units followed the advances of their respective armies. Al together they registered 16,000 graves, bringing the total of graves registered during the campaign to 48,506.

In addition, two BRITISH and one CANADIAN Graves Concentration Units operating in NORMANDY and later in northern BELGIUM and HOLLAND concentrated 4,000 graves.

At the end of hostilities there were seventy-nine permanent cemetery sites in existence and twenty-eight plots in communal cemeteries were also being used by arrangement with the local authorities.

In January a GRU was specially sent from UK to register the graves of soldiers killed in 1939—1940 and by the beginning of May had succeeded in dealing vith 6,433 of these.

Welfare

GENERAL

Approval was given in January for the formation of a pool of welfare officers within 21 Army Group to provide AWS officers for attachment to formations down to divisionsand sub areas.

EQUIPMENT

An order was placed with the Services Central Book Depot for 100,000 Penguin books to be delivered each month, and during February steps were taken to create a reserve of sports equipment for issue after hostilities ceased.

Supplies were difficult to obtain but somewere received from UK and these were augmented by purchases from BELGIAN, FRENCH and AMERICAN manufacturers.

CANTEENS, CLUBS AND HOSTELS

Welfare centres, canteens and clubs were installed in large towns, including CALAIS, BRUGES, EINDHOVEN, NIJMEGEN and TILBURG for troops on visit or passing through on short or privilege leave, and, in addition, canteens were opened in the staging and concentration areas for operation GOLDFLAKE.

Forty-six canteens were also opened by the BELGIAN Red Cross Society before VE day.

LIVE ENTERTAINMENT

By the end of January sixty-six plays and concert parties, and also ninety FRENCH and BELGIAN artistes were on tour. Every effort was made to open permanent entertainment centres in the rear areas. Portable stage sets, costumes and draperies for theatres were supplied from stock or obtained in UK while musical instruments of all types were also made available for purchase.

Although the combined resources of BRITISH and CANADIAN entertainment were adequate to meet demands, the rapid movement of operations made it difficult to route concert parties to forward troops.

The problem of providing entertainment for these men was further complicated in the early stages of operation PLUNDER because mixed parties were forbidden to cross the RHINE.

Until this ban was lifted on 14 April there was a glut of entertainment between the MAAS and the RHINE and a scarcity among the fighting formations. Fifty-seven ENSA shows, including five CANADIAN and six FRENCH/BELGIAN, were on the Continent at the beginning of May, and there were also thirty-two parties formed by service personnel, including RN, RAF, CANADIAN and “Stars in Battledress”.

Part-time entertainments included 244 dance bands and orchestras, sixty-nine unit or formation parties and twelve shows organised by BELGIAN and DUTCH civilians.

BROADCASTING

Broadcasting stations BLA 2 and BLA 4 were allotted to Second Army and were finally deployed near NIENBURG and HAMBURG and BLA 3 in the CANADIAN area was finally located at APEN.

At NORDEN a 100 KW transmitter was found undamaged and this, together with a captured 20 kw GERMAN Air Force mobile transmitter was earmarked for use by No. 1 Field Broadcasting Unit as the basis of the future “Forces Network” to cover the BRITISH zone of occupation.

Between January and May thirty radioprogrammes were recorded within 21 Army Group area by No. l FBU production unit for broadcast by the BBC on the AEF programme.

The target figure of one wireless receiver to every seventy men was largely achieved by the end of hostilities.

CINEMAS

AKS Cinema Sections continued to arrive during the period, bringing the scale at VE day to approximately one mobile cinema per 4,350 men.

In view of the lack of entertainment and social life in GERMANY, it was essential to provide more entertainment for the troops there and consequently, several AKS sections were withdrawn from L of C and sent forward.

AKS increased the number of garrison cinemas operated by them by opening more in GERMANY which were to be run and maintained by AKS until ENSA could take them over.

On VE day, ENSA was running 28 cinemas, all outside GERMANY, while AKs had 149 in operation, of which 84 were in GERMANY.

LEGAL AID

To bring free legal aid facilities nearer to the fighting troops No. 1 Forward Aid Section was moved from BRUSSELS to BOURG LEOPOLD on 23 January 45 with Second Army, and eventually followed the advance into GERMANY. No. 2 Section moved to LILLE with HQ L of C on 29 January.

SSAFA

Representatives from the BRUSSELS bureau visited OSTEND, GHENT and ANTWERP each week, while other bureaux were established as necessity arose at EINDHOVEN, CAEN, BOURG LEOPOLD, HEEZE, HORST and GOCH.

After the RHINE crossing, bureaux were opened at EMSDETTEN, HENGELO and LUNEBURG.

An office at BRUGES attached to 105 Rft Gp was opened on 5 April. During this period 2,850 men were interviewed and given advice on their personal problems.

ATS

The strength of the ATS in the theatre steadily increased during this phase and the total reached approximately 8500 by VE day.

The programme for the move to the theatre of five mixed AA Regts, three for the BRUSSELS defences and two for those at ANTWERP, was completed and all gun sites were manned by 7 Feb when the extensive necessary works services in these areas were completed. The units themselves did very good work in helping to improve their own conditions despite their disappointment at the lack ofoperational work, especially at BRUSSELS.

A start was made with a big programme for moving into the theatre complete ATS signal sections to take over from military sections. The manning of the switchboards at Rear HQ 21 Army Group was one of the first commitments. The move of GHQ Second Echelon to BRUSSELS also brought an ATS group of over 500 into the theatre.

In March a programme of the despatch of drafts of 200 here a week was put into execution. These drafts were of mixed trades, largely clerical, but also included auxiliaries for work in hospitals.

Military Government/Civil Affairs

To bring immediate relief to liberated towns of northern HOLLAND CA detachments advanced with the forward troops of First Canadian Army and distributed medical supplies, clothing and fuel from stocks which had been previously accumulated for this purpose. In addition to thirty-six CA detachments which were employed there, the rehabilitation of the country was begun under the direction of officers who were specialists in transport, public utilities, food supplies, finance and agriculture.

Also under CA arrangements the BRITISH Red Cross and other relief societies operated hospitals, laboratories, laundries and bath units.

In other liberated countries CA continued to ad vise and help local authorities in the distribution of food and fuel, and at the same time kept HQ 21 Army Group informed of the political and economic situation. In GERMANY Military Government detachments took over the control of provinces andtowns as soon as they were captured.

The control of the feeding, housing and registration of DPs was a Military Government responsibility.

For this purpose DP camps were set up in the territory occupied by 21 Army Group. The medical facilities which these camps provided for bathing and dusting with de-lousing powder, played an important part in preventing the spread of disease throughout Europe.

The importance of the work of Mil Gov/CA greatly increased in the later stages of the campaign.

It is impossible to describe them adequately in the limited space available as their activities constituted a separate and notable contribution to the campaign.

Mil Gov/CA operations from D-day to the close of this phase have been described in a series of periodic surveys compiled by Mil Gov/CA Historical Section, a summary of which is in course of preparation.

Conclusion

On 5 May 1945 21 Army Group, in conjunction with the forces of the United States of AMERICA had, in the words of its Commander-in-Chief, “seen the thing through to the end".

With the capitulation on LUNEBURG Heath followed by the unconditional surrenders at RHEIMS and BERLIN victory at last became a reality for the Allies. This history has attempted to portray in outline the contribution made by 21 Army Group to the immense administrative achievements that were necessary to bring about this triumph.

This greatest combined operation of all time had involved problems and difficulties that far transcended any previously encountered. Apart from the ordinary hazards of a huge assault against a heavily defended enemy coast and the delicate adjustments that had to be made to ensure that the often conflicting demands of operational and administrative requirements were correctly balanced at every stage, there were many other problems to be overcome.

To compensate for the lack of an adequate port in the assault area an artificial port was pre-fabricated in the UNITED KINGDOM and successfully established in its allotted place on the NORMANDY coast.

To economise in tankershipping and to assist in meeting the enormous demands for petroleum products that the mechanised armies required, a system of pipelines was constructed and laid from ENGLAND to GERMANY under the English Channel.

In the wake of the advancing armies the liberated peoples of EUROPE had to be succoured and their interior economy and industry rehabilitated after the oppression of the GERMAN occupation. Every preparation had to be made for the import from overseas of stores of every descriptionin immense quantities so that communications of all kinds could be restored quickly to working order after being devastated by the enemy.

To turn more particularly to 21 Army Grroup’s part in the operations it has to be remembered that the campaign was waged in the face of an acute shortage of manpower. The most careful planning was necessary to ensure that the strength of the force was always compatible with the task it was set and yet did not weaken the Empire effort at home and in other Theatres of War by its demands for reinforcements in particular of the many specialist categories.

The fact that despite the greater destructiveness of modern weapons and the bitter weather conditions experienced, the percentage of those who died from wounds and the rates of sickness were approximately half those of the last war was a valuable contribution to this end.

Morale is recognised as the most important single factor in War for without it no success can be achieved.

The spirit of the men at all times, the willingness with which they went into battle, their endurance and the low incidence of crime pay tribute to the work of the regimental officer and of those responsible for the arrangements for rest, recreation, good mail facilities and entertainment.

In 21 Army Group an average strength of approximately one million—equal to the population of BIRMINGHAM but spread out from NORMANDY to the BALTIC and constantly moving—had to be fed, paid, clothed, equipped, cared for and transported.

This fact alone will indicate the immensity of the administrative problem but it only forms part of the intricate pattern involved in the support of so great an undertaking.

Although recorded many years previously in his book “The River War”, about a very different type of conflict, how fully justified in the light of this campaign remain the words of Mr. Winston Churchill, Prime Minister of Great Britain at this time, when he wrote:

 “Victory is the beautiful bright coloured flower. Transport is the stem without which it would never have blossomed. Yet even the military student in his zeal to master the fascinating combinations of the actual conflict often forgets the far more intricate complications of supply.”