Outline of Operations

The most vital of the operations that took place during the period 27 September 44 to early January 45 were those to open the port of ANTWERP as the entire administrative build-up for the force depended upon their successful and early conclusion. The plan to open ANTWERP fell into three parts: first the isthmus leading to SOUTH BEVELAND had to be cleared at the same time as the “island” formed by the SAVOJAARDS PLAAT (D 2008), the LEOPOLD canal and the sea; secondly, SOUTH BEVELAND itself had to be secured, and thirdly, WALCHEREN island guarding the outer approaches to the port had to be captured.

While these operations were in progress the right wing of First Canadian Army was to be directed to advance from the ANTWERP—TURNHOUT canal across the general line of the road TILBURG—BREDA—ROOSENDAAL—BERGEN OP ZOOM to the MAAS. This latter task was given to 1 Corps which had been brought up on the right of the CANADIAN sector from LE HAVRE, while 2 Canadian Corps was made responsible for clearing the SCHELDT.

On 1 October the operation to seal off SOUTH BEVELAND began when 2 Canadian Infantry Division passed through the 1 Corps bridgehead over the LEOPOLD canal about five miles WEST of TURNHOUT. The northern outskirts of ANTWERP up to the DUTCH frontier were quickly cleared.

Despite very heavy opposition from paratroops and frequent counter attacks with infantry and tanks in the WOENSDRECHT (D62) area the isthmus was virtually sealed by 20 October and 2 Canadian Infantry Division were ready to advance WEST.

Meanwhile the operations for the clearing the SOUTH bank of the SCHELDT started on 6 October with a bitterly opposed assault across the LEOPOLD Canal NORTH of MALDEGEM (J09) by 3 Canadian Infantry Division. It was four days before the bridgehead could be sufficiently extended to enable bridges to be completed.

On 9 October, after sailing up the GHENT—TERNEUZEN canal an assault group of two battalions and a tac brigade HQ sailed into the SCHELDT and landed on beaches at the eastern tip of the “island” obtaining complete surprise and quickly establishing a bridgehead.

On 19 October after fierce fighting a junction was made with troops from the LEOPOLD canal bridgehead near ST KRUIS (D00), and BRESKENS was cleared on 22 October. After the fall of BRESKENS the enemy opposition began to crack and by 3 November the canal areas between ZEEBRUGGE, SLUIS and BRUGES were cleared of all enemy and 12,500 prisoners had been taken.

Meanwhile, on 24 October, 2 Canadian Infantry Division advanced into SOUTH BEVELAND. Despite considerable opposition they reached the BEVELAND canal on 27 October and proceeded to bridge it.

The previous day 156 Brigade of 52 Division, newly arrived from UK, sailed in LVTs from TERNEUZEN and landed successfully near BAARLAND (D3219).

A link-up with 2 Canadian Infantry Division was made on 29 October.

On 30 October the combined advance was halted at the eastern end of the causeway leading to WALCHEREN island but the following day some troops of 5 Canadian Infantry Brigade passed along the causeway and actually reached to within one hundred yards of the western end of it where they were stopped by heavy mortar and machine gun fire from the WALCHEREN dykes.

1 November was set as the date for the assaults on WALCHEREN Island. The main preliminary operation was the bombing by the RAF of the WESTKAPELLE and other sea dykes whereby the island was flooded by four breachings.

Three assaults were to be made on the island : by 2 Canadian Infantry Division and 52 Division from SOUTH BEVELAND, by No. 4 Commando on flUSHING and by Nos. 41, 47, 48 and 10 Commandos near WESTKAPELLE.

The assault from the EAST was unsuccessful, the CANADIAN battalion eventually being forced back after it had made four hundred yards progress at the causeway. The attack on flUSHING was successful and the build-up proceeded satisfactorily during the day.

The force attacking WESTKAPELLE was supported by the fire of HMS Warspite and two monitors and a close support squadron of twenty-five vessels. This squadron was heavily engaged by the nine hostile batteries between WESTKAPELLE and flUSHING.

The weather unfortunately severely restricted flying operations from UK but Typhoons from 2 TAF on the Continent pressed home a determined attack as the assault troops were about to land.

The fact that despite heavy losses the landing of the Commandos proved successful was due in no small measure to this attack and to the action of the close support naval squadron who drew to themselves, sometimes at point blank range, the fire of the enemy batteries.

On 2 November a junction was made with the force at flUSHING and on 6 November the GERMAN commander was captured at MIDDELBURG after an attack in LVTs across the inundations. By 8 November some eight thousand prisoners had been captured on WALCHEREN Island and the operations had been successfully concluded.

During this time 30 Corps was concerned with expanding the NIJMEGEN bridgehead and keeping open the corridor while 8 Corps and 12 Corps came up on its right and left respectively.

30 Corps gradually expanded WEST and SOUTH—WEST towards s’HERTOGENBOSCH to link up with 12 Corps while further WEST l Corps under First Canadian Army was moving towards the line TILBURG~BERGEN-OP-ZOOM. s’HERTOGENBOSCH was cleared on 27 October by 12 Corps and on the following day TILBURG was secured.

BREDA was captured by Polish Armoured Division under command 1 Corps on 29 October and within twenty-four hours BERGEN-OP—ZOOM, ROOSENDAAL, and OUDGASTEL (D73) had been cleared. 104 US Infantry Division who had come under command 1 Corps, joined in the sweep up to the MAAS and by 8 November all the territory SOUTH of the MAAS including the island of THOLEN and the SAINT PHILIPSLAND peninsula (D54) was completely in our hands.

Meanwhile, on the right of the BRITISH sector operations were proceeding to clear all the enemy WEST of the MAAS and to establish bridgeheads across that river. During October, 8 Corps with 7 US Armoured Division under command, captured VENRAIJ (E72) and reached the MAAS northwards from BOXMEER (E74).

In November, 12 Corps came in on their right followed shortly afterwards by 30 Corps who had been relieved at NIJMEGEN by 2 Canadian Corps.

While 8 Corps steadily pushed the enemy across the DEURNE canal near MEIJEL (E70) towards VENLO (E90), 12 Corps attacked on 14 November from EAST of WEERT towards ROERMOND (K79).

On 19 November, 30 Corps with 84 US Infantry Division under command, attacked towards GEILEN- KIRCHEN (K86). Some very stiff fighting took place in most difficult country and under bad weather conditions, but by early December, the enemy had been cleared from the WEST bank of the MAAS as far SOUTH as a few miles below MAESEYCK (K67) whence our line crossed the river and ran just NORTH of SITTARD to inclusive GEILENKIRCHEN.

On 13 December, regrouping started for the second stage. This operation was to be carried out initially by 30 Corps who were to attack South-East from the NIJMEGEN area. 12 Corps took over in the SOUTH and HQ 30 Corps moved to BOXTEL (E33).

However, on 16 December, the enemy launched his ARDENNES offensive against first US Army and on 20 December, the US Ninth and first Armies came under operational control of the HQ 21 Army Group.

30 Corps was concentrated in the general area LOUVAIN—HASSELT, and operated with first US Army on the northern and western flanks of the ARDENN ES salient, capturing some seven hundred prisoners.

As the salient was gradually eliminated, 30 Corps was pinched out, and on 14 January, Corps HQ proceeded to BOXTEL to resume preparations for its original operation.

Administrative Picture

FORMATION OF THE ADVANCE BASE

To implement the decision made early in September that the new advance base for the BRITISH forces would be established in the area of ANTWERP and BRUSSELS reconnaissances were carried out and plans initiated long before the port of ANTWERP was opened.

The selection of this area for the advance base was made because it was suitably located both for stocking from the ports and for delivery to the fighting troops. In addition it was well served by road, rail and canal communications, contained much suitable accommodation and had readily available a good supply of labour.

The depots, however, could not be fully stocked until the port of ANTWERP was open. In the meantime commodities were delivered to the depots under HQ 21 Army Group control by road and rail through the Channel ports and from the RMA.

The development and exploitation of the system of canals provided an additional means of transport but road and rail transport remained the priority systems for getting initial stocks on the ground particularly in the forward areas. Barge transport along these canals was of great assistance in the subsequent build-up.

In addition to the necessity for guaranteeing a constant intake of all commodities to meet daily maintenance requirements it was estimated that prior to launching any major advance 20,000 tons of supplies, 40,000 tons of POL and a similar tonnage of ammunition in addition to large quantities of ordnance, RE and medical stores would be required in the advance base.

The policy was that the advance base should remain outside GERMANY even when operations progressed into that country. Should HAMBURG or a similar port be captured it would be used solely as a transit port to supplement the existing L of C.

By late September the administrative difficulties created by the sweep across FRANCE and BELGIUM were being overcome and the L of C presented a more organised aspect. It became evident, however, that the long administrative tail should be shortened as soon as practicable.

The military population in the RMA alone was approximately 100,000 and the tonnage of stocks there amounted to between 300,000 and 400,000 tons. It was decided, therefore, that once the port of ANTWERP was opened the RMA should begin to close down and that after all the stocks required by 21 Army Group had been forwarded to the new advance base the remainder would be handed over to the War Office for disposal.

With the opening of ANTWERP it also became possible to close certain Channel ports in order to release key personnel and transportation resources for essential Work in the advance base.

Stocking of the advance base presented a difficult movement problem with the import of stores from UK having to be co-ordinated with the moving of the stocks from the RMA. In particular the available transporter and rail lift for heavy “A” vehicles was severely limited.

In the middle of October there were still some eight hundred heavy “A” vehicles to be moved and the last of them was not cleared until the end of December. “B” vehicles could be driven under their own power but the acute shortage of drivers slowed up this clearance.

At the beginning of November Canadian Military HQ in ENGLAND loaned a vehicle company from its depot in UK for “ferry” work between BAYEUX and BRUSSELS. Close control had to be kept of all this movement so that a proportion of all the different makes and types of “B” vehicles was constantly available in the new advance base.

Until the opening of ANTWERP when a reserve at last began to accumulate, no sooner did “B” vehicles arrive in the advance base than they had to be re-issued to the armies and to L of C’ so great was the urgency for them.

Excellent accommodation for advance base workshops was easily found in the area, generally in factories. Difficulty was experienced, however, in finding suitable sites nearby for returned vehicle parks as, owing to the low-lying nature of the country, vehicles left in the open were liable to sink into the muddy soil.

The most suitable areas were aerodromes and double carriage-way roads but all aerodromes were being used to capacity and to take up much of the road space would have seriously interfered with the clearance of ANTWERP.

At first, even after its approaches had been cleared of enemy, ANTWERP could not be used as the river was heavily mined and the lock gates were damaged. The planned working tonnage of the port exclusive of bulk POL was 40,000 tons per day of which 17,550 tons was allotted to the BRITISH and 22,500 tons to the US forces.

The capacity of the bulk POL installations of the port was ample to meet all BRITISH and US requirements. The BRITISH and US authorities had joint access to common user facilities and installations.

Movement of AMERICAN stores was directed from quayside to their advance depots and any storage accommodation Within the port area was utilised for transit purposes only. Small installations were required for the local maintenance of the US forces and arrangements for these were concluded between HQ 21 Army Group and the Channel Base Section of Com Z.

MAINTENANCE ON THE FORCE

Early in October 21 Army Group took over Second Army No. 6 Roadhead at DIEST as a cushion for holding stocks for the forward area. Second Army commenced stocking No. 8 Roadhead in the area of BOURG LEOPOLD on 4 October. To effect this eight railheads were opened and controlled by an organisation known as “Q” Administrative Post set up within HQ Second Army.

This organisation was modelled on the lines of TRANCO but its responsibilities were confined to railhead clearance, supervision of the layout of the roadhead, and co-ordination of all movement within it.

Early in December corps railheads were established for supplies and POL to reduce the transport commitment and the risk of delay which might be caused by the break-up of roads during thaw conditions. The operations of First Canadian Army for clearing the SCHELDT estuary were first maintained from N 0. 7 Army Roadhead in the LENS area and later from No. 9 Roadhead which opened near TERMONDE on 5 October.

On 3 November No. ll Army Roadhead opened in the area of TURNHOUT. The GERMAN ofiensive in the ARDENNES presented no administrative problem for Second Army as 8 and I2 Corps continued to draw supplies and POL from their corps railheads and ammunition from N o. 8 Army Roadhead. 30 Corps, however, after its rapid move SOUTH to defend the line of the MEUSE, was mainly based on GHQ depots.

It was planned that once the port of ANTWERP was open all troops SOUTH of the SEINE should be maintained from stocks left in the RMA and through the port of CAEN. All other BRITISH troops in FRANCE were to be maintained in supplies and POL through the Channel ports whilst the armies and all BRITISH troops in BELGIUM would be main- tained from the advance base.

ACCOMMODATION

With the approach of winter and the likelihood of 21 Army Group continuing operations in northern HOLLAND and Western WESTPHALIA the provision of accommodation both for forward and L of C troops became a major problem. In the case of the latter extensive requisitioning was carried out of buildings previously occupied by the GERMANS and a large hutting programme for AA deployment in the advance base was completed at short notice.

Orders for the provision of this hutting were placed with BELGIAN contractors. Accomodation was found for two divisional rest areas, one in the area of DIXMUDE, ROULERS and YPRES and the other in the area of GHENT.

Subsequently a brigade rest area was located SOUTH of BRUSSELS. In addition much accommodation was reserved in FRANCE and in BELGIUM for Civil Affairs to cater for the possibility of large scale evacuation of BELGIAN cities as a result of heavy enemy air attack and also for the arrival of refugees and displaced persons.

For the forward troops hutting accommodation was im- practicable and transport limitations prevented much tentage from being brought forward.

The policy therefore, was to resort to extensive requisitioning, the occupation of any camps formerly utilised by the GERMAN army and, except in GERMANY where it was prohibited, to billetting on the local population.

LOCAL RESOURCES

A mutual agreement was arranged between the Governments of GREAT BRITAIN and BELGIUM enabling the military to obtain stores and services from local resources in BELGIUM. This relieved the problem of supplying stores which were already in short supply in UK and in addition saved valuable shipping space.

To implement this agreement the BELGIAN Government formed a department called the Office of Mutual Aid (OMA).

This organisation delegated powers to burgomasters which enabled the military to obtain all their requirements with the exception of the major transactions which were processed through the OMA.

All contracts involving the production and payment for goods and services including notably those for civilian labour, were arranged through the OMA. Similar mutual aid agreements were concluded with FRANCE and the NETHERLANDS.

All these agreements were concluded on a lease lend basis. Mention will be found elsewhere of the contracts placed locally for the supply of fresh fruit and vegetables to the troops and also for the production of large quantities of hutting. But one of the most important contracts was for the manufacture of bridging material for the construction of the bridges that would be thrown across the RI-IINE.

Some 1,500 tons of the total of 25,000 tons necessary were produced locally by BELGIAN contractors but in addition to this all the sixty-foot timber piles were cut down and manufactured near BRUSSELS.

Another example of operational importance was the local manufacture of 350,000 extended end connectors which are steel shoes, weighing approximately five pounds, which when fitted to the outside of tank tracks enable them to travel better over soft ground and in snow.

They proved of considerable operational importance early in the New Year and in the battles between the IVIAAS and the RHINE. Speed of manufacture was in many cases greater in BELGIUM than in ENGLAND where any new project had to be placed on a priority list. For instance, at the end of September it was decided that in view of our air superiority an increased amount of light could be used by vehicles at night in the rear areas.

It was therefore necessary to design a method by which vehicles could use more light in the rear areas but could conform to operational requirements when in the forward areas. 200,000 headlamp modification sets, each consisting of sixteen different items, were designed and supplied within four weeks, whereas a minimum of three months for the task had been estimated by the Ministry of Supply in UK. Lastly the considerable tyre repair capacity available in BELGIUM was utilised by REME to the full.

COAL

For the first two months of the invasion there was little demand for solid fuel. It was only when military railways began to operate that competing demands became so serious that a solution to the problem had to be found.

Priorities were established by the Solid Fuels Section at SHAEF so that coal used for military railways would have first precedence.

Second priority was given to coal for other military purposes, such as military hospitals, laundries, cooking and space heating for troops. The next priority included essential civilian requirements, such as fuel for electric power, gas and essential industries.

During the latter part of October a new problem arose—namely that of coal supply for the industries working under army contract. The principle adopted for supplying solid fuel to these industries was determined in accordance with the priority level of the products to be manufactured.

In October 21 Army Group and Communications Zone established agencies in the coal mining areas, while SHAEF appointed a Solid Fuels Sub-section for each liberated country.

Physical possession of coal for military purposes was taken over by the former agencies and coal was distributed to the various military consumers. Distribution for essential civilian purposes was left in the hands of the several national governments concerned.

In the early part of December, however, it became apparent that the distribution of coal in BELGIUM was not being carried out by the civil agency in accordance with the allocations made by the BELGIAN Working Party (which reviewed all solid fuel requirements in respect of availability).

Therefore, a joint 21 Army Group and Communications Zone organisation called Coal Distribution Section (BELGIUM) (CODISEC B) was set up. This section, consisting of a headquarters in BRUSSELS and ’ive sub-sections each in a BELGIAN mining area, checked the despatches of coal in accordance with the priority of allocations.

By means of guards on the mines and on the trains the arrival of the coal at its correct destination was ensured and pilfering reduced.

Military Movement Control offices at the principal BELGIAN railway junctions also prevented the diversion or the re-consignment of coal in transit.

The mining of coal depends on a constant supply of pitwood. At the time of the liberation of BELGIUM about 60,000 cubic metres of pitwood were in stock but it was so unequally distributed between the mines that in some places there was only three days supply while others had sufficient for three weeks normal production.

On the assumption that one ton of pitwood is required to produce approximately thirty tons of coal, SHAEF had set 21 Army Group the task of furnishing 2,000 tons of pitwood per day from indigenous sources. In actual fact it was found in practice that the planning figure was too pessimistic and that one ton of pitwood produced over forty gross tons of coal.

A daily supply of 1,400 tons of pit- wood, therefore, proved suflicient not only for the production of the essential requirements of coal but also for a reserve gradually to be accumulated.

The difficulty in the rail liftfrom the source of cutting to the mines was the chief bottleneck to the attainment of this tonnage but, on an average, it was successfully maintained until the GERMAN offensive in the ARDENNES robbed the military authorities of the resources of the ARDENNES forest which was the chief soucre of pitwood in BELGIUM.

21 Army Group then attempted to provide pitwood from other indigenous sources but met with little success.

It was found necessary to import pitwood from the UK but supplies did not arrive until the latter part of January and then only in very small quantities. When the operational situation was restored and work could again be resumed in the ARDENNES the target of 2,000 tons of pitwood per day was not only reached but was soon exceeded.

PLUTO

During the autumn a further extension of the PLUTO scheme for pumping petroleum across the Channel from UK to the Continent was put in hand. The original pipeline which had its continental terminal near CHERBOURG had not proved successful although some petroleum had been pumped through.

It was decided, therefore, to develop a short crossing entitled DUMBO from DUN GENESS. The first plan was to bring the cross-channel pipes to AMBLETEUSE but as this beach was found to be heavily infested with mines it was decided to change the continental terminal to BOULOGNE.

Clearance from BOULOGNE, however, presented considerable difficulties and work was put in hand to extend the pipeline to CALAIS Where rail facilities were very much better. This extension was completed in November, the first pipeline having begun to operate at the end of October.

By the end of the year DUMBO was giving an average discharge of 1,300 tons per day. The saving in tanker shipping that this project effected was very great as the cargo of a tanker discharging into the system at LIVERPOOL was pumped across ENGLAND and under the Channel and finally emerged on the Continent.

 SHIPMENT OF REPLACEMENT VEHICLES

The period between the cessation of imports into the RMA and the opening of ANTWERP was a critical one for the shipment of replacement vehicles as the movement of stores was taking up almost all the capacity of the Channel ports. The heavy “A” vehicle situation was also becoming serious as many tanks had either been damaged during the advance or left behind through mechanical breakdown and stocks in the RMA and Armoured Replacement Group were almost exhausted.

On 27 September as a result of no shipments having arrived for three Weeks the force had approximately only seventy per cent of the unit entitlement (UE) of the main gun tanks and only fifteen per cent and five per cent were remaining in the ARC and base stocks respectively.

A large number of repairable gun tanks lay between ROUEN and BRUSSELS but, owing to the strain on recovery facilities and the capacity of Workshops being greatly reduced by frequent moves, it was estimated that a considerable time would elapse before they could be made available again to the fighting formations.

It was arranged, therefore, that forty tanks per day should be shipped into BOULOGNE during October.

Early in November LSTs began to arrive in OSTEND and from then until the opening of ANTWERP thirty heavy “A” vehicles a day were received through OSTEN D and twenty through BOULOGNE.

Clearance from these ports presented great difficulty as there were no rail facilities from BOULOGNE and tank transporters, already fully employed, had to be used. In the case of OSTEND owing to there being no class 70 route, rail clearance had to be used and this was hampered by the constant shortage of engines and Warfiats.

The closest touch was maintained with War Office and BUCO to regulate the flow of tank imports and to ensure that types of tanks not movable by rail went to BOULOGNE and the remainder to OSTEND. This shipment of tanks absorbed the whole of the MT shipping lift to forward ports.

Shipment of “B” vehicles, therefore, had to be continued through the RMA and from 27 September they came in at the rate of approximately 250 per day.

With the advent of Winter it became clear that conditions in the RMA were going to be bad and the “B” vehicles there would become mudbound owing to lack of sufficient drivers to bring them up to the new advance base. All shipments of replacement “B” vehicles were therefore discontinued at the beginning of November until the opening of ANTWERP.

Once this port became available shipments came through it at an average rate of between 40 and 50 heavy “A” vehicles and between 250 and 300 “B” vehicles per day.

RE-ORGANISATION OF THE SYSTEM FOR HOLDING, SERVICING AND ISSUING TANKS

It was found that two AFV servicing units were insufficient for dealing with the number of replacement tanks to be issued as Well as the complete re-equipment or reorganisation of tank units. On the break-up of 27 Armd Bde, therefore, the bde workshop was allotted to the Army Delivery Squadron of Second Army to service tanks there. On 12 December the following system for servicing and issuing tanks was adopted :—

• 27 Armoured Brigade Workshop continued with the army delivery squadron servicing tanks issued from GHQ parks. N o. 3 AFV Servicing Unit was placed under command of First Canadian Army, No. 2 AFV Servicing Unit remained under GHQ control to service 79 Armoured Division and to deal with any re-equipment and re-organisation programmes for either army.
• An Armoured Stores Company for the holding of tank kits was formed and placed under GHQ control while RAOC kitting sections were allotted to delivery squadrons with armies and 79 Armoured Division.
• RAC reinforcements formerly employed by Second Army Delivery Squadron for servicing were divided equally between the two armies.
• HQ 21 Army Group remained responsible for delivering tanks, after inspection by the AFV Inspectorate, to army and 79 Armoured Division’s delivery squadrons.

NEW TYPE VEHICLES

The following new equipments began to operate during this phase ;

• LVT (Landing Vehicle Tracked). These are light armoured tracked amphibious vehicles capable of carrying a section of infantry or one jeep, scout car or 6-pr anti-tank gun. They were issued to 5 Assault Regiment RE in September, and played an important part in the operations for clearing the SCHELDT and WALCHEREN island.
• COMET. The Comet was the latest BRITISH cruiser tank and carried a 7 7-mm gun. 29 Armoured Brigade was to be equipped with these in December but before the change from Shermans to Comets was completed the ARDENNES of:"ensive began. The Brigade was re-issued with its Shermans and proceeded immediately to hold the MEUSE crossings between NAMUR and DINANT. In consequence the Comet tank did not see action until after the crossing of the RHINE.

TANK TRANSPORTERS

The advance into BELGIUM made the need for tank transporters acute. By the first week of October all nine companies in the 21 Army Group Order of Battle had arrived. One was allotted to First Canadian Army, three to Second Army and five were under GHQ control. Among the tasks performed by the tank transporter companies under GHQ control were :—-

• Operational lifts of armoured formations.
• Clearance of reserve tanks from the RMA.
• Moving RE equipment, cranes and other heavy loads incapable of movement by rail.
• Clearance of replacement tanks from BOULOGNE.
• Delivery of reserve tanks to the army delivery squadrons.
• Back-loading of tanks to ports for repair in UK.
• Lifting back repairable tanks from army areas to the advance base.
• Carriage of certain naval craft over land.

Q(AE) was the branch of HQ 21 Army Group which co-ordinated all transporter requirements submitted by other branches and services. In the‘ ten months during which the five tank transporter companies under GHQ control were operating on the Continent they covered 2,490,000 miles laden and 2,067,222 miles unladen.

The average daily mileage of each ‘transporter worked out at 68 miles per day. A shortage of heavy tyres for tank transporters became acute in December and four of the GI-IQ tank transporter companies had to be taken off the road and were only used in emergencies. After that date therefore, the majority of tank moves had to be carried out either by rail or on their tracks.

HOLDINGS OF SHERMAN TANKS

Attached at Appendix “S” is a chart showing the theatre position for holdings of Sherman '75-mm gun tanks.

These were the main gun tanks of the force and the supply position for them is representative of most other types. The chart is based on the percentage of the unit entitlement of the force and shows the percentage held by units throughout the campaign, the cumulative percentage held by units and in ARG, and the total percentage of UE available with units, in ARG and in base vehicle parks.

The ideal theatre position was for units to be at 100 per cent with a further twenty-five per cent behind them in the ARG and another twenty-five per cent behind that in base vehicle parks. The chart does not show those tanks under repair behind second line or awaiting repair for which there was a theatre entitlement of twenty-five per cent which was seldom exceeded.

Any sudden change in the unit entitlement results in a large jump in the percentage holdings through the theatre. These occurred in particular during December when the UE of the force was changed to two 17-pr tanks and one 75-mm tank per troop instead of two 7 5-mm and one 17-pr per troop. Again in January the UE of Sherman 7 5-mm was reduced by the conversion of 29 Armoured Brigade to Comets.

It will be seen from the chart that up to the end of August no appreciable base stocks had been built up. No sooner had tanks arrived in the theatre than they were issued to ARG and from there to units. In the latter half of August these issues to the ARG continued but the ARG stock was built up considerably owing to their difficulty in getting tanks forward to the units advancing across the SEIN E.

A peak in holdings was reached on 5 September, on which day shipping was turned off until 25 September. Thereafter throughout September the losses by units could not be wholly replaced. The stocks in the ARG were running down and the base stocks were becoming rapidly exhausted until at the end of September there was only ninety per cent of the UE in the theatre.

Once shipping started on 26 September at the rate of forty tanks a day through OSTEND and BOULOGNE the theatre position improved rapidly so far as units were concerned, but the stocks in ARG and base vehicle parks did not increase until mid-October.

Thereafter the situation remained normal until the heavy issues to the AMERICANS at the end of December (mentioned in the next para) which affected the total theatre position by a reduction of twenty-five per cent of UE being deducted from the total holdings.

The effect of the conversion of a brigade to Comets was to produce surplus theatre holdings behind units until mid-March when the position settled down and until the end of the campaign approximated throughout to target holdings.

HANDOVER OF SHERMAN TANKS TO THE US FORCES

On 26 December a personal emergency ops signal was received by the MGA from Commanding General Communications Zone asking for the immediate loan of as many medium tanks up to 500 as could be made available.

By 1800 hours the same afternoon vehicle parks had been warned to be ready to make substantial issues and special REME teams from advance base workshops were sent to assist. The same evening a signal was sent releasing a total of 351 Shermans.

The next day was utilised for preparing the tanks for issue and assembling transporters and warflat trains. Train programmes for the maintenance of the armies were interrupted in order to allow the assembly of the trains.

The preparations included a re-adjustment of the Wireless layout of each tank to conform to US practice. The extreme cold and bad weather conditions much hampered the work but three pre-heaters for warming up the engines were obtained on loan from the RAF and proved of great assistance.

In all 217 tanks were moved by transporter and 134 by rail. By 1 January. all of the 351 tanks had been issued but the exceptionally severe Weather conditions delayed the arrival of some of the tanks on transporters. Amongst other material loaned to the AMERICANS about this time were 106 25-pr guns, 78 arty trailers, 30 6-pr guns and various types of ammunition.

CLOTHING AND EQUIPMENT

The provision of additional clothing for the winter assumed importance during this phase and certain increases in the scales of protective clothing were agreed to by the War Office in November. Owing to the shortage of all types of army clothing the ‘Nar Office was unable to agree to 21 Army Group adopting Scale I of War Clothing Regulations instead of Scale III.

It was, however, found possible to authorise each man to hold two sets of battle dress provided that only one set was new and the other part-worn. A kit bag and a fourth blanket were issued to every man in the force.

Local production of clothing was implemented and 10,500 rabbit skin fur coats were made and issued to armies in December. At the end of December the lNar Office released snow camouflage and winter warfare equipment which was shipped to the theatre in January and issued to formations in accordance with scales laid down by G(SD). This equipment proved invaluable during the heavy falls which occurred during January.

It was agreed with the War Office that certain units formed from allied liberated man power should be equipped to equivalent BRITISH scales so that they could replace BRITISH units in the Order of Battle, thereby releasing BRITISH manpower.

Large issues of clothing, equipment, AF. G1098 stores and vehicles were made, particularly to the BELGIANS, although issues to complete authorised programmes continued concurrently both to FRENCH and NETHERLANDS units.

On 12 October an Inspectorate of Army Equipment was formed at HQ 21 Army Group to assist units where necessary in identifying captured equipment and to ensure the return of excess holdings of equipment and vehicles. By the end of the year there were four inspectorates, one each working in BRUSSELS, 11 and 12 L of C Areas and with First Canadian Army.

During December these inspectorates were successful in finding and recovering 436 vehicles and trailers surplus to WE and also a very large quantity of clothing and surplus equipment. In one base sub area alone over 20,000 items were recovered in three days.

Owing to the need for building up reserves of artillery ammunition for future oifensives G(SD) limited expenditure of certain natures and allotted specific quantities for each operation. As a result of experience gained during the campaign amendments became necessary to “21 Army Group Ammunition Rates”. The revised rates published on 7 November compared with the original rates are shown at Appendix “P”.

The re-equipment of infantry division A tk regiments was commenced in December and a re-organisation centre was established near BOURG LEOPOLD to assist Second Army in re-equipping their units while First Canadian Army undertook to carry out the work in corps areas.

On completion of the change-over, each A tk regiment consisted of four btys each of one tp of 17 -pr Valentines (3 guns), one tp of 17 -pr towed (3 guns) and one tp of 6-pr towed (4 guns).

Before the end of December it was found possible in response to a recommendation received from 1 Corps to make available and distribute sufficient four-wheeled drive 3-ton lorries to convert all second line RASC companies and platoons to a fifty per cent four- wheeled drive basis. This was of great assistance in the winter conditions.

Captured enemy equipment assumed increasing importance during November and a new section of Q(AE) branch was formed, designated Q(AE)4, with the task of controlling all

captured enemy equipment in conjunction with G(SD), and also to undertake planning for the disarmament of GERMANY.

PREPARATION OF STATISTICS

Q(AE) Statistics prepared the first weekly wastage report of “A” vehicles by WD number on the Hollerith machines and forwarded it to War Office on 25 October.

Various calculations relating to leave eligibility and also a paper on the suggested statistical organisa- tion considered necessary in connection with demobilisation of the GERMAN armed forces were prepared at the request of “A”. Subsequently the branch undertook to prepare statistics for the Medical services.

As a result of the adoption by War Office of the consolidated figures prepared from unit returns on AFsG3200 as the basis for future maintenance demands Q(AE) Stats assumed responsibility for the preparation of the monthly “B” vehicle maintenance demands prev- iously prepared by Ordnance. The branch designed and produced a new form, 21 Army Group Form 100 which was taken into use for the first time on 31 December as AF.Gl000 (Monthly Return of War Office Controlled Stores) had become out of date.

On 15 November a census of office machinery was taken and the branch agreed to maintain it at the request of P & SS.

Organisation of the L of C

At the beginning of this phase HQ 7 and 8 Base Sub Areas, which were administering ANTWERP and OSTEND respectively were under command of First Canadian Army, while HQ 4 L of C Sub Area in BRUSSELS was under command of Second Army.

Each of these HQ was also made responsible for finding suitable accommodation for HQ installations in its area of the new advance base. At the beginning of October HQ 4 L of C Sub Area handed BRUSSELS over to a specially formed garrison HQ entitled HQ Brussels Garrison and assumed administrative responsibility for the 21 Army Group roadhead in the area of DIEST. All the above HQ came under command of HQ L of C after the move of that formation to MALINES at the end of September.

When Rear HQ 21 Army Group moved to BRUSSELS the L of C was already stretched from BAYEUX in the RMA to the BELGIAN/DUTCH frontier and its ration strength at the end of October had risen to 450,000 including RAF and PW personnel. Even with the addition of HQ 15 L of C Sub Area the number of suitable administrative headquarters was clearly insufficient for proper control and so HQ 16 L of C Sub Area was formed and HQ 11 Garrison was converted into HQ 9 L of C Sub Area. On 28 September HQ 16 L of C Sub Area assumed responsibility under HQ 11 L of C Area for the department of the SOMME and a portion of the OISE department. In November it moved into BELGIUM to administer the port of GHENT, the responsibility for the territory previously administered by it devolving on 6 L of C Sub Area. In October HQ 36 Beach Brick, which had moved up from the RMA, took over administrative responsibility for the arrondissement of BOULOGNE.

On 8 December a large scale re-shuFFIe took place and HQ 11 L of C Area moved to MALINES to take over administrative responsibility for the advance base and those parts of BELGIUM Within the L of C zone. HQ L of C then moved back to ROUBAIX in FRANCE in order to be in a more central position for controlling the whole L of C. Simultaneously HQ 12 L of C Area moved from CABOURG in N ORMANDY to AMIENS to assume administrative control of all areas of FRANCE Within the BRITISH zone. The administrative layout of the L of C as at 31 December is shown at Appendix “J”.

Movements

GENERAL

The necessity for transferring the supplies and stores vital for the maintenance of the armies and for the establishment of the new advance base in the BRUSSELS—ANTWERP area involved the Movements Staff in many problems of road, rail, air and shipping movement in addition to the new factor of rehabilitating and exploiting the intricate canal systems of BELGIUM, HOLLAND and northern FRANCE.

Naturally, the successful establishment of the new advance base hinged finally on the capture and clearance of the approaches to ANT- WERP. Until such time as that great port became available for shipping the maximum use had to be made of road and rail transport from the RMA and of imports through the hastily repaired Channel ports of DIEPPE, BOULOGNE, CALAIS, LE TREPORT and OSTEND.

From the Movements point of view the L of C to the army roadheads was divided into three main portions, firstly that area lying SOUTH of the SEINE, secondly the area NORTH of the SEINE to the BELGIAN frontier, and finally the area of BELGIUM.

All these came directly under HQ 21 Army Group control with the exception of the army railheads which were under control of the armies. It was clear that problems were bound to arise as a result of the mixed BRITISH and US traffic over the BELGIAN transport system and particularly from the port of ANTWERP. A BELGIAN Movements Committee was therefore estab- lished in BRUSSELS to ensure the best use by 21 Army Group, Communications Zone and the BELGIAN Government of all the resources available.

Representatives of “Q” sat on the committee so that priorities could be settled Whenever necessary.

The Movements staff of the SHAEF Missions to BELGIUM and the NETHERLANDS were also of the greatest assistance in co-ordinating military and civil movement and ensuring that facilities were available for the former when required.

Three major operational moves were either planned to take place or occurred during this phase.

The first was to have been the switch of 30 Corps from the MAASTRICHT area to the extreme NORTH near GRAVE and NIJMEGEN.

This was scheduled to take place between 13 and 26 December but was curtailed by the GERMAN offensive in the ARDENNES and in its stead 30 Corps was rapidly moved to cover the line of the MEUSE. Although this manoeuvre involved crossing both the BRITISH and the AMERICAN L of C it was successfully achieved.

To counter the same offensive 6 Airborne Division was brought over from UK. The move of the Whole division with skeleton transport took place entirely by sea through OSTEND and CALAIS and was completed in about four days.

The main effect of the GERMAN break-through in the ARDENNES was that the movement programmes for war—like stores for the operations scheduled to begin in early January had to be cancelled and the only trains running forward of the roadheads were those carrying stone and construction materials. In the AMERICAN zone, however, considerable congestion occurred on their rail L of C owing to their inability to continue accepting stores in depots EAST of NAMUR.

This had its effect on the working of ANTWERP where stores began to pile up on the quays as there were no US depots in the area.

In order to cater for the possible loss of their LIEGE depots an area between LILLE and VALENCIENNES was established by the AMERICANS as a service area. This was designed also to relieve the congestion on the railway lines without interfering with the BRITISH L of C from the Channel ports and the RMA.

By the end of October the front in HOLLAND had become more stabilised and with the growing efficiency of the rail communications it was possible to dissolve TRANCO and return to the normal L of C organisation for movement.

It had been decided by SHAEF that ANTWERP should be a joint US and BRITISH port to be developed under BRITISH direction and that it should handle tonnages up to 45,000 tons per day excluding bulk POL.

A special combined US/BRITISH staff was set up under Q(Mov) 21 Army Group to plan the joint operation and clearance of the port in all its aspects. This staff produced complete agreement on these problems the terms of which were defined in a document called “The Charter of ANTWERP”.

At the same time as ANTWERP opened, canal traffic from that port to the depots in the advance base was started. It had been hoped that coal trafic could commence from the LIMBURG mines towards ANTWERP along the ALBERT canal during December but due to various difficulties encountered by both BRITISH and AMERICAN engineers this was not achieved until early in the new year.

Movements and Transportation staffs were provided for the barge traffic. In order that the most economical use of all barges could be made the BELGIAN Government was requested in November to establish an organisation through which demands could be placed and which would be responsible for all military needs being given priority.

A more detailed account of the work on the canal systems will be found elsewhere.

At the beginning of December it was apparent that largely owing to the activities of the black market the distribution system for coal within BELGIUM was breaking down.

Unless essential civil services were maintained and unrest avoided, military plans would have been seriously affected and therefore it became necessary to treat the control of coal movement as a military operation. Guards were placed at collieries and receiving points and strict pro- gramming of traffic with military despatching was inaugurated.

A movement control group was specially brought over from UK to assist in the establishment of this organisation. By the end of the phase a considerable improvement in the delivery of coal to the correct destinations became evident.

RAIL

When the armies established roadhead areas, road and rail layout was co-ordinated both with a view to sending forward supplies and the moving forward of stocks when the roadhead was eventually closed. By 21 September a double line was through from the ROUEN area to BRUSSELS and 22 September a single line bridge across the SEINE at LE MANOIR was open.

On 6 October the line was through from the RMA to EINDHOVEN in the Second Army roadhead area. NORTH of ANTWERP and EAST of EINDHOVEN bridges were constructed with the object of keeping railheads as close to the fighting troops as possible. It is interesting to note that some railheads were established within five miles of the forward defended localities.

After 23 October the US armies took over the responsibility for operating all railway traflic WEST of LISIEUX in order to reduce the commitment in the RMA, and contracted to forward traffic from that area in accordance with the BRITISH programmes.

During December the lines EAST from TILBURG and NORTH from EINDHOVEN were extended so that when the bridge at RAVENSTEIN was repaired railheads could rapidly be established between the WAAS and the RHINE.

At the same time the line from TIL BURG to GENNEP was developed so that the dumping of stores for operations SOUTH of NIJMEGEN could be accelerated. By mid-December rail communications were through to ’s HERTOGENBOSCH both from WEST and SOUTH and at the end of that month the railway was opened as far as RAVENSTEIN as the railway bridge at ’s HERTOGEN BOSCH had been completed.

A considerable amount of personnel traffic, principally drafts, was beginning to flow along the L of C and during October and November a personnel service was organised with appropriate halts and feeding points.

The traffic initially ran from DIEPPE to LOUVAIN but subsequently went from OSTEND up to EINDHOVEN. In addition arrangements were made for civilians to be evacuated in returning store trains and in special trains from localities made uninhabitable by battle or flooding or for reasons of security.

On 1 January with the inauguration of the leave service to UK via CALAIS trains were run from OISTERWIJK for First Canadian Army, from BOURG LEOPOLD for Second Army, and from ROUEN for the L of C.

PORTS

OSTEND

This port was open to traffic from 28 September and was developed initially as a stores and bulk petrol port with the intention that, as ANTWERP came into use, the intake of stores would be slightly reduced and the personnel flow through the port increased so that it would ultimately become the main personnel port for the BRITISH forces.

DIEPPE

The import of stores through DIEPPE ceased on 28 December having averaged over 4,000 tons per day since the port was first opened. A total of 420,000 tons had been discharged.

LE TREPORT

This was opened as a satellite port of DIEPPE on 2 October and used principally for LOT carrying “Queen Marys” with crashed aircraft. The use of this port ceased as soon as BOULOGNE Was developed.

BOULOGNE

With the opening of ANTWERP it became unneccessary to continue discharging large quantities of stores in BOULOGNE and the port was closed to stores import on 13 January. The cross-channel POL pipeline was extended to a pipehead at CALAIS which greatly facilitated the handling of bulk POL trains.

CALAIS

Initially the port was developed for personnel traffic and as a train ferry terminal. The first train ferry was accepted on 21 November. This port later handled all BLA leave personnel.

ANTWERP

The port was opened to coastal shipping on 26 November and to deep draught shipping on 28 November after considerable sweeping of the approaches had been accomplished by the Navy. Tonnages discharged on BRITISH account rose rapidly reaching and average of 8,600 tons per day at the end of December and in January had increased to over 10,500 tons per day. Bulk petrol installations within the port were developed as a joint project and during December 160,000 tons of bulk petrol were discharged. The opening of ANTWERP made it possible to accept shipping direct from the US and from the Middle East.

GHENT

On 19 December the first ship entered GHENT. As it was uncertain whether GHENT was to be used for BRITISH or US traffic a charter similar so that for ANTWERP had been drawn up for dual control. Initially only BRITISH traffic was passed through the port.

MULBERRY

During September and October severe gales damaged the break-Waters and as the opening of ANTWERP for BRITISH and US traffic could now be foreseen, SHAEF agreed that winterisation work should cease at the end of October.

By the end of November it was possible to close the port completely for US and BRITISH traffic, and dismantling of the port preparatory to sheltering portions of it in the CAEN canal was commenced.

ROADS

It was clear that owing to the destruction of the RAVENSTEIN rail bridge, road trans- port would be the main method of supporting administratively the operations South-East from NIJMEGEN across the RHINE. The number of EAST-WEST road routes available EAST of BRUSSELS in the BRITISH zone was very limited and it was expected that under winter traffic conditions they would rapidly break up. Accordingly a route development plan was prepared for the roads essential for maintenance and operational concentration. These routes were to be carried forward as far as possible so that once bridges were established over the MAAS the traffic system could be linked up with the minimum of delay to facilitate the concentration for the crossing of the RHINE.

AIR FREIGHT

On 1 December the permanent transport airfield in BELGIUM was opened at NIVELLES. This airfield was reserved solely for transport aircraft.

During December and early January a steady lift of 400 to 500 tons per week of mixed ordnance stores, mail, newspapers and blood was maintained. The empty freight aircraft were used for the return to UK of compassionate leave cases, personnel drafts, PW and certain units returning to UK for re-equipment.

MFO

On 12 October the main MFO Depot had been moved to BRUSSELS and the port depot was transferred from DIEPPE to OSTEND six days later.

RE Works

GENERAL

The development of the advance base was never hindered by delays to essential works, although at one time non-priority jobs had to be held over for two and a half to three months.

In view of the many projects for the development of the advance base the general policy was to place orders with civilian firms for the supply of huts, works services, etc., through the agency of the OMA. The shortage of coal, however, caused considerable delays to civilian production.

During this period 176 Workshop and Park Company took over the transit depot at DIEPPE from No. 6 ESBD which was subsequently established in BRUSESLS. No. 7 ESBD also moved into BRUSSELS area but left a small detachment in the RMA to operate the TAILLEVILLE depot. Port sections were established at BOULOGNE and OSTEND as well as DIEPPE.

On 16 December 169 CE Works (11 L of C Area) with an augmented staff, assumed control of the,BRITISH sector of BELGIUM, in addition to those parts of HOLLAND on either side of the SCHELDT. At the same time, the responsibility of 168 CE Works (12 L of C Area) in the RMA, was extended to cover the area to the BELGIAN frontier.

AIRFIELDS

Four RAF airfield construction wings, less one squadron which was placed under command of Second Army, were fully employed on the winter programme for the maintenance of airfields which included repairs to concrete runways, hangars and all types of accommodation as well as preparing 100,000 sq. yards of hard standing for unloading stores from transport planes to lorries.

About Christmas and early in the New Year adverse weather considerably hampered the work of airfield construction. A great amount of labour was employed in maintaining runways and tracks clear of snow and ice, and successful tests were carried out for de-icing runways with local rock salt.

The first FIDO equipment for dispersing fog was installed at OAMPRAI EPINOY. This consisted of piping laid along each side of the landing strips with petrol burners placed at intervals.

WATER SUPPLY

In this phase the water supply for installations in the RMA, including hospitals, was completed. The water supply in ANTWERP was found to be intact and generally there were no difficulties encountered throughout BELGIUM. Repairs, however, were carried out to the main pipeline from the mainland to WALCHEREN.

During the ARDENNES offensive there was danger that three-quarters of the water supply for BRUSSELS would fall into GERMAN hands. This would have occurred if the enemy had been successful in reaching the line of the River MEUSE between HUY and DINANT.

DRAINAGE

Electrical pumping apparatus which had been tested and forwarded from UK was received in this theatre at the end of the year for draining the large flooded areas in HOLLAND.

ELECTRICITY SUPPLY

The HT line from CAEN power station to BAYEUX was repaired in October and hospitals were equipped with lighting. The SCHELL and MERXEN power stations in the ANTWERP area were repaired and also operating by the end of October.

Arrangements were made for the construction of a power line from MERXEN to ROOSENDAAL to energise the HT gird in HOLLAND, owing to the complete destruction of the GEERTRUIDENBERG power plant.

In addition, two floating power stations of 27/28,000 kw capacity were despatched from USA to boost up the power supply.

Temporary lighting was supplied to all quays in the ANTWERP dock area in December.

BULK PETROL INSTALLATIONS

The following works services were completed :—

• The second four-inch line from OUISTREHAM to BRONAY was functioning.
• Eight three-inch HATS cable petrol lines (PLUTO) had been brought in through BOULOGNE, and connected to three 1,200-ton tanks. A manifold to form a header for all lines was also completed. Rail and road facilities were provided and in late December receipts averaged 1,000 tons daily.
• Three six-inch pipelines were laid from OSTEND to GHENT by l November and 7,200 tons of tank storage were constructed with road, barge and rail distribution facilities at both places. 3,600 tons of tank storage and twelve pumps were also constructed at an intermediate station at BEERN EM between OSTEND and GHENT,
• Four 1,200-ton tanks and one 600-ton tank were erected at OALAIS in November and three six-inch lines with pumps were laid from BOULOGNE to CALAIS.
• By the end of December the oil installations at HEMIXEM and HOBOKEN were interconnected and the pipeline ANTWERP—EINDHOVEN was operating. Plans were already in hand for the pipeline to be extended beyond EINDHOVEN.

CONSTRUCTION

SHAEF, having decided to allocate hutting from all sources, was notified that hutting for Winter quarters was required for approximately 200,000 personnel altogether and 1,500,000 sq ft of covered accommodation was required for other purposes in the forward areas and base installations.

Work continued on hospitals, depots and installations in the RMA. The pressure of work, however, in the ANTWERP area necessitated the transfer of an extra CRE (Works) from the RMA.

Hospitals were being constructed at ANTWERP, LOUVAIN, OSTEND, BRUGES and DIEPPE, whilst large camps were also under construction for refugees and PW, amounting to approximately 100,000 personnel.

On the adoption of CALAIS as a leave port a transit camp was built for 2,600 with feeding facilities for 3,000.

Owing to the very large AA deployment in the area of ANTWERP, over 1,000 camps, varying from fully hutted mixed AA batteries down to single isolated searchlight sites, were constructed.

There were practically no other major building projects, but an immense amount of clearance of debris, repairs and alterations to buildings in addition to road repairs and hard standings were carried out.

Arrangements were made for the production by civilian contractors of approximately 1,000 Nissen huts in November and 5,000 per month afterwards.

Orders were also placed for a modified design of a hut known as the “Elite” after previous designs had failed to prove satisfactory. The production of hutting was limited by the availability of timber which was mainly supplied by theforestry companies.

FORESTRY

Seven forestry companies out of the twelve operating in the theatre at this time were employed in the AR-DENNES. Timber was urgently required for bridging, hutting and construction of “corduroy” roads. Also the supplies of pitwood had fallen so far behind actual requirements for coal production that four forestry companies were specially employed from the latter part of December on this production. The loss of soft wood supplies in the ARDENNES as a result of the GERMAN offensive was a serious handicap.

QUARRYING

The greatly extended lines of communication meant a very heavy road stone commitment for the Quarrying Group RE whose output increased in January to 170,000 tons. During the very cold weather which commenced on 27 December 44 and continued until the end of January, a maximum depth of frost of fifteen inches was reported. This placed a further drain on the limited transport available as the FRENCH and BELGIAN Ponts et Chaussees authorities had to be allotted military transport to assist in road gritting and snow clearance as well as the general maintenance of routes which by previous arrangement they had partly undertaken. A diagram showing the production or distribution of stone by the quarrying group is at Appendix “T”.

ROADS

The L of C responsibility for the maintenance of roads and bridges was considerably increased when its boundary was advanced to the line of the ALBERT canal. This burden was particularly heavy since the routes from the RMA had still to be maintained while at the same time preparations for the opening of ANTWERP absorbed very considerable engineer resources.

NAVIGABLE WATERWAYS

With the occupation of northern FRANCE, most of BELGIUM, and part of HOLLAND, it became imperative to open the canals which were normally the most important means of transport. One of the first steps was to substitute high level for low level bridges at various points.

BRIDGES

All floating bridges on the SEINE with the exception of one each at VERNON and ELBEUF were removed in order that barge taffic could be resumed. At the end of October military convoys were diverted via ROUEN, except class '70 trafiic which was diverted through PARIS, in consequence of the removal of the class 70 bridge at MANTES GASSICOURT.

STORES

Altogether 16,500 tons of engineer stores were moved up by road and rail from the RMA and substantial lifts of stores were imported into ANTWERP while demands for 25,000 tons of material were placed on the OMA. 

Transportation

By the end of September it was apparent that the size and strength of the Transportation Directorate was inadequate to deal with all the complex railway problems of organisation which arose in FRANCE and BELGIUM. The Directorate of Transportation was therefore divided into two sub-directorates, Ports (including MULBERRY) and Railways, each headed by a brigadier.

The main railway activities centred around the restoration of the SNCB which was vital for the efficient development of the advance base.

At the same time the main rail L of C from the RMA to EINDHOVEN was further developed as the Channel ports were opened up, and progress was also made on re-opening DUTCH railways and canals. Apart from restoring the railway system and constructing sidings and depots, a great deal of equipment and stores was handed to the BELGIANS and DUTCH to assist them in essential development.

In addition many WD locomotives were brought into the theatre to relieve the shortage. The BELGIANS took over the responsibility of operating the railways, although Tn personnel continued to assist with the maintenance of locomotives.

In December the shortage of coal threatened to curtail rail movement, but by diversion of coal from non-essential consumers this danger was averted.

During October railway construction was in progress at widely scattered locations from SOUTH of the SEINE to the MAAS but the general movement of units continued eastwards.

At this time a railway construction and maintenance group was allotted to work in each of the areas controlled by First Canadian and Second British Armies but the groups "remained under the direct control of Tn Directorate for major tasks.

The maintenance of the L of C from the RMA to northern FRANCE was a considerable problem and consequently a complete railway construction and maintenance group was allocated for the purpose. The hastily repaired routes required heavy maintenance especially as the approaches to the SEINE were via secondary lines.

A fourth group was responsible for all other work in NE FRANCE from the SEINE to the FRENCH—BELGIAN frontier and undertook the necessary repairs in the ports of CALAIS and BOULOGNE.

The damage at ANTWERP was comparatively light, but considerable work had to be carried out before heavy traffic could be handled.

However, the extensive marshalling yards built for operating the modern NORTH docks were damaged by mortar and shell fire, and the enemy had lifted and removed thirty-five miles of track and over two hundred points and crossings from the rail layout in the port area.

Extensive railway construction however, was not found to be necessary for the development of ANTWERP as a base. Two transportation stores depots were established in the advance base one at HAL near BRUSSELS for bridging materials and the other at ANTWERP for miscellaneous stores.

In addition an advanced transportation stores dump was established at ACHT near EINDHOVEN.

Practically all railway bridges in HOLLAND had been destroyed by the enemy. The majority were over canals, and replacement spans rarely less than one hundred feet were required. Consequently at this stage of the campaign the demand for railway construction units reached its maximum.

Towards the end of November, the additional labour working with the units included eighteen pioneer companies, two docks operating companies, two railway operating companies and aport maintenance company. During November nineteen bridges, of which six were double line, were re-opened for traffic and work was in progress on twenty-two others : 4,000 linear feet of standard bridging were used during the month.

In November and December, the water level of the SEINE rose higher than for any corresponding period since 1910.

Nevertheless the bridge at LE MANOIR stood up to these conditions, a remarkable tribute to the value of “camels feet” foundations. The river flowing at a speed of 10 knots rose almost to rail level, and the bridge had to be kept under constant load.

By the end of the year the L of C was open to the River MAAS at RAVENSTEIN and MILL and railheads were available within ten miles of the forward positions of the armies. The main routes out of ANTWERP were open and repairs in the NORTH marshalling yards were completed; further WEST it had been possible to hand over the majority of the heavy maintenance commitment to the US Army and the SNCF but one railway construction and maintenance group remained in NE FRANCE and the Channel ports.

During the first six months of the campaign seventy-five railway bridges consisting of 202 separate spans had been wholly or partly reconstructed by BRITISH railway construction and ancilliary units. Twenty—eight of these bridges carried two or more lines. These works had absorbed over 8,000 linear feet of new standard bridging material in addition to 1,640 linear feet of locally produced spans, while in the same period 2,500 linear feet of original spans had been repaired.

The HQ of the Tn Stores organisation which had moved to BRUSSELS was controlling two Tn stores depots and one Tn spares depot in the RHA, and two Tn stores depots with one Tn spares depot in BELGIUM. In October, however, one Tn stores depot in the REA was closed, and the personnel were moved to BELGIUM, where they opened a new depot at ECKEREN near ANTWERP.

In November approval was given for the formation of three type “A” and three type “B” Tn stores port detachments. At the same time recommendation was made for the formation of a machinery spare parts section RE for providing spares for locomotives and IWT craft.

On 12 September a port construction and repair company arrived in ANTWERP. Although the port itself was not badly damaged major repairs necessary to the KRUISSCHANS lock were not completed till December.

Quaysides were cleared of concrete obstructions, scrap steel etc., with the assistance of mechanical equipment sections and civilian labour. In view of the fact that it was a large port, special organisations were set up. The port superintendent was relieved of all port operating group administrative matters, and a group commander known as the deputy port superintendent, was made responsible for all the port operating and port maintenance companies. The port was then divided into five sectors, each under the direction of a dock superintendent and all Tn activities in the port Were co-ordinated by a Colonel Tn.

Apart from discharging MT and petrol ships, port operating personnel were used primarily in a supervisory capacity. The discharge of most of the other ships was carried out by civilian labour who were employed under contract on a tonnage basis. During the attacks on ANTWERP with flying bombs and rockets certain port installations were severely damaged and repairs were carried out by civilians under the supervision of PC and R personnel.

The Tn service was responsible for dredging the port and dredgers manned by Tn personnel improved the berthing facilities and also dredged the River SCHELDT. Subsequently an organisation was set up called tht “SCHELDT Dredging Control” which co-ordinated all such military requirements with the long term civilian policy. Between 2 November and the end of January a total of 1,031,000 cubic yards had been dredged.

The port of GHENT was opened in December as an alternative to ANTWERP in the event of the latter port becoming totally or partially denied to us, and provisional arrangements were made for the discharge of up to 12,500 tons per day should it be necessary on a joint BRITISH and US account. The administration of this port was similar to that at ANTWERP. GHENT is reached through the TERNEUZEN/GHENT Canal.

The main sea looks at TERNEUZEN were seriously damaged. A hasty repair was made which enabled assault craft to get into the SCHELDT for the attack on WALCHEREN, the clearance of which opened the port of ANTWERP. DUTCH engineers estimated that permanent repairs would take six months.

A PC and R Coy was therefore deployed and completed a difficult engineering job in under two months. By 1 December the canal was clear for shipping and the first ship commenced discharge on 19 December. A new type retractable Bailey was built over the main locks to replace the demolished Bascule bridge.

Once ANTWERP was open, the port of BRUSSELS was developed exclusively for the discharge of barge traflic and by the end of January a daily average tonnage discharge of 2,376 tons was reached on BRITISH account.

At DIEPPE PC and R personnel concentrated on improving the general working efficiency of the port and although the tonnage handled was satisfactory it decreased rapidly soon after the opening of ANTWERP.

Damage to the port at LE TREPORT was slight and only a small number of PC and R personnel were employed for minor clearance and repair work. This port was only intended as an overflow to DIEPPE and consequently was only used to a small extent for discharging and loading vehicles on LSTs.

At BOULOGNE the port was extensively damaged and the only repair work carried out was to enable the required port capacity to be attained. It was not until 12 October that the first ships arrived and a daily average of 2,205 tons was reached during the month of November. finally, with the opening of CALAIS, the port was handed back to the FRENCH in January.

At CALAIS LST hards were constructed and completed by the end of November but it was not until January that stores were discharged at a daily average rate of 337 tons. This port was earmarked mainly for personnel and leave traffic.

A considerable amount of demolition had been affected by the enemy prior to the capture of OSTEND and the main entrance from the Channel was obstructed by at least eleven sunken ships. Reconstruction work commenced in September, and by mid-October the main tasks of clearance and repairs to quays, removal of wreckage and construction of LST ramps were completed.

After opening on 26 September it became the principal port for discharging coasters and bulk petrol.

During the month of January the average daily tonnage discharge rose progressively to 3,443 tons.

Little use was made of OUISTREHAM but the port of CAEN proved exstremely useful for import- ing coal and stores into the RMA and latterly for exporting stores to the advance base and unwanted stocks to UK. Dredging operations at the entrance to the OUISTREHAM canal were started at the end of September and completed by the end of November.

In order to minimise the chances of flooding in that area, bridges and debris were cleared from the River ORNE by the end of November. This port attained a daily average tonnage of 1,232 tons during January.

In order that the important canal systems of FRANCE, BELGIUM and HOLLAND should be exploited to the full the Ports and Waterways Engineering Sections of the Tn Directorate of 21 Army Group were grouped in one branch so that the maximum use of engineering resources between ports and waterways could be made. The responsibility for IWT supervision of the reinstating of canals was taken over by the Canal Clearance and Repair Section of the ports and waterway engineering branch.

Concurrently with the clearance of the canals, the IWT operating branch began to re-establish the BELGIAN and DUTCH IWT operating organisations. The BELGIAN Government under Tn direction formed a centralized IWT organisation known as ORNI (Offiee Regulateur de Navigation de l’Interieur). Personnel of two IWT operating companies were deployed throughout BELGIUM, organising and controlling craft movement.

When ANTWERP was opened more and more resources were deployed on the canals at the expense of the Channel ports. A Port Mechanical branch was formed to control all mechanical units and to ensure that the mechanical engineering services required for the operation and maintenance of port and waterway equipment were put to the best advantage.

The main problem of Tn IWT was to re-establish the BELGIAN waterway organisation, as it was evident that IWT operating on military account would become one of the major methods of port clearance, particularly in the case of ANTWERP.

By the end of October the whole system of canals in BELGIUM was in satisfactory order, with the exception of the ALBERT canal. Clearance of this canal was started in October by BELGIAN contractors under the general supervision of the BRITISH and US IWT organisation and eventually opened to 600-ton craft by 15 December.

By the end of December, 207,800 tons had been moved throughout BELGIUM by IWT and clearance ex ANTWERP by IWT had reached approximately 3,000 tons per day.

Tn also undertook the clearance of the DUTCH canals and a start was made on the ZUID WILLEMS canal in HOLLAND. The main waterways in northern FRANCE were comparatively undamaged, the principal obstructions being demolished bridges which the FRENCH authorities, under our direction, were able to reinstate themselves. 

Postal

On 21 October the port of entry for mails was altered from DIEPPE to OSTEND and on 1 November the employment of CAEN as the mail “in” port for the RMA ceased. As a result of this transfer the mail situation was not affected by the opening of the port of ANTWERP although it had originally been intended to use it. The UK “out” port changed from SOUTHAMPTON to TILBURY on 26 October and again to DOVER on 7 November.

In order to accelerate the delivery of home going mail and to assist UK offices, arrangements were made for a considerable extension of the range of letter sorting in the theatre. Labelled bundles of letters were prepared for all towns with a population of more than 20,000 and direct despatches of mail were made up in the theatre for all towns with a population of more than 150,000.

By early October arrangements had been completed for the interchange of mail between personnel of 21 Army Group and civilians in liberated territory. At first only limited areas were affected but these widened progressively with the re-establishment of the civilian postal services.

During this period bad weather conditions caused several interruptions of both air and surface- borne mail, the most serious of which occured just prior to Christmas when thick fog prevented flying and interfered with the sailing of mail ships. Conditions, fortunately, improved on 22 December and all outstanding mail was cleared by Christmas Day.

In view of the abnormally high rate of sales of postal orders it was decided that purchases from APOs would be made only with the authority of an officer. In early 1945 a temporary telegraph service was inaugurated and operated via APO channels to enable personnel proceeding on leave to advise their families at short notice of their impending arrival. Telegrams were conveyed to UK from the Base by air and transferred to the central telegraph office in LONDON for onward transmission by wire. This arrangement ceased as soon as the fact that leave was to be granted was made public and personnel had sufficient time to inform their families before their arrival.

Supply and Transport

SUPPLIES

During this phase not only had the daily maintenance of the armies to be continued and the slender resources in the roadheads increased, but also the new supply base in BELGIUM had to be established and built up. The stocks for the new base were to be transferred from the substantial holdings in the RMA and imported through the Channel ports until such time as ANTWERP was open.

It was decided, as a precaution against the possibility of heavy air and sea attacks being concentrated on ANTWERP, to establish the base depots in three groups so that each group would have the use of alternative ports from which to accept imports from UK. The groups were located at ANTWERP, GHENT and BRUSSELS containing four, five and three BSDs respectively.

The last shipment of supplies, with the exception of periodical deliveries of fresh meat and vegetables for troops in that area reached the RMA in the first week of October. These supplies together with the RMA stocks were balanced at 15,000,000 FS rations. From that time onwards until the opening of ANTWERP supplies were shipped to the Channel ports.

Both army roadheads continued to be stocked by rail ; Second Army received approximately 700 tons per day from the RMA whilst First Canadian Army were supplied from DIEPPE at the rate of approximately 600 tons per day. In addition approximately equal tonnages were forwarded daily to the advance base.

Although supplies of fresh vegetables and fruit were unobtainable during the early stages of the campaign, it was possible in October to obtain plentiful supplies in BELGIUM and by 2 December 1,400 tons of vegetables representing 6,280,000 rations, the equivalent of six days issue for the force, were acquired by local procurement.

At the same time contracts were made with civilian bakeries at LILLE and BRUSSELS to produce 85,000 lbs of bread per day with BRITISH ingredients for local troops, and negotiations were started to procure the manufacture of fresh pork sausages to replace the tinned equivalent in the FS ration.

Arrangements were also made for the procurement of 8,000,000 boxes of matches with the object of saving exports of this item from UK.

Considerable difficulties were still being experienced with the distribution of frozen meat due to the insufficient number of refrigerated and insulated Wagons but from 1 November a 100 per cent issue of fresh meat was made on alternate days.

With the opening of ANTWERP in sight it was essential to plan for the reception direct from AMERICA of the maximum quantity of supplies which formerly had been transferred in UK from ocean going freighters to coasters serving the armies.

On 6 November War Office was notified that approximately 28,200 tons which were to be loaded in US in December could be accepted in ANTWERP direct.

On 24 November the second bid for 13,950 tons was placed for acceptance during February.

In December bad weather conditions hampered the removal of stocks from the RMA and by the end of that month there were 9,000 tons in excess of L of C requirements. Subsequently plans were made to ship these supplies by coaster from CAEN during the second and third weeks of January.

When ANTWERP was open arrangements were made for the rear L of C sub areas to be maintained through the ports of BOULOGNE and CAEN, and HQ, L of C became responsible for bidding to HQ 21 Army Group their tonnage requirements of shipping and for demanding supplies for this tonnage through S and T channels.

By the end of this phase the advance base was well established; storage capacity including refrigeration amounted to approximately 100,000 tons, while 35,000,000 rations, representing 29 days’ reserves for the entire force, were under GHQ control.

SOLID FUELS

A special section was appointed by the S and T Directorate during October to deal with all matters concerning solid fuels. The first deliveries of coal from the UK for locomotives and slack for power stations and domestic use were received through the port of CAEN.

These imports steadily increased from 400 tons per day in October to 1,000 per day in January.

The first imports through DIEPPE started in October and by January had amounted to an average of 700 tons per day. In October some of the collieries in FRANCE and BELGIUM commenced working again and by the end of that month the first supplies were despatched by road and rail to DIDs in FRANCE. The first deliveries of coal by rail from BELGIUM, however, did not commence until November.

The shortage of solid fuel, particularly in BELGIUM, had considerable effect on local production and firms with whom various services had placed urgent contracts were unable to carry out their contracts. It was arranged therefore that S and T should be responsible for receiving these requirements from the services for screening and consolidating and then demanding them together with other military requirements.

After the allocation was made the responsibility for distribution was entirely left to the civflian authorities under military direction and supervision. The scale of solid fuel for the force was fixed at an overall figure of 4 lbs per man per day which included the requirements for hospitals and laundries. As it was considered that only two-thirds of the force would be in a position to use coal, the unit scale was fixed at 3 lbs per man per day.

This scale had to be fixed in relation to the availability of transport and supply and not on whether the amount was adequate or not. The provision of coal depended on the constant supply of pitwood mentioned in para 2 (e) of this chapter.

TRANSPORT

At the beginning of this phase the rail service from the RMA was limited and interrupted and consequently the bulk of maintenance had still to be brought up by road. One of the greatest problems which arose as a result of the extended L of C was unit administration, and units and sub units had not only to be self-administering but also self-contained for periods of seven days or more.

With the approach of winter, staging camps were established at the terminals and along the principal maintenance routes. These camps were organised on a hotel system and provided hot meals, baths and accommodation for drivers, enabling them to rest and carry out maintenance on their vehicles.

On 30 September the S & T Staff of TRANCO was Withdrawn and joined Rear HQ 21 Army Group in BRUSSELS.

In order to relieve the strain on L of C transport and to give GT coys an opportunity for maintenance and rest, considerable quantities of horses and equipment captured from the enemy, in addition to requisitioned civilian horsed transport, were brought into use.

During the period between 1 to 15 December, a total of 9,442 tons was lifted by horsed transport, of which sixty per cent was within the ANTWER-P area.

14 October marked the commencement of the re-organisation of all RASC transport units with the exception of the L of C GT coys. There were two reasons for this :— firstly, operational experience had shown the desirability of modifying the organisation of army transport companies and, secondly, to effect an economy i.n manpower thus enabling demands for infantry reinforcements to be met.

In November and December sixteen army transport companies were re-organised into fourteen standard 3-ton or 6-ton GT coys of four platoons each retaining the same designation as before.

A further operational re-organisation was that of the second line transport of the armoured divisions, to which an additional company was added, the armoured division troop carrying company. Third line armoured division transport companies became army transport companies with the same organisation as the other third line transport.

The measures adopted for economising in manpower affected the remaining transport units, and mainly consisted of reducing the scale of reserve drivers in infantry divisional, corps troops, troop carrying, motor ambulance and artillery companies.

Personnel of the composite platoons in the infantry divisional companies as well as the ambulance car companies were reduced, the latter being replaced by ATS drivers. The elements of the two army transport companies made surplus during the reorganisation became the nucleus of two station maintenance companies. Flying squads of expert advisers and skilled artificers of No. 4 MT Inspectorate did much to maintain the standard of mechanical efficiency of transport.

On 17 December GT coys began to be formed from BELGIAN military personnel. These units were to be placed at the disposal of HQ 21 Army Group after an initial period of training in UK. On their return they were to release the personnel of seventeen GT coys, loaned by the War Office to 21 Army Group, and take over the equipment. Although this pool of transport was to be operationally controlled by 21 Army Group, the BELGIAN authorities would be responsible for all problems of personnel, pay and discipline.

A small staff, headed by a lieutenant-colonel who assumed the title of Commandant du Groupement des Transports Automobiles, was formed at the end of December in order to control these units, and to act as a liaison HQ. Simultaneously a start was made in forming fourteen more BELGIAN and nine NETHERLANDS GT coys for work under the direction of Civil Affairs.

Two RASC Crane Platoons, formed during September, were despatched to the advance base depots as they were not required for work on the beaches or in. the transhipment areas. After the beaches were closed in October all RASC motor boat companies returned to UK for re-fitting and re-organisation preparatory to operating in the newly opened ports. The first of these companies with ten fast launches and ten harbour launches arrived in ANTWERP in January.

In order to meet the increasing demand for transport for port clearance there was a gradual release of transport units from the 21 Army Group pool to the L of C. By 13 December the pool was reduced from fifty-nine equivalent 3-ton companies to twenty-six.

A small pool of transport however remained under the direct control of S & T for employment on standard GHQ details, such as pitwood commitments in the ARDENNES (in which one 6~ton and two 10-ton companies were engaged) and ferrying up remaining GHQ units from FRANCE and BELGIUM.

The air freight organisation was further developed during this phase and it was calculated that, subject to the availability of aircraft, some 350 tons could be handled daily at NIVELLES. In actual fact this figure was never reached nor did the necessity for it arise.

POL

The first GHQ stocks of POL were delivered by rail to HAL in BELGIUM. formerly used by Second Army as a POL area before they established N o. 6 Army Roadhead in the area of DIEST.

During the latter part of September it became apparent, especially as OSTEND was in the process of being developed as a bulk petrol port, that filling areas should be established forward of DARNETAL to obviate the necessity of returning jerrycans to the rear areas. filling centres, therefore, were set up at GHENT for the use of First Canadian Army and at NINOVE for use by Second Army.

In early November the Mobile Petrol filling Centres controlled by armies were withdrawn and placed under GHQ control which left armies with no responsibility for filling jerrycans.

In the meantime, the population in the rear areas of the L of C was diminishing and the continuation of the pipeline from the installations at PETIT COURONNE across the SEINE to DARNETAL reduced the commitment of bulk petrol transport companies in the SEINE area. This enabled five companies with a total lift of 1,500 tons to be released for OSTEND.

In view of the fact that all POL products were common user items and inter-changeable between BRITISH and US forces, a POL section of the G-4 Branch of SHAEF had been formed before the opening of the campaign. All demands, whether from 2-1 Army Group or from Com Z on behalf of the US Army Groups, were made to that branch.

The installations at PETIT COURONNE were jointly shared and operated by BRITISH and US personnel.

At the request of SHAEF, however, these installations were handed over to the AMERICANS on 10 October with the exception of 6,700 tons of storage capacity for BRITISH requirements. By this time OSTEND was importing approximately 2,000 tons of bulk petrol per day.

It was discovered in BELGIUM that certain civilian oil companies had been operating during the GERMAN occupation and a petroleum board, the Union Petroliere Belge, controlled the majority of their activities. 21 Army Group, however, only recognised this organisation in matters of civilian distribution, and as far as possible, supplied their requirements, which were limited to essential business only. In return, the UPB, as agents for the oil companies, gave every assistance by permitting the use of their plants and employees in accordance With BRITISH and US requirements.

The supply of returnable containers had considerably diminished and the shortage was so serious that special arrangements for their collection were made. In less than a month over 1,000,000 were returned. Further steps were taken to improve the situation by importing IVITSO in non-returnable cans through DIEPPE and by the middle of November the daily average imports by this method had risen to 2,750 tons.

These imports were largely aided by the fact that War Office had been requested and agreed to maintain a minimum production of 1,260,000 such containers per month for MT80. In addition War Office held a reserve of 30,000 tons of MT80 in non-returnable cans.

In view of the fact that so few jerrycans had been returned by units during the advance these imports would have proved absolutely invaluable had the pursuit been continued into GERMANY. Another method adopted for conserving the supply of containers was the provision of bulk POL for the L of C.

Accordingly, petrol stations, staffed with personnel from the composite platoons of the bulk transport companies, were set up along the L of C with the convoy-lane method of refilling. These depots were replenished from bulk petrol transport.

The first inland storage depot was opened at BRUSSELS and was maintained by rail tank cars from ROUEN until the opening of ANTWERP where the first POL supplies arrived on 29 November. During November another subsidiary inland installation was opened at TOURNAI to augment the distribution to the L of C.

POL was transported there by barge from GHENT. GHQ POL stacking areas were located at ANTWERP (outside I installations 35,000 tons), DIEST/HASSELT (40,000 tons), GHENT (35,000 tons) and BRUSSELS (20,000 tons).

Prior to the opening of ANTWERP plans had been made for the use of 300,000 tons of petrol storage and other installations in the port. These were to be shared jointly between the BRITISH and US. GHENT with its 50,000 tons of storage had the largest installations solely available to 21 Army Group but since no rail cars were available to carry bulk petrol in sufficient quantity from OSTEND it was decided to link up OSTEND and GHENT by a triple pipeline capable of a daily capacity of 3,600 tons. The first of these lines commenced pumping on 28 October.

Meanwhile plans for implementing the second phase of the PLUTO scheme, consisting of laying cross channel pipelines from DUN GENESS to BOULOGNE, were put into effect and the first pipeline began to operate on 26 October.

At the end of December, DUMBO, as this portion of the PLUTO scheme was entitled, was giving an average of 1,300 tons per day and in addition to this the total supply in the theatre under GHQ control amounted to 245,000 tons of packed and bulk POL equivalent to 58 days at normal expenditure for the force, but 73,000 tons of MT80 was later earmarked for AMERICAN use.

Printing and Stationery

At the beginning of this phase the advanced stationery depot serving Second Army was in BRUSSELS, the CANADIAN depot was in ANTWERP and the other BRITISH advanced depot was serving L of C from the RIVIA.

It was found necessary to move the latter forward however, and on 8 December it moved to BRUSSELS where it started to function on 1 January 1945. In order to provide a depot for L of C during the move the Base Depot was split in two; one part moved forward to BRUSSELS to act as an advanced depot for L of C in northern FRANCE and BELGIUM, while the other remained in the RMA to look after the loading of bulk stores for transfer to ANTWERP where premises had been earmarked for the base depot.

This accommodation was damaged by a flying bomb and seven hundred tons of stores which were already on the rail from the RMA had to be switched to BRUSSELS where premises were acquired at short notice. These premises were inadequate and as the depot grew it became necessary to expand into other buildings.

There was a steady increase in demands for printed matter and it became apparent that the static plant taken over by 2 GHQ Printing Press in BRUSSELS, plus the mobile press which worked alongside it, could not handle the volume of work. Therefore two further plants were taken over, one at the end of October and the other in December, and both were operated with civilian assistance. The use of civilian labour by the printing press and in all stationery depots enabled these units to double their normal capacity.

A considerable amount of printing work as well as repairs to office machinery and the manufacture of rubber stamps was placed with local contractors under the Mutual Aid procedure. It was necessary to supply paper and sometimes other materials to the contractors from imported military or captured enemy stocks, and sometimes it was difficult to provide the contractors with the necessary electric power.

Publications were distributed from BRUSSELS from 30 September onwards. The number of publications distributed rose to an average of approximately 100,000 per week during the period and the total weight distributed by the publications depots was approximately eleven tons weekly.

Ordnance

Until the establishment of the advance base in BELGIUM 14 AOD in the RMA continued as the main depot for the force with the exception of stores shipped from UK to OSTEND for issue direct to armies and forward L of C troops. Such stores were handled by 17 STD which moved for this purpose from DIEPPE to OSTEND during October.

Special consignments of bulk clothing, soap and other expendable stores were also sent there for issue to formations. Late in September 14 FTS moved from the RMA to BRUSSELS to handle the supply of MT spare parts to L of C troops in that area.

Having reconnoitred a good site in ANTWERP with excellent storage facilities and efficient road and rail communications, 15 AOD immediately commenced preparations for opening their depot as early as possible in the New Year. Personnel of 17 AOD arrived in ANTWERP on 30 October to assist in this and approximately 10,000 civilians were also employed. As the port was not yet open initial stocks had to be brought in through the Channel ports and moved up by road and rail.

BOULOGNE, DIEPPE and OSTEND were each used for a particular type of store in order to facilitate sorting and despatch. Up to the time of the opening of ANTWERP 58,000 tons of stores were shipped through these ports. In the meantime items that previous experience had shown to be in constant demand were forwarded in bulk from 14 AOD to 15 AOD. So that the newly formed depot should not be congested it was at one time necessary temporarily to stop these transfers from the RMA owing to the large volume of imports arriving direct but controlled stores such as guns and wireless sets continued to be moved up and urgent issues of them were made by 15 AOD before the depot officially opened.

By 1 January First Canadian Army became based on 15 AOD, followed by Second Army on 10 January.

In order to handle the large quantities of stores handed in by units when the advance slowed down a RSD was established in a very suitable site fitted with boot and clothing repair machinery at BRUSSELS. At the same time local manufacture and repair of ordnance stores by BELGIAN civilian firms was organised. By requisitioning local commercial factories during October and placing contracts with them for the production of gas it was possible to cease importing industrial gases from UK.

Early in October the use of LE HAVRE for the importation of vehicles was considered, but after several reconnaissances had been carried out it was found to be impracticable owing to the US forces needs in the port area. This port, although not shortening the L of C to any appreciable extent, afforded better unloading facilities than the RMA.

Towards the end of October however the Channel ports were available and vehicles were received through them thus shortening the distance to army vehicle parks. Vehicle companies continued to move forward from the RMA to open new parks in the advance base area thereby easing the task of maintaining an even flow of vehicles to the armies.

The inability of divisional laundries to wash bulky items such as blankets coupled with the presence of convalescent depots, reinforcement camps and hospitals in the army areas made it essential for extensive laundry services to be provided there if the long haul back to the RMA where such facilities existed, was to be avoided.

Accordingly it was decided that a base laundry should be sited in Second Army Troops area to serve both armies.

A base hospital laundry was then sited in the OSTEND hospital area while another moved to BRUSSELS in order to assist 17 RSD. Two hundred civilian laundries were placed under contract during this phase to serve troops on the L of C in BELGIUM.

2 BAD was the first ammunition depot to arrive in the advance base, opening near BRUSSELS at the beginning of October. Owing to limited port facilities and the diversion of most road and rail traffic from the RMA and ports direct to army roadheads the stocking of this depot was necessarily slowiat first. However, on the opening of ANTWERP and when the army roadheads had reached their targets of stocks to be held, 2 BAD was rapidly built up to a maximum holding of 75,000 tons.

Early in November 3 BAD, which had been serving as an advance ammunition depot at DIEPPE for First Canadian Army, was moved forward to the area of OSTEND. At the end of December 17 BAD opened in the advance base just NORTH of ANTWERP but owing to attacks by V weapons and the limitation that had to be placed on the use of ANTWERP as an ammunition port, it was not possible initially to develop it to any large extent.

The clothing and equipping of allied liberated manpower units was dealt with by bringing over the initial equipment for these units from the UK and later by setting up a special section in 15 AOD to make issues to the units concerned.

REME

During October both “A” and “B” vehicles were beginning to show signs of age and the early frosts and heavy traffic had so broken up the BELGIAN and DUTCH roads that troubles were developing with vehicle suspension systems, and consequently workshop loads remained heavy.

To achieve the maximum output, specialisation was carried out in workshops with civilian labour assisting, and such units were sited wherever possible in buildings and factories where they could remain static for the maximum time and carry out their work more efficiently.

In order to develop the REME resources in the advance base area CEME (Chief Electrical and Mechanical Engineer) HQ moved up to BRUSSELS to co-ordinate the work of the three advance base workshops and reconnaissances were carried out with a view to moving forward all remaining workshop units from the RMA to the advance base.

A scheme was formulated for augmenting “B” vehicle repair by utilising the resources of civilian garages under military supervision, technical control being provided by CEME HQ.

By the end of the year this scheme was progressing well, although difliculties were experienced at first due to the lack of electricity and coal for heating purposes and the poor condition of civilian employees following the GERMAN occupation.

About this time an experiment was carried out in EINDHOVEN where members of a Unit Maintenance Inspectorate team took over a tyre repair plant and succeeded in producing four hundred repaired tyres per week, thus meeting the requirements of one complete corps, in priority types of tyres ; in fact sufficient were left over to make issues to other formations.

Early in November formations were experiencing difficulty in getting supplies to the forward troops through the water-logged country on the MAAS, consequently Weasles (amphibious, tracked, 10-cwt load carriers) were in great demand. Their casualty rate was high as they necessarily received rough treatment. The heavy going also gave rise to many mechanical failures whilst the wet roads led to a big increase on the “B” vehicles accident rate.

Tracked recovery vehicles had to be lent to formations from army recovery sections. To illustrate the difficulty fighting formations, especially armoured units, were experiencing, one armoured brigade on the night of 18/19 November had twenty-three tanks and two ARVs completely bogged, representing the loss of more than a complete tank squadron.

The growing vehicle repair commitment led to an acute shortage of engine assemblies and a decision was taken to make some third line workshops into assembly repair workshops in addition to their normal activities. They reconditioned “B” vehicle repairable engines, gear boxes and driving axles using a large number of civilian fitters to ease the labour shortage and increase production. This work was carried out on a line production system and produced good results. A motor cycle repair line was also started.

Meanwhile, in the advance base area a Base Armament and General Workshop had arrived and an AFV servicing unit was "established adjacent to the heavy “A” vehicle park in close proximity to the advance base workshops site.

This layout proved ideal as it provided close liaison between supply, servicing and repair facilities for tanks, with a minimum of transportation. flying bombs and rockets directed against ANTWERP seriously interfered with the production of 2 Canadian and 21 Advance Base Workshops and direct hits were received within the workshop perimeter resulting in damage to buildings, but few casualties.

During the period after the enemy were pushed back to the River MIAAS, REME provided one company consisting of volunteers from 30 Corps REME units for a “Services Battalion”. This company did two tours of nine and four days respectively in the line near GEILENKIRCHEN, thus making a useful contribution towards resting the infantry.

The GERMAN offensive in the ARDENNES seriously affected the output of field workshops which had to “down tools” to a certain extent as many of the corps areas were in imminent danger from enemy airborne landings and ground attacks from northern HOLLAND over the River MAAS.

Each workshop was prepared to form a strong point using all available equipment under repair in its defence. They had to stand-to on many occasions during this emergency which lasted until mid-January. During the heavy fighting, recovery sections worked hard under arduous conditions. At one time as many as seventeen recovery vehicles were deployed on a corps axis between NAMUR and MARCHE, a distance of thirty miles.

A typical example of recovery work was the occasion when two Churchill bridge layers had to be moved one hundred miles from DINANT to MAASTRICHT. Owing to the hilly roads and prevailing icy conditions, it was found necessary to employ two transporters, four wheeled and two tracked tractors to carry out the job which took four days to accomplish. A very heavy load was also thrown on brigade workshops, much work being carried out in the open with temperatures down to —4 degree Fahrenheit and often no third line workshops were immediately available to back them up, owing to the rapid development of the operations.

Consequently much of the work undertaken was of a heavier nature than usual. Workshops in the advance base area were also kept fully employed.

One of the priority tasks undertaken by them was the servicing and inspection of 351 Sherman tanks required for immediate issue to US forces. This task was carried out five days. They also embarked on a LVT (Landing Vehicle Tracked) programme for an armoured division besides acting as temporary third line workshops for two other armoured divisions.

The combination of hilly country and icy conditions on the roads aggravated the difficulties of movement. No anti-skid devices except chains for “B” vehicles were available and tracked vehicles, particularly Cromwell tanks and carriers had the greatest difficulty in traversing the roads.

One armoured brigade tried the device of welding carrier links to their Churchill tanks with moderate success. Skid chains on “B” vehicles proved a mixed blessing for although they assisted forward movement they did not prevent sideways skidding and in the hands of inexperienced drivers were really dangerous on icy roads.

Damage to artillery was also considerable, the ground freezing so hard that spades could not be dug in, with the result that trail legs were bent and cradles and saddles cracked.

Claims and Hirings

With the majority of the work in its area completed the district office situated in BRIONNE was closed and the area put under the control of the district office at CAEN. An additional district office was opened at EINDHOVEN with sub-offices at NIJMEGEN and TERNEUZEN.

It was arranged that AD Claims and Hirings, Second Army should assume temporary responsibility locally for the work of the Directorate in the small area of HOLLAND under BRITISH control.

An agreement relating to the acquisition of land and buildings was concluded with the BELGIAN authorities in terms very similar to those arranged with the FRENCH. This involved the BELGIAN Government accepting, under Mutual Aid, the financial responsibility for housing BRITISH troops, and as a result a new billeting procedure was evolved which avoided payment for billets by units out of Imprest.

When BRUSSELS became a leave centre a number of hostels and clubs were opened and billeting was undertaken on a large scale. It was unusual, but in the circumstances unavoidable, to employ the billeting procedure when frequent changes of occupants were involved.

The arrangements, however, proved most successful due as much to the generosity of the local population as to the almost universally exemplary behaviour of the troops occupying such billets. In order to save BRITISH man power the BELGIAN system of repair and maintenance, and also of the cleaning of buildings by contract through the municipal authorities, was applied, subject to security, to a number of requisitioned properties and theseservices were supplied under Mutual Aid.

Prior to entry into HOLLAND it had been agreed that the normal procedure for Hirings should be followed, but it soon became apparent that arrangements could be made with the NETHERLANDS authorities similar to those operating in FRANCE and BELGIUM.

Negotiations were somewhat protracted owing to the initial hesitation of the NETHERLANDS authorities to arrange to pay compensation for requisitioned property to the possible detriment of those who had suffered war damage. It was pointed out that the act of requisitioning was deliberate whereas war damage was fortuitous, and a procedure was eventually adopted very similar to that already operating in other liberated countries. DUTCH Commissions were to be set up under the direct control of the Paymaster General to the NETHERLANDS forces to consider the assessment of compensation for the use of requisitioned property.

Similar arrangements to those in BELGIUM were made for billeting. Owing to unsatisfactory communications it was found that in spite of the above arrangements burgomasters in the more remote areas had not received their instructions, and a precise of these was prepared and printed in DUTCH and ENGLISH setting out the burgomasters’ responsibilities regarding the provision of accommodation. This was prepared and distributed by the Directorate in conjunction with the DUTCH authorities.

In the area surrounding NIJMEGEN, but excluding the town itself, almost the entire civilian population had been evacuated and the district had suffered extensively from war damage. Looting by GERMANS, by allied troops, and to some extent by DUTCH civilians, had occured and it was impossible finally to determine how the damage and losses had been caused or satisfactorily to establish liability.

In conjunction with the US Claims Service it was decided to endeavour to agree with the NETHERLANDS authorities a figure which would reasonably represent the losses which might be said to have arisen at the hands of allied troops and to apportion the amount between the BRITISH and US according to an agreed percentage of liability.

Payment would be made to the NETHERLANDS Government thus enabling them to settle war damage and other claims in the dEFIned area simultaneously. The negotiations were lengthy and did not reach conclusion until much later, and then only after War Office and Treasury approval, since a settlement of claims in bulk would never normally be allowed. It was however the only practical solution to the very difficult problem.

As a result of negotiations with the FRENCH authorities in PARIS it was found possible to bring the arrangements for billeting in FRANCE into line with those in BELGIUM and HOLLAND and GRO No. 932/45 was issued. 21 Army Group Form 83 (Billeting Order) was eventually printed in ENGLISH, FRENCH and DUTCH.

Negotiations which had commenced during Phase II regarding the conclusion of a Claims agreement with the FRENCH whereby they would assume financial responsibility under Mutual Aid for certain types of claims were continued during the whole of this phase but did not reach finality.

For claims in GERMANY instructions were received from the War Office that no payment for claims of any kind would be made to GERMAN nationals but that certain categories of claims would be recorded. Claims made by friendly nationals of allied or neutral countries would be investigated, assessed, and paid or repudiated as the case might be. For ease of administration it was decided to requisition and record all real estate required in GERMANY, irrespective of whether it was in public or private ownership.

During the months of October, November and December, 19,646 requisitions and 3,943 de-requisitions were recorded. Of a total of 14,128 claims received during the same period 9,341 were disposed of.

Labour

The policy was to replace military by civilian labour as far as possible in order to release pioneer companies for work in forward areas. It also permitted the build-up of a reserve of companies in BELGIUM ready to take over any commitment, either in L of C areas or within army boundaries, which the Directorate might be called upon to fulfil at short notice. As a part of the same policy preparations were made to accommodate a PW Brick in the advance base if the many political and economic problems which agitated the BELGIAN people at this time led to strikes.

The following figures illustrate the growth of the number of civilians employed.

Nearly half of these were comprised of artisans employed by the technical services of the army.

In the engineer base workshops at BRUSSELS and in the advance base workshops at ANTWERP a large number of skilled men were employed as welders, electricians, mechanics and instrument makers.

Ordnance used civilians as boot repairers, packers, checkers and sorters.- Without such skilled help the technical services would have been unable to keep pace with the amount of work which was needed at this time to maintain the armies.

As each port was liberated the pilots and fishermen were particularly useful in work connected with the clearing of minEFIelds, wrecks, and under-water obstacles. Local divers were employed on the entrances of the harbours,

While technical artisans of the local port authority began to repair winches and railway sidings. This labour was recruited by the Administrative Units (Civil Labour) and worked under the direction of the Royal Navy, (Movements) and Transportation.

At the end of September the labour bureaux in the liberated countries were able to give sufficient information as to the exact rates of pay in issue before our entry for detailed instructions on that subject to be published by SHAEF.

Until October all payment was made by the officers of the AUCL on wage lists prepared from time sheets. However, with the tremendous growth of the number of civilians employed this responsibility became too onerous. In consequence an agreement was reached with the BELGIAN, FRENCH and DUTCH authorities by which the Governments became responsible for paying all wages, workmen’s compensation, family allowances and social insurances under a mutual aid agreement.

Despite the many difficulties encountered however, there were no hold-ups during the winter months amongst the thousands employed through the agency of the AUCL, even though during the same period many strikes occurred among workers employed on civilian enterprises and contract labour.

In this respect it is important to mention the great help which the various SHAEF Missions gave to the Labour Directorate in settling many questions which affected the employment of civilians, for through their agency there was direct access to the various governments on a ministerial level.

The introduction of a mid-shift meal for civilian workers proved of great value in smoothing out certain problems for men would often work for food when money was of little attraction. The provision of anti-gas capes and condemned army boots to civilians employed in roadheads and depots was also useful in overcoming the reluctance of workers to engage for outside work.

One of the great difficulties which arose, particularly in ANTWERP, was the controversy between labour directly employed by the military and contract labour when working alongside one another in the same area under different terms of service.

Among other things contract labour argued that the provision of a mid-shift meal to the directly employed labour Was a privilege which was equivalent to an increase in pay. Although 2-1 Army Group met this complaint by providing contract labour with a mid-shift_meal there still remained many differences which caused friction.

It was therefore agreed in November that in all the ports which were under military control and worked with contract labour, all other installations such as S and T and Ordnance working within the dock boundaries would also employ the same form of labour.

In October the War Establishment of the AUCL, which was re-named the Pioneer and Civil Labour Unit, was increased, enabling it to spread its net further afield by opening branch offices and ensuring better supervision and control of civilian labour.

At the same time two further PCLUs were formed making a total of twenty-two in the theatre. In December a revision of WES for labour staffs was essential to bring the staff organisation into line with the policy of using labour as a pool. A pool of staff officers consisting of three DDs Labour Teams and five ADS Labour Teams was formed, replacing the fixed labour increments to L of C headquarters staffs, which enabled D Lab to move senior staff representatives to meet the ever-changing labour situation.

The extensive utilisation of civilian labour to work base installations at this time enabled the Director of Labour to withdraw pioneer companies from the RMA and to re-deploy them to meet the increasing labour demands of the armies.

Where as at the beginning of the period only just over one quarter of the military labour in the theatre was under command of the two armies, by January nearly one half of the total of two hundred and fifteen companies was employed forward of the army boundaries, participating in the build-up for the late winter offensive.

During this period steps were taken to increase the 21 Army Group labour pool by forming twenty-four BELGIAN and twelve DUTCH pioneer companies. At first progress was hampered by lack of equipment and clothing, but the first six BELGIAN companies were ready by December.

The advantage of these allied units over the FRENCH labour companies which were formed during the previous period was that the BELGIAN and DUTCH Governments gave permission for their nationals to be employed in GERMANY.

When thefts of coal assumed such proportions that they threatened to have a serious effect on military requirements and vital industries, seven pioneer companies were employed as guards in depots, mines and on coal trains.

Veterinary and Remount

To ease the strain on MT it was decided to form Horsed Transport units for draught work in the L of C areas. This was facilitated by the arrival in October of 5 Veterinary Hospital and 2 field Remount Depot, which were located at LE BECHELLOUIN and ROUEN respectively.

The task of collecting sick and wounded and selecting fit horses had already been begun by 6 Veterinary and Remount Conducting Section which was then transferred to BRUGES where a large number of captured horses had been reported.

After the fall of KNOCKE they collected a further four hundred horses suitable for work in HT units. To form these horsed transport units it was necessary also to collect suitable horses from those previously dispersed to farmers in the SEINE INFERIEURE area.

This was effected by an agreement with GOC Third French Region whereby veterinary officers attended horse registration parades held by the’ FRENCH remount authorities to select suitable animals. HT units were initially formed by V and R 21 Army Group with FRENCH and BELGIAN labour supervised by RAVC personnel. By the end of December all such units, employing a total of nine-hundred horses, were handed over to S and T.

Units were established in ANTWERP, MALINES, BRUSSELS, LILLE, AMIENS, DIEPPE and the RMA but priority was given to those in ANTWERP and the RMA, to each of which a detachment of 5 Veterinary Hospital and 2 field Remount Depot was attached. Horsed transport did invaluable work during the winter months by pulling loads through mud conditions which Would have proved impassable for MT, but their most useful employment was in the docks on short haulage from the quays to the BSDS etc.

As rail lift to ANTWERP was not available for their transportation two hundred horses had to be marched there by road from ROUEN which distance of 224 miles was covered in 12 days.

With the exception of harness and a few items of farriery equipment brought in by Ordnance from the UK these units were equipped entirely from captured enemy material. One GERMAN horsed transport vehicle park uncovered at VERSAILLES was placed at the disposal of 21 Army Group by Communications Zone.

Even so these units could not have been formed if GERMAN forage dumps had not also been discovered as the forage situation was otherwise so critical that it was impossible to retain old and worn out horses as a reserve of meat for HOLLAND.

As is only to be expected when horses are collected under war conditions, outbreaks of contagious diseases appeared but the working efficiency of the HT units was never affected by them. Captured horses which were old and worn out were either disposed of locally through the food control organisation to prevent black market activities or despatched to Government laboratories for serum production purposes. fit horses when not required by 21 Army Group continued to be registered and allotted to farmers.

V and R Branch of HQ 21 Army Group performed all administrative work concerning horses employed in the L of C and in addition received, stored and issued veterinary supplies obtained, often from USA, on behalf of Civil Affairs.

The formation of a V and R dog training unit was also proposed as the use of war dogs guarding dumps and installations would result in a considerable saving of manpower. In addition arrangements were made for sick and wounded War dogs of the AMERICAN army to be evacuated through V and R channels as the US had no organisation to deal with them.

Salvage

This period of operations was one of routine salvage work in the army area and the expansion of base depots in the advance base. A feature was the establishment of captured stores depots in BELGIUM with the aid of the BELGIAN recovery organisation.

A system was started whereby reports of stores found all over BELGIUM, received both through civilian and military sources, were collated and circulated to Services. Large quantities of material useful to the war effort were uncovered to the Services and utilised as also were stocks brought into the depots.

Compared with the experience of FRANCE there is no doubt that the handling of enemy stores in BELGIUM was successful. A similar method was adopted for vehicles, many of which were allocated to civilian economy.

The addition of the BELGIAN military personnel to the small Salvage organisation was an important contributory factor to the satisfactory results obtained.

An interesting sideline was the reception of arms from the BELGIAN Resistance Movement which was carried out without incident. Arms were handed in either to local Resistance HQ or to police stations from which they were collected into four main depots.

The clearance of stores and scrap material lying in ANTWERP docks in the early stages undoubtedly helped the receipt and handling of military cargo both in the BRITISH and AMERICAN sectors.

Fire

During this phase AFS concentrated on providing fire defence for :—

• NIJMEGEN bridgehead
• Advance base
• The port of ANTWERP
• Corps FMCs and army roadheads
• Bulk petrol pipelines.

In addition to the four fire fighting companies under command of armies for FMCs and roadheads and one fire fighting company at NIJMEGEN, two companies moved to 8 Base Sub Area, three to 7 Base Sub Area, one to each of 4 and 16 L of C Sub Areas, and one to BRUSSELS.

Static fire service control centres were established at BRUSSELS, GHENT,LOUVAL\I, TILBURG, NIJMEGEN and EINDHOVEN in addition to those at ANTWERP and OSTEND. Where possible these centres were established in existing civilian fire stations thus achieving the advantage of having both army and civilian fire brigades connected to military exchanges.

Where PAD control system existed they were connected by direct military line to AFS stations.

When HQ 10 Garrison entered NIJMEGEN on 25 September the city was being heavily bombed and shelled and the DUTCH civilian fire brigade was unable to deal with the numerous fires caused by incendiary raids.

A fire fighting company was therefore moved from FRANCE to N IJ MEGEN , arriving 4 October where it dealt with many fires and by its example put new heart into the DUTCH firemen who, with CA assistance, were gradually built into a useful organisation.

All bulk petrol installations whether taken over from existing civilian resources or constructed by military personnel, were carefully surveyed by AFS officers who made recommendations concerning fire defence where they considered them necessary.

Excellent co-operation was shown by RE and RASC in implementing these recommendations.

It was arranged that one or more AFS appliances would attend every incident following the fall of V missiles within an area of military importance, to take part either in fire fighting or in rescue work.

As a result the many small fires caused by the explosions were dealt with in their incipient stages and rescues of trapped @@@@@V1C131II‘1S were effected by skilled personnel. No major fires were caused by enemy V weapons during this phase.

The more stable conditions existing in this period made it possible to provide static water supplies in the military establishments where natural or mains supplies were inadequate. The exception was No. 8 Army Roadhead, where petrol and ammunition dumps were stacked along roadsides to overcome transport difficulties in bad weather.

On 1 January 45 the enemy made his last concerted attempt to dislocate the allied air forces and attacked airfields throughout BELGIUM and HOLLAND causing many fires among aircraft and buildings. At GHENT, BRUSSELS and EINDHOVEN AFS companies were instrumental in fighting the fires and saving large quantities of RAF stores.

The total number of fires attended by AFS units during the period was 559 of which 12 were major fires, 103 being due to enemy action.

NAAFI/EFI

In October the Home Canteen Service arrived and took over the NAAFI supply work in the rear areas.

Thus NAAFI supplies were provided through HCS and EFI in all areas from the base at CAEN forward to the mobile canteens and advanced canteen posts operating with troops close to the borders of HOLLAND.

The mobile canteens formed an important part of the activities of EFI in the theatre. Operating in the forward areas they were frequently in the thick of battle and the work of crews was often adventurous. For instance, as a result of taking a wrong turning an EFI van went into the BELGIAN town of ST VINCENT ahead of the troops, was mistaken for an armoured car of the FFI and liberated six allied airmen who had been hiding in a cellar. Mobile canteens did not have a roving commission but were carefully routed so as to ensure a regular supply and service to as many troops as possible.

Vans were posted to corps and routed by the formation to which they were attached. They drew supplies from the nearest mobile canteen depot or bulk issue stores as it was sometimes necessary to stock for periods of up to seven days to cover long advances.

The stock carried consisted of tea, milk, sugar, biscuits, cigarettes, lemonade powder, soap, tooth-paste, laces and stationery. Mobile vans were also used extensively on air strips to provide free snacks to ex PW being evacuated to UK by air.

By the end of November the value of goods passed through all establishments had increased to £l0,160,000 an increase of over £6,000,000 in three months in spite of the drastic restrictions on nearly all commodities owing to world shortage.

The programme which was being specially arranged for Christmas was hampered by news of the enemy attack on the ARDEN NES.

However, difficulties caused by changes of location were successfully overcome and quantities of tinned turkey, pork, Christmas puddings and oranges were added to the normal army issue. In addition large quantities of slab cake sweets, pears, apples, cigars and a small quantity of captured enemy wines were manufactured or procured locally in liberated territories.

Reinforcements

REINFORCEMENT GROUPS

During this phase 101 Rft Gp which held or distributed reinforcements for Second Army was located at BOURG LEOPOLD : 102 Gp which still served the BRITISH element in First Canadian Army was stationed in the area of TERMONDE ; 103 Gp was at CORBIE near AMIENS where, in addition to carrying out its normal functions.

It acted as a collecting and sorting centre for personnel discharged from hospitals situated in northern FRANCE ; 104 Gp was situated in the BRUSSELS/LOUVAIN area and 105 GD which started the period at DIEPPE, later moved to BRUGES when OSTEND was opened as a personnel port.

MOVEMENT OF REINFORCEMENTS

When 104 Rft Crp was finally set up in the advance base late in October, all reinforcements were phased in at OSTEND, but until that date only fighting arms came through this port. All remaining reinforcements continued to arrive at DIEPPE where they were received by 105 Rft Gp and sorted into non-technical and technical branches.

All non-technical personnel were moved by rail to 103 Rft Gp at CORBIE, while technical arms were moved direct to 101 and 102 Rft Gps in accordance with posting orders issued by REFORSEC. Daily bids for the forward rail lift of these reinforcements were made by“A” (Org).

These bids were based on the overall picture of reinforcement availability as then known by A (Pers), and took into account any forecast of battle casualties which could be obtained. It was accepted by Q (Mov) that these bids could not always be accurate, and alterations in numbers and times of trains would often be necessary.

By 5 October reinforcements were being received at DIEPPE at the rate of 1,000 daily and by 24 October the system was working so Well that personnel trains ran from DIEPPE and OSTEND to CORBIE, LOUVAIN and BOURG LEOPOLD as required.

The question of the personnel lift from BAYEUX during October and November was settled by making road transport available to bring forward personnel discharged from hospitals in that area at the rate of 500 a week.

During this phase the train services were not sufficiently elastic to meet the irregular and priority demands for reinforcements which the two armies often submitted, and also did not provide sufficient branch lines from the main railway axis to enable the group HQS to collect personnel from their outlying sub units.

Consequently an ad hoc RASC unit was put at the disposal of REFORSEC to cater for such short cross-country journeys and the trans- porting of reinforcements between the various groups. The importance of providing these transport facilities cannot be over-estimated for REFORSEC was thus enabled to meet urgent operational demands quickly and to overcome the unavoidable inadequacy of the train service.

The total numbers of reinforcements despatched from UK to 21 Army Group in these months were approximately :—

British - 54,290

Canadian - 15,030

Allied - 3,800

CONTROL OF REINFORCEMENTS

Initially, difficulties connected with reinforcing 21 Army Group occurred in passing personnel from base reinforcement groups to the reinforcement groups of Armies. Delay in transporting personnel forward was caused by a lengthening L of C. involving, on the one hand continual unit moves, and, on the other, the scattering of reinforcement sub units in order to ensure that they were in the vicinity of the various personnel ports. To overcome these difficulties it was decided, that so far as the state of reinforcements permitted, forward reinforcement groups should be automatically maintained at their authorised holdings plus any known deficiencies in field units. On no account were reinforcements in excess of the above authorised holdings despatched forward merely on the grounds that they were available in a base reinforcement camp, or because there was room in the forward lift. In the case of Second Army, reinforcements in excess of 1,000 every other day were not sent forward without prior acceptance by all concerned.

Advance REFORSEC rendered to REFORSEC a daily return showing the holdings and deficiencies against the authorised holding in the forward reinforcement groups so that the supply of reinforcements by arms and trades should approximate to the demand.

Temporary changes in the Order of Battle were not effected in changes in reinforcement channels, and BRITISH units which came temporarily under command of First Canadian Army during this period were still reinforced through 101 Rft Gp.

When OSTEND was made into the main port for reinforcements, it was soon found that REFORSEC, situated at AMIENS, was out of touch with the reinforcement situation, and consequently moved to BRUSSELS within easy reach of all the reinforcement groups and first Echelon.

SHORTAGE OF INFANTRY

The provision of officers and men to bring infantry divisions in 21 Army Group up to establishment continued to be a problem, and by October there was an acute shortage amounting to 970 officers and 11,900 ORs.

As it was apparent that the War Office would not be able to make up these deficiencies from manpower resources in UK, it was decided to disband 50 Division and to post the infantry personnel thus made available to other forma- tions. These postings remedied the OR position in infantry battalions to the extent that the deficiency noted in October had been turned into a small surplus of 2,000 by the end of December, but at that date 520 officers were still required to bring formations up to their establishment. With a likelihood of heavy casualties in the coming Spring operations, it was clear that drastic measures would have to be taken to provide infantry officers. It was therefore decided to disband various RA regiments which had been part of 50 Division and to post back to UK for infantry training the officers who thus became surplus.

Additional measures taken were to send to the UK for the same purpose a large number of RASC and pioneer officers and to request War Office to reduce establishments at home as much as possible, so as to render surplus potential infantry officers, and, finally to send out category and elderly officers to this theatre to release younger extra-regimentally employed officers for posting to infantry units.

This last measure was only partly successful, because of the reluctance of commanders to lose, at this stage, their trained and practised staff Officers, however, great the need of the units might be.

The deficiency in infantry officers was never, in fact, completely made up. On the other hand the measures taken prevented the shortage becoming so serious as to render formations or units ineffective.

Discipline

MILITARY PRISONS, DETENTION BARRACKS AND FIELD PUNISHMENT CAMPS

When the bulk of the force in the theatre was concentrated NORTH of the SEINE it became necessary to move the penal establishments from NORMANDY.

Accommodation was found for N o. 3 Military Prison at DOUAI and a new Military Prison——No. 25——was formed in BRUSSELS during the first week of November.

The premises of this prison contained a laundry, and soldiers under sentence were employed there in washing blankets and similar stores in bulk for Ordnance. No. 5 field Punishment Camp was moved to a small fort in the ANTWERP area.

In December it became clear that the available penal accommodation was insufficient to carry out the policy whereby all sentences were to be served in this theatre.

Authority was consequently obtained for the setting up of a third military prison. This prison was used for soldiers sentenced to penal servitude and to imprisonment for serious offences, as it was considered essential to segregate those who were committed for such crimes from those who were in prison for minor misdemeanours. During this period all available accommodation was fully occupied.

BLACK MARKET AND CURRENCY OFFENCES

Economic conditions in BELGIUM and HOLLAND lent themselves to illicit trading, stealing of WD property and illegal currency transactions.

On the one hand there was a scarcity of food, coal and clothing amongst the local population and on the other the high prices of luxury goods, such as cosmetics, jewellery, watches and films prevented the troops from buying them.

During the period of inflation which followed, the rate of exchange put these luxuries further out of reach of the BRITISH soldier and tempted him to trade with the civilians in stolen and mis-appropriated WD property.

Every eifort was made to check this tendency and many civilians were prosecuted in their own courts for wrongfully possessing military stores and equipment. Gradually, the vigilant searches of the SIB, combined with the actions of the local authorities, helped to diminish these illegal transactions.

REVIEW or SENTENCES

It was usual for courts martial to impose a sentence of three to five years penal servitude for cases of desertion, and it was the policy that the first two years of such a sentence were to be served in a military prison. Many of these cases, however, were occasioned by battle exhaustion arising from long and dangerous contact with the enemy. In order, therefore, to give suitable men a chance of redeeming themselves by sending them back into a fighting unit, and also to help remedy the lack of reinforcements, a board of officers was set up by Second Army to review by personal interview all cases of desertion and kindred offences after three months of the sentence had been served. The board was assisted by a psychiatrist and was empowered to suspend the sentence in suitable cases and to return the soldier to front line duties. Out of 596 cases reviewed, 435 men were returned to the line and of these only 53 failed a second time. So successful was this board that a 21 Army Group board with its own WE was set up to conduct the review of all cases of this type.

COURTS MARTIAL

Prisoners of War

By the end of December approximately 240,000 PW had been captured of which 170,000 had been evacuated to UK in accordance with the declared War Office policy.

From the beginning of October, however, when the War Office decided to scale down the number they would accept in UK, the PW camps within the theatre became overcrowded.

By the end of December the accommodation question was acute and in view of the large numbers of PW which it was excepted to capture during the forthcoming operations, it was decided to construct two more PW camps which were staffed by personnel provided by the War Office. Even these, however, were insufficient and over-crowding continued.

The problem of accommodation was further complicated by an agreement made between the War Office and US authorities that all PW would be shared equally between the two forces.

This agreement was made at the time of the North African campaign, and was never cancelled or amended. Under this arrangement approximately 100,000 PW were transferred from US to BRITISH custody.

In actual fact, however, the number of prisoners taken far exceeded those who were required for employment.

In November a proposal was made to ease the strain on accommodation by handing over 25,000 PW to the custody of the FRENCH Government, but this policy did not become effective until a later date.

War Crimes and Atrocities

As the armies moved through FRANCE and BELGIUM reports came to light of acts committed by the enemy which were contrary to the laws and usages of war.

Evidence was produced which revealed that PW had been shot, that allied airmen had been ill-treated and killed, and that many acts of inhumanity had been committed against non-combatants.

A standing Court of Inquiry was set up by SHAEF to enquire into these allegations and the responsibility of HQ 21 Army Group was to make preliminary investigations and to forward a report to the SHAEF court.

During the period from October to January sixty cases of this category were reported to SHAEF.

In December a report on German atrocities in BELGIUM was completed.

Leave

SHORT LEAVE ON THE CONTINENT

With the assistance of BELGIAN voluntary organisations (notably the Princesse de Ligne hostels) it became possible in October to begin short leave within the theatre.

Hotels were requisitioned in BRUSSELS, and clubs were started with the support of EFI, the Council of Voluntary War Work, and the CANADIAN Auxiliary Services. Similar arrangements were made for short leave to start in PARIS in November.

In view of the nature of the operations and the military value of resting the troops, the War Office agreed that the cost of the leave scheme should be borne entirely by the public.

This short leave was initially for forty-eight hours in BRUSSELS or PARIS, and later was lengthened to three days.

PRIVILEGE LEAVE TO UK

Although it was the policy to open privilege leave to UK as early as possible after the initial phases of the operation were completed, the provision of leave transit camps and the availability of shipping did not permit home leave to start until 1 January when a party of 1,000 officers and men was despatched.

The plan to raise the allocation to 3,000 per day on 4 January, when HARWICH was opened in addition to DOVER and FOLKESTONE, as a disembarkation port, was put into effect without difficulty.

The duration of leave was eight days in the UK in order to give a minimum of seven days at home.

Special arrangements for longer leave from the theatre were made for those who lived in IRELAND and in the NORTH of SCOTLAND.

Marriages

It was possible under the provisions of the Foreign Marriage Act for BRITISH nationals to contract a valid marriage whilst serving in the forces abroad, but marriages of this nature were not always recognised by the laws of other nations.

By October applications were being received from members of 21 Army Group for permission to marry FRENCH, BELGIAN and DUTCH subjects.

Consequently, with the approval of the War Office, arrangements were made with the appropriate authorities for marriages to take place in accordance with local laws.

As it was necessary to investigate the political sympathies of the proposed bride from the security point of view, and, in order to provide some check upon hasty marriages which from differences of language and religion might afterwards lead to unhappiness, HQ 21 Army Group exercised control of marriages to foreign subjects through its Intelligence and Chaplains Branches.

By the end of January over sixty marriages had been approved.

Chaplains

The conditions which characterised this period enabled the Chaplains Service to provide more conventional and fitting surroundings for worship and meditation by setting up garrison churches and “chaplains houses” in all areas which contained a large static military population.

At the same time, two mobile churches which had arrived in the theatre at an earlier period were allocated, one to each army, and began to make tours among front line troops.

On 28 September St Georges House, which contained an excellent general and theological library, opened at BRUSSELS as a chaplains rest and conference centre.

It also provided accommodation for the various outstanding Church leaders, including the Bishops of DOVER and MAIDSTONE, and the Moderator of the General Assembly of the Church of SCOTLAND who paid visits to BLA during the winter months.

By means of these visits chaplains were kept in touch with the life and thought of their churches in UK and were also able to hand on valuable information as to how those still in ENGLAND, both clerical and laity, could make a contribution to the maintenance of the morale of active service troops.

Medical

BUILD-UP OF HOSPITALS NORTH OF THE SEINE

The quick advance of the armies had left the majority of the hospitals in the RMA. It was therefore of primary importance to move at once as many as possible into northern FRANCE and BELGIUM, since at the beginning of this period there were only 6,100 beds to serve the bulk of 21 Army Group located NORTH of the SEINE, compared with the 11,400 beds which remained in NORMANDY.

Despite the urgency of the situation only one general transport company could be allotted to the task and this was fully employed up to the end of December in moving the required medical units forward.

Apart from the lack of transport, the speed at which the hospital area in the advance base was built up also depended on finding and adapting adequate covered accommodation, for since winter was approaching, it was not feasible to site hospitals under canvas.

At one time the lack of accommodation was so serious that six general hospitals which had become redundant in the RMA were shipped back to UK to wait until suitable buildings were available in the advance base.

The problem was gradually surmounted by taking over all existing civilian and GERMAN military hospitals and by converting many large schools and convents to medical uses. By 7 January 29,600 beds were equipped and functioning within the theatre, while 1,400 beds were closed but ready to open when required.

HOLDING POLICY AND CONVALESCENT DEPOT

At this time the lack of adequate convalescent depot facilities adversely influenced the intention to lengthen the holding period.

Nevertheless by 27 October cases which were likely to return to duty or to be convalescent within twenty-eight days were, whenever possible, held in the theatre, and by 7 December the holding period had been extended in most cases to thirty days.

The opening of convalescent depots was delayed by lack of suitable accommodation, the need to wait until completion of the necessary engineer work, and the difficulty in obtaining essential accommodation stores such as beds or double bunks.

A 500 bed depot was eventually opened at ST POL on 30 October and another with a capacity of 300 beds at DE HAAN in November. By the first week in January 3,700 beds were available in convalescent depots.

L OF C

Hospital Areas

The main hospital areas in the L of C were in the vicinity of BRUSSELS, ANTWERP, GHENT, BRUGES, OSTEND, LILLE, TOURNAI, AMIENS and ST OMER.

Early in the period there were hospitals at ROUEN and DIEPPE.

When US forces took over these areas and when DIEPPE closed as a port these medical units moved into BELGIUM.

The medical area of the RMA which figured so importantly in previous phases now existed only in the shape of a winterised 1,800 bed general hospital in BAYEUX.

Evacuation

Evacuation by hospital carrier from the RMA continued from ARROMANCHES until mid December, although by this time the commitment had dwindled to only one carrier weekly.

When this service ceased casualties unfit for evacuation by air were accepted by the US authorities and taken to UK from CHERBOURG.

Air evacuation continued from CARPIQUET, but by the end of the year it was more usual for casualties to be shuttled forward to an airfield near ST OMER.

Hospital carriers continued to evacuate casualties NORTH of the SEINE from DIEPPE until mid November, but the main port for sea evacuation was OSTEND which despatched its first hospital carrier on 21 October.

Movement to OSTEND from other hospital areas was through ambulance railheads.

The BRUSSELS area which received shuttle cases from Second Army and also, until early November, most of the ambulance trains, was the main centre for air evacuation.

Air evacuation from ANTWERP started at the beginning of October, but as ANTWERP became untenable as a medical centre, due to attacks by V Weapons, the air evacuation unit was moved to BR-UGES and continued to function from there.

SECOND ARMY

Medical Areas

Early in October two general hospitals (200 beds) and one 600 bed general hospital set up a medical area in the vicinity of EINDHOVEN, which continued to receive the casualties from various winter operations. A CCS was sited near the airfield at EINDHOVEN to act as a holding unit for the “air cushion”.

The US Evacuation Hospital was moved NORTH of UDEM to deal with US casualties from NIJMEGEN and eventually returned to US control in December.

In mid November in order to provide hospital facilities for the operations in which 12 and 30 Corps were then employed NORTH of SITTARD, a subsidiary medical area consisting of one 200 bed and one 600 bed hospital was set up at HASSELT.

This area later received the casualties from the BRITISH divisions employed in the ARDENNES battle. A convalescent depot (1,000 beds) opened at BOURG LEOPOLD in mid November and its presence enabled Second Army to carry out a fourteen days holding policy within its own medical area.

Evacuation Channels

Early in October the air shuttle service moved to EINDHOVEN and remained there throughout the period.

Cases which required a long term of treatment and convalescence were evacuated direct to UK, and other cases to BRUSSELS.

From the BRUSSELS area personnel trains transported sitting cases to the AMIENS area two or three times a week.

The first army ambulance railhead was established at OVERPELT when casualties were loaded on temporary ambulance trains, consisting of box cars fitted with stretchers.

The ambulance railhead moved forward to VALKENSWARD on 10 October and at the same time properly fitted ambulance trains which had come forward across the SEINE were put into use.

Although the emergency ambulance trains had greatly assisted in clearing casualties they did not form a satisfactory method of handling patients who where seriously ill. Rail evacuation continued to BRUSSELS until November, after which it was possible to run trains direct to all the L of C medical areas.

During the ARDENNES counter offensive casualties of 30 Corps were evacuated direct into hospitals at BRUSSELS and LOUVAIN. The hospitals in this area were cleared of all casualties and their holding policy shelved during the time of the crisis.

First Canadian ARMY

At the beginning of this period two general hospitals (200 beds) under control First Canadian Army were situated at COURTRAI and ANTWERP.

Casualties from CALAIS were evacuated direct to a general hospital (600 beds) at ST OMER, and those which occurredin the fighting in the LEOPOLD canal area were sent to ANTWERP and BRUGES.

Casualties from the WALCHEREN operation were evacuated from field ambulances direct to hospitals in GHENT and BRUGES, although some were evacuated by sea direct to OSTEND.

By the end of December the main concentration of hospitals in the First Canadian Army was situated in the ’s HERTOGENBOSCH-TILBURG area.

Ambulance trains began to run from TURNHOUT on 7 December, while air evacuation direct to UK by Dakota and to BRUGES for short term cases by “Sparrow” flight began on 12 December.

US CASUALTIES

The casualties of 82 and 101 US Airborne Divisions were handled by 24 US Evacuation Hospital, who used BRITISH channels of evacuation.

Early in January when the ARDENNES operation put a strain on US medical arrangements, an offer was made to clear the US hospitals in NAMUR and LIEGE by BRITISH ambulance trains to OSTEND, but although the offer was accepted it never became necessary for the plan to be put into effect.

SUPPLY OF MEDICAL STORES

Base depots medical stores continued to be centred in the areas TOURNAI, ANTWERP, OSTEND, BRUSSELS and LOUVAIN, while advanced depots medical stores supplied the needs of their respective armies.

The Base Blood Transfusion Unit was situated at BRUSSELS where it received daily supplies of blood by air.

HEALTH OF THE TROOPS

The health of the troops remained at a satisfactory high level; in spite of the changing conditions of accommodation and ground, standards of sanitation were well maintained.

From the time the troops ceased to live in bivouacs and were accommodated in billets or other buildings, there was some increase in colds and mild respiratory diseases.

There was a sharp rise in VD rates which coincided with the entry into the populated areas of BELGIUM and HOLLAND and the commencement of leave on the Continent.

The incidence rose throughout the period and while the mean monthly rate per 1,000 troops was 1.98 in October, it had risen to 3.06 in December.

There was also a rise in the scabies and pediculosis rate.

The monthly rate of sick admitted into hospital was :—

• October — 22.4 per 1,000 men
• November — 24.3 per 1,000 men
• December — 28.0 per 1,000 men

In November the first twelve cases of trench foot to appear in the theatre were reported, and by December another fourteen new cases had come to light. This incidence can be counted as negligible, especially as each case was only a slight attack.

The almost complete absence of this type of casualty can be largely ascribed to good man-management by regimental officers coupled with the issue of socks on a generous scale to forward troops.

Statistics showing admissions to medical units and the incidence of certain diseases are found at Appendix “N”.

Pay

In the first week of October officials of the BELGIAN Treasury and of the National Bank explained to representatives of the Pay Service of HQ 21 Army Group the intention of the BELGIAN Government to control in"ation by replacing the existing note issue With a new currency. It was pointed out that, apart from the secrecy in which the change-over had to be shrouded, the problem was complicated by the fact that unless the military authorities agreed to institute certain safeguards, the Government scheme which limited exchanges to 2,000 francs, would be defeated by people who were in a position to bribe allied soldiers to exchange large sums of money for them through the agency of the army cashiers.

Consequently, while arrangements were made to exchange all BELGIAN currency in the possession of troops, orders were issued explaining the reasons for the Government’s action, forbidding military personnel to exchange currency for civilians, and restricting the amount of money which could be sent to UK in postal orders.

At the same time no unit exchanges were made unless they were accompanied by a certificate signed by the OC unit, stating that the amount involved included only pay and allowances. The allied forces were allowed six days in which to complete their exchanges. The amount of money which was involved reached such proportions that the change-over could not have been effected in time Without the employment of special counting boards staffed by BELGIAN civilians.

The Pay Service found little trace of soldiers being tempted to participate in illegal money transactions in BELGIUM, but in HOLLAND, however, where a black bourse between BELGIAN francs and DUTCH guilders flourished and in which the armed forces participated, the Pay Service exchanged a sum of guilders far in excess of what they had originally distributed in pay and allowances.

In the early stages of the operation it had not been possible to carry out any pay documentation of enemy PW.

However, steps were now taken to open an account for each prisoner and, where applicable, to issue official receipts to prisoners through camp commandants for money which had been impounded during the previous months. The working pay for employed prisoners was credited to their accounts. The token money, specially printed in ENGLAND, was not used for payment of services. Instead, canteen supplies were issued on a fixed scale and the cost charged to the prisoner’s account.

As so many of the men who were granted local leave on the Continent came from either HOLLAND or GERMANY, it was necessary to make special arrangements for them in PARIS and BRUSSELS for currency exchanges. Civilian cashiers working under RAPC supervision were installed in each of the leave hostels, and carried out an average of 30,000 exchanges weekly.

When UK leave commenced special facilities were arranged also at CALAIS for exchanging local currency into sterling.

As at this time 21 Army Group was operating in three countries it became necessary to establish two new Command Pay Offices, one in BRUSSELS and another in TILBURG, in addition to the one operating at ST OMER. In the last week of December No. 2 Base Clearing House which had been operating in LONDON moved to RENAIX.

Provost

During this period the strength of the Provost within 21 Army Group was increased by the addition of four TC coys and six VP coys in October and by another VP coy in December.

Furthermore a special squad of thirty BELGIAN gendarmes was lent by the Commissaire de Police Belge to help in the control of the slow moving civilian traffic which used the main military supply routes.

While all wings of the Provost carried out their routine tasks of patrolling and signing routes, guarding vulnerable points, routing convoys and exercising disciplinary control over military personnel in the whole area occupied by 21 Army Group, the main interest of their work at this time centred around the advance base and BRUSSELS which became the main leave centre.

Provost working in close co-operation with the local police dealt with all problems attendant on the setting up of a leave centre in a city, such as controlling clubs and cafes, countering black market activities, apprehending absentees and investigating the theft of WD vehicles, which at this time were being stolen at an increasing rate.

Action in connection with VD included, in addition to enforcing the order putting brothels out of bounds, the creation of an index of prostitutes.

The smartness, discipline and restraint of troops on leave in the leave centres were matters which were commented on favourably by the local inhabitants.

As the port and supply base of ANTWERP developed, involving a growth in the number of military and civilian personnel employed, there was an increase in pilfering and organised crime which the Provost set out to combat.

A permanent river patrol of port and security police stationed on a specially fitted moored barge, policed the River SCHELDT on fast motor launches and searched at will the craft upon the estuary. These surprise checks often resulted in the apprehension of enemy agents and collaborators as well as in the recovery of stolen WD stores.

At the same time a rigid control was imposed on civilians working at the docks and depots which brought to light a large number of thefts.

The culprits were generally let off very lightly by the civilian courts, for it was the policy to fine offenders even when a term of imprisonment would have been the more appropriate and deterrent punishment.

Military personnel also were concerned in various thefts of foodstuffs, petrol, vehicles, clothing and blankets, which afterwards found their way into the civilian black market.

In one case investigations of the SIB led to the arrest of a gang of deserters masquerading as an authorised military unit.

This gang was organised to the extent of having its own stationery and identity cards printed, for several months drew petrol and rations from army sources, and requisitioned its own cars and billets from unsuspecting civilians.

In mid December when the GERMAN offensive in the ARDENNES began, the movement of the necessary BRITISH formations to oppose the enemy drive was carried out without radical changes to the existing traffic circuits.

Second Army was responsible for the majority of these moves, but to ensure that there was complete agreement with the Americans a provost officer from HQ 21 Army Group was attached to ADSEC COM Z to act as a channel through which HQ 30 Corps could communicate directly with the AMERICAN Provost and Movement branches.

Education

The static conditions in the L of C areas made it possible to establish elaborate permanent study centres at LILLE, ROUBAIX, OSTEND, GHENT, BRUGES, ANTWERP and BRUSSELS.

With the assistance of Salvage, who supplied wood and other materials, and of Ordnance, who supplied captured enemy tools, handicraft classes proved very attractive to the troops and of great recreational value.

Classes in modern languages, book-keeping and mathematics were also popular.

At first the supply of text books was quite inadequate and at no time were there sufficient books suitable for advanced students of languages.

In the areas in advance of L of C it was diflicult to maintain elaborate study centres, so during this period education centred around ABCA discussions, debates and lectures from AEC personnel.

At certain formation training schools AEC personnel were attached to the school staff and a special allotment of time was made in the syllabus for educational subjects. AEC personnel also gave individual instruction and help to patients in hospitals and convalescent depots. At RHUs, military prisons and field punishment camps it was found that organised education had a good effect on morale.

During the winter the Education Service sponsored a considerable number of lecturers who spoke on the life and culture of EUROPE and on subjects of sociological and economic interest. The lecturers were supplied from many sources and included distinguished civilians from UK and from the various liberated countries. Education staffs were also usefully employed in connection with formation and unit broadsheets.

Graves

The comparatively static conditions which characterised this phase of the campaign enabled the Graves Service to catch up with the locating and registration of the accumulation of graves which had been reported in previous months.

By the end of the year from a total of 36,538 burial reports which had been received, 32,218 graves had been registered.

In addition, work had been commenced on permanent BRITISH and CANADIAN cemeteries in NORMANDY, while twenty-six BRITISH cemeteries, two CANADIAN cemeteries and twelve military graveyards in civilian cemeteries were being developed in NORMANDY and BELGIUM.

Two GRUs were formed to work in L of C areas, in addition to one BRITISH GCU and one CANADIAN GCU for work in the BAYEUX area.

By the end of the year 1,321 graves had been concentrated in permanent cemeteries.

The locating of graves of BEF personnel killed during 1939-1940 was also started and by 29 December a total of 2,840 graves of this type had been located and reported. This work was extremely difficult at first as no official records were available, but was later made easier through the co-operation of local municipal authorities in providing lists of burials.

Welfare

GENERAL

During October the Rear Welfare Equipment Depot was brought forward to BRUSSELS from the RWA. The distribution of large quantities of captured enemy welfare equipment continued to be carried out through the advanced equipment depots.

In most of the areas which contained a concentration of troops, gift shops were opened, where luxury goods such as perfume, cosmetics and toys were sold to the troops at very low prices. The most notable of these gift schemes were those run by the Second Army and by Baronne Rolin of BRUSSELS.

Owing to a variety of reasons a quantity of undeliverable tobacco parcels had accumulated at the Base APO. Arrangements were now made for these to be distributed on a fair basis through Welfare to field formations.

By December woollen comforts knitted and manufactured in UK had been distributed to the force on an allocation of at least one item per man. Owing to delays in delivery of supplies, the issue to forward troops was not carried out as early as had been intended.

CANTEENS, CLUBS AND HOSTELS

During October and November over thirty canteens and clubs were set up in BRUSSELS to cater for 10,000 troops on short leave.

An appreciable proportion was operated by the BELGIAN Red Cross, largely staffed by voluntary workers.

The Montgomery Club, the largest military club of its nature in the theatre, was opened by EFI in BRUSSELS on 20 December and on 18 December the first "21 Dance Club” also opened there.

In BRUSSELS, too, a need arose for a club to which service men and women could go irrespective of rank. In particular some oficers in town had friends or relations in the ranks of the women’s services, and to meet this demand the Marlborough Club was opened.

Apart from these clubs opened in town centres, many divisions and higher formations opened clubs conveniently situated for the use of men temporarily out of the line.

During the ARDENNES offensive mobile canteens staffed by EFI and CVWW personnel operated in the forward areas.

LIVE ENTERTAINMENT

The number of ENSA parties touring the 21 Army Group area increased to thirty-one, and, in addition, there were eight BELGIAN teams organised by ENSA.

There were also four “Stars in Battle-dress” parties on tour. A voluntary all-BELGIAN show visited units in Second Army area.

BROADCASTING

No. 1 field Broadcasting Unit arrived with four mobile 1 kw transmitters and by 7 January three broadcasting stations were working, one each in Second Army area, First Canadian Army area and advance L of C area. Each station transmitted over an area of 25 miles radius. Programmes consisted of relays of the AEF programme, gramophone records and of items specially recorded in the field.

After the liberation of EINDHOVEN some five thousand wireless sets from local manufacture were made available for purchase.

CINEMAS

The operation of a number of garrison cinemas was undertaken by the Army Kinerna Service because ENSA was unable to open sufficient to meet the requirements of the force.

AKS was called upon to show an increased number of training films. A certain amount of enemy equipment and Continental equipment made for the enemy was obtained.

It was less valuable than anticipated due to lack of spares and poor material used in its manufacture.

LEGAL AID

The legal aid section of HQ 21 Army Group which had previously operated from UK arrived in BRUSSELS on 27 October and by the end of December had reviewed and given advice in 1,200 cases.

SOLDIERS’, SAILORS’ AND AIRMEN’s FAMILIES’ ASSOCIATION

Representatives of SSAFA landed on the Continent on 5 October, and immediately set up offices in BRUSSELS and soon afterwards at EINDHOVEN and CAEN. In addition members of the association toured the L of C area, visiting the chief military centres each week. By the end of the year the SSAFA had given help and handed on information in over five hundred cases of domestic welfare, matrimonial disagreements and financial hardship.

ATS

No. 1 Continental Group ATS employed with HQ 21 Army Group, completed its move from VAUCELLES to BRUSSELS on 28 September.

In November the strength of the ATS in 21 Army Group was increased by the addition of two companies formed to take over some of the various duties of male personnel at L of C headquarters and in two general hospitals.

The advance party of the first mixed HAA regiment to arrive in the theatre landed on 21 November and by the end of the year the ATS who formed part of two mixed regiments which defended ANTWERP during the V bomb attacks numbered approximately eight hundred.

Civil Affairs

Between September and January the BELGIAN Government was faced with a food crisis.

AMERICA and BRITAIN agreed to supply the BELGIANS with 4,000 tons of food which was duly delivered and distributed through the agency of Civil Affairs thus relieving the operational staffs of a heavy responsibility.

In addition they were also responsible for supervising the wholesale distribution of domestic coal in conjunction with the allocations by SHAEF and the distribution programmes of CODISEC.

This action cut down theft and pilfering which at one time seemed likely to jeopardise the requirements for public utilities, domestic consumption and military purposes.

By reducing these losses and also by their liaison with the civil population Civil Affairs helped to stave off the strikes and political disturbances which threatened and which would have had a very adverse effect on the development of the advance base.

While the difficult operation of disarming resistance groups was being carried out, Civil Affairs public security officers acted as observers for military authorities and provided timely appreciations of the situation for the general staff.

During the ARDENNES offensive Civil Affairs detachments were deployed to keep roads clear of refugees and to stop any panic movement of civilians across the MEUSE from EAST to WEST.