SUPPLIES

This phase of the operations in North-West EUROPE did not provide any major supply problems of a technical nature. The main problem experienced in common with all planning sections, was the difficulty of forecasting future operational moves due to the constantly changing tactical situation.

The FS bulk ration had almost entirely superseded Compo packs by 21 July and plans for fresh items to take the place of the tinned equivalents were in hand. In order to provide suitable cold storage for imported meat, insulated meat pits and ten-ton portable cold stores were constructed in the neighbourhood of ARROMANCHES.

The shipment of all fresh vegetables was successful, but required a great deal of detailed supervision in DIDs. The baking of bread was somewhat delayed due to the lack of sites with suitable water supplies, and also to delay in shipping the necessary equipment, but by 5 August bread was issued to nearly all troops.

Later it was impossible for bakeries with the armies to keep up with the advance and maintain their output at the same time.

In the case of the L of C, contracts were placed with civilian firms in order to ensure full scale provision of bread for all L of C troops.

The import of supplies was averaging about 2,600 tons per day and by 5 August stocks based on a feeding strength of 700,000 represented some twenty-seven days supply. These stocks were held in RMA EAST and WEST depots which were fifteen to twenty miles apart and were worked independently, each area being controlled initially by a CRASC Supply Units who was responsible for GHQ supply units including BSDs, DIDs, field butcheries and bakeries in his area.

This, however, proved too great a task and on 15 August CRASC 19 Supply Units took over responsibility for the field butcheries, bakeries and two DIDs which dealt exclusively with coal and fresh vegetables. This re-organisation effected a great improvement in both areas.

Early in August it was decided when making the bids for the period D+94 to D+103 that the tactical situation and the stocks on the ground justified the introduction of commodity loading in accordance with the original maintenance plan.

However, the greatly changed situation as the time for receipt of these supplies approached had strained the transport system to its limit. It was hoped, however, to relieve this by shipping the intake of maintenance through Channel ports and a last minute attempt was therefore made, in vain, to revert to balanced ration loadings for this period.

In point of fact failure to revert to the balanced ration system was of little on sequence as when the armies began their advance all drawing of fresh rations practically ceased, the major issues being Compo, except for captured stocks. A considerable quantity of the latter was available.

At OSS in HOLLAND 11,000,000 pounds of frozen beef and 850 tons of tinned meat were uncovered. 550 tons of meat were also found in the area of BRUSSELS, in addition to a large number of miscellaneous items which Were used in substitution for items in the BRITISH scale.

For five days Second Army subsisted on captured stocks without having to touch first, second or third line reserve holdings.

In the latter half of September all units in FRANCE received full daily issues of frozen meat from cold storage facilities at ROUEN and AMIENS.

Demands from armies for roadhead replenishments were based on a seven days cycle, armies submitting detailed breakdown demands with priorities two days before each period.

The aim was to deliver six days balanced rations and one days balancing items. This scheme was slow in getting into operation, mainly due to rail transport difficulties and the impossibility of reconciling receipts with despatches.

The problem of distribution began to be easier from 9 September when DIEPPE opened, becoming available as a base for First Canadian Army and a modest rail lift became operative to the SEINE railheads. During the critical period in the first fortnight of September, 600 tons were flown to the BRUSSELS area from UK for Second Army.

TRANSPORT

The build-up in the bridgehead had increased to such an extent since D-day that due to congestion on the roads certain transport units had been phased back. Early in August, however, these were again called forward in anticipation of a large scale advance.

On 6 August in response to a request from HQ 21 Army Group one three-ton and one six-ton GT Coy were loaned to the US armies for an agreed period of eight days.

Despite the fact that a third GT Coy was loaned, it was not possible to release these units until 4 September when the transport crisis on the BRITISH L of C was at its height. A DUKW company was also loaned to the AMERICANS for use on the UTAH beaches for six weeks.

From 22 August onwards more and more transport had to be provided to enable the armies to stock their roadheads. Although it had been originally planned to establish roadheads at distances of fifty to one hundred miles apart and to stock them up to maximum of five days holdings of all stores, this system had to be modified owing to the extreme rapidity of the advance. First Canadian Army economised in transport by setting up an advance section of No. 3 Roadhead, thirty miles further on near BOUGTHEROLDE.

As transport became available stocks in No. 3 Roadhead at LISIEUX were moved forward and this advance section became the base of the First Canadian Army up to the line of the SOMME. With the opening of DIEPPE the transport allotted to First Canadian Army from HQ 21 Army Group resources amounted to eight three-ton companies.

Second Army formed temporary “cushions”, the first of which was established South-West of FALAISE and preceded the opening of No. 4 Roadhead EAST of RUGLES.

On 19 August prior to the stocking of No. l Cushion, Second Army had six equivalent three-ton GT coys from GHQ resources under their command.

By 26 August this number had increase to fourteen and on 2 September, exclusive of two platoons of army tank transporters converted for load carrying, thirty-nine equivalent three-ten GT coys were under their command.

By the middle of September the BRITISH L of C had lengthened to three hundred miles, almost double the distance on which the allotment of transport to 21 Army Group had been calculated. Until the development of rail and port facilities, therefore, the road maintenance lift had to be increased by every possible means.

The decision to cut imports into the RMA to seven thousand tons per day already mentioned in para 5(b) released eight DUKW companies for conversion into normal GT coys and also a number of GT coys empoyed on beach clearance. At the end of September only three DUKVV companies remained as such, of which one was on loan to US Army.

In August Second Army followed the example of First Canadian Army and by welding on to each trailer at base and sides of airfield track converted a company of forty-ton tank transporters into load carriers. First Canadian Army had previously converted one platoon.

These modified transporters could lift sixteen and a half tons of supplies, thirty-six tons of ammunition, ten tons of POL or five hundred jerrycans, which meant a very considerable lift for a three platoon company.

An extra. lift of between five and six hundred to11s was added to the pool by bringing five GT coys up to their full WE and by the issue surplus to VVE, of an additional thirty three-ton reserve vehicles to each of four GT coys. In addition, one hundred and fifty-four 800 gallon tankers were issued early in September to supplement the seven bulk petrol transport companies employed on forward maintenance.

On 16 September eight US truck companies commenced to run from BAYEUX to BRUSSELS delivering five hundred tons of petrol per day.

On 20 September they were employed on the maintenance of the two US airborne divisions which took part in operation MARKET GARDEN.

Further assistance came from the release of AA RASC transport platoons and six platoons of twenty-nine and three platoons of twenty-two three-ton vehicles were formed from first line AA transport. Two ten-ton GT coys were further equipped with five-ton trailers.

The decision by Second Army to ground certain formations in the advance released considerable amount of first and second line transport for local work, thus enabling GT coys to continue in the maintenance lifts.

In mid-September War Office agreed to loan an additional seventeen GT coys to 21 Army Group. five arrived before the end of this phase, the remaining twelve were expected to arrive preloaded with supplies or petrol before 3 October.

The ever increasing transport required for Civil Affairs was an added handicap to the maintenance of the armies. Between 26 August and 6 September five thousand tons of food and medical supplies from Civil Affairs depots at BUSSY and LUC-SUR--MER were transported to PARIS.

On 9 September First Canadian Army formed No. 5 Roadhead SOUTH of ABBEVILLE at the same time as DIEPPE was opened. This roadhead and the opening of the SEINE railheads on 13 September, coupled with an increased allotment of two additional GT coys on 16 September allowed First Canadian Army to maintain itself to the DUTCH frontier, and to clear approximately three thousand tons per day from DIEPPE.

On 6 September Second Army began stocking X0. 6 Army Roadhead in the area of GRAMMONT. When trains began to run in limited numbers from the RMA the dualproblem arose of continually balancing the rail capacities on either side of the SEINE and lifting by road the balance of the six thousand tons per day required by that army for its maintenance and stocks. HQ 21 Army Group, therefore, assumed responsibility for the control of all transport and set up the organisation entitled TRANCO at AMIENS on 19 September.

By 25 September orders had been issued for the regrouping of the GT coys in the DOULLENS and ELBEUF areas NORTH and SOUTH of the SEINE.

In each of these areas two CSRASC each commanding a group of companies were placed. Of these one was responsible for road patrol and the organisation of staging camps, while the other called “Control” was responsible for reporting daily, by wireless, availability of transport in the area and movement of all maintenance convoys through the report centre established on the main “up” and “down” routes. Control CSRASC also operated at the RMA, at No. 6 Army Roadhead, and at DIEPPE.

The co-ordination of transport allocation was then exercised by TRANCO, based on “Q” priorities given to Second Army demands. A loading bill was sent out daily by wireless or telephone forty-eight hours in advance to controlling HQ.

VEHICLE MAINTENANCE

During this intense period of activity the maintenance of vehicles inevitably had to be reduced, but partly due to the majority of vehicles being new no serious ill effects ensued.

A major fault occurred in the engines of K-5 4 X 4, three-ton Austins, 1,400 of which, as well as all the replacement engines, were found to be defective and to have piston trouble.

AIR FREIGHT

When BRUSSELS and ANTWERP were reached, maintenance by air became imperative and a HQ CRASC transport column trained in air freight organisation was transferred from the RBLA and placed under command of Second Army.

By 13 September this HQ with two DIDs had handled 6,352 tons of stores. The tonnages of air freight increased throughout the month, during which an average of between four hundred and five hundred tons a day was achieved.

Early in September bulk petrol was delivered to LILLE by means of long range tanks of Liberator aircraft but this experiment was abandoned as it was wasteful both in petrol and aircraft.

PETROL

At the beginning of this period imports of POL were averaging 4,500 tons per day of which fifty per cent was in bulk against an average daily consumption of POL products of 2,000 tons per day. The restriction of movement in the bridgehead reduced petrol consumption to a minimum and by 5 August the stock of MT 80 was 66,000 tons representing thirty-three days stock. All petrol units that were required for the bridgehead had arrived by 5 August but eight bulk petrol transport companies were phased in by 25 August in anticipation of the advance across the SEINE.

As First Canadian Army and Second Army were based on RMA EAST and RMA WEST respectively all issues to armies were by pack, but at the same time L of C units were commencing to receive their petrol in bulk which released jerricans for the impending advance.

During August the physical distribution of petrol to the armies caused no difficulty until the crossing of the SEINE. Meanwhile, the intake of bulk petrol through PORT EN BESSIN was approximately 2,300 tons per day with a similar amount arriving in pack.

The consumption during the second half of August had doubled and stabilised at approximately 4,000 tons of all products per day. Forward distribution was effected during the early stage of the advance by transporting packed POL stores by road from the RMA to No. 3 and No. 4 Roadheads.

In order to increase the bulk petrol lift, Q(AE) authorised the issue of seventy, and in early September a further eighty-four, additional 800 gallon tankers to the bulk petrol companies to be held surplus to establishment. Between 5-10 September a total of 2,308 tons of packed MT 80 was delivered by air to the BRUSSELS area.

On 9 September rail service from the RMA to the SEINE was opened and the first 750 ton train was despatched to BERNAY on the same day.

The progress of the pipeline continued and on 16 September bulk petrol lorries started loading at BRIONNE for the army filling areas which were at this time at NEUFCHATEL and GRANDE VILLIERS.

By 18 September the pipeline was extended to the PETIT COURONNE installations at ROUEN where 160,000 empty jerrycans had been collected. Simultaneously a filling area under GHQ, control was opened at DARNETAL to utilise the very large number of empty jerricans left in the area.

DARNETAL besides being the pipehead NORTH of the SEINE also became the rail tank car filling point as the rail was developed.

The first line of PLUTO had been laid from the ISLE OF WIGHT to CHERBOURG. On 13 August pumping of water commenced and by 24 August Water pumping tests on the second line were proceeding at a rate equal to approximately 145 tons per day.

During September approximately 4,000 tons per day was required for the force, and although 2,000 tons per day could be accepted in bulk at PORT EN BESSIN, the balance was required to be stored at an advanced port in order to economise in transport. OSTEND, liberated on 9 September, was the port chosen and the first tankers were discharged there on 29 September.

Stocks of packed products in the UK were now so limited that imports of packed POL had to be reduced in October to the production rate of 350 tons per day.

SUPPLIES

During this phase not only had the daily maintenance of the armies to be continued and the slender resources in the roadheads increased, but also the new supply base in BELGIUM had to be established and built up. The stocks for the new base were to be transferred from the substantial holdings in the RMA and imported through the Channel ports until such time as ANTWERP was open.

It was decided, as a precaution against the possibility of heavy air and sea attacks being concentrated on ANTWERP, to establish the base depots in three groups so that each group would have the use of alternative ports from which to accept imports from UK. The groups were located at ANTWERP, GHENT and BRUSSELS containing four, five and three BSDs respectively.

The last shipment of supplies, with the exception of periodical deliveries of fresh meat and vegetables for troops in that area reached the RMA in the first week of October. These supplies together with the RMA stocks were balanced at 15,000,000 FS rations. From that time onwards until the opening of ANTWERP supplies were shipped to the Channel ports.

Both army roadheads continued to be stocked by rail ; Second Army received approximately 700 tons per day from the RMA whilst First Canadian Army were supplied from DIEPPE at the rate of approximately 600 tons per day. In addition approximately equal tonnages were forwarded daily to the advance base.

Although supplies of fresh vegetables and fruit were unobtainable during the early stages of the campaign, it was possible in October to obtain plentiful supplies in BELGIUM and by 2 December 1,400 tons of vegetables representing 6,280,000 rations, the equivalent of six days issue for the force, were acquired by local procurement.

At the same time contracts were made with civilian bakeries at LILLE and BRUSSELS to produce 85,000 lbs of bread per day with BRITISH ingredients for local troops, and negotiations were started to procure the manufacture of fresh pork sausages to replace the tinned equivalent in the FS ration.

Arrangements were also made for the procurement of 8,000,000 boxes of matches with the object of saving exports of this item from UK.

Considerable difficulties were still being experienced with the distribution of frozen meat due to the insufficient number of refrigerated and insulated Wagons but from 1 November a 100 per cent issue of fresh meat was made on alternate days.

With the opening of ANTWERP in sight it was essential to plan for the reception direct from AMERICA of the maximum quantity of supplies which formerly had been transferred in UK from ocean going freighters to coasters serving the armies.

On 6 November War Office was notified that approximately 28,200 tons which were to be loaded in US in December could be accepted in ANTWERP direct.

On 24 November the second bid for 13,950 tons was placed for acceptance during February.

In December bad weather conditions hampered the removal of stocks from the RMA and by the end of that month there were 9,000 tons in excess of L of C requirements. Subsequently plans were made to ship these supplies by coaster from CAEN during the second and third weeks of January.

When ANTWERP was open arrangements were made for the rear L of C sub areas to be maintained through the ports of BOULOGNE and CAEN, and HQ, L of C became responsible for bidding to HQ 21 Army Group their tonnage requirements of shipping and for demanding supplies for this tonnage through S and T channels.

By the end of this phase the advance base was well established; storage capacity including refrigeration amounted to approximately 100,000 tons, while 35,000,000 rations, representing 29 days’ reserves for the entire force, were under GHQ control.

SOLID FUELS

A special section was appointed by the S and T Directorate during October to deal with all matters concerning solid fuels. The first deliveries of coal from the UK for locomotives and slack for power stations and domestic use were received through the port of CAEN.

These imports steadily increased from 400 tons per day in October to 1,000 per day in January.

The first imports through DIEPPE started in October and by January had amounted to an average of 700 tons per day. In October some of the collieries in FRANCE and BELGIUM commenced working again and by the end of that month the first supplies were despatched by road and rail to DIDs in FRANCE. The first deliveries of coal by rail from BELGIUM, however, did not commence until November.

The shortage of solid fuel, particularly in BELGIUM, had considerable effect on local production and firms with whom various services had placed urgent contracts were unable to carry out their contracts. It was arranged therefore that S and T should be responsible for receiving these requirements from the services for screening and consolidating and then demanding them together with other military requirements.

After the allocation was made the responsibility for distribution was entirely left to the civflian authorities under military direction and supervision. The scale of solid fuel for the force was fixed at an overall figure of 4 lbs per man per day which included the requirements for hospitals and laundries. As it was considered that only two-thirds of the force would be in a position to use coal, the unit scale was fixed at 3 lbs per man per day.

This scale had to be fixed in relation to the availability of transport and supply and not on whether the amount was adequate or not. The provision of coal depended on the constant supply of pitwood mentioned in para 2 (e) of this chapter.

TRANSPORT

At the beginning of this phase the rail service from the RMA was limited and interrupted and consequently the bulk of maintenance had still to be brought up by road. One of the greatest problems which arose as a result of the extended L of C was unit administration, and units and sub units had not only to be self-administering but also self-contained for periods of seven days or more.

With the approach of winter, staging camps were established at the terminals and along the principal maintenance routes. These camps were organised on a hotel system and provided hot meals, baths and accommodation for drivers, enabling them to rest and carry out maintenance on their vehicles.

On 30 September the S & T Staff of TRANCO was Withdrawn and joined Rear HQ 21 Army Group in BRUSSELS.

In order to relieve the strain on L of C transport and to give GT coys an opportunity for maintenance and rest, considerable quantities of horses and equipment captured from the enemy, in addition to requisitioned civilian horsed transport, were brought into use.

During the period between 1 to 15 December, a total of 9,442 tons was lifted by horsed transport, of which sixty per cent was within the ANTWER-P area.

14 October marked the commencement of the re-organisation of all RASC transport units with the exception of the L of C GT coys. There were two reasons for this :— firstly, operational experience had shown the desirability of modifying the organisation of army transport companies and, secondly, to effect an economy i.n manpower thus enabling demands for infantry reinforcements to be met.

In November and December sixteen army transport companies were re-organised into fourteen standard 3-ton or 6-ton GT coys of four platoons each retaining the same designation as before.

A further operational re-organisation was that of the second line transport of the armoured divisions, to which an additional company was added, the armoured division troop carrying company. Third line armoured division transport companies became army transport companies with the same organisation as the other third line transport.

The measures adopted for economising in manpower affected the remaining transport units, and mainly consisted of reducing the scale of reserve drivers in infantry divisional, corps troops, troop carrying, motor ambulance and artillery companies.

Personnel of the composite platoons in the infantry divisional companies as well as the ambulance car companies were reduced, the latter being replaced by ATS drivers. The elements of the two army transport companies made surplus during the reorganisation became the nucleus of two station maintenance companies. Flying squads of expert advisers and skilled artificers of No. 4 MT Inspectorate did much to maintain the standard of mechanical efficiency of transport.

On 17 December GT coys began to be formed from BELGIAN military personnel. These units were to be placed at the disposal of HQ 21 Army Group after an initial period of training in UK. On their return they were to release the personnel of seventeen GT coys, loaned by the War Office to 21 Army Group, and take over the equipment. Although this pool of transport was to be operationally controlled by 21 Army Group, the BELGIAN authorities would be responsible for all problems of personnel, pay and discipline.

A small staff, headed by a lieutenant-colonel who assumed the title of Commandant du Groupement des Transports Automobiles, was formed at the end of December in order to control these units, and to act as a liaison HQ. Simultaneously a start was made in forming fourteen more BELGIAN and nine NETHERLANDS GT coys for work under the direction of Civil Affairs.

Two RASC Crane Platoons, formed during September, were despatched to the advance base depots as they were not required for work on the beaches or in. the transhipment areas. After the beaches were closed in October all RASC motor boat companies returned to UK for re-fitting and re-organisation preparatory to operating in the newly opened ports. The first of these companies with ten fast launches and ten harbour launches arrived in ANTWERP in January.

In order to meet the increasing demand for transport for port clearance there was a gradual release of transport units from the 21 Army Group pool to the L of C. By 13 December the pool was reduced from fifty-nine equivalent 3-ton companies to twenty-six.

A small pool of transport however remained under the direct control of S & T for employment on standard GHQ details, such as pitwood commitments in the ARDENNES (in which one 6~ton and two 10-ton companies were engaged) and ferrying up remaining GHQ units from FRANCE and BELGIUM.

The air freight organisation was further developed during this phase and it was calculated that, subject to the availability of aircraft, some 350 tons could be handled daily at NIVELLES. In actual fact this figure was never reached nor did the necessity for it arise.

POL

The first GHQ stocks of POL were delivered by rail to HAL in BELGIUM. formerly used by Second Army as a POL area before they established N o. 6 Army Roadhead in the area of DIEST.

During the latter part of September it became apparent, especially as OSTEND was in the process of being developed as a bulk petrol port, that filling areas should be established forward of DARNETAL to obviate the necessity of returning jerrycans to the rear areas. filling centres, therefore, were set up at GHENT for the use of First Canadian Army and at NINOVE for use by Second Army.

In early November the Mobile Petrol filling Centres controlled by armies were withdrawn and placed under GHQ control which left armies with no responsibility for filling jerrycans.

In the meantime, the population in the rear areas of the L of C was diminishing and the continuation of the pipeline from the installations at PETIT COURONNE across the SEINE to DARNETAL reduced the commitment of bulk petrol transport companies in the SEINE area. This enabled five companies with a total lift of 1,500 tons to be released for OSTEND.

In view of the fact that all POL products were common user items and inter-changeable between BRITISH and US forces, a POL section of the G-4 Branch of SHAEF had been formed before the opening of the campaign. All demands, whether from 2-1 Army Group or from Com Z on behalf of the US Army Groups, were made to that branch.

The installations at PETIT COURONNE were jointly shared and operated by BRITISH and US personnel.

At the request of SHAEF, however, these installations were handed over to the AMERICANS on 10 October with the exception of 6,700 tons of storage capacity for BRITISH requirements. By this time OSTEND was importing approximately 2,000 tons of bulk petrol per day.

It was discovered in BELGIUM that certain civilian oil companies had been operating during the GERMAN occupation and a petroleum board, the Union Petroliere Belge, controlled the majority of their activities. 21 Army Group, however, only recognised this organisation in matters of civilian distribution, and as far as possible, supplied their requirements, which were limited to essential business only. In return, the UPB, as agents for the oil companies, gave every assistance by permitting the use of their plants and employees in accordance With BRITISH and US requirements.

The supply of returnable containers had considerably diminished and the shortage was so serious that special arrangements for their collection were made. In less than a month over 1,000,000 were returned. Further steps were taken to improve the situation by importing IVITSO in non-returnable cans through DIEPPE and by the middle of November the daily average imports by this method had risen to 2,750 tons.

These imports were largely aided by the fact that War Office had been requested and agreed to maintain a minimum production of 1,260,000 such containers per month for MT80. In addition War Office held a reserve of 30,000 tons of MT80 in non-returnable cans.

In view of the fact that so few jerrycans had been returned by units during the advance these imports would have proved absolutely invaluable had the pursuit been continued into GERMANY. Another method adopted for conserving the supply of containers was the provision of bulk POL for the L of C.

Accordingly, petrol stations, staffed with personnel from the composite platoons of the bulk transport companies, were set up along the L of C with the convoy-lane method of refilling. These depots were replenished from bulk petrol transport.

The first inland storage depot was opened at BRUSSELS and was maintained by rail tank cars from ROUEN until the opening of ANTWERP where the first POL supplies arrived on 29 November. During November another subsidiary inland installation was opened at TOURNAI to augment the distribution to the L of C.

POL was transported there by barge from GHENT. GHQ POL stacking areas were located at ANTWERP (outside I installations 35,000 tons), DIEST/HASSELT (40,000 tons), GHENT (35,000 tons) and BRUSSELS (20,000 tons).

Prior to the opening of ANTWERP plans had been made for the use of 300,000 tons of petrol storage and other installations in the port. These were to be shared jointly between the BRITISH and US. GHENT with its 50,000 tons of storage had the largest installations solely available to 21 Army Group but since no rail cars were available to carry bulk petrol in sufficient quantity from OSTEND it was decided to link up OSTEND and GHENT by a triple pipeline capable of a daily capacity of 3,600 tons. The first of these lines commenced pumping on 28 October.

Meanwhile plans for implementing the second phase of the PLUTO scheme, consisting of laying cross channel pipelines from DUN GENESS to BOULOGNE, were put into effect and the first pipeline began to operate on 26 October.

At the end of December, DUMBO, as this portion of the PLUTO scheme was entitled, was giving an average of 1,300 tons per day and in addition to this the total supply in the theatre under GHQ control amounted to 245,000 tons of packed and bulk POL equivalent to 58 days at normal expenditure for the force, but 73,000 tons of MT80 was later earmarked for AMERICAN use.

SUPPLIES

By the end of January storage accommodation for supplies (excluding cold storage) amounted to 37,000 tons in ANTWERP, 40,000 tons in GHENT and 27,000 tons in BRUSSELS and an additional 10,700 tons could be made available in GHENT if it was necessary to utilise that port owing to ANTWERP becoming untenable.

An additional 12,000 tons capacity in BRUSSELS became available later. Apart from ANTWERP, cold storage facilities in BRUSSELS, GHENT, OSTEND, LILLE and COURTRAI totalled 5,200 tons.

The power supply to the cold storage plant at ANTWERP had twice been cut by V-2 and it was arranged to reduce shipments of meat from 5,000 tons to 3,000 tons per fortnight. This made the remaining cold storage space outside ANTWERP sufficient to ensure the continued issue of frozen meat.

At the beginning of January the feeding strength in the RMA and in the area SOUTH of the SEINE was still approximately 90,000. It was arranged to maintain these L of C troops from stocks in the RMA balanced with fresh items imported from UK through CAEN.

Troops between the River SOMME and the BELGIAN border were maintained through CALAIS.

Arrangements were also made for some 12,000 tons of surplus supplies in the RMA to be brought forward by road, rail and sea to the advance base by 11 February.

Contracts for the manufacture of pork sausages which had commenced during December were gradually extended to factories throughout the L of C.

A large number of GERMAN esbit tablets were re-manufactured in February to conform with the BRITISH equivalent of hexamine tablets.

During the same month negotiations were made for the manufacture of baking powder which was now in short supply in the theatre. About the middle of February fresh vegetables, which had been in plentiful supply were threatening to become unobtainable and so plans were made to resume shipments from UK.

This, however, was only a temporary seasonal stoppage. Although many more bakeries were required due to the increasing military population the shortage of manpower would not permit any further units to be formed.

The organisation and equipment of army bakeries, however, was such that in a mobile field bakery a higher output of bread per individual could be produced than in the case of the static field bakery.

Accordingly it was decided to convert the existing eight static field bakeries to fourteen mobile field bakeries which was accomplished without any further increase of personnel.

Civil Affairs commitments had been increasing from the start of the campaign and it was clear that demands for food would become greater as the advance progressed into HOLLAND.

CA initially had been allotted a number of depot units on a lower War Establishment than normal supply units. These had proved inadequate for their task and by January two BSDS and one DID had to be loaned from 21 Army Group resources. The CA depots were unable to cope with the increasing responsibilities and mounting tonnages as they were deficient in space and equipment.

On 15 February, therefore, as mentioned elsewhere, S and T took over the entire responsibility for handling CA supplies and a separate chain of depots was organised for the purpose.

Six DIDs, a CRASC supply unit and certain port detachments were made available to CA. The existing CA depot units were disbanded, and reformed into one DID.

The effect of this was that in addition to the fact that the personnel for two BSDs, seven DIDs and three field butcheries would not be available for disbandment as part of the scheme to make more manpower available, the HQ CRASC supply units which had been relied on to command additional supply units during the advance into GERMANY had been absorbed on these duties.

The main CA depot area was at ’s HERTOGENBOSCH where 42,000 tons could be stacked. Two BSDs and seven DIDs were earmarked for NETHERLANDS District to help in the liberation of WEST HOLLAND, but in actual fact only one BSD and three DIDs were required as the handling of all relief supplies was quickly taken over by the Dutch.

March was a period of intensive building up of stocks in preparation for the assault across the RHINE.

As soon as Second Army vacated the area of No. 8 Army Roadhead it became a GHQ supply depot. It was anticipated that a break-through into GERMANY would considerably increase the 21 Army Group feeding strength, as a result of the liberation of allied PW and DPs.

Apart from commencing to stock-pile 2,700,000 rations in this area, the stocks in No. 10 Army Roadhead by 24 March had risen to 1,746,000 FS and 935,000 Compo rations equivalent to approximately 5,000 tons.

The general plan for the meeting the additional commitments in GERMANY was to free units already employed in HOLLAND and BELGIUM for the final advance. The CA depots at SAS VAN GHENT, BOOM, WYNECHEM and ST AMAND were closed and their stocks placed in CA depots at CAPELLE and BRASSCHAET, the units released there by being held in readiness for any CA tasks in GERMANY. In addition the War Office provided four supply companies (light) each of four platoons, which were organised to carry out the duties of normal DIDs. Three field butcheries which arrived in the theatre at this time were re-equipped for employment as DIDs.

Four DIDs were allotted to cope with the feeding of DPs in the RHINE and RUHR areas and remained there until the cessation of hostilities.

The forecast for the total feeding strength for May and June was 1,920,000 and of this total it was estimated that 1,300,000 personnel would be entitled to FS rations.

Although adequate GERMAN stocks of food had been uncovered to feed large numbersof PW these stocks were either geographically inaccessible or there were no organisations set up for making the necessary distribution.

In consequence a special temporary ration scale of 1,100 calories was provided from 21 Army Group stocks.

Initially there was some confusion as to the commitments for feeding the various nationalities of PW and DPS including RUSSIANS. It was eventually decided that with the exception of BRITISH and US liberated PW who were to receive the normal field service ration scale the remainder would get the same scale of rations as mobile civilian labour. All these rations were drawn from S and T stocks.

SOLID FUEL

During this phase both loco and domestic coal continued to be imported into FRANCE through CAEN and, to the end of January, through DIEPPE.

In February this latter port which had been averaging an intake of 800 tons of coal a day was handed over to Communications Zone control.

Shipments into CAEN averaged 1,200 tons a day in January and February, rising to 1,400 tons daily in March.

The bulk of 21 Army Group’s requirements of solid fuel in FRANCE, however, were supplied from indigenous sources.

In BELGIUM and HOLLAND 21 Army Group had to rely entirely on local production of coal for all its demands. The very severe winter weather that was experienced in January caused a great increase in fuel consumption by all classes of user.

At the same time coal production declined sharply, partly due to the effect of the cold on the undernourished miners, but even more tothe difficulties of getting them to and from the mines.

In addition to these, serious strikes took place prior to the re-constitution of the BELGIAN Government.

Very great difficulties were experienced in the movement of any coal that was mined due to these severe weather conditions which reacted unfavourably on all means of transportation, but in particular on the canals which froze to such an extent that practically all barge movement ceased.

Stocks in BELGIUM at one time were reduced to the supply of only one to two days and issues in BRUSSELS for a complete week had to be restricted to hospitals only.

In March, however, the stock position had greatly improved although the demands for solid fuel placed on S and T by the Services for civilian contractors could only be met to the extent of twenty-five per cent in February and thirty-three and a half per cent in March.

Thus only contracts of the most urgent operational priority could be permitted to be fulfilled.

Pilferage of coal from rail wagons and from barges in transit from the mines to the depots reached serious proportions, due to the high prices obtainable in the black market.

Finally, it was decided to send a monthly summary of these losses to the Financial Adviser for consideration for financial adjustment. In March 7,300 tons of pitch were imported from UK for the manufacture of briquettes to augment the fuel necessary for the railways.

By the beginning of March the SHAEF Solid Fuels Section for GERMANY had established itself in AACHEN and ten mines were operating under allied control in the area.

Only three of these, however, produced coal surplus to colliery requirements.

It had been estimated that coal requirements for the NETHERLANDS for the first month after liberation would be 4,000 tons per day.

Although it was doubtful if this quantity could be moved in, a stockpile of 12,000 tons was established at ’s HERTOGENBOSCH.

Arrangements were made to send in three hundred tons per day in addition to other supplies shipped to ROTTERDAM from ANTWERP and the UK during the early part of the liberation.

After 1 April the issue of solid fuel for space-heating ceased and the scale was reduced from four lbs to one-a-half lbs per man per day for all purpose.

TRANSPORT

Allocation of Transport to Armies

At the beginning of this phase HQ L of C had under command eighty-two and a half equivalent three-ton companies, whilst First Canadian Army and Second Army had respectively nine and eight companies from the GHQ pool.

The 21 Army Grouppool of transport under direct control of GHQ was approximately twenty equivalent three-ton companies but these were committed on permanent employment such as haulage of timber, RE and airfield construction work.

Two DUKW companies which had been retained since the beginning of the campaign were placed under command First Canadian Army for operation VERITABLE.

With the forthcoming assault across the RHINE and owing to the flooded countryside it was essential to increase the number of DUKW companies.

Three GT coys which were originally DUKW companies were nominated for re-conversion and during the initial period were issued with a few DUKWs for refresher training.

The number of DUKWs available in the theatre in the middle of February, however, was so limited that the conversion of the proposed companies could only be done slowly, but by the middle of March two additional companies making a total of four, were fully equipped.

During the period preceding the assault across the RHINE DUKWs were used not only on second line maintenance but also for evacuation of casualties over the flooded areas between the MAAS and the RHINE. Including these, First Canadian Army and Second Army had ten and twenty-two equivalent three-ton companies from the GHQ pool under command by 24 March.

As the armies advanced rapidly across GERMANY the daily demands for transport increased.

By 31 March the GHQ transport tonnage lift under command Second Army had jumped to over ten thousand tons.

One month later as the campaign was drawing to a close this GHQ lift alone had increased to twenty—three thousand tons or the equivalent of seventy-six three-ton companies which was the largest tonnage to be placed under army control at any time throughout the campaign.

Allied Liberated Manpower Units

The recruiting of BELGIAN and DUTCH personnel to form additional GT coys continued and by 15 January six BELGIAN GT coys had been despatched to UK for training.

Meanwhile, seven of the fourteen BELGIAN and two of the nine NETHERLANDS GT companies to be trained in the theatre had been raised by CA.

In order to employ this transport with the maximum officiency it was decided that CA should relinquish the control of all allied transport to S and T except a small number of FRENCH units.

S and T also undertook to raise and train the balance of the planned BELGIAN CA companies, including those that were already training in the UK.

Two problems arose in the latter part of January which affected the training and equipping of allied liberated manpower companies.

Firstly, War Office agreed that 21 Army Group should retain the seventeen GT coys originally only on loan which meant that the equipment from these companies was not available for the BELGIAN companies on their return from UK.

Secondly, it was discovered that personnel called up for duty by the BELGIAN Government to form these companies were in the majority of cases non-drivers. As a result the whole training scheme was re-cast and a primary training centre with a capacity of 2,500 all ranks staffed by BELGIANS and supervised by a BRITISH CRASC, augmented by BRITISH instructors, was established in BELGIUM.

Companies were called up weekly for one month’s primary regimental training before being despatched to UK.

This enabled all companies to train for a total period of fourteen weeks. These units were inter changeable with BRITISH companies and capable of carrying out work anywhere in the theatre.

By the last week in April seven BELGIAN and four NETHERLAND GT coys trained in the theatre were being employed on the L of C and in HOLLAND. The first six BELGIAN companies to be trained in the UK had by this time returned.

Five were employed on the L of C and one with Second Army giving a total lift of 8,100 tons. These allied GT coys under BRITISH control proved very successful.

Pitwood

The delivery of pitwood to the mines after the GERMAN offensive in the ARDENNES became a matter of the highest priority and two ten-ton companies were specially allocated for this purpose.

The new source of supply of pitwood came from the forests in northern BELGIUM and, during the period of acute shortage of supplies, turn rounds of two hundred miles were accomplished.

Tyres

At the end of January the shortage of tyres, especially in the case of Rogers forty-ton tank transporters and also ten-ton load carriers, became acute and four companies of ten-ton vehicles were withdrawn and three-ton vehicles issued in lieu until such time as the position improved.

This resulted in the loss of a lift of 2,400 tons but the companies could not be re-converted until the end of March.

Additional Units

In February two additional station maintenance companies were formed using personnel of two army transport companies which were made surplus consequent upon the re-organisation which took place in the previous phase. These two companies were allotted to the armies.

In the middle of March the original three station maintenance companies which were with the L of C were re-organised and doubled by the addition of three extra sections.

On 13 April a further lift was added to the transport pool by the arrival from UK of a civilian transport company organised by the Ministry of War Transport. This particular unit with a five hundred ton lift capacity was employed on Civil Affairs tasks in HOLLAND, and although it was not a S and T responsibility it released other military transport for employment with the armies.

At the end of April GOLDFLAKE transport units began to arrive comprising, in addition to formation second line transport, three CRASC transport columns, eleven GT companies, seven artillery platoons, one transporter company, one bulk petrol transport company, one bridge company and one ambulance car company.

AIR FREIGHT

During January the air freight organisation was again modified. Previously reception was controlled by a CRASC transport column and three DIDs.

Two of these DIDs were converted to form two air composite platoons, designed to handle all types of stores and trained in airfield duties besides packing airborne stores.

The third DID which was previously engaged on air freight was sent back to UK for training in duties of air despatch.

By the first week in February this unit had returned to the theatre and was placed in charge of the two dumps established at NIVELLES airfield for air supply of brigade groups as mentioned elsewhere.

Supply by air for operation VARSITY was also planned to take place from the Continent in case all flying was temporarily stopped from the UK.

Four hundred and twenty RASC personnel and fifty-three sets of double roller runway were flown from the UK for the operation. In actual fact, however, in this particular operation, re-supply by air from the Continent never became necessary and the personnel were ultimately returned to UK.

POL

At the beginning of January the BRITISH bulk storage facilities for POL more than covered their requirements but the US were not so well off.

The OVERLORD maintenance plan had stipulated that thirty days’ reserve of POL should be kept for the whole force in the theatre: SHAEF laid down the tonnage figure that the reserve would represent.

It was found that BRITISH storage accommodation was well in excess of that figure and therefore it was agreed that as from 1 March eighty thousand tons would be regarded as being held on US account when the storage was full. This gave a reserve of thirty days to both the AMERICAN and BRITISH forces.

Another important decision made during this period was that in principle POL installations would be supplied and operated by the force in whose zone they were located.

With the extension of the pipeline towards GERMANY it became vitally necessary to have more operating personnel. Fortunately pumping was able to be stopped on the CHERBOURG/ROUEN pipeline system on 9 January and by the end of that month personnel working on that stretch could be released.

First priority for the extension of the pipeline was the consideration of a line from ANTWERP to EINDHOVEN which was then to be the pipehead.

DUMBO was now working so satisfactorily that an increase of “offtake” facilities became essential and authority was therefore given for two lines to be constructed from CALAIS to GHENT and thence to ANTWERP.

Later the construction of a further forty miles from EINDHOVEN up to the RHINE was authorised.

At the end of April the pipe was extended across the RHINE to EMMERICH and arrangements were in hand for it to be continued to the filling area at BOCHOLT.

Previously POL had been brought across the river to BOCHOLT from EINDHOVEN by bulk petrol transport at a rate of one thousand tons per day.

Having been transferred to containers in the filling area at BOCHOLT it was then railed to No. 14 Army Roadhead from which Second Army was supplying 8, 12 and 30 Corps.

DUMBO continued to develop throughout the last months of the campaign.

In January it had an average output of 1,300 tons per day, which increased during February to an average of 1,600 tons per day.

In March and April the daily average maintained was 3,100 tons and on the last day of war the record delivery of 3,560 tons was given from its fifteen “pipelines under the ocean”, of which eleven were in actual operation.

A directive was received in April that RASC were to be responsible for pipeline maintenance and high pressure pumping. This could not be implemented owing to shortage of personnel,and the RE continued to operate the lines.

As mentioned elsewhere, FIDO was now operating at EPINOY. It proved very effective but its consumption was in the neighbourhood of ninety thousand gallons a night.

Early in January 616 Squadron operating from BRUSSELS was equipped with jet propelled aircraft which needed kerosene for fuel.

An initial stock of twenty thousand gallons was delivered and supplies continued at the rate of three thousand gallonsper day.

In February a FRENCH civilian installation at DOUAI was opened, primarily to supply fuel for the RAF airfields in the neighbourhood. Tankage totalling 2,700 tons was taken over and proved most useful as many of the aircraft of the airborne operation in conjunction with PLUNDER took off from these airfields.

At the end of March the RAF were requested to reduce their shipments of packed POL. This was compensated for by increasing shipments of bulk aviation petrol, and packing some six hundred tons per day for them in the installations of ANTWERP and GHENT. 

On 19 January a V-2 scored a direct hit on the BRITISH portion of the POL installation at ANTWERP, demolishing a train, igniting its contents and setting fire to three storagetanks.

The fire burned for approximately forty-eight hours but although 10,000 tons of storage were rendered useless, only 3,500 tons of petrol were destroyed.

As a result of this fire it was decided to remove camouflage from such installations as it proved not only inflammable, but a hindrance to fire fighting. It was also agreed with the AFS that the RASC should be responsible for the provision and maintenance in working order of waterlines within the compound, while the AFS should be responsible outside it.

When the fire brigade arrived the operation of the water system would be an AFS responsibility. This policy proved most effective in subsequent incidents and damage was quite insignificant.

It was decided early during this phase to place the bulk transport companies on a four platoon basis.

In consequence the eight three-platoon companies were formed into six, each of four platoons.

The 150 vehicles held by them surplus to WE were used to equip afurther company. Thus by the beginning of March, assuming that eighty per cent of thevehicles were running, 21 Army Group had a bulk petrol lift of 2,700 tons per day.

A further three platoon company arrived during operation GOLDFLAKE from ITALY.

From the composite platoon personnel of these companies, one Petrol Station Company, consisting of six platoons each of four sections, was formed for the L of C. It was estimated that each section, with the help of Pioneers or local civilians could operate a petrol station issuing ten thousand gallons per day.

A “C” type petrol depot also arrived in GOLDFLAKE during the first week in April.

Meanwhile the BELGIAN and FRENCH canal systems were being extensively utilised. Ten thousand tons of bulk POL barges were at the disposal of S and T and it was agreed that from 1 March the routing of these barges should be done entirely by S and T.

As time went on the Union Petroliere Belge were able to resume their normal activities,and certain of their services became available for military use; for instance, some five hundred tons of contaminated petrol and derv were treated by them, to produce a petroleum spirit suitable for military use, and derv acceptable to CA.

White spirit was also produced from kerosene (44) and bulk lubricants were being blended into a number of grades for industrial use in BELGIUM, FRANCE and HOLLAND.

When Second Army moved out of the DIEST area a third GHQ stock holding area for packed products was formed around the area DIEST/HASSELT/AERSCHOT where stocks for operation PLUNDER were accumulated.

Meanwhile Second Army opened No.10 Army Roadhead on 6 March and by 24 March stocks of POL there had reached a total of 23,600 tons.

By 15 March the pipehead at EINDHOVEN was for both armies the source of bulk POL which was coming into the theatre at a rate of 15,000 tons per day for the whole force, including 3,000 tons achieved by DUMBO.

Petrol supply during the final advance never caused any anxiety and by VE day GHQ stocks had only been depleted by twenty-five percent, although at the end 7,500 tons per day were being issued in the BRITISH area alone,of which 6,600 tons were for military requirements.

With the end of the campaign in sight War Office became anxious to divert the resources of jerrican production from EUROPE to the FAR EAST.

It was therefore agreed in April that until the end of operations only 250,000 new jerricans would be required each month for this theatre and that after VE day imports of jerricans would cease. A total of 15,000,000 jerricans had been imported during operation OVERLORD.

5,000,000 jerricans were therefore offered for export after VE day, provided shipping was made available.The total quantities of POL imported since 6 June 44 amounted to 476,646,000 gallons of which 381,317,000 gallons were MT 80.

Petrol bulk lorries alone covered nearly thirteen million miles.

The RASC were operating 300,000 tons of storage on V E day, most of which was interconnected by over six hundred miles of pipeline.