THE RETENTION OF PW IN THE THEATRE FOR LABOUR PURPOSES

Until early August no PW were retained in the theatre except for a small number of “protected persons” who were employed in the medical care of enemy PW at medical units.

At the beginning of August authority was given to HQ L of C to retain in this theatre up to 40,000 PW for labour purposes.

On 24 August 18,135 PW were being held in PW camps as a labour pool and by 4 September the number had increased to 27,214.

EVACUATION OF PW

On 4 September it was decided that the number of PW to be held for labour purposes should be reduced to 20,000. On 12 September this target was further reduced to 14,500.

This made necessary the immediate evacuation from the theatre of approximately 12,000 PW in addition to the daily captures Which were then greatly increasing.

Shipping was available but War Office was having difficulty in finding accommodation in the UK. Arrangements were finally made to evacuate at a greatly increased rate (5,000 per day for the period 13-19 September inclusive and thereafter 2,500 daily).

On 19 September only 23,000 remained in the RMA.

ARROMANCHES continued to be used as the PW evacuation port but DIEPPE was later also utilised for the same purpose. In spite of the constant evacuation at the agreed rate, about 50,000 PW Were being held in the theatre at the end of September. Up to that date approximately 90,000 had been evacuated.

By the end of December approximately 240,000 PW had been captured of which 170,000 had been evacuated to UK in accordance with the declared War Office policy.

From the beginning of October, however, when the War Office decided to scale down the number they would accept in UK, the PW camps within the theatre became overcrowded.

By the end of December the accommodation question was acute and in view of the large numbers of PW which it was excepted to capture during the forthcoming operations, it was decided to construct two more PW camps which were staffed by personnel provided by the War Office. Even these, however, were insufficient and over-crowding continued.

The problem of accommodation was further complicated by an agreement made between the War Office and US authorities that all PW would be shared equally between the two forces.

This agreement was made at the time of the North African campaign, and was never cancelled or amended. Under this arrangement approximately 100,000 PW were transferred from US to BRITISH custody.

In actual fact, however, the number of prisoners taken far exceeded those who were required for employment.

In November a proposal was made to ease the strain on accommodation by handing over 25,000 PW to the custody of the FRENCH Government, but this policy did not become effective until a later date.

During the winter the problem of finding accommodation for PW was a major difficulty.

Although it was hard to get estimates of the numbers likely to be taken during the concluding stages of the campaign it was obvious that very large numbers would have to be handled. The inability of the UK to continue its function as a main base for holding PW, made it necessary for HQ, 21 Army Group to plan on making arrangements within its own resources.

At the end of April, accommodation had been found for 200,000.

This figure was reckoned to be capable of expansion by fifty per cent in emergency during the summer months. The number of PW camps was increased from six to thirteen, while to economise manpower the capacity of camps was varied (from the original 10,000) to 20,000 or 40,000 according to the locality.

55,000 PW were held in custody at the beginning of February and during operation VERITABLE.

20,000 more were captured. Soon after the crossing of the RHINE prisoners were being evacuated from the two armies at the rate of 3,500 each day, so that by the end of April the total number held in the L of C was approximately 200,000.

As a result of strong pressure the War Office agreed to take some PW in UK and to accept all officers.

It had been realised that the stage would be reached when, as the GERMAN army disintegrated, the evacuation of PW to camps in the L of C would have to stop.

Instructions had therefore been issued that HQs of Army level and above could, when the proper moment arose, instruct their troops that the enemy were not to be treated as PW, but rated as disarmed troops and held forward. Disarmed troops would not have PW status and were to be held as far as possible as organised bodies, under their own officers, and responsible for the main part of their own administration.

On 1 May the situation became such that orders were issued that no further PW were to be sent WEST across the RHINE.

On 5 May the plan for holding only disarmed enemy troops was put into force.

In an endeavour to reduce our holdings, negotiations had been taking place throughout the winter with the FRENCH and BELGIAN authorities as to the possibility of handing over PW to them. These negotiations proceeded slowly, owing to difficulties as regards the responsibility for feeding, clothing and other maintenance.

By the end of the campaign only 7,500 were in FRENCH custody, out of an agreed figure of 15,000, which was itself a first instalment. At the same time, arrangements were being completed to hand over 15,000 to the BELGIANS, mainly for work in the mines.

In March a separate section of the staff within HQ 21 Army Group was formed to co-ordinate all questions affecting prisoners of war, which up to this time had been dealt with by A(PS).

PWX

A plan had been made by SHAEF, in the autumn of 1944, for the evacuation of United Nations PW who would be overrun by the advance into GERMANY.

The plan involved a central organisation run from SHAEF, called PWX (Prisoners of War Executive).

The name was eventually used in general terms for the organisation, its staff, and, eventually, for repatriated PW themselves.

The plan involved the provision of PWX Liaison Groups at major HQ, working through PWX Contact Officers who were intended to be sent forward by every possible means (possibly including air-dropping) to camps in which United Nations PW were held.

In 21 Army Group the PWX organisation was controlled by the “A” staffs of the various formations concerned.

The general policy on which PWX worked was that the personnel of overrun PW camps were to be instructed to remain in their camps until they could be evacuated in an orderly manner.

This principle was adopted to avoid the hampering of operations by any uncontrolled movement of PW, and to simplify the problems of maintenance and documentation.

It was realised that large numbers of PW would be found outside camps, and that these would be partly those who had been working away from main camps, and partly from those who would have broken camp as soon as an opportunity offered.

The psychological desire of PW to move away from their camp areas was realised, and instructions were issued by the dropping of leaflets and through subterranean channels in an endeavour to counteract this tendency. ‘

It was estimated that some 275,000 United Nations PXV would be uncovered by 21 Army Group during the advance into GERMANY, out of a total of about 21/4 million held in greater GERMANY in camps and hospitals.

Accurate figures of numbers and locations were hard to obtain and information became less and less accurate, and more delayed, as the GERMANS tried to move PW camps away from the front.

It was decided that United Nations PW should be dealt with in three priorities in the following order: -BRITISH COMMONWEALTH and US, RUSSIAN, and others.

Up to the end of hostilities, practically no action was taken except for those of the first category.

In view of the impossibility of ensuring that all PW would be found in camps and would stay “put”,it was realised that it would be necessary to set up a chain of evacuation, in the form of camps, to which individual PW could be directed.

This chain would also be used for the controlled evacuation of those found in camps. Armies and corps formed ad has units for this purpose, generally from pioneer companies.

In addition, to take care of the problem behind army boundaries, three new RHUs (X, Y and Z) were formed, one from each of Nos. 103, 104 and 105 Rft Gps.

A number of other RHUs, CRCs and transit camps were involved from time to time in the movement of PWX.

All units concerned with the move of PWX were given special dusting, bathing, clothing and medical facilities, and provided with Red Cross services; the latter included both personnel and special PW parcels of small necessities and luxuries, such as razors and chocolate, which had been prepared and stored in the UK in readiness for this operation.

The YMCA also gave much assistance, mainly by the provision of personnel to help organise amenities and in giving PWX an opportunity to talk to British men and women.

AEC Teams were provided to give up-to-date information on world and allied news, but this scheme was never fully developed however, as the move of PW was generally too quick for full advantage to be taken of it.

21 Army Group was provided with BRITISH COMMONWEALTH, Naval and Air Force, US and other nations liaison officers, who were employed in giving special care to their own categories.

The general principle of evacuation for BRITISH COMMONWEALTH/US PWX was by air. In the case of BRITISH PWX, some were flown direct to the UK and some were staged back, most of them through BRUSSELS.

US PWX were directed to collecting camps in the LE HAVRE area. In addition to dealing with the evacuation of those uncovered by 21 Army Group, the rear links in the evacuation chain, notably BRUSSELS, were used for staging some of the BRITISH PW uncovered by the AMERICAN armies.

The uncovering of PW’ camps, the collection of individual PW and evacuation were only just getting under weigh on a large scale by the end of the campaign.