Shortly after the capture of CAEN, three advance base workshops were established in field sites in the area of the CAEN-BAYEUX road.

The chief commitments at this stage were the conversion of certain AFVs to personnel carriers; assistance in inspection and repair of artillery equipment of RA regiments undergoing re-organisation, conversion of tank transporters to load carriers, vehicle recovery and backloading.

Recovery resources were used with the primary object of keeping roads clear for fighting troops and supplies and most of this work was done under army control in order to relieve corps of responsibilities in rear of their areas.

Back-loading into workshop sites and collecting points took second priority and had to be done at night. All “crocks” were back—loaded to corps backloading points (CBPs), the priority being firstly repairable vehicles, then BRITISH “W” (write-off) “crooks” and lastly enemy vehicles.

As these dumps of crocks were collected during the advance, third line workshops were dropped off and worked on them until nothing worth repairing remained. This policy of setting down third line workshops at intervals on the line of advance was found to work well but due to the distances involved control was extremely difficult, although the wireless net proved invaluable and was the only way in which “crock” states could be obtained.

During this period third line workshops were controlled and moved entirely by corps headquarters. It was found that handling “crooks” and operating the CBPs should be primarily the responsibility of workshops rather than recovery units, and that it was better to use the latter for ferrying crooks and for their responsibility to cease after off-loading.

Classification and cannibalisation were more effectively controlled by a foster unit such as an armoured troop workshops rather than by recovery units.

During the rapid advance armoured brigade workshops were faced with the alternative of keeping up with their formations and doing no work or being left far behind. Infantry brigade workshops did not have quite the same difficulties as there are three in a division and they were able to carry on by “leap-frogging” each other.

It was realised that when independent armoured brigades are under command of a division REME technical control must be direct by the Corps DDME and not through the divisional CREME.

This policy also applied in respect of the recovery companies, technical control being exercised by the DDME and administrative control by CREME corps troops. This direct contact with brigade

REME co-ordinated by mutual liaison between divisional CsREME and brigade EMES speeded tank recovery and repair to a considerable degree.

By mid-August a CANADIAN fourth line workshop opened in the REME area at LA DELIVRANDE thus allowing third line workshops which had previously been carrying out jobs of a much heavier nature than usual to proceed with their normal work. At the same time the tendency for large scale cannibalisation began to diminish.

Third line workshops found it necessary to be every bit as mobile as brigade workshops. Second Army’s third line workshops had been fully mobile since the early days and able to move without. help, given thirty-six hours notice.

A recovery section always moved with them carrying forward as many spares as possible to counteract the difficulty that Ordnance were experiencing in making issues over such distances.

First Canadian Army tackled the problem differently. Their third line workshops were never under corps control during periods of rapid movement, on the assumption that they could not be expected to have good production figures if moved too rapidly, nor could corps properly administer them if they were many miles in the rear.

In fact they never had more than fifty per cent of third line workshops under corps control even under static conditions.

Recovery units had an extremely unpleasant task in clearing up areas after battles, particularly in the case of the FALAISE gap. Here they had to recover thousands of tanks, vehicles and guns, chiefiy GERMAN, in an area where there were some eight thousand dead horses and thousands of enemy dead still unburied.

Recovery vehicles were employed to take away these dead horses for disposal by Pioneers and prisoners of war and over two hundred carcasses were recovered from the River DIVES alone.

In the BRUSSELS area workshops were able to find first class accommodation for the first time, which was particularly fortunate as during early September all second and third line workshops were working at full pressure on very heavy vehicle repair programmes.

In order to assist the forward echelon workshops and to serve the advance base area 2 Canadian and 21 Advance Base Workshops were brought up from the RMA to the advance base area at the end of September.

At the same time an additional advance base workshop was landed over the beaches. In view of the length of the L of C and the battles still in progress for the Channel ports, this workshop was sited at ARRAS.

To support-the operations for the capture of LE HAVRE and the reduction of the Channel ports, third line workshops were moved across the SEIN E on 1 September with a view to establishing a REME area near REUVILLE. But the weather broke at this period and the plan had to be abandoned, workshops having to seek individual hard standings and accommodation such as railway stations which were not being used.

With the fall of LE HAVRE and the clearance of the coastal belt REME were able to carry out “make and mend” for the first time since the break-out.

The opening of the Channel ports required REME assistance in maintaining the continuous stream of vehicles coming off the ships on their journey to the reserve vehicle parks and vice versa for “dead” vehicles on their way back to the UK. The task of loading vehicles and tanks into cargo ships was extremely difficult and it was often necessary to lower modified bull-dozers into the ships for manoeuvring tanks into position.

REME preparations for the advance into HOLLAND were governed by the fact that the formations involved were starting from points often as much as fifty miles apart and that four different axes were being used.

To cover each approach axis a series of CBPs, each with third line workshops support was established. In response to 30 Corps Commander’s request for a maximum delivery of tanks to fighting formations the whole of the REME transporter resources were despatched on 13 September to VERNON and AMIENS to bring up repaired tanks.

Together with a few tanks from the ANTWERP workshops and the output of second line workshops this resulted in over eighty tanks being delivered in five days.

The terrain of the operation was very bad tank country, being low lying, offering negligible cover and intersected by innumerable waterways. Consequently heavy tank casualties were expected and two third line workshops and three heavy recovery sections were therefore made available.

In actual fact the tank casualties proved very light as the burden of the heavy fighting fell on the infantry.

Thus the REME resources were found to be more than adequate. However, during the advance into HOLLAND on practically a single axis, road clearance became of major importance and the recovery sections were kept fully occupied. It had been expected that there would be a heavy third line workshops commitment during this advance which might well have occurred had ARNHEM been captured but owing to the short duration of the operation it did not arise.

When the tempo of the battle slackened, second line workshops were able to embark on an extensive engine change programme assisted by detachments of craftsmen from third line workshops, as it was considered that second line workshops yielded quicker and more fruitful results than third line. In return, the latter often accepted second line work when conditions were favourable and second line workshops hard pressed.

During October both “A” and “B” vehicles were beginning to show signs of age and the early frosts and heavy traffic had so broken up the BELGIAN and DUTCH roads that troubles were developing with vehicle suspension systems, and consequently workshop loads remained heavy.

To achieve the maximum output, specialisation was carried out in workshops with civilian labour assisting, and such units were sited wherever possible in buildings and factories where they could remain static for the maximum time and carry out their work more efficiently.

In order to develop the REME resources in the advance base area CEME (Chief Electrical and Mechanical Engineer) HQ moved up to BRUSSELS to co-ordinate the work of the three advance base workshops and reconnaissances were carried out with a view to moving forward all remaining workshop units from the RMA to the advance base.

A scheme was formulated for augmenting “B” vehicle repair by utilising the resources of civilian garages under military supervision, technical control being provided by CEME HQ.

By the end of the year this scheme was progressing well, although difficulties were experienced at first due to the lack of electricity and coal for heating purposes and the poor condition of civilian employees following the GERMAN occupation.

About this time an experiment was carried out in EINDHOVEN where members of a Unit Maintenance Inspectorate team took over a tyre repair plant and succeeded in producing four hundred repaired tyres per week, thus meeting the requirements of one complete corps, in priority types of tyres ; in fact sufficient were left over to make issues to other formations.

Early in November formations were experiencing difficulty in getting supplies to the forward troops through the water-logged country on the MAAS, consequently Weasles (amphibious, tracked, 10-cwt load carriers) were in great demand. Their casualty rate was high as they necessarily received rough treatment. The heavy going also gave rise to many mechanical failures whilst the wet roads led to a big increase on the “B” vehicles accident rate.

Tracked recovery vehicles had to be lent to formations from army recovery sections. To illustrate the difficulty fighting formations, especially armoured units, were experiencing, one armoured brigade on the night of 18/19 November had twenty-three tanks and two ARVs completely bogged, representing the loss of more than a complete tank squadron.

The growing vehicle repair commitment led to an acute shortage of engine assemblies and a decision was taken to make some third line workshops into assembly repair workshops in addition to their normal activities. They reconditioned “B” vehicle repairable engines, gear boxes and driving axles using a large number of civilian fitters to ease the labour shortage and increase production. This work was carried out on a line production system and produced good results. A motor cycle repair line was also started.

Meanwhile, in the advance base area a Base Armament and General Workshop had arrived and an AFV servicing unit was "established adjacent to the heavy “A” vehicle park in close proximity to the advance base workshops site.

This layout proved ideal as it provided close liaison between supply, servicing and repair facilities for tanks, with a minimum of transportation. flying bombs and rockets directed against ANTWERP seriously interfered with the production of 2 Canadian and 21 Advance Base Workshops and direct hits were received within the workshop perimeter resulting in damage to buildings, but few casualties.

During the period after the enemy were pushed back to the River MAAS, REME provided one company consisting of volunteers from 30 Corps REME units for a “Services Battalion”. This company did two tours of nine and four days respectively in the line near GEILENKIRCHEN, thus making a useful contribution towards resting the infantry.

The GERMAN offensive in the ARDENNES seriously affected the output of field workshops which had to “down tools” to a certain extent as many of the corps areas were in imminent danger from enemy airborne landings and ground attacks from northern HOLLAND over the River MAAS.

Each workshop was prepared to form a strong point using all available equipment under repair in its defence. They had to stand-to on many occasions during this emergency which lasted until mid-January. During the heavy fighting, recovery sections worked hard under arduous conditions. At one time as many as seventeen recovery vehicles were deployed on a corps axis between NAMUR and MARCHE, a distance of thirty miles.

A typical example of recovery work was the occasion when two Churchill bridge layers had to be moved one hundred miles from DINANT to MAASTRICHT. Owing to the hilly roads and prevailing icy conditions, it was found necessary to employ two transporters, four wheeled and two tracked tractors to carry out the job which took four days to accomplish. A very heavy load was also thrown on brigade workshops, much work being carried out in the open with temperatures down to —4 degree Fahrenheit and often no third line workshops were immediately available to back them up, owing to the rapid development of the operations.

Consequently much of the work undertaken was of a heavier nature than usual. Workshops in the advance base area were also kept fully employed.

One of the priority tasks undertaken by them was the servicing and inspection of 351 Sherman tanks required for immediate issue to US forces. This task was carried out five days. They also embarked on a LVT (Landing Vehicle Tracked) programme for an armoured division besides acting as temporary third line workshops for two other armoured divisions.

The combination of hilly country and icy conditions on the roads aggravated the difficulties of movement. No anti-skid devices except chains for “B” vehicles were available and tracked vehicles, particularly Cromwell tanks and carriers had the greatest difficulty in traversing the roads.

One armoured brigade tried the device of welding carrier links to their Churchill tanks with moderate success. Skid chains on “B” vehicles proved a mixed blessing for although they assisted forward movement they did not prevent sideways skidding and in the hands of inexperienced drivers were really dangerous on icy roads.

Damage to artillery was also considerable, the ground freezing so hard that spades could not be dug in, with the result that trail legs were bent and cradles and saddles cracked.

With the closure of the RMA it became necessary to find locations for the two remaining advance base workshops. These were eventually sited at LOTH, a few miles SOUTH of BRUSSELS, and at VILVORDE adjacent to 1 Base Armament and General Workshop and 1 Canadian Advance Base Workshop. The location at LOTH was very suitable as the premises had been used as a heavy engineering workshop by Krupps, but a four weeks delay was caused through having to clear the site of some three thousand tons of steel stock, machine tools and other material.

At the beginning of March, there fore, two advance base workshops were in ANTWERP, three in BRUSSELS together with a base armament and general workshop, and one was on the L of C at AREAS.

In accordance with normal policy, advance base workshops, wherever possible, specialised by types. For example 1 and 2 Canadian Advance Base Workshops dealt with “A” and “B” vehicles of US origin,whilst 21 and 22 Advance Base Workshops repaired those of BRITISH manufacture.

Although this was the principle it could not always be followed due to re-grouping of workshops, variations in repair loads and other causes.

1 Canadian Advance Base Workshop established an engine re-conditioning workshop for the complete overhaul of certain, mainly heavy, types of engines which were reconditioned in the theatre and not evacuated to UK as had formerly been the practice.

A repair and recovery organisation was established for operation GOLDFLAKE along the L of C from MARSEILLES to BELGIUM.

Operation VERITABLE for REME was largely a question of continual recovery of vehicles. The weather conditions during and prior to the operation had been extremely bad. The intense cold that prevailed at the beginning of February had resulted in many mechanical troubles such as hydraulic systems failing to function (especially in Cromwell tank steering systems) clutches burning out and bogie tyres freezing to tracks. The sudden thaw accompanied by much rain and the flooding by the enemy of the countryside during the operation resulted in many casualties to vehicles being caused through bogging quite apart from the large number caused by enemy mines.

In many cases the wheeled tractors could not approach close enough to the vehicles to be recovered, and there was a constant demand for tracked tractors. This difficulty, however, had been anticipated and D8 tractors from army resources had already been attached to recovery sections. Some army recovery sections worked between brigade Workshops and the corps back-loading points whilst others were employed continuously on back-loading from the CBPs to third line workshops.

Difficulty was experienced in finding suitable workshop sites during the concentration period in the NIJMEGEN area and hard standings were rare until GOCH and CLEVE had been captured. Even at these places it was necessary to bulldoze workshop sites clear of debris. Some second line workshops had to remain WEST of the River MAAS until the battle had made considerable progress, even though the evacuation of casualties over the limited number of bridges and along the crowded roads was most difficult.

In spite of this heavy back-loading across the River MAAS the only bad bottleneck was the class '70 bridge at MAASTRICHT in the US sector where close liaison was necessary with US Traffic Control as permission had to be obtained for each individual crossing. Corps installations were also kept WEST of the river, being fed with work from two corps back-loading points opened in the vicinity of GRAVE and GENKE. The latter CBP was intended to form a dump from which three third line work-shops could draw, but as two of the workshops already had several weeks work to complete at the beginning of the operation it was never used and finally went to the army back-loading point at BOURG LEOPOLD.

In spite of these heavy tank casualties second line workshops of the formations concerned competed with the bulk of the work, but tank troop workshops assisted armoured brigade workshops in urgent second line repair work.

At one moment during the operation one armoured brigade workshop had thirty-five Churchill tanks sent into it for repair, which, together with fifteen other tanks awaiting repair represented the equivalent of a complete armoured regiment out of action.

The gun workshop of corps troops workshops in support of the AGsRA were kept continuously at work on barrel changes and other jobs necessitated by the heavy barrages and concentrations fired by the medium artillery.

The brief pause that ensued between operations VERITABLE and PLUNDER was utilised to the full by REME. Equipment and vehicles were inspected and overhauled so that everything should be operationally fit for the final assault and advance.

All second line workshops were moved into the area between the MAAS and the RHINE in accordance with the policy that as many REME units as possible should be brought right forward preparatory to the advance into GERMANY. There was a large amount of REME work to be carried out as most of the vehicles in 21 Army Group, especially the amphibious types, had been operating for some time without adequate overhaul.

Just prior to the assault many of the second line workshops closed down so as to be ready to follow their formations closely over the RHINE.

A heavy strain was thrown on REME by overhauls and modifications to the specialist type vehicles and equipment of 79 Armoured Division. The two Buffalo (heavy tracked cargo carrier) regiments of the division were the first to be released for overhaul by a tank troops workshop. During the three months from January to March 569 Buffaloes were passed through this one workshop and it was possible completely to re-equip one of these regiments and one squadron of the other regiment. It had already been decided that the remaining squadrons of the latter should be re-organised as an AVRE regiment equipped with modified Churchill tanks mounting a spigot mortar.

During the same period a complete overhaul of the Kangaroos (armoured personnel carriers) of this division was accomplished by armoured troops workshops with the assistance of REME units from First Canadian Army.

REME had previously been approached by the Royal Navy with a request that some means should be devised to transport by road some Landing Craft Mechanised (LCM) from ANTWERP to the concentration area NORTH of NIJMEGEN.

The craft were some 50 ft in length and when mounted on the proposed trailer stood 15 ft high, which only gave a 3” clearance under some of the bridges along the route.

The base armament and general workshops designed a prototype trailer of which, after successful tests, the Navy ordered 25.

Five days before the operation began a request for 40 similar trailers for smaller landing craft was received and met with assistance from 25 ships’ chandlers.

For the actual operation REME was faced with three main problems.

The first was to provide an adequate bank recovery organisation for keeping exits and entrances to the crossing places clear, secondly to maintain an organisation in the marshalling areas capable not only of keeping the roads clear but also of carrying out minor repairs to vehicles in the area, and thirdly to make complete preparations for a rapid advance once the bridgehead was firmly established. The solution to the first was found by bringing forward a beach recovery section and a heavy recovery section which had taken part in the NORMANDY landings. These units were placed under the command of a bank control group which was to control bothbanks of the river, although technical control was exercised by REME. Recovery DUKWs were also held available to assist stranded amphibians or light craft.

The second difficulty was overcome by arranging for the divisions which were not taking part in the actual assault to provide recovery and repair posts at suitable points in the marshalling areas.

For the last problem the experience gained in the previous advance from NORMANDY proved invaluable. CBP teams were held in readiness to - move at a moment’s notice. Certain workshops were then allocated by corps to deal with any work left behind, while others were at short notice to move and take up positions near CBPs, as and when these were formed.

The first REME recce parties were across the river by H+6. A little later D4 and D8 tractors crossed, together with ARVs, and bank recovery was commenced without serious difficulty.

By D+3 recovery was reduced to maintaining watching briefs at bridges with occasional assistance to vehicles with stalled engines. Fine weather reduced the danger of bogging in the assembly areas, and the bridge approaches, DUKW exits, roads and tracks remained in good condition.

Brigade workshops followed their formations over the RHINE approximately three or four days after the fighting troops and began leap-frogging forward, while corps troops workshops followed some days later.

1 Corps REME who were to look after the area between the MAAS and the RHINE took over “crock parks” established by the advancing corps, and their recovery sections of third line workshops were brought well forward.

The latter sited themselves close to the dumps of vehicles and equipment left behind, but repairs to passing vehicles kept them so busy that they were unable to carry out work on them for some considerable period.

In some cases armoured divisions moved both their brigade workshops forward at the same time, but it was sometimes found that the speed of the advance and the accumulation of tank casualties made it better to bring up a third line workshops and then leap-frog the brigade workshops past it to catch up with the division again.

As in the advance to BRUSSELS armoured brigade workshops were unable to cope with all second line tank repairs and third line workshops had to be sited primarily to take the overflow. One independent armoured brigade obtained good results by using an advanced workshop detachment, then moving the main section of the workshops past it leaving it to become a rearward workshops detachment.

Every bridge, defile or other obstacle was liable to become a bottleneck in the advance and wherever possible recovery vehicles were held ready to assist. Recovery patrols often consisting of officers on motorcycles with tractors at call, were also organised along the routes.

For the crossing of the ELBE a beach recovery section was made available for recovery at the bridges. This proved very necessary at ARTLENBURG, where a long and exceptionally steep hill made the exit from the class 40 bridge one of the most serious bottlenecks of the campaign. D8s, ARVS and tractors were kept continuously busy.

A large number of vehicles used by PW and DPs were found abandoned on every road and the RAF had taken heavy toll of enemy vehicles.

In many cases this transport so blocked the roads that it was necessary to use bulldozers in addition to other recovery vehicles to clear them. An unusual job undertaken by the tractors of the recovery section during this period was the towing of ploughs for digging signal cable runs along the divisional and corps axes. A chart showing the output of REME workshops throughout the campaign is attached as appendix “R” not yet ready.