90 Infantry Division (USA) drive south along the Périers / Saint-Sauveur-Lendelin road

With the VIII Corps on the right and VII Corps on the left, a new offensive was planned, an offensive designed to push out of the narrow neck of the Normandy peninsula and into the plains of France. The 90th's mission in the scheme of things was to drive south along the Périers / Saint-Sauveur-Lendelin road.

During the brief lull preceding the battle the 90th surveyed its positions and studied the terrain to be taken. Directly in its path and immediately in front was an obstacle, formidable and heavily defended. If the division was to make progress in the coming offensive that obstacle must first be surmounted. The decision was made and plans were perfected to eliminate the enemy stronghold... the Island.

The Island was so called because of the surrounding terrain features. Bounded on the north by the River Sèves and on all other sides by treacherous swamps and bogs, it was shaped like a deflated football approximately three kilometers in length and one kilometer in width. The only path of approach was across the Sèves, and the only path to the Sèves was open terrain too well observed by the strongly entrenched enemy.

The 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 358th made the assault behind a well-conceived artillery preparation. The attack was foredoomed to failure, however, for with the exception of the Island comparative quiet reigned all along the Normandy front. This allowed all enemy artillery within range to concentrate its fire on one focal point... the assaulting troops of the 90th. The "incoming mail" was accurate and demoralizing.

Never before had the Division been subjected to such sustained massed fire. Machine gun fire and mortars from the southern banks of the Sèves added their weight of fire and succeeded in delaying the attack. That delay enabled the enemy to estimate correctly the situation and to draw more troops to the point of attack. A sheet of impenetrable fire was placed across the Sèves. Yet elements of one company braved the fire and landed on the southern banks.

Lacking reinforcements, however, they soon withdrew. In the afternoon the 1st Battalion forced a crossing of the Sèves, overcame immediate resistance, and drove deep into the Island. But a man with a rifle is no match for a tank. The 90th's armor waited impatiently for a bridge across the Sèves, but the German artillery and mortars successfully denied the Engineers the opportunity to throw a bridge across the river.

In the evening the fire had become so intense that only one company of the 2nd Battalion was able to effect a crossing to support the troops now isolated on the Island. That night a violent counterattack consisting of armor and crack parachute troops was repulsed on the Island. Everything had gone wrong, and to make matters even worse, a dense fog had descended on the area denying the use of liaison planes for vitally needed observation. The following morning came more misfortune. The Sèves overflowed its banks.

That, together with the intense enemy fire, continued to deny the 90th's armor a bridge across the river. A new enemy counter-attack on the Island itself succeeded in disorganizing the marooned elements on the far banks. Only limited quantities of ammunition and supplies could be furnished the assaulting troops across the flooded river. In the face of such decided obstacles, both man-made and natural, an immediate withdrawal was definitely indicated. Many escaped the trap by swimming the Sèves. Others failed to reach the river and were captured by the enemy. The battle for the Island was ended.

Nowhere, except in this one instance, has the 90th Division in its combat history, failed to take its assigned objective. But nowhere in its history has any military organization exhibited greater devotion to duty than did those who, despite insuperable odds, drove forward into the ill-fate campaign of Sèves. Ever since D-Day, the 90th, together with all other Divisions in the invading forces, had suffered from lack of "elbow room". Fenced into a narrow corridor bounded by the sea, broad maneuvers and wide end runs were impossible.

Up to the latter days of July the possibility remained ever imminent that the enemy might draw sufficient reserves to launch an overwhelming counter-offensive aimed at driving the Allies into the sea... with the added possibility that such an offensive might conceivably succeed.