CHAPTER I
PART I - INTRODUCTION
PART I - INTRODUCTION
1. PREFACE
At 0800 hours on 6 June 1944 the first elements of the Allied Expeditionary Force operating under the direct command of the C-in-C 21 Army Group to whom the Supreme Commander had assigned the responsibility for the assault and opening phases of the campaign, had landed successfully on the coast of NORMANDY.
At 0800 hours on 5 May 1945, eleven months later to the day, the order to cease fire became operative on the BRITISH fronts as all the GERMAN forces opposing 21 Army Group in North-West GERMANY and HOLLAND had surrendered unconditionally to Field Marshal Montgomery.
On 8 May 1945 the GERMAN High Command surrendered all their remaining land, sea and air forces unconditionally to the Allies, thus giving up their conquered territories of DENMARK, NORWAY and the CHANNEL ISLANDS without a battle. In these eleven months the Allied Armies had broken through the Atlantic Wall, liberated the countries of FRANCE, BELGIUM, HOLLAND and LUXEMBOURG, and advanced halfway across GERMANY to make contact with the RUSSIAN Armies in the SOUTH and centre and reach the BALTIC in the NORTH.
2. Scope of Administrative History
Behind these operational triumphs lay many achievements of logistical planning and support of this greatest combined operation of all time. The object of this history is to provide an account of the administrative problems that faced the Staff and the Services of HQ 21 Army Group during this period and the ways in which they were surmounted.
While in certain instances it will be necessary to describe in detail the measures taken by specific formations, as a general rule the administrative efforts of the Second British and First Canadian Armies and HQ L of C, can only be dealt with summarily since their activities were necessarily controlled and encompassed by the policy formulated by HQ 21 Army Group.
Similarly, although Civil Affairs; Millitary Government was formed to facilitate and aid the operations of the land forces by controlling and administering the civil populations, this history makes no attempt to describe its activities in detail, as it is considered that they were conducted on such totally different lines from the normal support of the Armies, that they can best be portrayed in a separate account.
Included in this history is a chapter comprising the main lessons learnt during the campaign. Although in certain cases these refer specifically to single phases, normally only those lessons learnt from the campaign as a whole have been included in order to avoid drawing false conclusions through over-emphasis of any one particular aspect.
3. Division of the History
The history falls into four phases :—
PHASE I comprises the assault, the battle of CAEN and the completion of the build up for the break- out from the beach head. The approximate dates of this phase are from 6 June to 25 July 1944.
PHASE II includes the break-out from the NORMANDY bridgehead, the pursuit of the enemy across the SEINE and up to the line of the MEUSE-ESCAUT canal, the capture of ANTWERP and finally the airborne operation (Operation MARKET GARDEN) which was a supreme effort to force river crossings over the MAAS and the RHINE, and thus turn the right flank of the GERMAN defence line. This phase can be said to have been completed on 26 September 1944.
PHASE III covers the establishment and stocking of the Advance Base in BELGIUM including the opening of the great port of ANTWERP and the measures necessary to oppose the GERMAN winter offensive. The approximate date of completion of this phase is 14 January 1945 when stock-piling for Phase IV began.
PHASE IV. This phase, commencing on 15 January 1945 and ending on 8 May 19-15, may be entitled “The Last Round”. It contains the operations to cross the River MAAS and capture the territory up to the River RHINE (Operations VERITABLE and GRENADE) and also Operation PLUNDER which was the assault across the RHINE. It concludes with the advance to the BALTIC by Second Army, the operations of First Canadian Army in Northern GERMANY and HOLLAND, and the final surrender of the GERMAN forces opposing 21 Army Group on 5 May 1945.
At this image “E” will be found a map illustrating the outline of administrative development in support of the campaign from NORMANDY to the BALTIC.
4. Composition of the BRITISH Force
At the moment when the Supreme Commander gave the order for the operation to commence, Second Army and First Canadian Army, both of which remained throughout the campaign under the command of HQ.
21 Army Group consisted of :—
- SIX armoured divisions (including one POLISH armoured division)
- TEN infantry divisions
- TWO airborne divisions
- NINE independent armoured brigades
- TWO Special Service (Commando) brigades
- GHQ, Army and Corps Troops
- Certain Allied Contingents.
Clearly a force of such size required a considerable number of administrative troops to operate the ports, railways, communications and installations on its lines of communication. The operation of ports and railways and IWT was controlled centrally from HQ 21 Army Group in accordance with normal practice, but HQ L of C relieved HQ 21 Army Group of the onus of local administration and of the control of certain other installations.
5. Administrative Responsibility of HQ 21 Army Group
HQ 21 Army Group was responsible for :—
(a) Co-ordinating the general administrative planning of ALL Services both AMERICAN and BRITISH in the early stages.
(b) Informing Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force or War Office of the special needs of the Forces until such time as the Armies could formulate firm demands, thus enabling action to be taken to ensure that there were sufficient stores in UK to meet these demands when they were received.
(c) Maintaining the BRITISH Forces and making the appropriate demands for this purpose on the War Office.
Responsibility for the co-ordination of the detailed administrative planning and formulation of administrative policy was delegated by the Commander-in-Chief to the Major-General I/C Administration.
During the planning stage it was considered desirable to attach an AMERICAN administrative element to HQ 21 Army Group in order to ensure that US and BRITISH planning marched in step. This element consisted of a Brigadier-General assisted by representatives of the G-1 and G-4 Sections of the AMERICAN General Staff. The Brigadier-General was appointed deputy to the MGA and his administrative staff section worked alongside, but not integrated With, the ‘A’ and ‘Q’ staffs of HQ 21 Army Group.
During the course of this history it is proposed to deal with the US administrative planning and arrangements only when they directly affect the BRITISH administrative picture.
PART II — OUTLINE OPERATIONAL PLAN FOR THE ASSAULT
PART II — OUTLINE OPERATIONAL PLAN FOR THE ASSAULT
6. The initial plan for Operation OVERLORD provided for an assault on the NORMANDY coast from immediately NORTH of the CARENTAN estuary to the River ORNE with the object of securing as a base for further operations a lodgement area which included airfield sites and the port of CHERBOURG. See sketch map at this image “A”.
7. The operation was a combined BRITISH, CANADIAN and UNITED STATES undertaking by all Services of the three nations. The Naval forces involved were under command of the Allied Naval Commander Expeditionary Force (ANCXF). HQ Allied Expeditionary Air Force (AEAF) commanded all Air Forces taking part in the operation while all the land forces participating were initially placed under command of HQ. 21 Army Group.
8. The Naval Forces operating in the assault were divided into two separate task forces :—
Eastern Task Force in support of the BRITISH Forces.
Western Task Force in support of the AMERICAN Forces.
Their tasks were as follows :—
(a) Provision of protection from enemy naval forces.
(b) Clearance of enemy mines and minefields.
(c) Bombarding enemy defences.
(d) Supporting the assault by fire as necessary.
9. The RAF and US Air Forces were responsible for :—
(a) The strategic bombing of enemy lines of communication before and during the assault.
(b) In conjunction with ADGB the air defence of the bases and troop concentrations in the UK and protection of coastal convoys, warships and shipping.
(c) The tactical bombing of enemy troop concentrations, reinforcements, strong points and other targets in the vicinity of the assault.
(d) Establishing complete air superiority and thus protecting the ground forces.
10. The general plan for the Army’s part in the operation was :-
(a) To carry out airborne landings on the night D—1/D with the object of protecting the flanks of the area in which the assault was to take place.
(b) To assault on the NORMANDY coast between VARREVILLE and OUISTREHAM on a five divisional front from landing ships and landing craft with two BRITISH, one CANADIAN and two UNITED STATES divisions.
(c) To land the follow-up divisions, one BRITISH and one UNITED STATES on the second tide on D-day and on D+1.
(d) Thereafter to build up our forces in divisions as follows :—
BRITISH AMERICAN
By D+ 4 to . . 61/3 81/3
By D+12 to . . 9 9
By D+20 to . . 15 9
By D+35 to . . 15 15
(e) The initial objectives were the towns of CAEN, BAYEUX, ISIGNY, CARENTAN, and airfields in the vicinity.
(f) Second Army was to protect the left flank of UNITED STATES First Army, while the latter captured CHERBOURG, ANGERS, NANTES and the BRITTANY ports.
The Order of Battle of 21 Army Group for the assault is shown at this image “B, not yet ready”
PART III —— OUTLINE OF ADMINISTRATIVE PLANNING
PART III —— OUTLINE OF ADMINISTRATIVE PLANNING
11. Preface
It will be noted that both in this outline administrative planning and in each of the four phases the problems and achievements of the “Q” Staff and Services are dealt with prior to those of the “A” Staff and Services.
This change in accepted staff procedure does not in any way mean that the activities of the “A” Staff and Services are any less important than those of the “Q" Staff and its associated Services but is made deliberately because the work of the latter follows on more naturally and in a more logical sequence from the outline of operations than would be the case if the Work of "A” and the "A” Services was described first.
12. Staff Responsibilities
On the HQ 21 Army Group Administrative Staff which carried out the planning for Operation OVERLORD were three senior appointments responsible to the MGA as follows :—
(a) DQMG who co-ordinated the work of Q(Plans), Q(Maint) and Q(AE) and under whose direction the “Q” Services functioned.
(b) DQMG (Mov & Tn) who was responsible for all movement planning, the movement of personnel vehicles and stores by air, sea and land, and for the co-ordination of the work of the Movements Staff and the Transportation Service.
(c) DAG who was responsible for all “A” Planning and Organisation, "A" Personal Services and activities of the “A” Services.
The detailed organisation of the administrative staff is set out at this image “C not yet ready”.
Second Army was charged with all planning from D-day to D+14 (subsequently extended to D+17) under the general direction of HQ 21 Army Group. This involved the assessment of the requirements of administrative units and stores from D to D+41 and the phasing in of daily maintenance requirements and administrative personnel for the period D to D+17 including the requirements of the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force. HQ 21 Army Group took over these responsibilities from Second Army from D+18 onwards.
Although AMERICAN forces were being employed alongside BRITISH forces, in view of the inherent differences in BRITISH and AMERICAN administrative procedure the US forces were made responsible for their own maintenance and build-up subject to the over-riding approval of the C-in-C 21 Army Group.
13. Control of Movement
During the planning period an organisation was set up for the control by the Royal Navy of both a ferry service to land personnel and stores from vessels at anchor off the beaches and a cross-channel shuttle service of ships and other craft.
The control of this was to be assisted by Movements officers both ashore and afloat. In the initial stages control on the far shore was to be de-centralised to Beach Sub Areas with their appropriate naval increment but as soon as possible the control of shipping in the whole BRITISH assault area was to be exercised by FOBAA (Flag Officer British Assault Area) in conjunction with Q(Mov) Shipping, 21 Army Group.
To implement the policies laid down by HQ 21 Army Group, ANCXF and AEAF in regard to alterations in the build-up, an organisation entitled BUCO (Build Up Control Organisation) was established in UK to control the movement of ships and craft from the UK and of personnel and vehicles into them from the concentration and marshalling areas.
This organisation was also responsible on the BRITISH side for the post D-day concentration plan and for ensuring that all units were ready in time to move to marshalling areas for embarkation, although the actual mounting of the operation was the responsibility of the 'War Office acting through the Home Commands.
The BUCO staff contained representatives from HQ 21 Army Group, ANCXF, AEAF, War Office Q(Mov), Ministry of War Transport, Second Army, First Canadian Army, 2 Tactical Air Force and representatives of the US “users” who acted as liaison links with HQ ETOUSA which controlled the US concentration and build up. ‘While BUCO was concerned with the movement of personnel and vehicles, HQ 21 Army Group controlled directly, in conjunction with War Office, all alterations or additions required in the stores shipment programme.
14. Outline Maintenance Plan
The BRITISH Forces were to be maintained over the beaches until such time as sufficient ports were captured and developed on the assumption that beach maintenance could cease on the opening of the SEINE ports. As the BRITISH sector contained only four small ports, PORT EN BESSIN, COURSEULLES, CAEN and OUISTREHAM, the capacity of which, even if captured intact, would not be sufficient for dealing with the tonnage requirements of the BRITISH Forces, it was decided to construct an artificial port at ARROMANCHES.
This artificial and prefabricated port was known by the codeword "MULBERRY B” and its object was to reduce the degree of dependence on maintenance over open beaches in the early stages of the operation. A similar artificial port “MULBERRY A” was to be constructed in the AMERICAN sector. In addition, small havens of sheltered water for the discharge and protection of the ferry craft were to be formed by sinking chains of ships off the coast prior to the develop- ment of the MULBERRY and the codeword “GOOSEBERRY” was given to them.
Second Army was to be maintained for the first few days from Beach Maintenance Areas and subsequently from two Army Roadheads one of which would ultimately be handed over to First Canadian Army.
As soon as possible a Rear Maintenance Area Was to be established. It was not intended that the beach maintenance areas should develop into the Rear Maintenance Area but they were either to close down or be retained as Stores Transit Areas on the opening of the RMA.
As well as the planning, the administrative responsibility for the early stages of the operation devolved upon Second Army. An important point to notice is that no reliance was placed on any railways being available for at least the first three months of the operation and so the L of C was planned to be entirely road operated. Whilst the development of the administrative organisation was planned to fall into three main phases, the dates of each phase could only be approximate as they were dependent on the tactical situation.
Stage I - D to D+4
During this stage maintenance was to be entirely over the beaches except for the possibility of a small tonnage being discharged through MULBERRY B on D+4. It was not anticipated that any appreciable tonnage would be unloaded at the MULBERRY until D+9. The beaches were organised into three sectors each controlled by a HQ Sub Area and each containing a beach maintenance area. A total of eight Beach Groups (two as reserve formations) were placed under command of the Beach Sub Areas which in turn were placed under command as follows:-
101 and 102 Beach Sub Areas - 1 Corps
104 Beach Sub Area - 30 Corps.
HQ. 4 L of C Sub Area was responsible for the area of ARROMANCHES where MULBERRY B was to be constructed as soon as the tactical situation permitted. It was planned to use PORT EN BESSIN for the reception, storage and distribution of bulk petrol and HQ 10 Garrison was made responsible for its local administration under the direction of HQ 4 L of C Sub Area. HQ 11 L of C Area was given the overall responsibility for the developing of MULBERRY B and PORT EN BESSIN through the agencies of 4 L of C Sub Area and 10 Garrison respectively and were placed under command Second Army. The proposed administrative layout during this stage is shown at this image “D”.
Stage II — D+5 to D+17
With effect from D+5 Second Army through HQ 11 L of C Area were to take over from Corps the responsibility and control of the beaches and beach maintenance areas. HQ 11 L of C Area would then be responsible through the HQ of the beach sub areas for the clearance of all beaches in the BRITISH Sector and, as above, through 4 L of C Sub Area for the operation and local administration of MULBERRY B and PORT EN BESSIN.
Two army roadheads were planned during this period of which No. 1 in the area of CAEN was to be prepared to start issues on D+5 whilst No. 2 in the area of BAYEUX was to open on D+7.
Second Army was to be responsible for the operation and control of both roadheads until No. 1 was handed over to First Canadian Army. It was anticipated that CHERBOURG would be captured by the US forces on D+8. As it was improbable that certain awkward loads for the BRITISH forces could be brought across the beaches it was planned in agreement with the US to unload them at CHERBOURG, and HQ 12 L of C Area was detailed to provide a detachment under command of First US Army to represent BRITISH interests and operate a transit area for BRITISH stores. The administrative layout during this stage is shown at this image “D”.
Stage III — D+18 to the capture of the SEINE ports
The majority of Second Army units were planned to have disembarked by D+17 and on that date the remainder of First Canadian Army would commence their move to the Continent. The presence of the two armies would necessitate a co-ordinating and controlling headquarters. HQ L of C with an increment from HQ 21 Army Group would move to the Continent between D+17 and D+20 for this purpose until the arrival of the complete HQ of 21 Army Group which was not anticipated to take place before D+30.
11 L of C Area with its units under command would revert to under command HQ L of C from the date of the latter’s assumption of administrative control. HQ 5 L of C Sub Area under command HQ L of C would be responsible for developing the RMA while 7 and 8 Base Sub Areas were to move to the Continent so as to be readily available when the capture of the SEINE ports of LE HAVRE and ROUEN appeared imminent. The detachment of HQ 12 L of C Area operating at CHERBOURG '-'3-11d then be released and HQ 12 L of C would take over command of 7 and 8 Base Sub Areas.
In addition 11 Garrison was held in reserve to operate and administer MULBERRY A as it had been arranged that this artificial port would be transferred to 21 Army Group if CHERBOURG was captured more or less intact by the US forces. The administrative layout at this stage would thus be as shown at this image “D”.
15. Build up of Reserve Stocks
The rapid build-up of reserves was clearly a matter of paramount importance throughout the early stages if the fighting formations were to be afforded liberty of action in the event of a sudden crack in the enemy’s defences. The urgency was at its greatest in the initial few days when suflicient reserves would have to be landed not only to allow for a rapid advance but to be available for resisting the fierce and lengthy counter attacks which might be launched against the shallow bridgehead. In addition to normal maintenance, therefore, reserve stocks were to be landed at the following scales :—
(a) By midnight D+3
Ammunition — Four days expenditure at 21 Army Group rates for the forces ashore by D+5
POL — Fifty miles per vehicle ashore on D+5
Supplies —— Two days supplies for the forces ashore on D+5
Ordnance Stores (less ammunition)
Maintenance from D+1 to D+9 would be dependent on Landing Reserves. A specially scaled Landing Reserve Set would be landed as early as possible for each brigade group or equivalent formation ashore. From D+10 maintenance would be by Beach Maintenance Pack. Each pack was sealed for a division or an equivalent formation and contained first and second echelon spares plus equipment for thirty days at special wastage rates.
(b) By D+41
Fourteen days initial stocks of all commodities were to be held in the RMA.
(c) By D+90
Fourteen days initial stocks of all items plus working margins not exceeding seven days were to be held in the Advance Base depots.
The RAF reserves were to conform with the above.
In calculating the holdings the following scales were used :—
Ammunition — 21 Army Group Rates (See Appendix “P”, not yet ready)
POL — 50 miles per vehicle per day
Ordnance Stores —— Beach Maintenance Pack scales and controlled stores calculated at (less ammunition) FFC intense Rates.
16. Army and RAF Responsibilities
The basic principle that services of common usage in the Army and RAF should be provided by one ‘service for the use of both was to be followed. In order to ensure the most economical arrangements having regard to the respective scales of requirements, it was agreed that the majority of services of common use should be provided by the Army. Thus the Army agreed to provide supplies, petrol, oil and lubricants, ammunition and equipment common to both Services, labour and other services of a like nature.
17. Replacement of Vehicles
The General Staf" requirement for heavy ‘A’ vehicles was that twenty-five per cent of unit entitlement should be available behind the armoured formations at all times. This is greater than the Contact Rate of wastage for ‘A’ vehicles but until workshops were established and their output aiforded a compensating reduction, the replacement demands from formations were higher than the Contact Wastage rate.
The requirement for light ‘A’ and ‘B’ vehicles was to produce in the beach-head between D-day and D+42 the calculated rate of wastage for that period, plus one month’s reserve to cover exceptional "losses in the assault and the creation of a repair pool.
There was considerable conflict in priorities between shipment of reserve vehicles and fighting formations in the build-up. The General Staff were, however, advised and agreed that reserve vehicles to maintain the force ashore should have priority in shipment over fighting formations where conflict between the two arose.
All vehicles due to be landed up to D+42 were to be waterproofed. As regards reserve vehicles this work was undertaken in War Office depots with the assistance of 21 Army Group Ordnance and REME personnel from units or reserves of low priority in the Order of Battle.
Replacement vehicles were to be shipped unaccompanied, Ordnance drivers meeting them on the beaches in order to clear them.
18. Reinforcements
For planning purposes it was assumed that normal reinforcements demands could not be expected from formations and units before D+18. To overcome this diificulty it was planned that reinforcements would be provided until then by means of predetermined drafts, based on an estimate of casualties, which would be despatched until D+9 direct to Corps Reception Camps and after that date to Second Army Reinforcement Group.
The policy governing the build up of reinforcements from D to D+2 Was to ensure :—
(a) that there would be a reserve of personnel in each beach-head to replace casualties in the beach groups as quickly as possible in order that the important work of off-loading would not be impeded by lack of manpower. The policy was to be put into effect by sending out drafts numbering ten per cent of the Beach Group strength to land in FRANCE on D+l even before it was known Whether they were necessary or not.
(b) that there would be a- supply of specialist and vital personnel to replace such casualties in assault divisions.
It would not be possible to send any other reinforcements at this stage.
From D+3 to D+9 reinforcements were to consist of first line reinforcements of units which it was estimated would have suffered seriouscasualties and standard drafts for each arm of the Service. Arrangements were made to permit variations in the predetermined drafts at short notice in order to cover unexpected shortages of key tradesmen and specialists.
As soon as practicable after D+9 a reserve of reinforcements was to be built up on the Continent. These reserves were to be held in Reinforcement Holding Units for the BRITISH and in Reinforcement Holding Battalions for the CANADIANS and were to be supplied to units under the normal system.
19. Casualties
The estimates of casualties for the BRITISH and CANADIAN forces were based on the official War Oflice casualty rates known as the Evetts Rates. In determining the estimate of casualties which might be sustained in the operation the following categories were considered :—
(a) DROWNED It was estimated that sixty per cent of the personnel in any craft lost or damaged would become casualties.
(b) SICK AND NON-BATTLE CASUALTIES
For planning purposes it was estimated that the sick who would be evacuated to hospital would amount to 0.17 per cent per day of the total forces ashore.
(c) BATTLE CASUALTIES
The Evetts Rates are divided into three, the “Intense”, “Normal” and “Quiet” depending on the degree of fighting involved. It was thought, however, that the most severe of the above rates was not sufficiently high to represent the anticipated casualties of some assault formations and therefore a new rate “Double Intense” was applied. The estimated total of battle casualties at these rates was divided into :—
D-day and D+l
Killed, captured and missing — 30% of casualties
Wounded —— 70% of casualties
D+2 and thereafter
Killed, captured and missing — 25% of casualties
Wounded —— 75% of casualties
The numbers of wounded were further calculated to be :—
Litter cases — 50%
Walking cases — 50%
20. Evacuation Policy
For D-day and until hospital accommodation was adequate for retention of casualties, the medical plan was based on :~
(a) the evacuation to the UK of all casualties, except those whom it was dangerous to move
(b) the provision of life saving surgery by the medical units in the beach organisations.
As soon as hospital accommodation ashore was adequate, all cases requiring not more than seven days treatment were to be retained on the Continent. As the build-up of hospitals permitted, this period was to be extended to fifteen days, thirty days and ultimately to such longer periods as the Army Group Commander decided.
LSTs and hospital carriers were to be used for evacuation over the beaches and from artificial ports, and hospital ships were to be used for evacuation from major ports.
21. Basis for Administrative Plan
The entire administrative plan for this operation was based on the Joint Outline Maintenance Project for Operation OVERLORD and the detailed instructions on each specific subject were issued to formations in the form of Administrative Instructions.
