The Salvage resources during this period were greatly strained as units were required in the large areas uncovered by the advance while plenty of clearance still remained to be done in the original bridgehead. In addition, with the lengthening of the L of C and the constant changes of roadheads and cushions, evacuation to the base salvage depot Which was established at CAEN on 12 August became increasingly difficult.

Such large quantities of materials were abandoned in the FALAISE area that a HQ based on HQ 197 Infantry Brigade was established with Service components including No. 17 field Salvage Unit to cover that area. The first reception area was established at BRETTEVILLE SUR L’AIZE, but it later moved to TRUN where it remained until December.

This organisation proved most satisfactory and resulted in the recovery of large quantities of stores and equipment, while the provision of Pl/V labour after the initial stages greatly eased the manpower problem.

In order to obtain some control over captured stores, a depot was opened at CORMELLES at which the captured stores and vehicles could be centralised. This catered for the area SOUTH of the SEINE.

The territory NORTH of the SEINE had to be left to the best efforts of the Services concerned but they were assisted by Q(Mov) routing loads of salvage to AMIENS where, after inspection by the area salvage officer, they could be directed to the appropriate Services depot. A salvage unit was available at SALEUX for unloading and sorting mixed loads.

A serious shortage of jerrycans resulted from units abandoning them in their speedy advance across FRANCE. Collecting them and transporting them was difficult as the cans were scattered far and wide but the salvage of these containers was made a matter of top priority.

A salvage collecting centre unit taken from L of C was due to be landed in the early stages of operation MARKET GARDEN in order to collect parachutes and other valuable dropping equipment before they could be stolen, as had happened in the D-day operations.

Owing to operational and weather conditions the arrival of this airborne unit was delayed, but meanwhile the salvage unit with 30 Corps had moved forward with the ground forces and done excellent work within the area into which the corps had advanced. The equipment salvaged was returned to BRUSSELS by road and thence to UK by air.

A base salvage depot was opened at ANTWERP on 26 September but being sited on the ALBERT canal was hindered for several days by enemy mortar fire from the opposite bank.

At the close of this phase the total tonnage re-issued by Salvage since D-day amounted to 21,840 tons including ammunition.

This period of operations was one of routine salvage work in the army area and the expansion of base depots in the advance base. A feature was the establishment of captured stores depots in BELGIUM with the aid of the BELGIAN recovery organisation.

A system was started whereby reports of stores found all over BELGIUM, received both through civilian and military sources, were collated and circulated to Services. Large quantities of material useful to the war effort were uncovered to the Services and utilised as also were stocks brought into the depots.

Compared with the experience of FRANCE there is no doubt that the handling of enemy stores in BELGIUM was successful. A similar method was adopted for vehicles, many of which were allocated to civilian economy.

The addition of the BELGIAN military personnel to the small Salvage organisation was an important contributory factor to the satisfactory results obtained.

An interesting sideline was the reception of arms from the BELGIAN Resistance Movement which was carried out without incident. Arms were handed in either to local Resistance HQ or to police stations from which they were collected into four main depots.

The clearance of stores and scrap material lying in ANTWERP docks in the early stages undoubtedly helped the receipt and handling of military cargo both in the BRITISH and AMERICAN sectors.

While salvage Work in the army areas continued on routine lines, activities in the RMA were limited by lack of transport, but it was possible to begin the clearance of the beaches. In particular, derelict Rhino ferries were broken down in order to obtain scrap steel and recover serviceable flotation tanks which were sent forward for use by Transportation.

PW labour was employed and some vehicles rescued from the derelict vehicle park at CORMELLES were found to be repairable by REWE, whilst the remaining scrap vehicles were broken down to furnace size steel. This was stock piled on the docks at CAEN and arrangements were made to clear it to UK in LCTS taken over from the Admiralty by the Ministry of Supply.

Steel scrap was recovered in BELGIUM by various means such as cutting up flying bomb ramps and apparatus, railway guns and their mountings and also steel obstructions obtained by clearing beach defences from the BELGIAN coast and coast roads. Another source was GERMAN ammunition which was broken down by a BELGIAN firm under contract, the explosive recovered being purified and made into standard demolition charges for subsequent use in GERMANY. All the scrap steel obtained from these various sources was despatched to ANTWERP for subsequent shipment to UK.

The breaking up of vehicles was also started in BELGIUM, particularly at the salvage depot at VILVORDE where all “written off ” vehicles from the advance base vehicle parks were brought for this purpose.

The battle of the rivers entailed heavy expenditure of ammunition and exceptionally large quantities of ammunition empties were received in the Salvage organisation, a high proportion of which had tobe stock piled for clearance at a later date.

After operation VERITABLE a battlefield clearance scheme was organised by First Canadian Army which resulted in the recovery of a considerable tonnage of material but the number of enemy small arms found was very small which indicated that some deliberate plan of concealment or destruction had been undertaken by the enemy.

It is interesting to note that the Salvage organisation in the British Army is a Service on its own, the personnel being members of the Pioneer Corps, where as in First Canadian Army the salvage units consisted of Ordnance personnel under the direction of DDOs and all returned stores were passed back through salvage units.

After the crossing of the RHINE a Salvage unit was sent to the area NORTH of WESEL to recover parachutes and other material dropped during the airborne landing. As had been the case in previous airborne operations the results achieved were disappointing as most of the parachutes had already disappeared during the three or four days between the landing and the arrival of the salvage unit.

The period of the advance through GERMANY proved difficult for effective salvage work and the salvage units with the armies concentrated mainly on recovering enemy stores required for immediate use and clearing others from railway wagons in order to release the wagons for maintenance of the armies.

Small temporary captured stores depots were established, pending the setting up of permanent captured stores depots under Service arrangements. Prior to this period a wide variety of enemy stores had been recovered and those required for Intelligence purposes were stocked at ANTWERP where they were packed and despatched to UK.

Scrap material not required in the theatre or in the UK was sold locally and up to the end of March £19,424 had been received from these sales.

The total tonnage of material reissued, shipped and sold up to the same date was 98,614 tons, although a large tonnage still remained awaiting disposal in base depots.