Outline of Operations

The operational picture during this phase (from 26 July to 26 September) can be divided into four stages :—

• Firstly the combined BRITISH, CANADIAN and AMERICAN operations in the area of FALAISE leading up to the crossing of the SEINE,
• Secondly the pursuit of the enemy through FRANCE and BELGIUM by Second Army,
• Thirdly the operations of First Canadian Army up the coast of FRANCEand BELGIUM, and
• Fourthly the operations to extend EAST and NORTH in BELGIUM and HOLLAND culminating in the combined US and BRITISH airborne operation in the neighbourhood of NIJMEGEN and ARNHEM.

25 July saw the beginning of the break-out from the bridgehead as the AMERICAN attack between PERRIERS and ST LO, which had been co-ordinated with an attack by 2 Canadian Corps across the road CAEN-FALAISE and another thrust SOUTH by 12 Corps, developed with great momentum and by 30 July the advance into BRITTANY had begun.

On that day Second Army began a drive from the CAUMONT area SOUTH and EAST towards the River ORNE with 8 Corps on the right, 30 Corps in the centre, and 12 Corps acting as a pivot on the left.

By 19 August, despite heavy enemy resistance, this attack had progressed as far as the road PUTANGES—FALAISE.

On 1 August 12 US Army Group had become operational with first and Third US Armies under its command but all US land forces remained under the overall command of the C~in-C 21 Army Group.

First Canadian Army launched a heavy attack towards FALAISE supported by one thousand heavy bombers on 7 August and was only halted some four miles NORTH of FALAISE.

On 12 August a junction was made between the CANADIANS and 12 Corps who had successfully crossed the River ORNE.

FALAISE was entered on 16 August but in the meantime the GERMANS launched a heavy counter attack against the first US Army in the vicinity of MORTAIN.

first US Army held this attack and so Third US Army continued its drive on LAVAL and LE MANS from which it was ordered to turn NORTH and help Second Army trap the GERMAN forces.

On 19 August they met the CANADIANS and the FALAISE “pocket” was closed.

Amongst the equipment that was subsequently checked were 571 guns, 358 tanks and SP guns and 4,715 vehicles of various natures.

As Second Army advanced into the “pocket” first US Army was ordered to attack NORTH-EAST to capture ELBEUF on the SEINE about ten miles SOUTH of ROUEN. They reached this town on 25 August, by which date Second British and First Canadian Armies were closing on to the SEINE and the mopping up of the FALAISE pocket was completed.

On 26 August orders were issued for 21 Army Group to advance NORTH with the intention of eventually capturing ANTWERP.

30 Corps crossed the SEINE on the right of the BRITISH line in the vicinity of VERNON (R47) with 12 Corps on the left forcing a crossing between LES ANDELYS (R39) and LOUVIERS (R28).

The bridgeheads over the SEINE were quickly established and by 31 August 30 Corps were crossing the SOMME at AMIENS and had elements across the road ALBERT (3/I36)—AMIENS after an advance of eighty miles.

12 Corps began their advance on 30 August and by the next day had reached POIX (M84).

During the next four days the advance continued rapidly and BRUSSELS was captured by Gds Armoured Division on 3 September, while 11 Armoured Division by an advance of sixty miles on the same day was in the area of ALOST.

On 4 September 11 Armoured Division captured ANTWERP but the northern suburbs close to the docks still remained to be cleared.

Meanwhile, 2 Canadian Corps crossed the SEINE on 26 August near ELBEUF.

On 30 August ROUEN and flEURY were captured.

By 1 September DIEPPE was liberated and the port rapidly put into limited operation.

On 4 September the area of BOULOGNE was reached and by 10 September OSTEND and NIEUPORT had been occupied after DUNKIRK had been by-passed on 8 September.

BRUGES was cleared by 11 September and in conjunction with the Polish Armoured Division the GHENT—BRUGES canal was crossed after which an advance was made up to the LEOPOLD canal and the area up to the SCHELDT estuary between ANTWERP and TERNEUZEN (D21) was cleared.

1 Corps had meanwhile crossed the SEINE and were engaged with the enemy outpost positions near LE HAVRE. The main defences of this port were contacted on 6 September.

After a heavy naval and air bombardment the attack on LE HAVRE began on the evening of 10 September and was ended by the surrender of the garrison on the morning of 12 September.

3 Canadian Infantry Division had the task of clearing both BOULOGN E and CALAIS.

The former was attacked on 17 September but all resistance in the town was not finally crushed until the 22nd. This was followed by the attack on CALAIS which commenced on 25 September.

The town was entered on 28 September and after an armistice for the evacuation of civilians all organised resistance ceased on 30 September.

CAP GRIS NEZ area was captured at the same time and so cross-channel shelling of the BRITISH coast was over, while bases for the enemy V-weapons were pushed back into HOLLAND.

The Supreme Commander assumed direct command of the Allied Expeditionary Force on September and 12 US Army Group was placed under command of SHAEF.

Operating on the right flank of 21 Army Group it was directed on the ARDENNES and the inter Army Group boundary was an approximate line BEAUVAIS (11/I90)—DOUAI (H60)—ATH (J23)—HASSELT (K36).

On 8 September the Gds Armoured Division secured a bridgehead over the ALBERT canal and advanced rapidly up to BOURG LEOPOLD.

On 11 September a bridgehead over the MEUSE—ESCAUT canal was established in conjunction with 11 Armoured Division, while further WEST another bridgehead over that canal was secured at AART on 14 September by 15 Infantry Division. It seemed that a great opportunity now presented itself of out-flanking the GERMAN defence line and advancing EAST provided bridgeheads could be secured over the MAAS and the RHINE.

On 10 September it was decided that Second Army assisted by an airborne corps should attempt to advance to the ZUIDERZEE and thereafter swing EAST into GERMANY.

The operations entitled MARKET GARDEN commenced on 17 September.

101 US Airborne Division achieved complete surprise in their landings and occupied SON, ST OEDENRODE and VEGHEL. They captured and held intact all bridges in their area except that over the WILHELMINA canal which had been previously blown.

82 US Airborne Division also landed successfully and seized intact the bridge over the MAAS at GRAVE and the bridge over the MAAS—WAAL canal at HEUMEN.

1 Brit Airborne Div made a generally successful landing and captured the NORTH end of the road bridge across the NEDER-RHINE at ARNHEM.

Meanwhile the attack by Second Army began with 30 Corps advancing to six miles short of EINDHOVEN, with 8 Corps on the right and 12 Corps on the left exploiting their bridgeheads across the canal with a view to bridging it.

101 US Airborne Division captured EINDHOVEN and together With Guards Armoured Division pushed on to the southern bank of the WILHELMINA canal while 82 US Airborne Division continued to drive for the bridges at NIJMEGEN.

Unfortunately, at the crucial moment the weather turned against the allied forces and the operational situation which at the beginning seemed so rosy began to deteriorate. Enemy resistance was rapidly stiffening and the flying in of reinforcements and supplies for the hard-pressed airborne troops near ARNHEM got progressively more and more difficult as the weather grew worse.

After four days of very gallant fighting 1 Airborne Division had to relinquish its hold on the road bridge at ARNHEM and despite heroic advances by Guards Armoured Division and 43 Division Contact was never firmly made between 1 Airborne Division and 30 Corps.

On September 43 Division reached the RHINE and made contact with the Polish Para Brigade but owing to the strenuous reaction of the enemy and the steep banks of the river at that point, only a very small quantity of stores could be ferried over.

By 25 September 8 Corps had captured HELMOND and GEHERT and had made contact with 30 Corps near ST ANTONIS, while on the left 12 Corps had cleared the area between the road EINDHOVEN—TURNHOUT and the road EINDHOVEN—’sHERTOGENBOSCH.

During the night 25/26 September 43 Division managed to evacuate over two thousand men of 1 Airborne Division and the operation came to a halt.

Although it had not been one hundred per cent successful a deep thrust of some sixty miles had been made into country occupied and stubbornly defended by the enemy and the capture of the bridge at GRAVE and of NIJMEGEN with its road bridge intact proved invaluable in later operations.

Administrative Picture

Although the operational aspect of this phase divided itself into four distinct parts, two of these, the operations of Second Army up to BRUSSELS and ANTWERP and of First Canadian Army along the Channel coast, were taking place concurrently, the division was made more for the convenience of the reader than for the sake of necessity.

The administrative side of the picture can more conveniently be described by dividing the history of this phase into three stages:-

The break-out from the NORMANDY bridgehead to the line of the SEINE.

The crossings of the SEINE up to the capture of BRUSSELS and ANTWERP on 3 and 4 September respectively.

The operations to exploit EAST and NORTH terminating in operation MARKET GARDEN (airborne landings).

In order that a better background may be given with which to study the separate activities of the various Services, it is proposed to give a brief description of the salient features during these three stages that together form Phase II.

Moves of Higher HQ

Now that the feat of landing large assault forces together with all the administrative support necessary for the retention of the bridgehead on a heavily defended coast had been successfully achieved, the “A” and “Q” staffs of HQ 21 Army Group addressed themselves to the next main task of developing an administrative organisation on the Continent that would enable the C-in-C to carry out any operations that might be required.

Rear HQ 21 Army Group moved over to the Continent in August and opened at VAUCELLES on 11 August.

Until that time the base installations in NORMANDY had been controlled through the medium of an advance section of HQ 21 Army Group stationed with HQ L of C.

Later in August the forward element of SHAEF containing the administrative staff also moved across and set up at JULOUVILLE near GRANVILLE preparatory to assuming overall command of 21 Army Group and 12 US Army Group on their split into two separate forces which was scheduled for 1 September.

As soon as BRUSSELS and ANTWERP were captured in September preparations were immediately made for the transfer of HQ 21 Army Group from NORMANDY to BRUSSELS where it could be established in a position to take executive control of the build-up of the advance base which would now be in the area of those two cities.

This move actually took place on 23 September, only nineteen days from the first entry of our troops into BRUSSELS.

At about the same date SHAEF Forward moved to VERSAILLES where it was shortly joined by the large element still remaining in UK and was redesignated SHAEF Main.

Stage I

PLANS FOR WINTER IN BRIDGEHEAD

The policy of drawing the bulk of the GERMAN forces towards the BRITISH sector, thus paving the way for the AMERICAN advance round the right flank, was proving successful, but as a result our progress had not kept pace with the planning estimates.

At the end of July there seemed little hope of an early capture of the SEINE ports and the BRITISH forces would probably have to rely on maintenance through the RMA for some time yet to come. In fact, at this period, GERMAN resistance was proving stubborn, little sign of a crack was appearing and the possibility of having to spend the whole winter SOUTH of the SEINE had to be faced.

Stocking of the RMA continued therefore in order to cater for this eventuality and for all the breaks in day-to-day maintenance that winter conditions would impose on the unloading programme, but at the same time in the full knowledge that the stores discharged would be required to support the advance if a break-through was achieved.

Work had been proceeding on the development of the ports of CAEN and OUISTREHAM and as soon as the operational situation would permit, the CAEN—OUISTREHAM canal was to be opened.

In addition to this MULBERRY B was improved and extended and preparations for its winterisation put in hand with the object of extending its life beyond the planned date of 1 October until at least the end of the following January, as a further insurance against winter weather.

The narrow confines of the bridgehead limited the number of administrative units that could be accepted in the area and so only those units urgently required at the time were moved over to the Continent at this stage.

SUPPORTING THE BREAK-OUT

At the same time, however, preparations had to be made for any possible sudden break in the enemy’s resistance which could be rapidly exploited. Should operations become more fluid the necessary mobility to support the armies in their advances could only be found by the presence of sufficient administrative, and particularly transport, units.

Early in August it became apparent that the pendulum of the battle was gradually swinging in the allied favour. Immediate steps were taken therefore to phase in extra transport units, an example of this being on 1 August when a decision was made that six further general transport companies could be accepted in the theatre as soon as they could be shipped across.

It was decided also to begin to cut down the import of stores and reserves through the RMA in order to release transport from port and beach clearance duties and thus make it available for mobile operations.

This decision was supported by the fact that the stocks in the RMA had now reached satisfactory levels as approximately fourteen days reserves plus fourteen days working margins or equivalent stocks of all commodities were now held in its depots.

ROADS AND ROADHEADS

Both armies and all the corps had been ordered to develop all the roads that they required but the eventual main maintenance routes for the force starting from the RMA were to be developed, numbered, controlled and maintained by HQ 21 Army Group.

No attempt was made at this stage to sign any other than the main routes.

As the armies moved forward to the line of the SEINE two roadheads were established, No. 3 in the area of LISIEUX for First Canadian Army which opened on 24 August and No. 4 for Second Army near L'AIGLE which opened on 26 August, although No. 1 Cushion had been previously formed by the latter at FALAISE five days earlier.

Later No. 3A Roadhead, which was an advance portion of the Canadian Army roadhead, was opened at ELBEUF on 2 September. It had been decided that all First Canadian Army roadheads should be designated with odd numbers while Second Army roadheads would have even numbers for their nomenclature.

TRANSPORT

When the break-through occurred “Q” branch HQ 21 Army Group who controlled the allocation of all road transport saw to it that every available lorry was mobilised and given to the armies with the exception of a bare minimum of general transport companies that had to be retained for port and beach clearance.

In order further to help the transport situation practically all L of C units were grounded and their transport diverted to support the advance.

PLANNED ADVANCE BASE

It had been considered certain that the enemy, even though he might be pushed back fiom the line of the SEINE, would impose a delay on our advance at that point and would inevitably turn and fight again on the line of the River SOMME and other obstacles throughout NORTH FRANCE and BELGIUM.

It had been planned, therefore, that the area in a rough triangle DIEPPE—ROUEN—LE HAVRE should be laid out as an advance base although even at that time it was appreciated that operations might progress with such speed that the full development of this advance base would never become necessary.

Stage II

LENGTHENING OF L or C

During this stage the rapidity with which the advance was carried out meant not only that the BRITISH L of C lengthened to an alarming extent, but also that all question of the establishment of an advance base in the area of ROUEN as originally planned could be abandoned.

The entries into BRUSSELS and ANTWERP on 3 and 4 September respectively increased the length of the L of C by approximately three hundred miles but at the same time gave the opportunity of establishing the advance base in central BELGIUM with a first-class port in good condition through which the supplies could be landed as soon as the approaches could be cleared of all hostile elements.

For the moment, however, this huge advance in little more than a week produced administrative problems of no ordinary size. Such a complete disintegration of the GERMAN army had not been envisaged.

It had always been expected that somewhere a certain delay would be imposed which would have afforded an opportunity for the build-up of essential stores. This check however, never occurred.

Our dumps remained back in the RMA and the problem of supplying two corps advancing at an average rate of over forty miles per day had to be faced. It was obviously vitally necessary to exploit to the full the disorganisation and retreat of the enemy.

8 Corps, therefore, was grounded and all its second line transport, as well as fifty percent of its first line transport was temporarily removed from it in order to supply the two corps who were racing forward in the advance.

The opposition that they were meeting was not of great account but even so contact had to be continuously maintained and the momentum of the pursuit kept up so that the enemy would have no opportunity of again taking up a defensive position.

RESTRICTION OF IMPORTS

On 30 August a weighty decision had to be taken to rely on the early capture of a Channel port such as DIEPPE or BOULOGNE and to cease bringing in large quantities of stores and vehicles through the RMA.

Stores that it had formerly been considered essential to bring over from the UK were now phased back until such time as a port or ports nearer the battle area became available for their reception.

Bearing in mind the satisfactory levels of supplies of all natures in the RMA, it was decided to cut down imports from an average of some sixteen thousand tons per day to only seven thousand tons per day.

With the co-operation of the War Office this decision became effective in seven days. It proved invaluable as much transport was released for the direct support of the armies whereas had the original stores programmes been carried out they would have been occupied on clearing them from the beaches and ports into the depots of the RMA.

This freeing of transport enabled the advance to be continually supported and contributed in no small measure to the early consolidation of our hold on the area which was eventually to become the advance base.

PETROL

Napoleon said that an army marches on its stomach but ‘the prime necessity at this moment was not supplies but petrol. Three armoured divisions were taking part in this hunt and petrol was being consumed in enormous quantities.

Away on the right, also, General PATTON, commanding the Third US Army, was crying that his men could eat their belts but he must have “gas”.

The transportation of POL was a matter of the utmost urgency and the vast majority of the transport available was used for this purpose.

Fortunately, however, it remains a truism that the expenditure of ammunition is almost always in inverse ratio to that of petrol and the demands for transport of ammunition did not often conflict with those of petrol.

CONTROL OF ROADS AND TRANSPORT

Most careful control of the roads was essential if big hold-ups on the improvised bridges over the SEINE and the numerous other rivers were not to occur.

Tank transporters, formerly only allowed on the roads for a few hours at night, now had to travel in large numbers by day and urgent convoys of essential ammunition and ordnance stores had to be personally shepherded along agreed routes by personnel of the military police.

To achieve the necessary flexibility all third line transport was pooled and placed directly under army control and the tasks of all supply columns had to be extended. first line transport collected from the FMCS, second line transport from the army roadheads, and third line army transport and GHQ transport brought supplies from the RMA to the army roadhead.

The RASC columns concerned sometimes covered two hundred miles a day during this period. In order to augment the L of C lift, it was decided on 1 September to issue certain L of C units temporarily with reserve three-ton vehicles to enable them to carry out the long moves forward without having to jeopardise maintenance lifts by calling on GT companies for help.

The whole of the GHQ, reserve was absorbed in this way, and some 1,700 three-ton vehicles were issued for this purpose. One of the greatest difficulties in this ever-lengthening L of C was the lack of communications, as no lines were available and distances soon became too great for ireless. This meant the despatch rider had to be frequently used and this is a slow and not too reliable method over so many miles.

This lack of communications also affected the flexibility of supply as it was impossible to switch suddenly from petrol to ammunition had the tactical situation demanded it.

ROADHEADS

No. 4 Roadhead was so far behind the front line that cushions had to be formed before the next roadhead was made. These cushions are normally the dumped requirements of corps brought forward on third line transport to a position in front of the main roadhead, sited in relation to and in the direction of the next roadhead to be formed further ahead.

In this advance they were established near BEAUVAIS on 1 September (No. 2 Cushion) and near DOULLENS on 2 September (No. 3 Cushion) until finally No. 6 Roadhead was opened on 6 September SOUTH-WEST of BRUSSELS.

This last roadhead was sited with a view to being served by rail as well as road. First Canadian Army established No. 5 Roadhead between DIEPPE and ABBEVILLE on 3 September and this was served by a road L of C through DIEPPE.

The final roadhead established by the CANADIANS during the whole of this phase was No. 7 Roadhead which opened in the area of BETHUNE on 15 September.

ENEMY DUMPS

It might have been expected that in such a lengthy advance the armies could have relied to a certain extent on getting supplies from a number of enemy dumps. Probably largely due to the accuracy of the air forces in bombing the railways, roads, bridges and known enemy supply dumps this expectation was largely not fulfilled.

21 Army Group had therefore to rely entirely on its own resources, initiative and improvisations.

The decisions taken earlier on, firstly to out down imports and phase back all but the most essential stores, and secondly to ground certain fighting formations, ensured the continued support of the pursuit.

Stage III

PORTS

The numerous advances made, coupled with the capture of DIEPPE and OSTEND made it clear that is was no longer necessary to develop CAEN to its full capacity as it was situated too far away from the scene of operations.

The plan for the development of this port therefore, was scaled down and its imports restricted chiefly to coal.

DIEPPE was opened on 5 September and the first coaster arrived two days later.

The port was used for bringing in stores that were essential for either army but as the majority of the transport had already been allotted to Second Army a proportion of these imports was relied on for the maintenance of First Canadian Army.

The capacity of the port increased rapidly until it reached a daily figure of between six thousand and seven thousand tons by the end of the month. When the army rear boundary moved forward, HQ 21 Army Group took over control of the port.

LE HAVRE was captured on 12 September but was almost immediately allotted by SHIAEF to the AMERICANS. This decision was not unwelcome as it was now very little nearer to the scene of operations than the RMA had been and therefore, it would not have been worth while for the BRITISH to develop it.

ANTWERP was in our hands but unfortunately it could not yet be developed as the GERMANS controlled the approaches to it.

BOULOGNE and CALAIS were not captured until 22 September and 30 September respectively and so could not be opened during this phase. OSTEND, however, captured on 9 September was first opened on 28th of the same month.

CONTROL OF TRANSPORT

The BRITISH L of C was now approximately four hundred miles long.

In order that some of the grounded formations of Second Army could be lifted up before the next advance took place, a short breathing space occurred in which maintenance supplies were also brought up.

Meanwhile, plans were being laid for further advances eastwards in BELGIUM and northwards across the MAAS and the RHINE in conjunction with an airborne operation. It was immediately realised that this would place an even greater strain on the greatly extended L of C and road transport.

The main depots from which the armies were being maintained were still in the RMA and there were virtually no stocks on the ground between them and the holdings in corps FMCS in forward areas.

The support of this advance and airborne operation was an administrative risk as it would absorb all the reserves in the pipeline.

On the other hand, if it failed or was not entirely successful there would of necessity be a long pause while the L of C was re-organised and reserves built up.

The closest supervision and control in order that the best use should be made of every means of transport was therefore necessary, but Second Army had got too far ahead and it was impossible to have adequate control from a HQ at either of the two ends of the L of C.

About 10 September therefore it was decided to establish an organisation to be called TRANCO,which would co-ordinate all means of transport from the RMA to the army roadheads. It consisted of an integrated “Q” and “Q”

Movements staff with Services representatives from RASC and Labour to assist, and was set up at AMIENS in time to take control on 19 September.

AMIENS was selected for its location as being approximately half way along the L of C, a big rail centre and possessed of good communications. The establishment of TRANCO meant that a radical change in the road transport policy of 21 Army Group must occur.

All GHQ transport would be withdrawn from armies and would operate under the direct control of HQ 21 Army Group both at the ports and on the L of C, leaving to the armies only sufficient for the traffic forward from the army roadheads.

TRANCO directed and coordinated with other agencies movement of personnel, stores and transport for stocking army roadheads. It was also responsible for the transhipment of stores from railheads SOUTH of the SEINE to railtails NORTH of the SEINE.

Armies submitted estimates of their daily maintenance requirements by commodities for five day periods five days in advance.

TRANCO then issued an outline rail and road programme and by judicious use of the railtails NORTH of the SEINE and of the transport that was running through from the RMA, was able to adjust demands in accordance with ruling priorities.

The flow of supplies for the two armies which had been gradually decreasing up to that period began to increase again and although the levels of all commodities and stores inevitably fell to a low ebb in the forward areas just after the airborne operation, the supply situation generally continued to improve.

AIR LIFT

This particular subject does not lend itself readily to discussion in each of the three phases but is described here as it was during Stage III that its importance became paramount. The first army freight was flown into the theatre on 26 June but up to the end of August the tonnage of stores imported by this method never exceeded 200 tons in any single week. On 7 August for instance, the air freight lift for 21 Army Group was increased from 12 to 25 tons per day.

With the crossing of the SEINE airlift became all important and HQ 21 Army Group made a bid for the pre-planned airlift of 1,000 tons per day. During the week ending 9 September 1,600 tons of petrol and 300 tons of supplies were delivered to the AMIENS, VITRY and DOUAI group of airfields.

The next week priority was switched to ammunition and 2,200 tons were delivered together with some 800 tons of POL and 300 tons of supplies.

These airfields were soon found to be too far behind the front line to serve their full purpose and so within two days of the liberation of BRUSSELS three airfields, EVERE, MELSBROEK and GRINDBERGHEN were put into operation even before Second Army had time to establish a roadhead in that area.

Subsequently with the exception of approximately 2,400 tons of bulk petrol delivered by bomber aircraft to the airfield at LILLE the entire lift of stores was brought in through EVERE.

During a period of five weeks at this time, this airfield handled 18,000 tons of freight making an average of between 400 and 500 tons per day, not counting any allowance for non-flying days which occurred two or three times each week.

EFFECT OF OPERATION MARKET GARDEN

Operation MARKET GARDEN had to commence for operational reasons at a time when the administrative resources were barely able to support it.

The estimates of rail and other capacities had proved too optimistic with the result that although it was supported with the major administrative requirements i.e.—rations, petrol and ammunition, this was only achieved at the expense of ordnance and other stores for Second Army and of the build-up for First Canadian Army.

The situation, therefore, was that in spite of the opening of the port of OSTEND and the increase in the capacity of DIEPPE, this operation meant that a considerable back-log of ordnance stores and other items of equipment had to be made up if the formations were to have sufficient reserves to be restored to full fighting efficiency on its conclusion.

Summing Up of Maintenance Problems

From the foregoing it will be seen, therefore, that throughout this second phase there was no anxiety as to the availability of supplies. Decisions were made in fact, temporarily to restrict the "ow of them, into the theatre.

The crucial problem was how to get them up to the fighting formations and to keep pace with the Tremendously rapid rate of advance.

Transport was the big “Q” headache during the months of August and September and all the major decisions such as the restriction of imports, the grounding of formations and the setting up of TRANCO were made with a view to providing the necessary lift to sustain the momentum of the pursuit and to ensure that the BRITISH advance never faltered for lack of any commodity.

Equipment

During this phase the conversion of the seven 105 mm self-propelled field regiments in 21 Army Group to 25 pr regiments was completed in a re-organisation centre set up in 17 AOD.

Conversion would have taken place in any case as these 105 mm guns were primarily intended for the assault period, but it was made the more necessary because of an acute shortage of 105 mm ammunition provided from AMERICAN sources.

First Canadian Army made good use of the hulls of these vehicles and equipped the first Armoured Personnel Carrier regiment to be formed in EUROPE with these modified hulls within five days, in time to be of great use during the FALAISE battle.

The break-up of 59 Infantry Division threw up a large amount of equipment which was handed into 14 AOD under 59 Division arrangements, “A” and “B” vehicles, guns etc., being put through workshops before being taken into stock.

On 12 August the decision was taken to set up the 21 Army Group Modification Committee, consisting of representatives from (G)SD, Q(AE), Ord, REME, WTSFF, AFV(Tech) and AD(Mech), to assess the relative importance of authorised or proposed modifications to equipment, and to allot priorities, so that the best possible use could be made of workshop facilities in carrying out the necessary work.

The issue of equipment to allied liberated manpower now began in earnest as allied units were much needed for internal security on the L of C and other tasks.

A small advance section of the Q(AE) Statistics branch had arrived in NORMANDY on 8 July but the main body of this branch landed on 13 August and proceeded to VAUCELLES. The mobile Hollerith machinery (see Appendix “Q”) was installed in deep pits protected from air attack.

The weekly AFV return had been functioning efficiently since 29 July and on 22 August the “A” Vehicle Census Record was completely mechanised on the Hollerith.

Operation MARKET GARDEN

This operation, which was really a combination of two, merits special mention for three reasons; 

Firstly that it was undertaken at a time when the administrative resources of Second Army were strained to the utmost, but the administrative risk involved was considered to be worth the tactical advantage that might be gained ;

Secondly it was the first large-scale operation by airborne troops in front of forces already established on the ground in an attempt to secure a large slice of enemy-held territory to which the advancing ground troops could come up to re-organise;

Thirdly two US airborne divisions were involved as well as 1 British Airborne Division.The airborne part of the operation was entitled operation MARKET while that of the ground forces was operation GARDEN for which 30 Corps was made responsible.

BUILD-UP

In the middle of September stocks in No. 6 Army Roadhead were not only low but the roadhead itself was too far behind and suffered from the dis-advantage of having BRUSSELS interposed between it and the forward troops.

As already stated, the lines of communication to the RMA at BAYEUX were stretched. to the limit. It would have been desirable to have had a pause in order to reestablish the administration of both Second Army and First Canadian Army on a sound footing. However, no such pause was possible if operation MARKET GARDEN was to be launched successfully before the enemy had fully recovered from the effects of their retreat.

The administrative build-up was not helped by the fact that the operation involved heavy bridging commitments which meant that in addition to the bridging companies which had to be transported forward it was necessary to make available nearly eight hundred three-ton vehicles to assist in lifting forward bridging equipment from the RMA.

This involved six and ten-ton lorries being employed on lifting supplies and other uneconomical loads for such vehicles. However, part of a fast road convoy designated “Red Ball” was made available by US forces to bring five hundred tons daily into No. 6 Army Roadhead.

The main delivery from this method consisted of MT 80 and special requirements of ammunition and stores for 82 and 101 US Airborne Divisions. Tank transporters modified for load carrying were also successfully employed and actually, in the eight weeks commencing on 14 September, they lifted a total of 22,450 tons over a distance of 194,000 loaded miles.

These methods in conjunction with the air lift mentioned in para 6 proved successful in mitigating the administrative dificulties of the operation.

MAINTENANCE OF US FORCES

82 and 101 US Airborne Divisions were maintained from BRITISH stocks as far as common user items were concerned e g. POL and supplies, although later US rations were obtained and issued.

Non common user items such as ammunition, ordnance, signal and engineer stores were delivered from Communication Zone in daily packs either by the “Red Ball” route or by rail to No. 6 Army Roadhead whence they were lifted to 61 FMC at BOURG LEOPOLD.

GENERAL MAINTENANCE

Until 16 September all formations and corps troops under command 30 Corps were based on 160 FMC in the BRUSSELS area while ammunition was drawn from No. 6 Army Roadhead.

On 17 September 161 FMC was to be opened in the BOURG LEOPOLD area for the maintenance of the US airborne divisions, corps troops and the seaborne element of 52 Division.

It was planned to open 162 FMC in the ARNHEM area on D+3 for the main tenance of Guards Armoured Division, 43 and 50 Divisions, 1 Airborne Division, 8 Armoured Brigade and corps troops forward of the river WAAL. The maintenance of corps, army and GHQ RE attached to divisions was the responsibility of the divisions concerned.

With the exception of Guards Armoured Division who were ordered to hold eight days’ supplies and two hundred miles of POL and all corps troops who were restricted to four days’ supplies and one hundred and fifty miles of POL, all the formations within 30 Corps were to hold six days’ supplies and two hundred and fifty miles of POL per vehicle.

They were also Ordered to carry double second line holdings of 2-5 pr ammunition but were warned that after that they might have to carry on with depleted second line holdings due to shortage of stocks.

MAINTENANCE OF AIRBORNE TROOPS

The airborne formations were to be maintained by air from D to D+5 but plans were also made for maintenance in an emergency of 82 and 101 US Airborne Divisions from 161 FMC with effect from D-day and of 1 Airborne Division from 162 FMC with effect from D+3.

In the event of extreme emergency first Allied Airborne Army were prepared to land one hundred and fifty tons of US ammunition at BRUSSELS airport which would then be carried forward to the US formations by road.

TRANSPORT

Owing to lack of army transport still stretched to the limit along the L of C, 30 Corps were made responsible for their own third line transport lift from the roadhead to FMCs.

This extra responsibility was partially met by ordering first and second line transport of the seaborne element of 52 Division to dump its commodities and G.1098 equipment, thereby providing eight platoons of transport lift.

All troop carrying transport less DUKWS was ordered to revert to 30 Corps control after transporting formations to their areas.

Each division was also ordered to be prepared to accept corps tasks for five platoons of transport for an indefinite period.

In addition to the above four US truck companies had been ordered to report by 18 September to 161 FMC whence they would be used to deliver commodities to US airborne divisions.

MEDICAL

An interesting point to note is that in addition to the normal medical arrangements on a corps level the help of the DUTCH civilian authorities was obtained through the medium of Prince Bernhardt.

Evacuation from divisional medical units was to be initially to civilian installations at BOURG LEOPOLD and later to CCSs to be established at ARNHEM and NIJMEGEN.

For airborne units evacuation was to be initially into field ambulances of 30 Corps or direct to the CCSs mentioned above, while 9 Troop Carrier Command prepared to evacuate up to 750 casualties daily from BRUSSELS on the return journeys from supply missions.

Medical supplies for airborne troops were to be dropped until D+4 inclusive.

ORDNANCE

Ordnance stores were received by both road and air, and arrangements were made for maximum loads to be forwarded to divisional, armoured and infantry Ordnance sub parks.

These sub parks were attached to their formations and supplemented the tank and MT spares position. Arrangements were made for delivery by air of urgent demands such as MT spares, wireless valves etc.

In addition, approximately one hundred tons of ordnance stores were landed at BAYEUX in three “bricks” each of about thirty-four tons. The critical transport situation delayed the arrival of these “bricks” in the Operational area, but at least one was expected by D-day.

REME

For repair work not more than one brigade workshop was to move with each formation but certain formation workshops were to remain on wheels while the remainder stayed in existing locations.

The principle for recovery was that all casualties were to be removed from the road for forward recovery only.

The APM 30 Corps was allotted two light recovery sections for work at traffic control posts.

THE MOVEMENT PROBLEM

The movement problem for 30 Corps was a very difficult one as it involved the tactical movement of approximately 20,000 vehicles across HOLLAND along one route supplemented by a subsidiary route. This subsidiary route did not avoid bottlenecks and so was not a complete second route.

Quite clearly the whole essence of the success of the operation lay in an efficient traffic control organisation and good march discipline.

Traffic control was exercised through three regulating HQs each of which controlled three traffic control posts with wireless communications between the TCPs and the regulating HQ.

The importance of speed in the advance was impressed on all ranks. It was laid down that movement would take place by day only.

Formations and units would harbour along the road each night retaining their order of priority. They would be fed into the axis as road space became available. For the first forty-eight hours rearward movement was to be restricted to an absolute minimum.

THE OPERATION

D-day was 17 September and the automatic drop for all formations of the airborne corps was successfully carried out.

On 18 September, however, maintenance by air of 1 British Airborne Division was not successful owing to intense enemy flak making the dropping inaccurate.

82 US Airborne Division was successfully supplied while 101 US Airborne Division had taken with them sufficient supplies and ammunition for the first forty-eight hours.

By 20 September the US truck companies had arrived. All three airborne divisions continued to be maintained by air although not adequately due to inaccurate dropping as a result of heavy flak and misty weather.

On 21 September it was obviously operationally impossible to establish 162 FMC in the area of ARNHEM and so an alternative site was chosen in the GRAVE area.

During this day the L of C was cut by the enemy but luckily a large GERMAN supply dump was captured at OSS and this proved of great value.

On 22 September the maintenance lift for 82 US Airborne Division was held up owing to the “cut” across the L of C but the lift to 101 US Airborne Division arrived successfully.

The L of C was cleared on 23 September and the lift was then delivered to 82 US Airborne Division. Four platoons carrying POL which had been held up until the L of C was clear and seven ammunition platoons were despatched to stock 162 FMC at GRAVE.

10 CCS was established at NIJMEGEN as also was 3 CCS which had been originally scheduled for ARNHEM.

163 Field Ambulance moved forward to DRIEL (6875) to evacuate airborne casualties in DUKWS over the River NEDERRIJN.

The L of C was again cut on 24 September and three of the ammunition platoons despatched the previous night failed to reach 162 FMC while the other four were prevented from returning.

A Gilbertian situation occurred on this day at the GERMAN supply dump at OSS as the second line RASC company of 8 Armoured Brigade took seventy-five prisoners of war from enemy elements they routed whom they discovered trying to use the dump at the same time as they were.

As forward maintenance was proving impossible, all available transport resources were concentrated on the task of building up stocks in 161 FMC.

The L of C to GRAVE was eventually restored on the evening of 25 September but by this time it had been decided to withdraw 1 British Airborne Division and the operation came to a halt.

The total number of prisoners of War captured during the period was, officers-26, ORs-1,040.

L of C Aspect

During the period in the bridgehead and until the armies had crossed the SEINE, the organisation of the L of C remained largely unchanged from the original layout. There were, however, one or two minor alterations involving local administrative changes of L of C formations.

On 31 July HQ L of C assumed responsibility for the control of CAEN through 7 Base Sub Area, which relieved 101 Beach Sub Area there.

On 3 August, 10 Garrison at PORT EN BESSIN was relieved by 101 Beach Sub Area and reverted to under command Second Army.

By the end of August, 102 Beach Sub Area became 6 L of C Sub Area and on 28 August 12 L of C Area took over direct responsibility for CAEN from 7 Base Sub Area.

Meanwhile preparations were being made for establishing the advance base in the area NORTH of the SEINE and 7 and 8 Base Sub Areas were standing by ready to implement at the earliest opportunity the original plan whereby they would administer the SEINE ports under HQ L of C.

It became apparent, however, after the crossing of the SEINE and the rapid advance into BELGIUM, that the L of C would be stretched to its utmost and that the advance base would be established in the area of ANTWERP and BRUSSELS and not in the area of LE HAVRE.

As a result many changes were effected on 2 September 12 L of C Area took over from 11 L of C Area administrative control of all L of C formations in the bridgehead and subsequently assumed responsibility of all territory SOUTH of the SEINE within the boundaries of 21 Army Group; on 3 September 11 L of C Area moved forward to AMIENS and took over administrative control of the BRITISH sector of FRANCE NORTH of the SEINE to the FRANCO-BELGIAN frontier.

This territory was divided into two departments, SEINE.

INFERIEURE and PAS DE CALAIS, which were administered by 6 and 15 L of C Sub Areas respectively meanwhile 7 and 8 Base Sub Areas had moved into BELGIUM and were responsible for ANTWERP and OSTEND respectively, whilst 4 L of C Sub Area administered the area of BRUSSELS.

Movement Problems

A considerable amount of the work achieved by Q(Mov) HQ 21 Army Group during this phase is contained in this chapter in paras 4, 5 and 6 while the Work of the Transportation Service is described in para 13.

When the army rear boundary was established on 23 July a clearer division of the Movements staff became possible. In addition to the Movements staffs at the various HQ concerned, Movement Control staffs were allocated to army roadheads to act as the equivalent of RTOs in the depot areas and to the RMA where they performed similar functions in the base.

There were also Movement Control staffs in the various beach sub areas, transhipment areas and transit camps. Traffic offices were established at both army roadheads and at HQ L of C.

MOVES or staffs

Towards the end of August it was clear that Rear HQ 21 Army Group would not be able to move for some considerable time and therefore control of the L of C would be very difficult if it became greatly extended. An advanced echelon of Q(Mov) was therefore planned to move to the ROUEN area and at the same time preparations Were made for RTO staffs for forward railheads and for a party for PARIS, should traffic be diverted that way.

The advanced echelon was established in ROUEN on 31 August but during the first week in September it moved to AMIENS with a tentacle at LILLE to help in the handover from the FRENCH to the BELGIAN railway operating authorities.

When 11 L of C Area HQ with its movement staff was brought up to AMIENS this advanced echelon moved on to BRUSSELS.

Thus, in mid-September movement in the area SOUTH of the SEINE was controlled by 12 L of C Area up to the railheads in the area NORTH of the SEINE within FRANCE it was controlled by 11 L of C Area in conjunction with the FRENCH railway officials at AMIENS, while in the area in BELGIUM it was controlled by 21 Army Group Movements staff in BRUSSELS in conjunction with the SNCB.

11 L of C Area was also made responsible for rail movement out of DIEPPE.

Port Executive Committees for LE HAVRE, DIEPPE and the Channel ports were set up before the advance and the necessary naval and sea transport personnel and reconnaissance parties mobilised.

They went forward with the armies to enter each port as soon as possible. These port parties were made available by the fact that, with the reduction in stores import, it was possible to start considering the closing of the beaches and thereby reduce the staffs at ARROMANCHES and CAEN.

One Transport Airfield Detachment RAF moved forward with each army complete with a Movements staff. With the establishment of a transport airfield at AMIENS a chain of transport airfields ran from the RMA to BRUSSELS.

The first MFO Port Depot was established at ARROMANCHES in the beginning of this phase and early in August a MFO depot was opened in the RMA.

On 2 September special MFO detachments were stationed at army and corps HQS and in mid-September the MFO main depot was moved to DIEPPE.

BEACHES AND PORTS

Control of the beach and port areas was re-organised. The PMLO for JUNO now controlled the port of COURSEULLES and the bulk of the beaches while the port commandant at ARROMANCHES controlled MULBERRY B, PORT EN BESSIN, and a portion of the GOLD beaches at the eastern end of MULBERRY.

No development of the beaches took place and work was confined to their maintenance. Enemy activity particularly against the JUNO area continued from long range guns until the capture of LISIEUX by First Canadian Army.

The transhipment areas were re-organised and transportation officers placed in charge of the actual transhipment and handling of labour while RASC officers were responsible for the handling of transport, the whole area being controlled under the port superintendent, by Transportation with Movements assistance.

CAEN

Work on minesweeping began at OUISTREHAM on 21 August but the development of the installations in the port of CAEN had started about a fortnight earlier.It was assumed that CAEN would be a major bulk coal port (up to 1,500 tons a day) and would handle up to 5,000 tons of dry cargo in addition. It soon became clear,however, that this full scale development of CAEN would be unnecessary so personnel and equipment were released for the development of ports further NORTH. The CAEN-OUISTREHAM canal was cleared on 3 September and two colliers began to discharge in CAEN on the same day.

ARROMANCHES

On 30 August the first LSI was berthed at the LST pier at ARROMANCHES and a trial was later successfully carried out to see whether a hospital carrier could berthalongside this pier.

Preparations were immediately made to use this means of casualty evacuation whenever possible.

DIEPPE

The enemy’s plans for demolishing DIEPPE went awry and it was possible to open the port within five days of its capture. The first coasters arrived on 7 September and the daily capacity of the port reached between six and seven thousand tons by the end of the month.

LE HAVRE

As already stated, this was captured on 12 September and almost immediately allotted to the US Army by SHAEF. As had been anticipated, the port was badly demolished and it was never necessary for the BRITISH to use it. The port parties scheduled for LE HAVRE had already been switched to ANTWERP.

OSTEND

This port was captured partly demolished on 9 September but was expected to be open within three weeks, after a certain amount of mine clearance and the removal of a block of sunken shipping at the entrance to its harbour.

As stated in para 6 (a) of this chapter, BOULOGNE and CALAIS were not opened during this phase.

RAILWAYS

Train ferry terminals for rail-fitted LST and “Zeebrugge” and “Twickenham” type ferries were constructed at CHERBOURG by 4 August. The programme for supply of locomotives and wagons had been worked out in advance and the War Office allotted the ferries according to it.

The use of LST for wagon ferrying meant a reduction in the shuttle service and in the facilities available for evacuation.

Evacuation of casualties, however, was now proceeding smoothly by hospital carrier and air and the evacuation of PW was reduced when the decision to use them for labour in the base area was taken.

By 17 August rail lines from CAEN to BAYEUX and CAEN to COURSEULLES were opened after the bridge at CAEN over the River ORNE had been constructed.

By 1 September a single line had been opened from CAEN to ARGENTAN via MEZIDON.

After the capture of BRUSSELS a through rail route from just EAST of ROUEN to the area of BRUSSELS was found nearly intact, although it included a long single line stretch from AMIENS to ARRAS via DOULLENS.

Work was immediately started by the FRENCH, assisted by transportation troops, on a bridge over the SOMME at AMIENS the lack of which was the cause of the break in the double line.

The line from DIEPPE to the main route through AMIENS was ready by 6 September which was the day before the first coaster discharged in that port. It was decided to construct a train ferry terminal for “Zeebrugge” type ferries at DIEPPE in order to avoid having to import locomotives from the area WEST of the SEINE rail break.

A new single line low-level bridge across the SEINE at LE MANOIR was completed by 22 September.

Both FRENCH and BELGIAN railway men were anxious to help in every way possible. The BELGIAN railways were in better condition and their central control in BRUSSELS was in full operation as except for the eastern portion of BELGIUM, the GERMANS were clear of the country.

The stock of locomotives was very meagre, however, and a number of captured locomotives and wagons were inaccessible due to rail cuts. It was agreed that the area SOUTH of the SEINE should be operated by the military owing to the poor condition of the track and signalling apparatus while the area NORTH of the SEINE should be operated by the local railway authorities.

With the increase in length of the BRITISH rail operated L of C the priority hitherto given to the US for imported locos and rail stock had to be reversed as the BRITISH had insufficient locos SOUTH of the SEINE to maintain the L of C from the RMA. A transfer of locomotives from US to BRITISH control was arranged.

STORES

Until the cut in imports was ordered the average discharge of stores of all kinds varied between thirteen thousand and nineteen thousand tons per day, depending on the weather, the availability of coasters and the handling of ferry craft.

On 14 August the millionth ton of stores was landed of which just under one third had been discharged at the artificial port.

Up to this time in view of the urgency for delivery there had been little attempt to record the movement of stores once they had been landed. It was now decided that convoy notes for lorry drivers would be instituted which enabled the turnround of the lorries and the general flow of stores to be checked.

Details of the loads were in broad terms except for pilferable cargoes which in addition to the details on the convoy notes, were on occasions specially guarded.

IWT

As soon as the armies reached BELGIUM there was an immediate request for information on the canal systems. Due to a shortage of staff the reconnaissance of the canals took a considerable time but it was clear that IWT would shortly become a major factor in the clearance of stores and that an increase of both Movements and Transportation staffs would be required for this purpose.

RE Works

The transition from the semi-static period in the bridgehead to full mobility across FRANCE and BELGIUM produced many problems for the Works Directorate.

In addition to the continued responsibility for works services in the areas behind the rear army boundaries large quantities of bridging stores had to be moved through ports and depots ; airfields, roads and pipelines and to be planned and constructed, bridges lifted and forestry work begun.

GENERAL

Early in September HQ 11 L of C Area with 5 CE Works attached took over control of the area between the SEINE and rear army boundaries, while 12 L of C Area with 4 CE Works attached assumed responsibility for the whole BRITISH area SOUTH of the SEINE.

This re-organisation involved the moves of several units, some of which, such as airfield construction units, were not fully mobile, but all the moves were accomplished in time to meet their expanding commitments.

In August the import of engineer stores steadily increased to a total of 90,500 tons but as stated earlier in this phase imports during the following month were drastically cut.

The constantly changing tactical situation resulted in heavy demands for certain types of stores such as bridging and oil stores and these had to be imported at the expense of normal maintenance supplies. Some idea of the volume of work can be gathered from the fact that 5 ESBD handled 4,015 tons in one day in August.

Fortunately, a considerable quantity of enemy engineer stores was captured, especially in the BRUSSELS area and the majority of this booty consisted of constructional stores as well as a good supply of machinery and electrical apparatus.

With the opening of CAEN and DIEPPE in September and the abandonment to 21 Army Group by armies of engineer stores dumps in the rear areas that they evacuated, another ESBD was required to take over the stores transit depot at DIEPPE and to establish an ESBD in the area of BRUSSELS.

Despite the considerable difficulties of maintaining contact with the stores representatives of the armies, an even flow of bridging and other operational stores was maintained and no hold-ups or shortages were experienced during the advance.

ROADS AND BRIDGES

With the enlargement of the bridgehead and consequent reduction in density of traffic, road maintenance became very much easier to accomplish.

Work proceeded in accordance with the final plan for the RMA and a new class 70 bridge was erected over the River ORNE, but the progress of the armies, coupled with demolitions by the enemy created an immense demand for bridging material in the forward areas.

To meet this as many bridges as possible on the minor roads in the L of C were dismantled and subsequently re-issued to armies.In all, nearly three thousand tons of bridging was recovered by this means. It Was also decided to maintain only two of the four main forward routes.

These were as follows:—

Class 70 route BAYEUX—CAEN—LISIEUX—EVREUX—PACY—MANTES (with class 40 branches to ELBEUF—PONT DE L’ARCHE~LES ANDELYS and VERNON).

Class 40 route BAYEUX—DOUVRES—TROARN~PONT L’EVEQUE—ROUEN.

A class 70 road from NANTES—GASSICOURT which had a class 70 Bailey bridge on barges spanning the SEIN E was continued via BEAUVAIS, AMIENS, ALBERT, ARRAS, DOUAI, TOURNAI, LEUZE and HAL to BRUSSELS.

The route via VALENCIENNES in the US area was used during the construction of the class 70 Bailey bridge at TOURNAI and the BRITISH army had right of way on this route. Across the SEINE class 40 bridges were completed and maintained at ROUEN, ELBEUF (two), PONT DE L’ARCHE, LES ANDELYS and VERNON (two).

With the exception of the bridge at ROUEN which used existing piers of a demolished bridge, all these were Bailey bridges on pontoons.

In September another class 40 dry Bailey bridge was erected at ROUEN. Altogether the number of bridges being maintained at the end of September on the L of O was 135 Bailey bridges and 21 of improvised types.

AIRFIELDS

The construction and maintenance of airfields became a serious problem during this phase. AGsRE moved forward with the armies and it was only by maintaining close liaison that it was possible to ensure that maintenance apparatus was moved up to the airfields in time to be of use.

In some cases airfields were constructed and occupied but were discovered almost at once to be of little operational value as the armies had advanced out of range of fighter aircraft.

On the whole it was found that repairing captured enemy airfields, even though they had cratered concrete runways, was more satisfactory than trying hastily to construct new airfields by laying surfacing materials on unused ground. Dust continued to be a nuisance but by spraying a mixture of naval fuel oil and diesel oil it was largely abated.

By the end of August twenty-three airfields were in use, ten of which had runways made with SMT, two with PBS, two with repaired concrete and nine without any special runway material. Only one permanent airfield was required—at CAPRICE.

Three more airfield construction wings RAF arrived in the theatre and it was decided not to bring in a fourth. Some of the wings were temporarily employed on road construction work in addition to the maintenance and construction of airfields.

BULK PETROL INSTALLATIONS

In August and September a total of approximately 152,500 tons of bulk spirit was received and 110,900 tons issued. The total distance of the pipeline laid was approximately 360 miles, carrying 7,500 tons within its length in addition to tankage capacity amounting to 53,000 tons.

By the end of September the following RE work had been completed :—

PORT EN BESSIN

• Storage for 11,000 tons of MT fuel and 4,000 tons of aviation spirit.
• Eight inside berths were in operation and cross-connected.
• One six-inch pipeline was laid to CHERBOURG, a distance of sixty miles with intermediate pumping stations each with 1,200 tons storage at CHERBOURG, MONTESBOURG and ISIGNY.
• One six-inch pipeline was laid to COLOMBES (fifteen miles) in order to provide aviation spirit. Filling arrangements were completed at seven airfields.

MAIN PIPELINES

One of the three six-inch pipelines laid from PORT EN BESSIN to BLARY, a distance of nine miles, was extended to J URIGNY (seven miles) where 4,800 tons of MT storage was installed with jerrican and road tanker filling points, and two were continued to DARNETAL near ROUEN a further 107 miles and across the SEINE. Here a 600 ton tank was installed and rail and road filling points completed. This was extended by one six-inch pipeline to FORGETTES (four miles) where 600 tons storage and a can filling point were provided.

At PETIT COURONNES, SOUTH of the SEINE, the system was connected into rehabilitated tanks of 10,000 tons capacity.

Intermediate storage tanks were established at:

• BRONAY 8,400 tons
• BILLY . 2,400 tons
• LISIEUX 2,400 tons
• BRIONNE 2,400 tons

Booster pumping stations were also installed at the last three places mentioned and at PETIT COURONN ES.

QUARRIES

Until the end of August lack of equipment seriously hampered the work of the five quarrying companies. Quarries were being operated at LE TRON QUAY, CAEN, FALAISE and LOUVIERS and all quarry operations came under direct control of the Director of Works.

An average of 7,000 cubic yards per day of road material was being produced at the end of this phase.

WATER

Water had to be supplied to all hospitals, PW camps, convalescent depots, NAAFI institutions and laundries etc.

Nine boreholes were successfully sunk yielding an aggregate of 36,000 gallons per hour.

14 AOD in the RLVIA was supplied from a civilian well.

The water for CAEN came from the springs at MOULINES, but extensive repairs had to be carried out to the main between BRETTEVILLE SUB L’AIZE and TILLY LE CAMPAGNE where the reservoir also had to be repaired.

A temporary supply of water for locomotives at CAEN railway station was provided from a well until the main system was repaired.

ELECTRICITY AND COLD STORAGE

In August it became clear that an organisation to repair and operate large power stations for military purposes in towns and ports was essential.

The establishment for this was approved on 16 September and known as 163 CRE (Power).

CAEN power station was brought into operation on 20 September and provided electricity for the operation of port cranes, capstans, industrial plants and depots in the RMA.

In addition to erecting fifteen ten-ton refrigerating plants at ARROMANCHES, the existing refrigeration plant at CAMBES, near CAEN, was utilised after a generating set and the necessary refrigerant and chemicals had been installed.

At OSTEND and ANTWERP cold storage facilities sufficient for 21 Army Group needs were found to be available and were hired, the supply of refrigerants and fuel etc. being a military commitment.

FORESTRY

HQ 8 Canadian Forestry District with five CANADIAN forestry companies and commanding two forestry companies RE was operating during this phase.

The CANADIAN companies were located in the forest of CERISY in the US zone and the RE companies in the areas SOUTH of BAYEUX and CAEN. 24,000 tons of sawn timber, piling, poles and pickets were made in addition to 15,000 tons of firewood.

WINTERISATION

At the end of July HQ 21 Army Group called for the requirements for winterisation of depots and roads in order to enable them to function throughout the winter.

The principles were as follows:-

• Essential hutting should be provided for storage.
• Minimum scales of hutting for living accommodation for personnel to be provided.
• Hutting should be provided for hospitals, depots, HQ and NAAFI’s. Messing arrangements etc. would be under canvas.

This produced the following requirements :-

• Hard standings - 1,109,000 sq ft
• Covered storage - 3,093,400 sq ft
• Hutting - 3,353,425 sq ft
• Roads within depots - 204 miles

By 22 August, however, it was seen that the advance was going so well that except for 14 AOD, winterisation would not be carried out as it was anticipated that the advance base would shortly be developed in the LE HAVRE—ROUEN area.

In mid-September a modified winterisation programme was approved. It was decided to winterise only two hospitals and such other essential installations as would remain in the RMA even after the establishment of the advance base which was now to be in the area of BRUSSELS.

To help in this the issue of one thousand Nissen huts was authorised and arrangements were made for the forestry companies to provide floors for them from local timber resources.

Transportation

Until the middle of August there was no great change in the activities of the Tn Service as unloading continued across the beaches and through MULBERRY and the small ports in the beach head in preparation for the expected advance NORTH.

But when the break-through to the SEINE took place, followed by the advance through FRANCE and BELGIUM into HOLLAND, Tn were faced with two big problems.

• Firstly, a long rail L of C from the RMA across the SEINE forward into HOLLAND had to be organised, and
• Secondly, in order to shorten the L of C and bring supplies by a shorter route through ports that would be able to operate right through the Winter, the Channel ports had to be opened.By the end of September both these tasks had been successfully tackled and a rail L of C existed from the RMA right through to EINDHOVEN.

The port of DIEPPE was open and the ports of OSTEND, BOULOGNE and ANTWERP were being made ready to accept shipping, although the use of ANTWERP depended on clearing the SCHELDT estuary of hostile elements.

The development of the rail L of C focused from the very start on the development of CAEN which had to become the main traffic and locomotive centre in spite of the damage that had been sustained there.

Energetic action had to be taken to repair yards, sidings, workshops and locomotive sheds, communications and signals. This was followed by the opening of the railway line to SERQUIGNY and to the SEINE and later railway construction troops were spread out all along the line to SERQUEUX and forward into BELGIUM. For this four railway construction and maintenance groups and fourteen railway construction companies had been brought over into the beach-head in readiness.

Throughout North-East FRANCE bomb damage at rail centres had been extensive and had been combined with serious demolition SOUTH of the SEINE, although NORTH of the river the demolitions were less widespread. A large number of bridges were down in the BRITISH zone in FRANCE and damage to installations and track was heavy.

The problem, from a 21 Army Group point of view, was a dual one. In the first place the most profitable route for repair had to be selected and in the second place the actual work of repair had to be organised utilising BRITISH resources and manpower and whatever assistance could be obtained from the FRENCH and BELGIANS.

The first part of the problem involved the use of a very wide range reconnaissance which was found extremely difficult to control and coordinate owing to the extremely bad communications and also to the acute shortage of transport.

It was decided, owing to the destruction of all bridges across the SEINE, to establish railheads SOUTH of the river with a road link across the river and railtails somewhere NORTH of the river. This system was a makeshift to close the gap until the SEINE bridge at LE MAN OIR was constructed on 22 September.

This bridge although 520 ft long was successfully completed in fourteen days. Two main bridges were also down across the SOMME, but it was found possible to bypass this damage by a diversion at DOULLENS.

Apart from this it was possible to get the L of C completed right through to BRUSSELS with the exception of a major bridge at HAL which was reconstructed by the BELGIANS.

In spite of the efforts of the railway operating organisation it was not until the end of September that the railways of FRANCE and BELGIUM began to show signs of settling down to provide any kind of reliable service. Communications were bad, particularly in the AMIENS arrondissement but after very close collaboration with the SN CF and the SNCB, the main trunk links and control circuits were nearly completed by the railway signals staff by the end of September.

The operating service was short of stock and locomotives due to an inadequate allocation of the engines being imported on allied account through CHERBOURG, but this problem had been gradually solved by the end of September.

The opening of the DIEPPE train ferry on 29 September finally overcame the problem of locomotive shortage, since locomotives for BRITISH use could thereafter be delivered direct to the BRITISH sector in accordance with a prearranged programme.

Amongst the most awkward of problems was that of coal, all of which was being imported from the UK principally via CAEN and CHERBOURG, and the coal traffic required for moving trains NORTH of the SEINE was taking up paths across the SEINE which could ill be spared.

Every effort was being made towards the end of September to arrange for coal to be provided from FRENCH sources in the mining area of the NORTH.

To tackle the problem of organising a rail L of C which was operated entirely by BRITISH troops in some sectors, by FRENCH and BRITISH in another and entirely by FRENCH and BELGIAN personnel elsewhere, great flexibility of organisation was essential.

It was found necessary by mid-September to drop the standard railway operating group and railway unit organisation in the area SOUTH of the SEINE and to set up a divisional superintendent’s office at CAEN.

At the same time the head of the railway branch left BAYEUX, where HQ 21 Army Group Rear remained, and went forward to ROUEN Where it could maintain some contact with TRAN CO. ROUEN had been selected as the base from which to send out the necessary railway construction reconnaissances and it was also suitable for the central control of railway operating.

Nevertheless it was soon found that it was necessary to have a railway operating headquarters further forward and a group HQ moved to AMIENS. As soon as BRUSSELS fell a railway staff was set up alongside the SNCB in that city.

In the area SOUTH of the SEINE the actual operating itself was complicated and difficult as it was a very bad section of line to work, so that at times it was not possible to attain the agreed programme.

The following are some of the particular difficulties encountered ;

first, a spate of rail breaks between CAEN and MEZIDON which was due to the effects of shelling ;second, accentuation of traffic-working difficulties by engine failures and hot axleboxes, particularly on the US double-headed through trains ; third, there was congestion in the CAEN yard and in the RMA area due to limited siding capacity, loading points and depots ;fourth, there was a shortage of engine power due particularly to insufficient numbers of BRITISH eocomotives and insufficient shed facilities to handle the locomotives at CAEN.NORTH of the SEINE, however, apart from the problems of water supply and repair of lines, the greatest difficulty encountered was that of re-organising the railway operating service in collaboration with the FRENCH and later with the BELGIANS.

Though the railway operating units could be used for this type of work they had been designed to operate railways rather than to assist others to do so, and their organisation was not altogether suitable for the latter task.

The second half of the problem on the Tn side was to develop the Channel ports as quickly as possible and thus relieve the strain on the L of C. It was not possible to open up CAEN as a port until the end of August, but other facilities were found to be adequate and, as a precaution, work continued on the winterisation of MULBERRY.

Preparations were made well in advance for opening each of the ports as they were captured. Reconnaissance parties were sent forward together with Royal Naval parties, the port commandant and sub-area representatives. They took with them a basic key plan to work from and were ordered to produce a final plan for the complete development of each port. For this Work the port construction and repair groups and port operating groups were utilised.

Representatives of 21 Army Group kept in closest contact with them in order to make the maximum possible use of facilities and resources at the disposal of 21 Army Group and to ensure that the planning of shipping and the shipping of stores could be modified to conform to the actual situation in each of the ports as they were captured.

The port of DIEPPE was captured on 2 September, by 7 September ships were being discharged there and by the end of the month a maximum of 7,200 tons in one day was being discharged and cleared by rail and road. The capture of BOULOGNE and OSTEND did not however provide two additional ports immediately as they were both in a very damaged state. All three ports were heavily demolished, blocked and mined, but in many cases demolitions were inexpertly and incompletely executed.

The factors which were most important in preventing these ports from opening quickly were mine clearance and the removal of block ships in the entrance. ANTWERP was taken by the end of the month but could not be operated because the SCHELDT was heavily mined and the GERMANS still occupied the river approaches.

The shortage of MT experienced by all in this phase had a very direct bearing on the administration and functioning of Tn units. With the advance most of the units had to change their location at least once if not twice and the movement of all these units with their impedimenta produced problems of the greatest complexity.

Not one of the Tn units was fully mobile and about 550 lorry and 100 transporter lifts additional to unit transport were required to move Tn units and equipment to the places where they were required to work.

Tn units could not, therefore, be moved with complete flexibility from place to place and in some cases were not able to get down to their Work as quickly as was desirable.

With the extension of the L of C from ARROMANCHES to EINDHOVEN the Tn Service became extremely difficult to control largely due to difficulties of communication.

On the move of HQ, 21 Army Group to BRUSSELS the DDTn (Ports) became directly responsible for the development of OSTEND and ANTWERP and through HQ 11 L of C Area for DIEPPE, LE TREPORT, BOULOGNE and CALAIS while MULBERRY B, PORT EN BESSIN, CAEN and OUISTREHAM continued to be developed under the supervision of HQ 12 L of C area.

The railways and stores organisations also moved to BRUSSELS leaving a divisional area organisation at AMIENS and a railway operating group at CAEN. The Tn Service was thus suitably disposed to prepare the build-up during the winter for the attack on GERMANY.

Postal

The most important aspect of this phase from the Postal point of view was the problem created by the rapid lengthening of the L of C.

Corps and divisional postal distribution centres moved forward sometimes at one and two day intervals and the maintenance of a regular daily service to and from the RMA presented many difficulties.

A postal service for units grounded at various points on the L of C and machinery for the disposal of mails of disbanded units and formations had also to be provided.

The establishment of so many APOs on the L of C led to a serious shortage of postal personnel.

This was to some extent alleviated by the employment of civilian labour on duties such as sorting of home-going mail which could not lead to breaches of security.

During the period there was a number of non-flying days due to bad weather, but in each case a double load of mails was successfully carried by the next day’s aircraft. In order, however, to provide for prolonged stoppages of flying, arrangements were made to transfer mails to surface routes as necessary.

The stage was eventually reached where a split of the air lift for mail became essential and separate lifts were devised for units of the rearward area and units of First Canadian and Second British Armies.

It was also possible in connection with this revision to arrange air transport of mails posted and due for delivery within the theatre.

On 10 September DIEPPE was adopted as a port of entry for mail for units in the forward area and from 25 September mail for units of the RMA was brought in at CAEN instead of ARROMANCHES (MULBERRY).

In conformity with the general administrative policy a decision was taken to move 8 Base APO to ANTWERP upon the freeing of the port, and this was completed by 26 September.

A rear element of 8 Base APO was left at CREPON to provide a base postal installation for the RMA, and the general area SOUTH and WEST of the River SEINE.

Supply and Transport

SUPPLIES

This phase of the operations in North-West EUROPE did not provide any major supply problems of a technical nature. The main problem experienced in common with all planning sections, was the difficulty of forecasting future operational moves due to the constantly changing tactical situation.

The FS bulk ration had almost entirely superseded Compo packs by 21 July and plans for fresh items to take the place of the tinned equivalents were in hand. In order to provide suitable cold storage for imported meat, insulated meat pits and ten-ton portable cold stores were constructed in the neighbourhood of ARROMANCHES.

The shipment of all fresh vegetables was successful, but required a great deal of detailed supervision in DIDs. The baking of bread was somewhat delayed due to the lack of sites with suitable water supplies, and also to delay in shipping the necessary equipment, but by 5 August bread was issued to nearly all troops.

Later it was impossible for bakeries with the armies to keep up with the advance and maintain their output at the same time.

In the case of the L of C, contracts were placed with civilian firms in order to ensure full scale provision of bread for all L of C troops.

The import of supplies was averaging about 2,600 tons per day and by 5 August stocks based on a feeding strength of 700,000 represented some twenty-seven days supply. These stocks were held in RMA EAST and WEST depots which were fifteen to twenty miles apart and were worked independently, each area being controlled initially by a CRASC Supply Units who was responsible for GHQ supply units including BSDs, DIDs, field butcheries and bakeries in his area.

This, however, proved too great a task and on 15 August CRASC 19 Supply Units took over responsibility for the field butcheries, bakeries and two DIDs which dealt exclusively with coal and fresh vegetables. This re-organisation effected a great improvement in both areas.

Early in August it was decided when making the bids for the period D+94 to D+103 that the tactical situation and the stocks on the ground justified the introduction of commodity loading in accordance with the original maintenance plan.

However, the greatly changed situation as the time for receipt of these supplies approached had strained the transport system to its limit. It was hoped, however, to relieve this by shipping the intake of maintenance through Channel ports and a last minute attempt was therefore made, in vain, to revert to balanced ration loadings for this period.

In point of fact failure to revert to the balanced ration system was of little onsequence as when the armies began their advance all drawing of fresh rations practically ceased, the major issues being Compo, except for captured stocks. A considerable quantity of the latter was available.

At OSS in HOLLAND 11,000,000 pounds of frozen beef and 850 tons of tinned meat were uncovered. 550 tons of meat were also found in the area of BRUSSELS, in addition to a large number of miscellaneous items which Were used in substitution for items in the BRITISH scale.

For five days Second Army subsisted on captured stocks without having to touch first, second or third line reserve holdings.

In the latter half of September all units in FRANCE received full daily issues of frozen meat from cold storage facilities at ROUEN and AMIENS.

Demands from armies for roadhead replenishments were based on a seven days cycle, armies submitting detailed breakdown demands with priorities two days before each period.

The aim was to deliver six days balanced rations and one days balancing items. This scheme was slow in getting into operation, mainly due to rail transport difficulties and the impossibility of reconciling receipts with despatches.

The problem of distribution began to be easier from 9 September when DIEPPE opened, becoming available as a base for First Canadian Army and a modest rail lift became operative to the SEINE railheads. During the critical period in the first fortnight of September, 600 tons were flown to the BRUSSELS area from UK for Second Army.

TRANSPORT

The build-up in the bridgehead had increased to such an extent since D-day that due to congestion on the roads certain transport units had been phased back. Early in August, however, these were again called forward in anticipation of a large scale advance.

On 6 August in response to a request from HQ 21 Army Group one three-ton and one six-ton GT Coy were loaned to the US armies for an agreed period of eight days.

Despite the fact that a third GT Coy was loaned, it was not possible to release these units until 4 September when the transport crisis on the BRITISH L of C was at its height. A DUKW company was also loaned to the AMERICANS for use on the UTAH beaches for six weeks.

From 22 August onwards more and more transport had to be provided to enable the armies to stock their roadheads. Although it had been originally planned to establish roadheads at distances of fifty to one hundred miles apart and to stock them up to maximum of five days holdings of all stores, this system had to be modified owing to the extreme rapidity of the advance. First Canadian Army economised in transport by setting up an advance section of No. 3 Roadhead, thirty miles further on near BOUGTHEROLDE.

As transport became available stocks in No. 3 Roadhead at LISIEUX were moved forward and this advance section became the base of the First Canadian Army up to the line of the SOMME. With the opening of DIEPPE the transport allotted to First Canadian Army from HQ 21 Army Group resources amounted to eight three-ton companies.

Second Army formed temporary “cushions”, the first of which was established South-West of FALAISE and preceded the opening of No. 4 Roadhead EAST of RUGLES.

On 19 August prior to the stocking of No. l Cushion, Second Army had six equivalent three-ton GT coys from GHQ resources under their command.

By 26 August this number had increase to fourteen and on 2 September, exclusive of two platoons of army tank transporters converted for load carrying, thirty-nine equivalent three-ten GT coys were under their command.

By the middle of September the BRITISH L of C had lengthened to three hundred miles, almost double the distance on which the allotment of transport to 21 Army Group had been calculated. Until the development of rail and port facilities, therefore, the road maintenance lift had to be increased by every possible means.

The decision to cut imports into the RMA to seven thousand tons per day already mentioned in para 5(b) released eight DUKW companies for conversion into normal GT coys and also a number of GT coys empoyed on beach clearance. At the end of September only three DUKVV companies remained as such, of which one was on loan to US Army.

In August Second Army followed the example of First Canadian Army and by welding on to each trailer at base and sides of airfield track converted a company of forty-ton tank transporters into load carriers. First Canadian Army had previously converted one platoon.

These modified transporters could lift sixteen and a half tons of supplies, thirty-six tons of ammunition, ten tons of POL or five hundred jerrycans, which meant a very considerable lift for a three platoon company.

An extra. lift of between five and six hundred to11s was added to the pool by bringing five GT coys up to their full WE and by the issue surplus to VVE, of an additional thirty three-ton reserve vehicles to each of four GT coys. In addition, one hundred and fifty-four 800 gallon tankers were issued early in September to supplement the seven bulk petrol transport companies employed on forward maintenance.

On 16 September eight US truck companies commenced to run from BAYEUX to BRUSSELS delivering five hundred tons of petrol per day.

On 20 September they were employed on the maintenance of the two US airborne divisions which took part in operation MARKET GARDEN.

Further assistance came from the release of AA RASC transport platoons and six platoons of twenty-nine and three platoons of twenty-two three-ton vehicles were formed from first line AA transport. Two ten-ton GT coys were further equipped with five-ton trailers.

The decision by Second Army to ground certain formations in the advance released considerable amount of first and second line transport for local work, thus enabling GT coys to continue in the maintenance lifts.

In mid-September War Office agreed to loan an additional seventeen GT coys to 21 Army Group. five arrived before the end of this phase, the remaining twelve were expected to arrive preloaded with supplies or petrol before 3 October.

The ever increasing transport required for Civil Affairs was an added handicap to the maintenance of the armies. Between 26 August and 6 September five thousand tons of food and medical supplies from Civil Affairs depots at BUSSY and LUC-SUR--MER were transported to PARIS.

On 9 September First Canadian Army formed No. 5 Roadhead SOUTH of ABBEVILLE at the same time as DIEPPE was opened. This roadhead and the opening of the SEINE railheads on 13 September, coupled with an increased allotment of two additional GT coys on 16 September allowed First Canadian Army to maintain itself to the DUTCH frontier, and to clear approximately three thousand tons per day from DIEPPE.

On 6 September Second Army began stocking X0. 6 Army Roadhead in the area of GRAMMONT. When trains began to run in limited numbers from the RMA the dualproblem arose of continually balancing the rail capacities on either side of the SEINE and lifting by road the balance of the six thousand tons per day required by that army for its maintenance and stocks. HQ 21 Army Group, therefore, assumed responsibility for the control of all transport and set up the organisation entitled TRANCO at AMIENS on 19 September.

By 25 September orders had been issued for the regrouping of the GT coys in the DOULLENS and ELBEUF areas NORTH and SOUTH of the SEINE.

In each of these areas two CSRASC each commanding a group of companies were placed. Of these one was responsible for road patrol and the organisation of staging camps, while the other called “Control” was responsible for reporting daily, by wireless, availability of transport in the area and movement of all maintenance convoys through the report centre established on the main “up” and “down” routes. Control CSRASC also operated at the RMA, at No. 6 Army Roadhead, and at DIEPPE.

The co-ordination of transport allocation was then exercised by TRANCO, based on “Q” priorities given to Second Army demands. A loading bill wassent out daily by wireless or telephone forty-eight hours in advance to controlling HQ.

VEHICLE MAINTENANCE

During this intense period of activity the maintenance of vehicles inevitably had to be reduced, but partly due to the majority of vehicles being new no serious ill effects ensued.

A major fault occurred in the engines of K-5 4 X 4, three-ton Austins, 1,400 of which, as well as all the replacement engines, were found to be defective and to have piston trouble.

AIR FREIGHT

When BRUSSELS and ANTWERP were reached, maintenance by air became imperative and a HQ CRASC transport column trained in air freight organisation was transferred from the RBLA and placed under command of Second Army.

By 13 September this HQ with two DIDs had handled 6,352 tons of stores. The tonnages of air freight increased throughout the month, during which an average of between four hundred and five hundred tons a day was achieved.

Early in September bulk petrol was delivered to LILLE by means of long range tanks of Liberator aircraft but this experiment was abandoned as it was wasteful both in petrol and aircraft.

PETROL

At the beginning of this period imports of POL were averaging 4,500 tons per day of which fifty per cent was in bulk against an average daily consumption of POL products of 2,000 tons per day. The restriction of movement in the bridgehead reduced petrol consumption to a minimum and by 5 August the stock of MT 80 was 66,000 tons representing thirty-three days stock. All petrol units that were required for the bridgehead had arrived by 5 August but eight bulk petrol transport companies were phased in by 25 August in anticipation of the advance across the SEINE.

As First Canadian Army and Second Army were based on RMA EAST and RMA WEST respectively all issues to armies were by pack, but at the same time L of C units were commencing to receive their petrol in bulk which released jerricans for the impending advance.

During August the physical distribution of petrol to the armies caused no difficulty until the crossing of the SEINE. Meanwhile, the intake of bulk petrol through PORT EN BESSIN was approximately 2,300 tons per day with a similar amount arriving in pack.

The consumption during the second half of August had doubled and stabilised at approximately 4,000 tons of all products per day. Forward distribution was effected during the early stage of the advance by transporting packed POL stores by road from the RMA to No. 3 and No. 4 Roadheads.

In order to increase the bulk petrol lift, Q(AE) authorised the issue of seventy, and in early September a further eighty-four, additional 800 gallon tankers to the bulk petrol companies to be held surplus to establishment. Between 5-10 September a total of 2,308 tons of packed MT 80 was delivered by air to the BRUSSELS area.

On 9 September rail service from the RMA to the SEINE was opened and the first 750 ton train was despatched to BERNAY on the same day.

The progress of the pipeline continued and on 16 September bulk petrol lorries started loading at BRIONNE for the army filling areas which were at this time at NEUFCHATEL and GRANDE VILLIERS.

By 18 September the pipeline was extended to the PETIT COURONNE installations at ROUEN where 160,000 empty jerrycans had been collected. Simultaneously a filling area under GHQ, control was opened at DARNETAL to utilise the very large number of empty jerricans left in the area.

DARNETAL besides being the pipehead NORTH of the SEINE also became the rail tank car filling point as the rail was developed.

The first line of PLUTO had been laid from the ISLE OF WIGHT to CHERBOURG. On 13 August pumping of water commenced and by 24 August Water pumping tests on the second line were proceeding at a rate equal to approximately 145 tons per day.

During September approximately 4,000 tons per day was required for the force, and although 2,000 tons per day could be accepted in bulk at PORT EN BESSIN, the balance was required to be stored at an advanced port in order to economise in transport. OSTEND, liberated on 9 September, was the port chosen and the first tankers were discharged there on 29 September.

Stocks of packed products in the UK were now so limited that imports of packed POL had to be reduced in October to the production rate of 350 tons per day.

Printing and Stationery

Throughout this period the two BRITISH advanced stationery depots served Second Army and L of C respectively while the CANADIAN depot, whose arrival had been delayed, started to serve First Canadian Army and CANADIAN units on the L of C during the early part of August.

In order to keep pace with the advance of Second Army a mobile detachment of the advanced stationery depot was formed which moved forward to each of the corps areas in turn.

A timetable was arranged so that units could collect from the mobile detachment at an agreed point in the corps area and as this system effected a considerable saving of unit transport it was continued until Second Army crossed the SEINE. Second Army depot was established in BRUSSELS and limited issues were started on 15 September.

The CANADIAN depot moved forward to ANTWERP about the same time.

On 26 August the Base Stationery Depot was called forward and took over the reserve stocks of the Second Army depot and L of C depot in the RMA.

10 Special Heavy Mobile Printing Section and a mobile detachment of 2 GHQ Printing Press arrived in the theatre on 6 August and were set up at Rear HQ. 21 Army Group where they started to print such matter as GROs, C-in-C’s messages and propaganda leaflets.

An undamaged printing works was discovered in CAEN on 18 August and the main body of 2 GHQ Printing Press was brought out on 6 September to operate it, The unit started to produce work on 7 September but within three weeks moved to BRUSSELS where it took over a plant on 24 September.

Publications produced in the theatre were distributed by 12 Publications Depot to all formations and units while those produced in UK, such as General Staff publications were distributed by 6 Publications Depot until it moved overseas on 17 August.

Thereafter all publications were distributed in the theatre.

Ordnance

ORDNANCE BUILD-UP

On 16 August 14 Forward Trailer Section opened for issue at ST MARTINS in the RMA. This unit had been specially stocked to supply MT spares to L of C units who lacked the Ordnance field Parks of formations.

17 AOD relieved of this load was then able to concentrate on supplying the fighting formations.

14 FTS consisted of forty-one four-ton trailers fitted with bins to carry small IVIT spare parts and sixty-nine bulk trailers for larger components viz. engines, axles etc. Although it was potentially a mobile unit it was not necessary to move it from the original site until a major move was made in September to the area of BRUSSELS.

Meanwhile 14 AOD was being rapidly developed and in order that it could open on 14 September, the target date, extensive use was made of Pioneers, civilian labour and prisoners of war. The planned figure for the initial stocking of 14 AOD was twenty-three thousand tons of all types of stores but owing to the delays in shipping actual receipts fell short of this figure by some five thousand tons.

A school of instruction was set up to train civilians in ordnance procedure, and what must have been the first passenger train service in liberated EUROPE was initiated for the benefit of 14 AOD to convey their civilians from CAEN to AUDRIEUX.

17 AOD closed down as an issuing depot and its remaining stock of BMPs LRs and other stores were placed under the control of CO0, 14 AOD. The personnel of 16 AOD who were operating with 17 AOD were transferred to 14 AOD and the depot became known as .14/16 AOD.

During this period one base laundry, three base hospital laundries, one base industrial gas unit, four army industrial gas units, twenty-one BRITISH and six CANADIAN mobile laundry and bath units, seventeen port ordnance detachments and fourteen port ammunition detachments arrived in the theatre ready to operate in the advance base and the Channel ports as soon as they were liberated.

At the end of August personnel of 15 AOD arrived in the theatre and later, after the capture of ANTWERP, moved forward from the RMA to recce sites for an advanced base ordnance depot in BELGIUM.

In order to shorten the L of C 17 Stores Transit Depot moved to DIEPPE on 17 September to receive detail issue stores from the UK main base depots for the armies and L of C.

EQUIPMENT

There were no major problems concerning the maintenance of formations during the period in the bridgehead, as distances were short and it was therefore possible to obtain urgent requirements within a few hours dependent upon the availability of stores at the depots and field parks.

Certain difficulties, however, were experienced in the supply of particular equipment, notably artillery, due to mechanical defects appearing after sustained action and prematures of ammunition, but these were overcome by obtaining urgent replacements and spares by air from UK.

A programme for the re-organisation of field artillery in the assault corps was arranged during August. Seven regiments equipped with SP 105 mm guns were converted into 25 pr regiments.

All stores and equipment required for this were brought over from UK together with a detachment of personnel of 15 AOD to set up a special re-organisation park to receive back the old equipment and issue the new.

The equipment rendered surplus by the disbandment of 59 Division and one brigade of 49 Division was received into 14 AOD which opened up special returned stores parks to handle the vast amount of equipment involved. Here the equipment was sorted, repaired and reissued to other units.

Surplus vehicles were received into returned vehicle parks for servicing and re-issue.

MAINTENANCE DURING THE ADVANCE

As distances between formations and the RMA increased, army roadheads moved forward to form dumps of selected fast moving stores readily accessible to the fighting formations, and also to receive stores in transit from the RMA. The supply of stores, however, Was entirely dependent upon the availability of transport.

After the break-out from the NORMANDY bridgehead both armies were maintained by road convoys from depots in the RMA to the ordnance maintenance companies at army roadheads.

At the same time a special stores convoy unit to carry forward stores of extreme urgency was formed from 15 FTS, a part of 15 AOD. Subsequently, after the armies had entered BELGIUM, stores were despatched by rail to railhead SOUTH of the SEINE and re—loaded on to railtail NORTH of the SEINE. This operation was supervised by ordnance railhead detachments.

The distances now separating the armies from the RMA made it necessary to increase the holdings of ordnance stores at army roadheads ; 15 Stores Transit Sub Depot was therefore moved forward to Second Army roadhead to augment No. l Ordnance Maintenance Company.

17 FTS was also moved up to hold an operational reserve of stores well forward in the Second Army area. Similarly, dumps had to be opened for the benefit of those L of C troops who by this time had also moved forward to areas considerably distant from the RMA.

VEHICLE PARKS

Owing to the very limited space in the RMA, as many as three or four vehicle parks were operating on the same site although independently of each other. Throughout the campaign army vehicle parks moved up in support of their formations and other vehicle parks were located at points along the L of C to control vehicles being ferried to armies.

At times a very considerable strain was placed on vehicle parks during the advance so that it was necessary to employ all available drivers, including military reinforcements and civilians to ensure that advanced parks were constantly stocked with vehicles for onward delivery to the armies.

Vehicles from UK were diverted to the Channel ports as soon as they were opened and 15 and 17 Transit Vehicle Parks were established at OSTEND and BOULOGNE respectively.

With the setting up of the advance base in BELGIUM approximately eight thousand light “A” and “B” vehicles had to be brought up from the RMA and to assist in this heavy commitment No.1 Canadian Vehicle Company was brought over from the UK in September.

AMMUNITION

It was found necessary to establish intermediate ammunition dumps along the line of advance in addition to maintaining dumps already in the army roadheads. These dumps were initially replenished from the RMA but as soon as DIEPPE was operative 3 BAD moved forward to receive ammunition through that port for First Canadian Army.

Nevertheless, ammunition still had to be obtained from the RMA and any surpluses that First Canadian Army had were handed over to Second Army.

Although the expenditure of artillery ammunition during the advance was comparatively low, heavy demands were made on arrival in the BRUSSELS area for replenishment of AFV natures and SAA.

Artillery natures were in short supply in the forward areas and formations were restricted to drawing half  21 Army Group rates per day. It was necessary at one stage to despatch 112,000 rounds of 25-pr by air from UK but the situation was improved by the discovery of 80,000 25-pr HE shell (without cartridges) at LOUVAIN which had been excellently maintained by the GERMANS since 1940.

REME

(Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers)

Shortly after the capture of CAEN, three advance base workshops were established in field sites in the area of the CAEN—BAYEUX road.

The chief commitments at this stage were the conversion of certain AFVs to personnel carriers; assistance in inspection and repair of artillery equipment of RA regiments undergoing re-organisation, conversion of tank transporters to load carriers, vehicle recovery and backloading.

Recovery resources were used with the primary object of keeping roads clear for fighting troops and supplies and most of this work was done under army control in order to relieve corps of responsibilities in rear of their areas.

Back-loading into workshop sites and collecting points took second priority and had to be done at night. All “crocks” were back—loaded to corps backloading points (CBPs), the priority being firstly repairable vehicles, then BRITISH “W” (write-off) “crooks” and lastly enemy vehicles.

As these dumps of crocks were collected during the advance, third line workshops were dropped off and worked on them until nothing worth repairing remained. This policy of setting down third line workshops at intervals on the line of advance was found to work well but due to the distances involved control was extremely difficult, although the wireless net proved invaluable and was the only way in which “crock” states could be obtained.

During this period third line workshops were controlled and moved entirely by corps headquarters. It was found that handling “crooks” and operating the CBPS should be primarily the responsibility of workshops rather than recovery units, and that it was better to use the latter for ferrying crooks and for their responsibility to cease after off-loading.

Classification and cannibalisation were more effectively controlled by a foster unit such as an armoured troop workshops rather than by recovery units.

During the rapid advance armoured brigade workshops were faced with the alternative of keeping up with their formations and doing no work or being left far behind. Infantry brigade workshops did not have quite the same difficulties as there are three in a division and they were able to carry on by “leap-frogging” each other.

It was realised that when independent armoured brigades are under command of a division REME technical control must be direct by the Corps DDME and not through the divisional CREME.

This policy also applied in respect of the recovery companies, technical control being exercised by the DDME and administrative control by CREME corps troops. This direct contact with brigade

REME co-ordinated by mutual liaison between divisional CsREME and brigade EMES speeded tank recovery and repair to a considerable degree.

By mid-August a CANADIAN fourth line workshop opened in the REME area at LA DELIVRANDE thus allowing third line workshops which had previously been carrying out jobs of a much heavier nature than usual to proceed with their normal work. At the same time the tendency for large scale cannibalisation began to diminish.

Third line workshops found it necessary to be every bit as mobile as brigade workshops. Second Army’s third line workshops had been fully mobile since the early days and able to move without. help, given thirty-six hours notice.

A recovery section always moved with them carrying forward as many spares as possible to counteract the difficulty that Ordnance were experiencing in making issues over such distances.

First Canadian Army tackled the problem differently. Their third line workshops were never under corps control during periods of rapid movement, on the assumption that they could not be expected to have good production figures if moved too rapidly, nor could corps properly administer them if they were many miles in the rear.

In fact they never had more than fifty per cent of third line workshops under corps control even under static conditions.

Recovery units had an extremely unpleasant task in clearing up areas after battles, particularly in the case of the FALAISE gap. Here they had to recover thousands of tanks, vehicles and guns, chiEFIy GERMAN, in an area where there were some eight thousand dead horses and thousands of enemy dead still unburied.

Recovery vehicles were employed to take away these dead horses for disposal by Pioneers and prisoners of war and over two hundred carcasses were recovered from the River DIVES alone.

In the BRUSSELS area workshops were able to find first class accommodation for the first time, which was particularly fortunate as during early September all second and third line workshops were working at full pressure on very heavy vehicle repair programmes.

In order to assist the forward echelon workshops and to serve the advance base area 2 Canadian and 21 Advance Base Workshops were brought up from the RMA to the advance base area at the end of September.

At the same time an additional advance base workshop was landed over the beaches. In view of the length of the L of C and the battles still in progress for the Channel ports, this workshop was sited at ARRAS.

To support-the operations for the capture of LE HAVRE and the reduction of the Channel ports, third line workshops were moved across the SEIN E on 1 September with a view to establishing a REME area near REUVILLE. But the weather broke at this period and the plan had to be abandoned, workshops having to seek individual hard standings and accommodation such as railway stations which were not being used.

With the fall of LE HAVRE and the clearance of the coastal belt REME were able to carry out “make and mend” for the first time since the break-out.

The opening of the Channel ports required REME assistance in maintaining the continuous stream of vehicles coming off the ships on their journey to the reserve vehicle parks and vice versa for “dead” vehicles on their way back to the UK. The taskof loading vehicles and tanks into cargo ships was extremely difficult and it was often necessary to lower modified bull-dozers into the ships for manoeuvring tanks into position.

REME preparations for the advance into HOLLAND were governed by the fact that the formations involved were starting from points often as much as fifty miles apart and that four different axes were being used.

To cover each approach axis a series of CBPs, each with third line workshops support was established. In response to 30 Corps Commander’s request for a maximum delivery of tanks to fighting formations the whole of the REME transporter resources were despatched on 13 September to VERNON and AMIENS to bring up repaired tanks.

Together with a few tanks from the ANTWERP workshops and the output of second line workshops this resulted in over eighty tanks being delivered in five days.

The terrain of the operation was very bad tank country, being low lying, offering negligible cover and intersected by innumerable waterways. Consequently heavy tank casualties were expected and two third line workshops and three heavy recovery sections were therefore made available.

In actual fact the tank casualties proved very light as the burden of the heavy fighting fell on the infantry.

Thus the REME resources were found to be more than adequate. However, during the advance into HOLLAND on practically a single axis, road clearance became of major importance and the recovery sections were kept fully occupied. It had been expected that there would be a heavy third line workshops commitment during this advance which might well have occurred had ARNHEM been captured but owing to the short duration of the operation it did not arise.

When the tempo of the battle slackened, second line workshops were able to embark on an extensive engine change programme assisted by detachments of craftsmen from third line workshops, as it was considered that second line workshops yielded quicker and more fruitful results than third line. In return, the latter often accepted second line work when conditions were favourable and second line workshops hard pressed.

Claims and Hirings

Executive control over claims and hirings on the Continent was vested jointly in Deputy Directors at HQ L of C and HQ 21 Army Group working under the supervision of Director and Hirings until he assumed full responsibility on his arrival with HQ :21 Army Group.

As operations progressed a satisfactory Claims and Hirings organisation was evolved, consisting on the one hand of static district offices and on the other representation at army and corps HQ.

District offices were established at CAEN, FLERS, BRIONNE, ROUEN, DIEPPE, AMIENS, LILLE, BRUSSELS, BRUGES and ANTWERP during this period.

The Director found it necessary to appoint an Assistant Director Claims and Hirings both for FRANCE and for BELGIUM, each of whom was responsible to the Deputy Director at HQ L of C.

The Deputy Director at HQ 21 Army Group controlled the Claims and Hirings detachments at Second British and First Canadian Armies, while the Director was responsible for the overall policy and supervision in the army and L of C areas.

The principal question of policy to be decided at this stage was the degree of financial and administrative assistance to be given by the FRENCH authorities in the matter of hirings, requisitions and claims. Care was taken to ensure that the UNITED STATES authorities were kept fully informed, both the different political agreements which GREAT BRITAIN and the UNITED STATES had concluded with FRANCE necessitated independent negotiations by the representatives of the respective countries.

During August agreement was reached whereby demands for accommodation were made on the FRENCH local authorities and the FRENCH Government assumed financial responsibility towards its own citizens for the payment of accommodation requisitioned at BRITISH request.

In accordance with the terms of the agreement, all hirings records held by the Directorate were handed over to the FRENCH on 30 September. Inherent to these negotiations was the definition of an operational area.

Clearly it would be wrong to pay “rent for the trenches”, but on the other hand the rapid movement of modern warfare and the extensive use of aircraft made it impracticable to consider that an operational area could be bounded by a static line such as an army or corps rear boundary.

After much discussion, it was agreed by all parties that an operational area should be defined as all that area occupied by troops under the command of corps and engaged on active operations. It was agreed that in such an area and for the period of active operations the occupation of land and buildings would take place without any formalities either before or after entry.

Discussions were also initiated with the FRENCH in regard to a claims agreement under which it was sought to attach to the FRENCH certain financial obligations arising out of claims by virtue of a Mutual Aid agreement, but these negotiations did not mature until a much later date.

The BELGIAN authorities were not sure what conditions they were likely to meet in their own country and so a tentative agreement had been concluded with them whereby the Claims and Hirings Directorate would make hiring agreements and pay claims on lines similar to those arranged with the FRENCH prior to D-day. Shortly after the liberation of BRUSSELS, however, it became apparent that the BELGIAN Government was functioning much better than had been expected and discussions

were begun with a view to effecting a retroactive agreement similar to the new one with FRANCE.

Again the closest liaison was necessary with UNITED STATES authorities.

The speed of the advance and the large number of troops located in BELGIUM caused an acute shortage of accommodation and Claims and Hirings officers in static offices in BELGIUM rendered assistance to the “Q” staff in finding accommodation for the troops.

A satisfactory agreement was made whereby accommodation previously occupied by the GERMANS was frozen for BRITISH use.

A right of appeal in case of hardship was given to the BELGIAN owners and although it was exercised on many occasions the vast majority of such requisitions went unchallenged.

During the months of August and September 6,721 requisitions of real estate were recorded and 3,422 claims were disposed of out of a total of 5,875.

Labour

As the armies moved rapidly across northern FRANCE and into BELGIUM an acute shortage of military labour was felt throughout the L of C. In addition to the existing commitments in the RMA which still had to be catered for, the early weeks of this period coincided with the arrival of the last L of C depots which required their allocation of companies, while in the newly liberated territory there were bridges to construct, railways to repair, and the Channel ports to operate.

Two examples of unexpected labour demands which had to be met quickly, were the provision of companies to work for the AOD and to operate the railhead-railtail on the SEINE. It had been hoped to employ civilian labour in the AOD, but as the civilians were not available in sufficient numbers up to eight and a half pioneer companies had to be diverted there from other tasks.

On the SEINE where stores in transit were often handled four times between railhead and railtail, eight companies were employed SOUTH of the river and seven on the NORTH side.

Another factor which contributed to the scarcity of labour, was the necessity to throw of sections on the line of advance to clear up, guard and move forward the residue of roadheads and cushions.

At the beginning of this phase the supply of civilian labour could not make up for the deficiencies of military labour. The lack of civilians was due to the fact that 21 Army Group was operating in a thinly populated agricultural area from which the best and youngest workers had been sifted by the enemy.

Moreover, many of the remaining aole-bodied men who in normal times might have formed a labour reserve were now playing a vital operational role within the Maquis organisation.

At the end of the period, however, the strain on labour resources was eased by the use of the liberated manpower of industrial northern FRANCE and BELGIUM. On 1 August 2-1 Army Group employed only 2,600 civilians but by the end of September there were 13,200 civilians working for the military (of which one in every three was a skilled man).

Early in August FRENCH pioneer companies started forming, the first of which was ready for work in mid-August. A decision which greatly eased the situation was to retain prisoners of war on the Continent to work under the direction of the Director of Labour.

If this latter decision had not been made it would have been necessary for HQ 21 Army Group to press SHAEF for permission to recruit civilians from the AMERICAN zone, and there was in point of fact an instruction governing these circumstances which had been foreseen in the planning period. Similar conditions, however, did not arise again during the campaign and SHAEF never had to decide on priorities between the US and BRITISH.

The evacuation of prisoners of war partially ceased in the second week of August and soon afterwards eight thousand GERMAN prisoners were employed in the L of C area. PW camps were situated near base installations and prisoners were employed on a day-to-day basis under BRITISH pioneer supervision. Late in September this form of labour was made more mobile by forming forty PW companies around BRITISH cadre staffs for deployment in the L of C where the labour situation demanded.

Veterinary and Remount

Authority was received for the mobilization of one Vetinary and Remount Conducting Section for the BLA and the unit arrived in the early part of September. It was located at LE BECHELLOUIN, SOUTH of the SEINE, and its primary role was to collect and treat battle casualties.

The FALAISE gap yielded a large number of GS wagons but very few horses. It was evident that the expected capture of a great many horses would present difficulties, however, so a request was made for one veterinary hospital and one remount depot to be despatched to BLA as soon as possible.

In FRANCE five thousand captured horses were distributed to local farmers while in BELGIUM a number of abandoned horses were registered and collected. In September the movement of all horses was stopped in order to prevent them from going to butchers in the black market.

Salvage

The Salvage resources during this period were greatly strained as units were required in the large areas uncovered by the advance while plenty of clearance still remained to be done in the original bridgehead. In addition, with the lengthening of the L of C and the constant changes of roadheads and cushions, evacuation to the base salvage depot Which was established at CAEN on 12 August became increasingly difficult.

Such large quantities of materials were abandoned in the FALAISE area that a HQ based on HQ 197 Infantry Brigade was established with Service components including No. 17 field Salvage Unit to cover that area. The first reception area was established at BRETTEVILLE SUR L’AIZE, but it later moved to TRUN where it remained until December.

This organisation proved most satisfactory and resulted in the recovery of large quantities of stores and equipment, while the provision of Pl/V labour after the initial stages greatly eased the manpower problem.

In order to obtain some control over captured stores, a depot was opened at CORMELLES at which the captured stores and vehicles could be centralised. This catered for the area SOUTH of the SEINE.

The territory NORTH of the SEINE had to be left to the best efforts of the Services concerned but they were assisted byQ (Mov) routing loads of salvage to AMIENS where, after inspection by the area salvage officer, they could be directed to the appropriate Services depot. A salvage unit was available at SALEUX for unloading and sorting mixed loads.

A serious shortage of jerrycans resulted from units abandoning them in their speedy advance across FRANCE. Collecting them and transporting them was difficult as the cans were scattered far and wide but the salvage of these containers was made a matter of top priority.

A salvage collecting centre unit taken from L of C was due to be landed in the early stages of operation MARKET GARDEN in order to collect parachutes and other valuable dropping equipment before they could be stolen, as had happened in the D-day operations.

Owing to operational and weather conditions the arrival of this airborne unit was delayed, but meanwhile the salvage unit with 30 Corps had moved forward with the ground forces and done excellent work within the area into which the corps had advanced. The equipment salvaged was returned to BRUSSELS by road and thence to UK by air.

A base salvage depot was opened at ANTWERP on 26 September but being sited on the ALBERT canal was hindered for several days by enemy mortar fire from the opposite bank.

At the close of this phase the total tonnage re-issued by Salvage since D-day amounted to 21,840 tons including ammunition.

Fire

During the advance through FRANCE and BELGIUM four fire fighting companies were employed, two each by First Canadian Army and Second Army, and in each case one company was deployed in corps FNICS and the other in army roadheads.

Other companies were moved from the RMA to AMIENS where they could be called forward for re-deployment when necessary. In addition, one FF company was placed under command First Canadian Army for opening the port of DIEPPE so that operation of the port was at no time hindered by the many small fires which occurred.

When HQ 7 and 8 Base Sub Areas moved into ANTWERP.and OSTEND respectively, each had one FF coy in close support to deal ‘with the numerous fires started by the enemy before abandoning the towns. In OSTEND the work was hampered by mines and booby traps which inflicted casualties on AFS personnel and by the fact that the enemy had removed the civilian fire-fighting equipment.

The FF coy at ANTWERP, in addition to extinguishing a large number of fires, contributed many hours of pumping in the port area to enable the docks to be repaired and to assist RN port parties in clearing obstructions and salvaging sunken craft.

In order to repair the dock gates more than two million gallons of water were pumped from the KRUISSCHANS SLUIS under continuous mortar and small arms fire, but no casualties were suffered among AFS personnel.

Operation of the ports of CAEN, DIEPPE, ANTWERP and OSTEND proved the desirability of the early appointment of AFS port fire officers to supervise fire precautions, co-ordinate all FF units and to take charge of fire fighting operations.

Many fires occured due to the tapping by FRENCH civilians of the bulk petrol line which was in operation from PORT EN BESSIN to the SEINE and a system was evolved whereby every case of damage to the pipeline was reported immediately to the nearest AFS station.

During this phase static fire service control centres were established at DIEPPE, AMIENS, ANTWERP and OSTEND.

Due to the rapidity of the advance and the frequent moves of corps FMCs and army roadheads, the problem of water supply was a difficult one and AFS units were called upon to improvise static reserves.

The total number of fires attended by AFS units during this phase was two hundred and fifty of which eight were major fires and twenty-six due to enemy action.

NAAFI/EFI

As the armies moved forward towards BELGIUM, and the lines of communication were stretched, EFI began to feel the handicap of lack of sufficient transport for taking even the essential supplies forward, as on a forward movement of this magnitude very little army transport could be made available for EFI use.

But DIEPPE was now functioning as a port through which small quantities of stores began to trickle.

This, coupled with the supplies coming through CAEN, where the base canteen depot situated in a hastily patched up barracks lay close to an invaluable railway, was an important step forward for the handling of imports, which, by the end of August had amounted to a value of £3,247,000.

To deal with the increasing commitments, EFI reinforcements were being drafted over from time to time and late in July the first draft of ATS/EFI arrived. During September 11 HQ EFI moved from SULLY to BRUSSELS.

Reinforcements

REINFORCEMENTS FROM UK

At the time of the break-out units were almost complete to WE since reinforcements in adequate numbers had been immediately available in the bridgehead to replace the heavy casualties which occurred during the fighting there.

The casualty rate during the pursuit was low, and replacement of men was, therefore, not as urgent a problem as was the provision of transport for essential petrol and ammunition.

In consequence reinforcements accumulated in NORMANDY until 7 September when HQ 21 Army Group asked the War Office not to send any further drafts unless specially called for.

The approximate numbers of reinforcements despatched from UK to NW EUROPE during this period were :—

• BRITISH - 38,900
• CANADIAN - 16,700
• ALLIED - 1 ,120

SHORTAGE or INFANTRY

Owing to a shortage of infantry, a decision was taken on 16 August to disband 59 Infantry Division and one brigade of 49 Infantry Division.

Certain units thus released were broken up and the personnel used to make up the shortages.

REINFORCEMENT GROUPS

Six reinforcement groups: 101, 102, 103, 104, 105 and 2 Armoured, had been allotted to 21 Army Group.

101 and 102 Gps had already landed during the first phase: 104 Gp arrived in the BAYEUX area in August, while 105 and 103 Gps landed in September and were situated at DIEPPE and CORBIE respectively.

2 Armoured Reinforcement Group controlled 2 Armoured Replacement Unit which in turn was responsible for forwarding RAC reinforcements through the Army, Corps and Forward Delivery Squadrons.

The other reinforcement groups were deployed so that 103, 104 and 105 in the L of C fed reinforcements forward to 101 and 102, which were under command of Second British and First Canadian Armies.

The reinforcement groups consisted of a varying number of reinforcement holding units each designed to hold 1,500 individuals in addition to a permanent staff of ninety-nine.

All the RHUs however, were not entirely occupied with handling reinforcements, for some were used to hold downgraded personnel, psychiatric cases and immatures.

MOVEMENT OF REINFORCEMENTS

Until mid-September all movement of reinforcement personnel within FRANCE and BELGIUM was carried out with the limited road transport available. About 14 September a daily personnel train was scheduled to run from CORBIE, near AMIENS, to DIEST.

On 16 September the first personnel train was arranged to run from DIEPPE to AMIENS and on that day also reinforcements travelled by rail from BAYEUX to AMIENS.

But regular movement of personnel by rail was not possible until a later date.

CONTROL OF REINFORCEMENT DEMANDS

A reinforcement section consisting of one AAG, one DAAG, one Staff Captain and twelve clerks, which with two advanced reinforcement sections from GHQ Second Echelon had landed in the previous phase, established itself alongside HQ 21 Army Group Rear when the latter landed at the beginning of August 1944.

Its function was to control the supply of reinforcements from the reinforcement groups in the L of C to the reinforcement groups under command of both armies, to consolidate demands for personnel and to submit them to GHQ Second Echelon in UK.

By the middle of August it was clear that although the Advance REFORSECS were able to deal with the posting of reinforcements to units and the demanding of replacements the main reinforcement section with HQ 21 Army Group Rear was being overwhelmed with personnel matters which were not entirely connected with reinforcing, such as transfers and disposal of downgraded or psychiatric cases.

It was therefore decided to send out the Organisation and Selection of Personnel branches from GHQ Second Echelon.

They arrived on 14 September and assumed the name of REFORSEC together with the functions of the original reinforcement section.

They also dealt with all personnel matters affecting transfers, disposal of downgraded cases, reversions to UK, postings to units not under command of armies and the consolidation of demands on the War Office.

These demands were submitted fortnightly and were based on the WE less first reinforcements and the authorised holding of a reserve of 24,000.

They were compiled from the weekly strength returns sent to Advance REFORSECS by formations and units under command of armies and direct to REFORSEC in all other cases. REFORSEC therefore acted as an advanced element of GHQ Second Echelon.

Discipline

MILITARY PRISONS, DETENTION BARRACKS AND FIELD PUNISHMENT CAMPS

By 25 September five field punishment camps and one military prison had arrived in the theatre. These were initially established under canvas, but a part of the military prison was later accommodated in CAEN civil gaol. Two FPCS were placed under command Second Army, and one under command First Canadian Army.

During August and September the WE's of these penal units were revised and increases in strength were authorised. Authority was also given for the formation of another military prison to accommodate 500 SUS.

There was a scarcity of buildings suitable for these units, and the problem of covered accommodation was still unsolved at the end of September.

ABSENTEES AND DESERTERS

Difficulty was encountered in returning to their units absentees and deserters who were apprehended in the rear areas. Units taking part in operations were unwilling or unable to spare good NCOs and men to escort an absentee or deserter who would probably be of no use to them in battle. On 17 September over 100 soldiers were under arrest, awaiting trial in the town guard rooms of CAEN and BAYEUX and at 7 FPC.

These were sent forward by rail to Second Army and First Canadian Army on 19 September, escorts being provided from reinforcements.

By mid September the large numbers of absentees and deserters awaiting trial in 21 Army Group made it apparent that special arrangements would have to be made to accommodate them. Consequently it was decided to employ 36 RHU, which opened in a new capacity on 25 September at RYES, as a sorting, holding and despatching centre for absentees and deserters apprehended both in the UK and in the field.

The urgency for setting up a special organisation to deal with this problem is illustrated by the fact that within five days of opening the RHU held 135 men on charges of desertion and absence without leave.

The whole of the original staff of 36 RHU, plus extra personnel to act as guards, was employed on this task, while ofificers to act for the defence and prosecution of the accused, together with a captain, legal staff, and a permanent president were attached to the RHU for the disposal of cases either summarily or by courts martial.

COURT MARTIAL CENTRE

On 13 September an order was issued for the setting up of a Court Martial Centre which began to function in October.

During the disbandment of 59 Division a permanent president and a captain legal staff, were appointed to deal with all outstanding cases affecting soldiers of 59 Division.

Soldiers awaiting promulgation were sent to 3 Military Prison.

Soldiers of 59 Division who were arrested after the disbandment were handled by 36 RHU.

COURTS MARTIAL

The number of soldiers convicted by courts martial for the period was as follows :—

The above figures include trials at reinforcement groups which resulted in the following convictions for absence and desertion :—

Trials at 103 and 105 Rft Gps in the UK accounted for the vast majority of these cases, these groups being responsible during that period for dealing with absentees and deserters apprehended in UK. The fall in the number of trials at reinforcement groups during September was caused by the movement of both these groups overseas.

SELF-INFLICTED WOUNDS

Special orders were published setting out the procedure for dealing with cases of selfinflicted injury.

The procedure entailed segregation of these soldiers in one hospital in the theatre, and if for any reason it was necessary to evacuate a soldier to UK very careful documentation was carried out to make certain that be would be returned when fit to undergo trial.

Prisoners of War

THE RETENTION or PW IN THE THEATRE FOR LABOUR PURPOSES

Until early August no PW were retained in the theatre except for a small number of “protected persons” who were employed in the medical care of enemy PW at medical units.

At the beginning of August authority was given to HQ L of C to retain in this theatre up to 40,000 PW for labour purposes.

On 24 August 18,135 PW were being held in PW camps as a labour pool and by 4 September the number had increased to 27,214.

EVACUATION OF PW

On 4 September it was decided that the number of PW to be held for labour purposes should be reduced to 20,000. On 12 September this target was further reduced to 14,500.

This made necessary the immediate evacuation from the theatre of approximately 12,000 PW in addition to the daily captures Which were then greatly increasing.

Shipping was available but War Office was having difficulty in finding accommodation in the UK. Arrangements were finally made to evacuate at a greatly increased rate (5,000 per day for the period 13-19 September inclusive and thereafter 2,500 daily).

On 19 September only 23,000 remained in the RMA.

ARROMANCHES continued to be used as the PW evacuation port but DIEPPE was later also utilised for the same purpose. In spite of the constant evacuation at the agreed rate, about 50,000 PW Were being held in the theatre at the end of September. Up to that date approximately 90,000 had been evacuated.

Chaplains

The Chaplains branch in common with all other Services found the shortage of transport a particularly heavy handicap at this time.

Each chaplain had to take under his care more than one unit, and as all units were moving fast and frequently, padres had to make many long journeys in order to carry out spiritual ministration to the troops.

Medical

BUILD—UP OF MEDICAL BASE

In the early part of this phase the build-up of general hospitals continued in the medical area centred on RANCHY near BAYEUX. The personnel of hospitals arrived according to programme but the build-up was nevertheless disappointingly slow due to delays in the arrival of equipment.

This was shipped separately and owing to bad packing often proved deficient of small but essential items.

With one exception all hospitals at this stage were tented. The supply of Water was a major problem and even after a Water pipe line had been constructed Water carts were engaged full-time in delivering water within the hospital area.

Major medical installations in the bridgehead on 26 July amounted to twelve CCSs and nineteen general hospitals. In addition three Base Depot Medical Stores had arrived for the supply of medical equipment. By 26 September another seventeen general hospitals and two additional base depot medical stores had arrived.

One of the results of the slow build-up was that the policy of retaining patients in the theatre could not be carried out as early as it was Originally intended, and consequently during this period all patients who were fit to travel and who were unlikely to return to duty in one week were evacuated to UK.

MEDICAL LAYOUT PRIOR TO THE BREAK-OUT

Before the break-out First Canadian Army had two BRITISH general hospitals of 200 bed size at LA DELIVRANDE, which, aided by a 600 bed hospital at REVIERS, handled all casualties of l Corps.

2 Canadian Corps casualties went straight from the CCS area at ST GERMAINE to the main hospital area at BAYEUX. About 20 August the two 200 bed type general hospitals moved to the ST GER-MAINE area which then became the nodal point for rearward evacuation from First Canadian Army. Second Army casualties coming back from FALAISE by-passed ST GERMAINE and Went straight back to BAYEUX.

In the main medical area Second Army hospitals remained closed in readiness to move forward.

MEDICAL LAYOUT AND CHANNELS OF EVACUATION OF CASUALTIES DURING THE PURSUIT

- FROM THE LINE OF THE SEINE

When the break-out occurred the evacuation line lengthened and a period of rapid movement and development of an air shuttle service began.

The battle of CAEN in August threw a great strain on the available number of hospital beds, but after the collapse of the enemy at FALAISE the picture changed completely. The heavy spate of casualties was for the time being finished but nearly 5,000 civilians were transferred from CAEN to other civilian hospitals, which movement fully occupied the ambulance car companies.

During the pursuit although only small rearguard actions were fought a great strain was put on the chain of evacuation: the great difficulty at this stage was lack of transport to bring hospitals forward sufficiently early.

This lack of transport was common throughout the Services and was inevitable in view of the nature of the operations.

As far as FALAISE and just beyond, all corps casualties were cleared by ambulance car company to BAYEUX. As the distance increased it was necessary to introducestaging posts and to obtain extra assistance from 227 MAC (8 Corps).

By the time the SEINE was reached the distance was far too great for large-scale evacuation by road, though a few cases were staged back via RUGLES and FALAISE. Most of the cases, however, were held by the general hospital which had opened at CAILLOUET until they could be evacuated by air from EVREUX.

On 5 September an ambulance railhead opened at MEZIDON, but four days later moved forward to LISIEUX.

Daily ambulance trains were organised from there to BAYEUX.

- FROM NORTHERN FRANCE AND BELGIUM

During the pursuit to the DUTCH frontier hospitals moved rapidly along the axes of both of the armies and by continually leap-frogging each other, ensured that themajor medical services were always within reach of the forward troops and obviated the need for evacuating over long distances.

After the advance had gone beyond the SEINE and until BRUSSELS was reached, the chief method of evacuation was by Sparrow aircraft to the BAYEUX area, (the Sparrow flight consisted of six obsolete bomber Harrow aircraft).

The first air evacuation centre was at EVREUX, but this was soon moved forward to AMIENS where patients awaiting evacuation were held in the general hospital.

A few casualties were also evacuated from AMIENS by road to ROUEN, where a base hospital was established and a small number were sent by air from AMIENS direct to UK.

When BRUSSELS was reached there was at first only one way of evacuating and that was by air. Most of the cases went by Dakota aircraft to UK or were ferried by Sparrow to AMIENS. At a later stage casualties were despatched from BRUSSELS by rail.

When the DIEST area was opened the air shuttle evacuation service operated from DIEST to BRUSSELS and at the end of September was extended to EINDHOVEN.

The main method of coordinating casualty air evacuation was by direct liaison between DDsMS armies and the senior medical officers with the RAF groups. So rapid was the advance and so far were the corps removed from HQ Second Army that the DDMS had great difficulty in keeping the RAF fully informed of his requirements.

During the latter weeks of this phase steps were taken to set up a medical area at DIEPPE and later at OSTEND.

Evacuation WEST of the SEINE was planned to cease on 16 September when a daily hospital carrier service to UK from DIEPPE was instituted, but in fact it continued for approximately another week to enable the hospitals in BRUSSELS and AMIENS areas to be cleared in time to receive the expected heavy casualties of the ARNHEM airborne operation.

-EVACUATION FOR OPERATION MARKET GARDEN

The medical scheme for this operation reverted to the policy adopted in the beachhead of evacuating casualties from the theatre as quickly as possible. By 17 September two hospitals, both of 200-bed capacity, were established at DIEST, While another stood prepared in BRUSSELS, available either to open in an emergency on to move forward. A FDS was established in the DIEST area to assist the two hospitals.

The staging of casualties back to the medical area was under corps arrangements, while to assist in handling US airborne sick and wounded, an AMERICAN evacuation hospital and ambulance company was sited at BOURG LEOPOLD.

The holding capacity of the Second Army medical units when operation MARKET GARDEN started was far below that required to accommodate the estimated influx of casualties.

To overcome this problem of limited hospital accommodation 500-700 casualties were evacuated-daily by air from BRUSSELS to UK, and in addition a rail lift to AMIENS for 200~300 daily was organised.

An ambulance train formed from recaptured BRITISH and BELGIUM stock and staffed by BELGIAN Red Cross personnel made its first run from BRUSSELS to AMIENS on 20 September. To help in the evacuation of forward areas an additional ambulance car company was put at the disposal of the DDMS Second Army for the operation.

CASUALTIES EVACUATED TO UK

During this period a total of 26,039 casualties was evacuated to UK by sea and 20,964 by air.

WOUNDED PW

Many concentrations of wounded PW were over-run in BELGIUM. PW hospitals were opened at AMIENS, BRUSSELS, ANTWERP, and later at BOURG LEOPOLD, staffed by collecting all available GERMAN protected personnel.

STORES AND EQUIPMENT

When the move forward began the advanced depots medical stores were re-sited in accordance with the new positions of the corps which each served, but the system of supply based on geographical layout had to be altered to meet rapidly changing conditions.

The advanced depots medical stores could not move at the speed required to maintain a satisfactory supply system.

To overcome this, mobile elements were formed from the depots, consisting each of two three-ton lorries and a supply of medical equipment.

The mobile element was attached to the forward CCS of the corps normally served, and proved a satisfactory answer to the problem.

Following the battle of the FALAISE gap the moves of the advanced depots medical stores were long and frequent. One was retained at AUBIGNY to supply units in the rear, while the others were “leap-frogged” forward into BELGIUM. Two of those depots moved up to NIJMEGEN and EINDHOVEN in support of the MARKET GARDEN operation.

Depots were based for maintenance on base depots medical stores at BAYEUX and at DIEPPE.

GENERAL HEALTH OF TROOPS

Towards the end of July and in the early days of August there was a marked increase in enteritis and diseases of the digestive system. This was undoubtedly caused by the large increase in the fly population, due to the very crowded conditions in the bridgehead, and to the existence of hundreds of unburied carcasses of cattle.

In September as troops moved forward into unsoiled ground there was a distinct drop in the incidence of enteritis. A certain amount of malaria made its appearance, some of which was probably caused by troops transferred from the ITALIAN theatre.

The rate of VD rose from .43 per 1,000 per month in August to .74 per 1,000 per month in September.

An outbreak of typhoid fever which was immediately localised occurred in HQ 6 Gds Tk Bde.

Seventy-three cases were reported up to 26 September, all from Brigade HQ.

This was the only real epidemic of the campaign so far and was believed to be due to a carrier in contact with the HQ personnel.

Pay

As the area of liberated territory increased certain changes were made in organisation.

The most important of these was in the role of the Forward Base Pay Offices. These units had been originally designed as advance sections of Command Pay Offices, with the primary function of paying bills in forward areas and to act as repositories of bulk supplies of currency to which corps and divisional cashiers returned at intervals to replenish their treasury chests.

During this period it was found that corps and divisional cashiers could not be spared for these journeys, and money was therefore delivered to Forward Base Pay Offices, and these in turn fed forward to corps and divisional cashiers.

At the same time the payment of bills was decentralised to all cashiers.

A P.R.I. deposit account scheme was instituted by which units were enabled to draw, deposit and transfer from their regimental funds sums within specified limits. The system allowed the P.R.I. to hold the minimum in cash in the field and to draw funds from the nearest field cashier on production of a P.R.I. pass book. This reduced the possibility of loss of regimental funds to a minimum and proved a great convenience to the account holder.

Over two thousand P.R.I. deposit accounts were opened and hundreds of thousands of transactions passed through the ledger accounts maintained in Command Pay Offices.

The army’s initial requirements of BELGIAN currency were estimated at a thousand million francs.

This sum was requested from UK in August, but owing to sea transport difficulties the consignment did not arrive until 5 September. On the same day pre-loaded vehicles went forward to Rear HQ Second Army, and on the morning of 7 September advances were issued to corps and divisional cashiers.

It was imperative that FRENCH francs in possession of the troops in BELGIUM should be exchanged immediately on crossing the border, because the difference in the purchasing power of the BELGIAN and FRENCH francs had already led to black market dealings in currency.

To counteract these practices, cashiers had been provided with a secret authority to draw funds in an emergency from banks, and on 5 September, Guards Armoured Division cashier drew 3,500,000 BELGIAN francs from the National Bank of BELGIUM.

BELGIUM, and particularly BRUSSELS, possessed large stocks of attractive goods, and the rate of expenditure of the armies doubled in a few weeks. The sterling equivalent of total currency transactions handled by army cashiers during this period equalled £388,000,000.

Deficiencies arising from overpayments etc. amounted to £2,000, approximately .0005 per cent of the total amount handled.

The speed of the advance of the armies and the ever lengthening L of C led to supplies of currency being sent from UK by air. Supplies of DUTCH guilders and GERMAN marks were flown forward on 6 and 11 September in preparation for the future. In all, £5,500,000 in BELGIAN francs, £4,750,000 in DUTCH guilders and £ 3,250,000 in allied military marks were sent in this way.

On 25 September the cash reserves housed in the radar station at DOUVRES, which then amounted to the sterling equivalent of £32,250,000 were transferred to PARIS and deposited with the National Bank of FRANCE.

On 26 September the supply of currency in bulk was taken over by the various Currency Sections set up for this purpose by Supreme Headquarters. For distributional convenience, the Pay Services 21 Army Group continued to supply funds to the RAF and certain of the allied contingents ; adjustment was effected through the currency sections.

To relieve the pressure on army resources, the fullest possible use was made of civilian banks which for cash duties were for a time unofficially incorporated in the Pay Services. Cashiers opened army bank accounts in BAYEUX, ROUEN, AMIENS, LILLE, PARIS, BRUSSELS and ANTWERP. Post Offices, NAAFI/EFI etc. were encouraged to pay in their takings to these bank accounts wherever their location made it feasible.

Provost

TRAFFIC CONTROL

With the first signs that a crack in the GERMAN defence was developing, it became apparent that a large-scale advance must be planned for, including the crossing of theSEINE. Therefore, six additional traffic control companies were phased in, all of which arrived before 8 August.

On 21 August, Second Army and First Canadian Army each had four TC coys under command, and seven were under command HQ L of C.

As the length of the pursuit increased, a request was made to the War Oifice for four more TC coys and six additional (VP) coys. This request was met in October.

There was a big signing problem on each of the four main administrative routes, together with the various roadheads and depots which were opened up as the armies advanced.

The signing of routes within roadheads proved to be one of the most important of provost tasks. Experience showed that one full TC coy is required for the control of a roadhead supplying three corps.

It was found that it was better to have one company permanently allotted for this tasks as the type of signing required was different from that normally employed on main administrative routes.

The best solution was found to be to allot distinctive coloured arrows to each main commodity.

The roadhead TC was responsible for signing to the depots and the depot commander responsible for signing inside his depot.

DISCIPLINE

In the early stages of the advance, a number of reports of looting were received. SIB investigated and found conclusive evidence that GERMANS in retreat had been guilty ofmost of these crimes. It was arranged that SIB, with representatives of Claims and Hirings, should enter important towns immediately behind forward troops in order to investigate without delay all reports of ill-discipline.

The policing of liberated towns was a major commitment, which increased as the advance continued, and the responsibility for which was taken over by the CMP allotted to L of C.

CHANNEL PORTS

Of the Channel ports that were liberated DIEPPE was the only one to be opened immediately and Provost had to handle large numbers of transit personnel, most of whom were reinforcements.

CRIME IN LIBERATED AREAS

Crime of varying natures began to develop in the liberated areas, particularly in the larger towns. Black market activities increased rapidly, and investigations often showedthat WD property was the subject of such dealings.

A number of civilians were apprehended for tapping the petrol pipeline, and others for improper possession of VVD stores. Civilians arrested were handed over to the civil police for disposal. The crossing of the FRENCH-BELGIAN frontier was followed by an outbreak of illegal dealings in the currencies of the two countries, and also by a certain amount of smuggling—particularly tobacco, cosmetics and liquor.

Provost kept close contact with Intelligence, local police and customs officials in dealing with these crimes.

In BRUSSELS and ANTWERP, where large numbers of troops were in contact with large civil populations, Provost were successful in reducing the activities of racketeers ofall types.

The police authorities of both FRANCE and BELGIUM were most friendly and willing to co-operate, but in the case of the former the activities of the GERMAN occupying forces in FRANCE had disorganised them and prevented them immediately reaching their full efficiency.

SPECIAL DUTIES

Military police were included in the escort provided for the Commander of the FFFI on his entry into PARIS, and remained With him for about a fortnight.Two sections of provost were detailed for special duties in connection with the airborne operation at ARNHEM. They were in addition to the Provost forming a normalpart of the airborne formations, and were included in what was planned to be the airborne FMA. Although they landed successfully the eventual withdrawal of 1 irborne Division prevented the full development of the project.

Education

Daily production and delivery of news broadsheets was continued by all formations to keep troops up-to-date with the news, the arrival of newspapers from home having proved erratic during periods of quick movement. The production of these broadsheets, and other activities to supply news to the troops, was the principal function of the educational service at this time.

A small supply of FRENCH and GERMAN “From Scratch” books became available from War Office, together with a limited number of FRENCH and GERMAN dictionaries.

8,000 copies of the ABCA map review “The Western Gates” were reprinted to meet the demand for map reviews.

Early in September, Education branch Second Army published a guide sheet to BRUSSELS which had a very wide distribution. In conjunction with the provost sta“, an information room was set up near the Gare du Nord, BRUSSELS.

A Warrant Officer, A.E.C. was in charge and answered enquiries in connection with visits to places of cultural and general interset.

Graves

The frequent moves of corps throughout this phase made the work of the GRUs attached to them very difficult.

Before graves could be located and registered as a result of the receipt of burial returns, the GRUs would have to move on again, sometimes for a distance of 120 miles.

Consequently the number of non-registered graves, particularly in the area NORTH of the SEINE up to the BELGIAN frontier, began to accumulate.

It was not until after the entry into BRUSSELS and ANTWERP that it became possible to deal with graves location and registration methodically.

Welfare

EQUIPMENT

Welfare stores continued to flow into the theatre, and in addition, large stocks of captured enemy stores became available.

Of these latter, 100,000 packs of playing cards, ten tons of writing paper and envelopes, and brushes of all kinds were distributed, while hotwater bottles, Eau de Cologne, powder and scissors were handed over to the medical authorities.

100,000 books were received as a gift from a publishing firm in UK.

CLUBS AND CANTEENS

A mobile canteen control committee was set up (with representatives from EFI, 2 TAF and CVWW) to control the allocation of mobile canteens.

The normal scale to forward formations was three per armoured division and four per infantry division. Forward troops were always given first priority for canteens.

The YMCA and BELGIAN Red Cross Society opened canteens immediately after our troops arrived in BRUSSELS, and on 25 September Toc H opened the first static club.

HQ of CVWW moved to BRUSSELS in September, and the United Services Welfare Centre was acquired.

LIVE ENTERTAINMENT

The original five all-male “Stars in Battledress” parties were replaced by six new parties including ATS personnel. Assistance and equipment was given in the forming of eleven divisional and other parties within the theatre. Stage equipment, draperies, scripts and song books, amplifying sets, etc, were issued to units. In all, 150 gramophones and 13,100 records were distributed.

During the period, ENSA built up a total of twenty-four mobile parties and twelve rediffusion vans and opened fourteen garrison theatres.

Six FRENCH-BELGIAN parties were employed with ENSA.

BROADCASTING

Broadcasts from NW] EUROPE included mention of army welfare activities, a “Stars in Battledress” broadcast in the “Transatlantic Spotlight” programme and contributions to the Allied Expeditionary Forces programme of the BBC.

CINEMAS

By the end of the phase, ENSA was running twelve garrison cinemas and the Army Kinema Service a hundred mobile Cinemas.

ATS

Auxiliary Territorial Service

The first ATS personnel to arrive in the theatre landed at ARROMANCHES on 12 August 44 with HQ 21 Army Group.

There were 400 in the party—one ATS group HQ and three companies—the auxiliaries being employed as cooks, orderlies, clerks and drivers.

Civil Affairs

During this phase when towns and large territories were being liberated very rapidly, Civil Affairs proved of the greatest assistance to the fighting formations. Their detachments were always well forward and by maintaining contact with the local authorities on matters concerning curfew, blackout, restriction of movements and finance they relieved the staffs of those formations of much anxiety.

It is of interest to note that one Civil Affairs detachment under command 30 Corps was conferring with national and local authorities in BRUSSELS in the early morning of 4 September, the day after its capture.

An advanced increment of the Civil Affairs stafi was established in that city on 10 September. In all, Civil Affairs in the field was now represented by two Base Port Depots, eight Inland Depots and four Civil Affairs Groups, all of which were under command either of one of the two armies, or of HQ L of C.

During “MARKET GARDEN” three Civil Affairs detachments were included with the forward troops, to be located at NIJMEGEN, ARNHEM and APELDOORN in the event of these places being occupied.