MILITARY OPERATIONS
in the
NETHERLANDS
from 10th - 17th May, 1940
described by
P.L.G. DOORMAN, O.B.E.
Colonel of the Dutch General Staff
Based upon material and data in
the possession of the Netherlands
Department of War in London
Translated from the Dutch
by
S.L. Salzedo
Published for
THE NETHERLANDS GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION BUREAU
by GEORGE ALLEN & UNWIN LTD
First published in June 1944
Second impression November 1944
THIS BOOK IS PRODUCED IN
COMPLETE CONFORMITY WITH THE
AUTHORIZED ECONOMY STANDARDS
Printed in Great Britain by Gilling and Sons Ltd., Guildford and Esher
CONTENTS
PREFACE.............................................................................................................3
FOREWORD.........................................................................................................3
I. THE TASK OF THE NETHERLANDS ARMED FORCES.................................................4
II. THE FORCES AT THE DISPOSAL OF THE KINGDOM ...............................................4
III. THE GEOGRAPHICAL CHARACTER OF THE NETHERLANDS FROM THE MILITARY
STANDPOINT.......................................................................................................9
IV. THE NETHERLANDS PLAN OF OPERATIONS ....................................................... 12
V. CONSIDERATIONS IN RELATION TO THE NETHERLANDS PLAN OF OPERATIONS...... 16
VI. EVENTS SHORTLY BEFORE THE OUTBREAK OF THE CONFLICT ............................. 19
VII. THE GERMAN PLAN OF OPERATIONS............................................................... 20
VIII. THE COURSE OF MILITARY EVENTS ON THE 10TH MAY..................................... 21
1. The Attack on the Heart of the Country. ......................................................... 21
2. The Struggle in the Southern Provinces.......................................................... 23
3. The Events in the Valley Positions, in the Area East of the Latter, and in the
Northern Provinces. ........................................................................................ 27
4. The Situation at the End of the First Day of War.............................................. 29
IX. THE MILITARY OPERATIONS ON THE 11TH MAY................................................. 30
1. The Fighting in the Heart of the Country and on the Southern Front of the Holland
Fortress. ....................................................................................................... 30
2. The Military Operations in North Brabant........................................................ 32
3. Events in the Valley Position and in the Northern Provinces............................... 33
4. The Military Position at the End of the Second Day of War. ............................... 34
X. MILITARY OPERATIONS ON THE 12TH MAY ........................................................ 35
1. The Struggle in the Heart of the Country and on the Southern Front of the Holland
Fortress. ....................................................................................................... 35
2. The Military Operations in North Brabant........................................................ 36
3. The Fighting in the Valley Position and in the Northern Provinces....................... 36
4. The Situation at the End of the Third Day of War............................................. 38
XI. THE EVENTS OF THE 13TH AND 14TH MAY........................................................ 38
1. The Fighting in the Valley Position and the Retreat to the East Front of the Holland
Fortress. ....................................................................................................... 38
2. The Military Operations in North Brabant and at the Kornwerderzand. ................ 40
3. The Events in the Heart of the Country. ......................................................... 40
4. The Situation on the Morning of the 14th May, and the Capitulation. .................. 41
XII. THE STRUGGLE IN ZEELAND.......................................................................... 42
XIII. FINAL REVIEW............................................................................................ 44
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THE APPENDICES .............................................. 48
APPENDIX I: DISTRIBUTION OF THE PRINCIPAL DUTCH FORCES OVER THE VARIOUS
THEATRES OF OPERATION................................................................................... 49
A. Troops intended for Subsidiary Strategic Duties. ............................................. 49
B. Troops intended as Security Forces on the Fronts of the Holland Fortress, for
Occupation of the Den Helder Position and of Important Objectives in the Interior. .. 50
C. Troops intended for the Principal Struggle. ..................................................... 50
APPENDIX II: ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF A GERMAN ORDER CAPTURED NEAR THE
HAGUE IN THE COURSE OF OPERATIONS .............................................................. 52
APPENDIX III: SPEECH DELIVERED BY RADIO BY THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE
LAND AND SEA FORCES TO THE PEOPLE OF HOLLAND ON THE EVENING OF THE 14TH
MAY ................................................................................................................. 54
APPENDIX IV: ORDER OF THE DAY OF THE DUTCH COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF LAND AND
SEA FORCES ON THE 15TH MAY ........................................................................... 55
 
 
PREFACE
On the occasion of the appearance of this book it is my duty and pleasure to
express my thanks to the Netherlands Government Information Bureau, who
made its publication possible. In the present difficult circumstances this was in
no sense an easy task.
It would scarcely be possible for me to mention by name all the people who have
in various ways helped me in the preparation of this book. May I here, then, take
this opportunity to thank them collectively.
I must, however, make an exception for Mrs. Olive Renier, who not only gave me
the utmost assistance as part of her normal work in the Netherlands Government
Information Bureau, but who also, outside her official capacity, spared no pains
to help me over the many problems which arose.
A few of the photographs reproduced in the book have been taken from
illustrations in the Netherlands periodical De Militaire Spectator. It was,
unfortunately, impossible to obtain permission beforehand for their use. I hope
and trust, however, that the editor will forgive me for taking this liberty. The rest
of the photographs, however, were supplied by courtesy of the R.A.F. Nor can I
conclude without expressing my gratitude for the wholehearted co-operation I
received from this quarter.
P. L. G. D.
FOREWORD
The moment has not yet arrived when a complete picture can be given of the
events which occurred in Holland during the "Five Days' Campaign." The data
which would be required for that purpose, both from Dutch and from German
sources, are not available.
If, nevertheless, we endeavour in the following pages to present a brief account
of these military operations, it is because it has been repeatedly observed that
an erroneous view was widely held with regard to the course of events in that
campaign, a view which in many instances has been made the basis of illfounded
criticism.
The pages which follow, therefore, are dedicated to those who, under difficult
circumstances, willingly laid down their lives for their country, and to the body of
expert military instructors who, in the pre-war years, were called upon to
discharge the onerous task of training the Dutch people for the duties of war.
These duties, indeed, owing to the long period of peace which had gone before,
in which the people had enjoyed to the full the opportunities of cultural
development, were particularly difficult.
Finally, they are dedicated to all those in Holland who are dear to us, and who, in
these years of stress, are being called upon to suffer for our omissions in the
past.
I. THE TASK OF THE NETHERLANDS ARMED FORCES
On the 13th September, 1938, the Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs
declared, in the Assembly of the League of Nations, that Holland recognized no
obligation, even under Article 16 of the League Covenant, to take part in any
common action, or to permit the passage of foreign troops through its territory.
Thus Holland had reverted to the old policy of independence which she followed
before 1914.
The object of the Netherlands Government, in issuing this declaration, was to
make it manifest to the entire world that in case of any conflict which might
possibly arise in the future there was but one attitude to be expected from the
Netherlands Government: that of strict neutrality towards all belligerents.
This declaration was not, however, in the least meant to imply that the attitude
of Holland in a future conflict would be limited to issuing a declaration of
neutrality. On the same occasion, indeed, the Minister for Foreign Affairs said:
"By arming itself as thoroughly as possible in order, with all the forces at its
command, to defend its frontiers against any violation of its integrity, no matter
from what quarter, and by thus being able to maintain an armed and effective
neutrality, such a state does its national duty, and this attitude will at the same
time best serve European interests."
In this way, therefore, the foreign policy of Holland was defined with perfect
clarity. At the same time, moreover, the task which the forces at the disposal of
the Government of the Netherlands would have to carry out was laid down.
This twofold task consisted of:
(a) Maintenance of Dutch neutrality.
(b) Defence of Dutch independence against any attack from without.
II. THE FORCES AT THE DISPOSAL OF THE KINGDOM
During the period which immediately followed the world war of 1914-1918 the
armed forces of Holland fell more or less into a decline. There were two reasons
for this. In the first place many sections of the Dutch held over-optimistic views
about the newly formed League of Nations and the general disarmament
foreshadowed in connection therewith. The second reason was that during the
long years of mobilization so many financial and personal burdens had
necessarily been shouldered for purposes of defence, that throughout practically
the entire nation there was reluctance to face further sacrifices.
The financial crisis during those years was also a contributory factor in reducing
expenditure, particularly defence, to the lowest level.
The result of all this was that between 1918 and 1936:
(a) The strength of the levies was reduced from 23,000 to 19,500; in the period
1920 to 1922 to as little as 13,000 men.
(b) The cadre of professional officers and non-commissioned officers was cut
down considerably.
(c) Many peacetime formations were abolished.
(d) The period of first training for unmounted forces was reduced to five and a
half months, and in the case of men liable to service, who had already taken part
in preliminary military training, to as little as six weeks.
(e) The most essential supplies of material were neglected, or else were on so
modest a scale that whole decades would have been needed for the attainment
of anything like tolerable conditions.
Nor was this all. During those years when training and supplies were below
reasonable limits, the state of preparedness had also fallen off considerably. The
number of peacetime formations was cut down to such an extent that each
formation had to be multiplied six or eight times to put it on a wartime basis.
Such an expansion could not be carried out all at once. It required an
intermediate phase in the form of pre-mobilization, in which the nuclei of the
wartime formations had to be created. The general mobilization which followed
shortly afterwards then raised the nuclei in question to full war strength. Owing
to this fact the entire process of putting the forces on a war footing was
prolonged for some days.
In the meantime, circumstances in the world around underwent a complete
change.
After power in Germany had passed into the hands of Hitler in 1933, there
followed in rapid succession the events the object of which was to unite all
German, or presumed German, territories in a "Greater Germany" and to put this
state in a position to dominate the Continent.
The year 1935 began with the plebiscite in the Saar territory, as a consequence
of which the Saar reverted to Germany.
In March of the same year Germany introduced the militia system, and in doing
so threw over one of the most important provisions of the Treaty of Versailles.
The return to the militia system meant that within a few years the German
armed forces would again have grown to such an extent as to rank among the
most powerful in the world.
June witnessed the Naval Treaty with England, while in October of the same year
Italy entered on the war against Abyssinia, a war which not only ended with the
complete occupation of that territory, but also drew Italy, as a result, into the
wake of Germany.
The Franco-Russian pact, concluded in the beginning of 1936, afforded some
relief. It looked as if a balance of forces was in process of slowly coming into
being on the Continent. The occupation of the Rhineland, however, destroyed
any such expectations.
Owing to the possibility of converting her western frontier into a strong wall of
defence, Germany was able to provide herself with a defensive flank. This gave
her freedom of action in the south and the east. The armies of the Western
Powers would now no longer be able, in case of need, to come quickly to the aid
of their hard-pressed allies in Central and Eastern Europe. It was once more
possible for the German General Staff to operate on internal lines.
In 1938 and 1939 the moment had arrived for Hitler to harvest the crop which
had been sown during the preceding years. Austria, the Sudeten territory and
later the whole of Czechoslovakia became his victims.
Italy, which had now entirely been absorbed into the orbit of Germany and also
wished to gather in her share of the profits, began her operation against Albania
in the spring of 1939. Such was the position when, in the autumn of the same
year, Hitler prepared for the next coup: the Corridor and Danzig. It was a coup
which was to mark the beginning of a new world war.
Apart from the fact that the above events had prompted the Dutch Government
to review its entire foreign policy, and, as has already been pointed out, to revert
to complete independence, a review of the army policy adopted during the
previous years likewise became inevitable.
It was not merely the fact that day by day there was a greater likelihood of
events developing in course of time into a military conflict in which Holland might
be involved, but new factors emerged as regards the tactics and strategy to be
expected in such a conflict.
Among these factors was the appearance of tank troops and motorized units in
the organization of the Great Powers surrounding Holland, and also the immense
growth of the air force.
Germany in particular, in building up her new armed forces, included a number
of armoured and motorized divisions in her organization. These units already
possessed a very high degree of military readiness even in peacetime.
Consequently the units in question could be called into action and employed in
operations within a few hours. The same may be said of the powerful air arm,
which was spread over a large number of airfields and was also in perpetual
readiness.
If, in the light of these facts, we examine the condition of the Dutch forces (of
which, during certain periods of the year, there were practically no trained
soldiers at all in the barracks), it becomes clear that such conditions could not be
allowed to endure and that, except at the cost of the abandonment of every
possibility of successful defence of our territory, a change in the policy so far
adopted as regards defence was essential.
This could not be more pointedly expressed than in the words which Minister
Colijn addressed in 1936 to the representatives of the people: "We no longer
have an army; it will have to be created at the time of mobilization."
In point of fact, having regard to the system then in operation, under which the
nuclei of the formations had first to be created during the period of premobilization
and then raised to wartime strength during the general mobilization
some time later, in order finally, during the period of concentration, to take up
their war positions, at least four to five days were needed before the Dutch
forces could be ready for fighting. It was clear to all that, under the
circumstances then prevailing, there was nothing to justify the belief that Holland
would be allowed this period for undisturbed preparation.
In 1936, therefore, there followed the change in the policy of defence, and this
change finally received its confirmation in the Military Service Law of 1938.
Under this law :
(a) The strength of the levies was increased by 8,000 men, and thus raised from
19,500 to 27,500 men.
This extension had become essential in order to remedy the extreme anaemia
from which the Dutch infantry was suffering.
But an army system requires time to become effective. As the war army was
made up of fifteen levies, it would take fifteen years before this increase of
strength attained its full effect. It was evident that a period of such length could
not be reckoned on. In order to make up to some extent for this difficulty, it was
decided that the 1939-1943 levies should comprise 5,000 additional men. For
those years, therefore, the levies would amount to 32,500 men.
(b) The period of service was fixed at eleven months.
As the infantry came to the colours in two batches every year, and as it may be
considered that a soldier is suitable for certain forms of fighting after five
months' training, the result of this measure was that one half of the infantry levy
was always available as trained troops. From this trained portion of the levy
twenty-four frontier battalions were formed. They were stationed close to the
main roads into Holland, and their object was to repel an unexpected attack, and
in this way to allow the Dutch forces sufficient time to mobilize and concentrate.
The twenty-four battalions in question were, however, not sufficient for the
discharge of this duty. Therefore an additional organization was created, by
which certain sections could, apart from a general mobilization, be called to the
colours separately in order to be available for this strategic measure. These
sections also consisted chiefly of infantry units. They, however, likewise included
the air force and air defence units. (As these units were called up by means of a
telegram with the letter Q, they were everywhere known as Q sections).
As regards the infantry, the Q sections consisted chiefly of older levies having
their place of residence in the frontier territories.
Finally:
(c) A defence fund was formed with the object of making good within the
shortest possible time the great deficiency which existed as regards supplies of
material.
The period during which the new Military Service Law was in operation before
war came was too short to allow of complete success.
Nevertheless its result was that on the second day of Easter 1939—the day of
the Italian attack on Albania — the frontier battalions and the Q sections were
able to take up their war positions, in order to safeguard a general mobilization
which might take place later. This did not occur till the end of August, however,
when the Dutch forces were raised to complete war strength.
In the months September 1939 to May 1940 great efforts were made to improve
training and efficiency to the utmost possible extent.
Unfortunately little could be clone to make up for the shortage of equipment, the
reason being that in this respect Holland was practically dependent on foreign
countries. Among other things, the light howitzers ordered in Germany, which
were so urgently needed to strengthen the divisional artillery, were only
delivered in very small quantities, and even then practically without ammunition.
At the outbreak of the conflict Holland possessed the following armed forces (see
also Appendix I):
(a) Four army corps each consisting of:
The staff.
Two infantry divisions, each consisting of the staff, three infantry brigades, one
machine-gun company, one regiment divisional artillery, consisting of the staff
and three brigades (two brigades armed with field guns of 7 cm. and one brigade
with 12 cm. or 15 cm. howitzers) and one company of pioneers.
The army corps troops consisting of:
One regiment of hussars, consisting of the staff, two mounted squadrons, four
cyclist squadrons, one machine-gun squadron, one anti-tank squadron, one
platoon of mortars, and one platoon of tanks.
One regiment of army corps artillery, but consisting only of one brigade of three
batteries armed with 10 cm. medium artillery.
The army corps train.
(b) One light division, consisting of the staff, two brigades of cyclists, two
regiments of motor cyclist hussars, the corps of horse artillery, consisting of a
staff and two brigades of artillery, armed with 7 cm. light field guns and the
divisional train.
(c) Twenty-four brigades of infantry, made up of the older levies.
These brigades were numbered from 23 to 46 inclusive; part of them were
combined into brigade groups.
(d) Twenty-four frontier battalions of infantry.
(e) Fourteen regiments of army artillery. These regiments were, however, to a
large extent armed with obsolete material (guns of 8 cm. steel, 12 cm. length
and 15 cm. length 24, guns with rigid carriages, without recoil). The Fifteenth
Regiment Artillery only was armed with the modern howitzer of 15 cm. length
15, and motorized. In the remaining regiments the guns were horse drawn, or
else they were entirely non-mobile and could therefore only be used in fixed
positions.
(f) A regiment of hussars consisting of the staff and four mounted squadrons.
(g) A number of detachments for the occupation of existing permanent works,
and for guarding important objects within the country.
(h) Depot troops. The brigade of infantry consisted of the staff, three battalions
of infantry, one mortar company and one anti-tank company.
In all, each infantry battalion had thirty-six light and twelve medium machine
guns.
The infantry division, therefore, in the main possessed guns as follows:
9 X 36 = 324 light machine guns.
9 X 12 + 18 =126 medium machine guns.
3 X 12 = 36 anti-tank guns (the companies were, however, not yet at full
strength).
3 X 6 = 18 mortars of 8 cm. (3-inch mortars).
2 X 12 = 24 7 cm. light field guns.
1 X 12 = 12 howitzers of 12 cm. length 14, or 15 cm. length 17.
As regards the Air Force, there was one bomber squadron, one squadron for
strategic reconnaissance and four squadrons of fighter aircraft. In addition the
organization included five squadrons intended to co-operate directly with the
ground forces.
The anti-aircraft defences consisted of a moderate number of batteries armed
with modern weapons, Vickers and Bofors, supplemented by a number of
batteries armed with fairly obsolete guns. In addition the organization included a
number of independent platoons of anti-aircraft machine gunners. A number of
these were combined into companies, allocated to the big units. Others were
allotted the task of guarding important objectives in the interior.
If we consider the composition of the Dutch forces with a critical eye, the weak
points necessarily strike us at once.
We may mention the following as the chief among them:
(a) Insufficient artillery power.
The division with an infantry strength of nine battalions possessed only thirty-six
guns, which were in addition not quite modern. The army corps artillery proper
numbered only twelve guns.
Altogether the army corps, with an organic strength of eighteen battalions of
infantry only, had seven brigades of artillery — that is to say, about one-half of
what is adopted as the normal in foreign organizations. True there were fourteen
regiments of army artillery, but their weapons were so much out of date that,
though they could be used on less important parts of the front, they were quite
unable to provide the necessary artillery support at decisive points.
(b) Insufficient anti-tank weapons.
In the organization of each brigade of infantry or cavalry regiment there was only
one anti-tank unit, and even this unit was armed with only a few guns.
(c) Entirely inadequate anti-aircraft defence.
In small countries, the air force of which cannot be expected, in the long run, to
maintain a fight with the air forces of great Powers, it is essential in particular
that the ground anti-aircraft defences shall not only be of specially great relative
strength, but that they shall also be perfectly armed. In the Dutch forces neither
of these conditions was fulfilled.
(d) Insufficient training of personnel.
The majority of the levies had only completed a first period of training, varying
from five and a half months to six weeks, while in the years which followed
repeat drill had only been practised for a short time and only once or twice.
Owing to these circumstances manoeuvres on a large scale could only be held
sporadically.
It need hardly be said that the Dutch Army Command were acutely aware of
these weak points.
The circumstances to which the inadequate equipment of the forces was due
have already been pointed out, with the added fact that when at last this
inadequacy was generally recognized there was no time to make good the
deficiencies.
Only the insufficiency of training could to some extent be remedied during the
period between September 1939 and the outbreak of hostilities in May 1940.
Notwithstanding all these deficiencies the Dutch armed forces were, when the
conflict broke out, from the highest to the lowest, ready to devote themselves
with complete self-sacrifice to the lofty task which awaited them.
III. THE GEOGRAPHICAL CHARACTER OF THE NETHERLANDS FROM THE
MILITARY STANDPOINT
Holland belongs almost in its entirety to the basin of the great rivers, the Meuse
and the Rhine.
As regards the southern portion of the country, the high lying ground is south of
the line Bergen op Zoom – Roosendaal – Breda - 's Hertogenbosch - Ravestein.
The land here consists, however, of alternative heath and woodland, containing a
number of clearings and settlements. Yet, generally speaking, this territory is far
from presenting clear and open spaces, and it is therefore not very well adapted
for military operations. On the border between Brabant and Limburg lies the
entirely open area of the Peel. This was originally marshland, but the peat moor
area has been partly cleared. Still, the land, off the roads, continues even now to
be impassable for large masses of troops.
In Limburg the hilly land approaches very close to the Meuse at various points,
the east bank of which is usually on a higher level than the west.
South Limburg proper, an important Dutch industrial area, and the only place in
Holland where coal is mined, is particularly hilly. The river Geul which cuts
through this area is for the most part deep, but otherwise is not in any sense a
considerable military obstacle.
From the east there are a considerable number of roads running through Dutch
territory to Belgium, but only four of them pass over the Meuse by means of
bridges—namely, at Maastricht, Roosteren, Roermond and Venlo.
From east to west the following continuous waterways are met with successively
in the southern provinces, in the direction south to north:
(a) The Meuse, duplicated at some points by the Juliana Canal. The Meuse,
especially since it has been canalized by dams, has become a waterway of great
military importance. A drawback, however, is that it lies only a few kilometres
from the German frontier, and that at various points the west bank is dominated
by the east bank.
(b) The Noorder Canal, joining on to the Peel area, and prolonged northwards by
the Raam.
The first-named canal is narrow and runs in part through wooded land. The
Raam is not an obstacle of any importance, especially in its southern part, but
the strength of this river for purposes of resistance can be increased at various
points by means of flooding.
(c) The Zuid Willemsvaart.
The canal has high dykes on both Bides, while shrub land and inhabited areas
extend over great distances along the banks. For this reason it is not very well
adapted for a prolonged defence.
(d) The Dommel.
(e) The Mark.
The two small rivers last mentioned are of practically no importance as obstacles,
and in addition they run to a great extent through woodland and inhabited
places.
Finally, there is a waterline from east to west in the form of the Wilhelmina
Canal, running from Beek-en-Donk through Tilburg and Oosterhout to
Geertruidenberg.
The area lying north of the high land of Brabant and south of the Meuse,
especially north and north-east of 's Hertogenbosch, is entirely open. Only the
Langstraat presents a narrow strip of groups of villages forming an almost
uninterrupted line.
The territory lying between the rivers Meuse and Waal, and between the Waal
and Lek, is generally speaking very open. Only the orchards, during certain
seasons of the year, provide some cover against visibility from the air. The dykes
along the river are high, while the roads generally speaking are narrow, stand
out sharply and for the most part are located on the open dykes.
Permanent bridges pass over the Meuse at Grave, Hedel, Heusden and the
Keizersveer. Over the Waal, on the contrary, the only bridges are at Nijmegen
and Zalt-Bommel, while the only bridges over the Lek are at Arnhem, Culemborg
and Vianen.
The rivers are some hundreds of metres wide, and the rate of flow is such as to
make crossing in small assault barges difficult.
The territory of Holland proper (the provinces of North and South Holland) lying
north of the river area and west of the line Wijk bij Duurstede – Utrecht -
Naarden, is a very open polder area intersected by innumerable ditches,
channels and canals. The roads are generally open. Only along the coast,
beginning at The Hague, and extending as far as the sea dyke at Petten, is there
an area of dunes having a width of some kilometres. The approaches from the
sea at the Hook of Holland and IJmuiden, and also the naval bases at Den
Helder, call for special attention from the military point of view.
Furthermore, the banks of the IJsselmeer, with the ports of Medemblik,
Enkhuizen, Hoorn, Edam, Volendam and Amsterdam, constitute a gateway of
attack for an enemy who has conquered Friesland, Overijssel or Gelderland, and
is able from there to command the IJsselmeer.
South of the Nieuwe Waterweg extends the island territory of South Holland and
Zeeland. These islands also are quite open. They, however, possess passive
security in the great rivers and arms of the sea which wash their shores.
The chief island in this territory is Walcheren, both because the approach to
Antwerp is controlled from that point, and because Flushing is a seaport of some
importance.
South Beveland is joined to the mainland of North Brabant by means of a dam,
with adjoining polders, while between Walcheren and South Beveland there is the
Sloedam. South Beveland itself is intersected by the Hansweerd Wemeldinge
canal, which canal, however, owing to the high dykes and the built-up areas
around, is less suitable for a prolonged defence than the territory farther
eastward at the Zanddijk, where the possibility of flooding may render an
approach from the east exceedingly difficult.
Likewise the land at Bath, the most easterly portion of South Beveland, forms a
strong natural obstacle.
The eastern part of Utrecht and the Veluwe consists of undulating hilly ground.
Extensive forests alternate with large open areas of heath and sand drifts.
Between both these areas is the Gelder Valley, constituting the basin of the Eem
and the Grift. This area also, in which extensive portions can be flooded,
especially in the north, has natural defences of great strength.
The basin of the IJssel extends from Arnhem to Kampen. In the southern portion
the high lands of the Veluwe approach very closely to the river, so that there the
west bank dominates the east bank, which fact is very favourable to defence on
an eastern front.
Further to the north the land is flat, and the river there is surrounded by high
dykes. The river itself is of considerable width, and for that reason has great
natural strength. Bridges connect the two banks at Arnhem, Doesburg, Zutphen,
Deventer and Zwolle.
The Spankeren – Apeldoorn – Hattem - Zwolle canal is of little military
importance. It is narrow and runs for a great deal of its length through wooded
land and built-up areas, while in addition a destruction of the lock at Spankeren
would drain the canal in some places.
The land lying east of the IJssel is very well adapted for an advance from an
easterly direction. The waterways in this region flow from east to west, so that a
continuous waterline in the direction south to north is not met with anywhere.
The ground, therefore, is not very suitable for delaying actions. The Deventer –
Raalte - Lemelerveld canal might be of some importance for this purpose, but it
lies outside the most obvious line of advance for an opponent coming from the
east. The Twente canals also run from east to west, so that these again are of
little importance for the defence of the country.
The northerly provinces, as cattle-raising, agricultural and industrial regions, are
of particular value in the defence of the country. Apart from the high land in
Drenthe, the soil for the most part consists of peat land and clay. Thus, along the
eastern border, from Gramsbergen, by way of Coevorden, Ter Apel and
Stadskanaal, a peat area extends, intersected by ditches, channels and canals,
and this is a kind of land which is very well adapted for delaying actions.
Winschoten commands the whole of East Groningen as a bastion.
Finally in Friesland, entirely open, a natural line of defence is encountered in the
old Frisian line of lakes extending from Sloten to east of Leeuwarden. The clay
land lying north of this, however, affords a very good passage for troops and
would require a very large number of men for prolonged defence.
Another important point for the defence of the country in this region is Zurig, the
place where the outer dyke of the Zuider Zee which runs from the Province of
Holland to Friesland reaches the coast.
IV. THE NETHERLANDS PLAN OF OPERATIONS
The task which the Dutch forces would have to fulfil in case of a conflict was
clearly defined by the foreign policy which had been specifically laid down —
namely:
Maintenance of neutrality.
Defence of the territory against any act of aggression.
Maintenance of neutrality meant that at every point on the frontiers of the
territory forces had to be present or at least available for being brought up
speedily, in order to repulse those who might violate the country's neutrality. In
practice, therefore, troops had to be maintained for this purpose at all important
points on the frontiers or on the lengthy coastline. Frontier and coastguards,
supplemented by naval and air patrols, played the chief part in carrying out this
duty.
The defence of the territory, really the principal task, made quite different
demands, however.
Of necessity the aim was to defend every part of Dutch territory, as was in truth
repeatedly declared by various Ministers at the assemblies of the States General.
But the Dutch frontier is not only long—the eastern frontier alone, from Vaals to
the Dollard, measured as the crow flies, has a length of about 400 km. — but, as
has already been stated, the nature of the ground, owing to the absence of any
natural obstacles, is such that lengthy portions are not in the least suited for
prolonged defence. The same applies to the southern frontier, which has a length
of fully 300 km., likewise without any natural protection.
Even the waterway which would rank in the first place for a continuous line of
defence with the eastern front—namely, the Meuse and IJssel with the Meuse -
Waal canal lying between — has a length of fully 200 km., which means that a
stubborn defence would require a number of troops exceeding many times that
of the Dutch forces. Even the defence of the part of the IJssel between Arnhem
and Kampen, with a length of 70 km., is a task beyond the powers of the forces
available.
Therefore the Dutch Army Command had necessarily to confine itself to the heart
of the country, as regards continuous defence of the territory.
Even in the past a line had been constructed for this purpose, the "New Holland
Waterline," later called the East Front of the Holland Fortress, along the line
(from north to south) Muiden – Weesp - Breukelen, and then to the east of the
town of Utrecht. Thereupon the line followed Schalkwijk – Leerdam - Gorinchem,
where support in the south was provided by the water area of the Biesbosch, the
Hollandsch Diep and the Haringvliet (south front of the Holland Fortress).
The great strength of this line was derived from the fact that, as regards the
chief zone of resistance, flooding could be effected to a width of 1 to 5 km. over
its entire length, except for a portion at Utrecht. The entire zone was provided
with permanent defensive works, which were, however, to a large extent
obsolete in their construction. Nevertheless, great value was still attached to
these works as points of infantry support, owing to the large surface, the
massive earthworks, and the safety against attack provided by the presence of
wide, wet ditches. This was particularly true where, as was the case at various
points, modern casemates had been built into these earthworks. Such casemates
were also constructed at all points where roads traversed the area of the
position.
The length of the east front of the Holland Fortress was about 60 km. Allowing
for the number of natural obstacles in the region, the defence of this position did
not exceed the powers of the Dutch forces.
Nevertheless, the position was not without its drawbacks. Among these the
following must be mentioned:
(a) The fact that the high ground in the eastern part of the province of Utrecht
would have to be yielded up to the enemy, which gave him the possibility not
only of finding covered positions, but positions which dominated the actual zone
of resistance.
(b) The growing strength of modern artillery fire and air bombing.
In most instances, too, the floods on our own side ended against dykes and
quays. In the first place this compelled the defender, if he wanted to have a field
of fire, to take up linear positions on the dykes. Moreover, a disadvantage of
these dykes was the risk that heavy bombardment would destroy them, thus
inundating our own positions.
(c) The city of Utrecht, in which the built-up areas approached very closely to the
position, was a drawback to the defence, lying as it did in the centre of the east
front.
(d) The impossibility of ever making contact by land with possible allies. The
broad river area in the south formed an absolutely insuperable obstacle to all
who might have been able to render help.
(e) The impossibility of our ever breaking out ourselves from behind the wide
floods.
In view of the foregoing considerations, the attention of Army Command in the
years preceding the war had been directed more and more to the Valleyposition.
This position, too, which runs from north to south, from Eemnes eastward by
way of Amersfoort, thence along the line Woudenberg – Veenendaal - Rhenen,
possesses great natural strength, because in several places, especially in the
northern part, flooding can be effected.
Furthermore, the high ground in the eastern part of the province of Utrecht
would now be on our own side, and as a result the position would at several
points dominate the ground on the east front.
This position has an advantage over that of the east front of the Holland
Fortress: it allows for the covered construction of defences in depth and the
concentration of reserves.
The length, from the IJsselmeer to Rhenen, is not more than 40 km., so that a
prolonged defence of this position was not beyond the powers of the Dutch
forces.
An opportunity for breaking out was provided along the parts remaining dry in
the flooded area, while by an extension through the area lying between the
Meuse and the Lek, along the line Rhenen - Apeltern, contact could be made with
the Dutch and possibly the Allied forces present in North Brabant.
On the basis of all these considerations the Dutch Army Command decided to
select the Valley position as the line in which the Dutch forces should carry on
the main defence.
During the last years preceding the war, the natural strength of this line was
increased to the utmost limit by the construction of a large number of casemates
and steel cupolaed bunkers. A ditch extending the whole length of the position
likewise provided it with the necessary defence against tanks
In addition to defence along this line, for reasons already stated — the
safeguarding of mobilization and concentration - an enemy advance would be
delayed in the outer provinces.
Particular value was attached to this delay, which Army Command pictured as
taking place in the east of North Brabant.
If the situation in Brabant is viewed in connection with what happened as regards
territorial defence in Belgium, one is struck by the fact that Weert, the southern
wing point of the link formed by the Raam, the Peel region and the Noorder
Canal, lies only 40 km. from Hasselt, on the Albert Canal.
Although the policy of strict neutrality adopted by Holland excluded the
possibility of any contact being made with foreign powers with regard to
contemplated military preparations, Army Command nevertheless had to take
into account the possibility that Holland and Belgium would simultaneously be
involved in a conflict with Germany. It was important in this connection to
examine what were the theoretical possibilities open to the Belgian Army
Command in such a case.
Having regard to the nature of the land, these were found to be the following:
(1) The Belgian forces would maintain a persistent defence on the Meuse as far
as Liége, and this defence would be extended to the north along the Belgian
Zuid-Willemsvaart.
In such a case the Belgian defence front could join up with the Dutch at Weert.
(2) The Belgian forces would extend the Meuse defence to the north, as indicated
under (1), along the Albert Canal, ending at the wing point of Antwerp.
In this case a few divisions interposed between Hasselt and Weert would also be
able to maintain a continuous defence.
(3) The Belgian principal defence would be conducted on the Meuse as far as
Namur and from that point by way of Louvain to Antwerp.
In this latter case the south wing of the Raam - Peel position at Weert would be
liable to be outflanked.
What the Belgian Army Command contemplated doing was not known to the
Dutch General Staff. In the preparation for defence of their own territory,
however, it was obvious that the above possibilities had to be taken into account.
Therefore particular attention was paid to the development of the Raam - Peel
position. At first designed as a purely delaying line, the possibility that the line
might be persistently defended was later envisaged.
Therefore, the Dutch plan of operations, as regards an attack from the east,
comprised:
(a) Delaying an enemy advance in the territory east of the IJssel (chiefly for the
purpose of covering the destruction to be carried out in this area).
(b) Delaying an enemy advance along the line the Meuse – Meuse-Waal canal -
IJssel.
(c) Delaying an enemy advance in the position Raam - Peel with the possibility of
changing these delaying tactics into a 1 persistent defence, depending on what
might be done by possible allies.
(d) Persistent defence of the Valley position extended through the area between
the Lek and the Meuse, and afterwards along the Meuse in order to join up at
Grave with the Raam - Peel position.
Further:
(e) Delaying an enemy advance in the sense indicated under (a) in the territory
of South Limburg, lying east of the Meuse.
(f) Delaying an enemy advance (on the east canal front) in the northerly
provinces, and persistent defence of the head of the outer dyke of the Zuider
Zee.
Delaying action on the lines mentioned under (b) and (c) was prepared in such a
manner that a continuous firing front was secured by guns set up in casemates
or steel cupolaed bunkers.
As regards the lines mentioned under (e) and (f) there were casemates at the
chief passages over canals or approach roads.
On the basis of this plan of operations, on the 10th May, the day on which the
conflict broke out, the Dutch forces were disposed as indicated on Map 1.
When considering this disposition the following should be noted:
Until shortly before the moment when the conflict broke out the Raam - Peel
position was occupied by the Third Army Corps and the Peel division, while, in
order to cover the open south wing at Weert, the Light Division was disposed to
the rear in echelons.
With this disposition of troops in the Raam - Peel position, therefore, defence was
the foremost object. True, the length of the Raam - Peel position between Weert
and Grave was still quite 60 km. — that is to say, one which far exceeds the
powers of defence of three divisions under normal conditions — but it must be
borne in mind that the entire middle section of the Raam - Peel position,
extending between Mill and Nederweert — that is to say, a section of about 45
km. — is naturally so strong that weak forces may suffice for the defence of the
approaches traversing this territory. Therefore, the strength of the defence could
be concentrated on the Mill-Grave part, where at the outset the main body of the
Third Army Corps was disposed.
A few days before the outbreak of the conflict the Dutch Supreme Command
realized that only a few weak sections of the Belgian forces were on the Zuid
Willemsvaart, so that, in case of an attack from the east, the resistance on the
raid canal would presumably only be of short duration. It could likewise not be
regarded as probable that Allied forces could arrive in time to close the gap south
of Weert. Therefore, the Commander-in-Chief of the Land and Sea Forces
decided to adopt only delaying tactics in the Raam - Peel position.
The Third Army Corps and the Light Division had now as a matter of course to be
allocated to the defence of the south river front, and in case of necessity as
reserve for the occupation of the Valley position. With this in view the Third Army
Corps was withdrawn, leaving a few battalions in the Raam - Peel position, and
was concentrated in the region shown on the map. If an attack really took place
from the east, this army corps would take up a position behind the Waal, in the
space between Ochten and Gorinchem, while the Light Division would be
transferred to the environs of Rotterdam.
Obviously, it would have been possible to get the units in question to carry out
the necessary displacements for this purpose at once. The reason why this was
not clone was that it was thought desirable:
(a) To leave an enemy in uncertainty as long as possible with regard to the
resistance to be expected in North Brabant.
(b) For reasons connected with neutrality, to maintain a considerable force as
long as possible south of the big rivers.
The task of the First Army Corps, depending on the circumstances, was:
Defence of the coast front.
To form the reserve for the occupation of the Valley position.
Occupation of the most important parts of the east front of the Holland Fortress,
which was itself the second line of defence.
For the rest the most important parts of the fronts of the Holland Fortress were
occupied by guard detachments consisting, of infantry troops, strengthened at
some points by brigades of artillery, all of which were, however, armed with outof-
date weapons.
The IJsselmeer itself was guarded by a small flotilla consisting of a few armoured
boats, mine sweepers, one torpedo boat and a number of motor boats.
V. CONSIDERATIONS IN RELATION TO THE NETHERLANDS PLAN OF
OPERATIONS
If we examine the disposition of the Dutch forces on the eve of the outbreak of
the conflict, it is evident that this disposition, in consequence of the attitude of
strict neutrality adopted by the Government, was intended to allow for all
possibilities which might arise.
An attack from the east, apart from the delaying actions on the Tines mentioned,
would be held in the Valley position, while in that case the Third Army Corps, by
occupying the Waal front, would create a continuous defence with the south front
of the Holland Fortress. The First Army Corps and also the Light Division would
finally form the reserve at the disposal of the Chief Command.
If an attack took place from a southerly direction, it would, after being delayed in
North Brabant, particularly on the Wilhelmina Canal, be held on the Waal and the
south front of the Holland Fortress. In addition to the troops of the Third Army
Corps available for this purpose, and the sections belonging to the security
garrison of the Holland Fortress, there could also be employed for this defence
the First Army Corps and also units from the Valley position, which position
under these circumstances would no longer be important.
From a westerly direction, an attack would be held on the coast by the security
garrison of the west front of the Holland Fortress, the First Army Corps, the
troops in Zeeland, and those occupying the position of Den Helder, while in these
circumstances the whole of the forces occupying the Valley position and the
troops in North Brabant could strengthen this defence in a later phase.
The disposition was therefore designed to meet the task imposed on the Dutch
Supreme Command by the foreign policy of Holland. The question must,
however, now be put whether this disposition was also in keeping with the
principle generally applied in strategy of the economy of forces. In dealing with
this question we will confine ourselves to the case which actually occurred -
namely, an attack from the east.
It is particularly desirable to examine whether there were not too many forces
allocated to subsidiary strategic functions, forces which in the final outcome
would cease to be available for the main struggle, for which in the nature of
things there never can be sufficient strength.
Let us examine the distribution of forces a little more closely in this connection.
As has already been stated, the total forces available were:
Battalions.
24 brigades of infantry of the field army 72
24 brigades of infantry, i.e. numbers 23 to 46 inclusive 72
24 frontier battalions 24
2 brigades of cyclists 6
5 regiments of hussars, amounting to 5
2 regiments of hussar motor-cyclists, amounting to 2
In all a force of 181
These forces, in case of an attack from the east, were allocated as follows:
Battalions.
(a) Delaying action east of the IJssel 5
(b) Territorial defence of South Limburg 4
(c) Ditto Northern Provinces 7
(d) Delaying action on river line Meuse - IJssel 16
(e) Delaying action in south part of North Brabant 3
(f) Territorial defence of Zeeland 4
(g) Delaying action in the Raam - Peel position 14
Total for subsidiary strategic tasks 53
Battalions.
(h) As guard security garrisons on the fronts of the Holland Fortress and in
occupation of important objects in the interior 32
(i) Defence of the Valley position, a strength of 39
(j) Defence of the region between the Meuse and the Lek 12
(k) Defence of the Waal, to the south front of the Holland Fortress (those troops
withdrawn from the Third Army Corps and the Light Division) 26
(l) General reserve (First Army Corps) a strength of 19
Total strength for the principal action 96
If we reckon that the troops mentioned under (e) in the case of attack from the
east would be allocated for defence of the south front of the Holland Fortress, the
figure for the respective duties becomes 50-32-99.
For the performance of the principal task, the defence of the heart of the
country, fully one-half of the available forces were therefore allocated.
The allocation of a fighting strength of fifty battalions, quite one-fourth of the
total available forces, for the performance of strategically subsidiary tasks
appears high.
Let us examine; therefore, to what extent the distribution and allocation of the
troops in each of the territories mentioned was strategically justified.
(a) The troops intended for delaying action east of the IJssel were chiefly meant
to safeguard the work of destruction which had been prepared there. A figure of
five battalions for an area fully 100 km. in length, with a depth varying from 20
to 60 km., is certainly not too high for this.
(b) South Limburg is an area of great political importance. If only for that reason
it would have been inadmissible to leave this part of the country entirely
undefended and open for a German advance against the Belgian system of
defence. The allocation of four battalions to this duty is certainly a minimum.
(c) The northern provinces, as has been said above, were of great economic
importance for the conduct of war. The fundamental idea which gave rise to the
decision to defend this area territorially was that an opponent must be prevented
from occupying these provinces with very weak forces. If an opponent knew that
in order to conquer them considerable forces — or, to put it more definitely, from
one to two divisions — were needed, there was the possibility that he would
refrain from attacking this territory. And if there were such an attack, the forces
engaged there would in any case be drawn from the troops which had to light the
decisive action on the chief centre of operations, and this would indirectly benefit
the main Dutch defence or our allies.
Territorial defence of the northern provinces was therefore strategically fully
justified. In view of the extent of the territory the number of battalions allotted
was essential.
(d) As regards the troops intended for delaying action on the river line Meuse-
IJssel, it must be recalled that originally the reason for the intended delaying
tactics on this line was to give the main body of the forces the opportunity of
mobilizing and concentrating. This reason, however, was no longer operative,
since the Dutch forces had in September 1939 carried out mobilization and taken
up war positions without hindrance by enemy action. Nevertheless, the idea of
delaying action on this line was adhered to in order to give the units in the
principal defence some time to attain complete readiness for action. The lack of
depth of Dutch territory, together with the great mobility of German motorized
units, rendered this necessary.
If delaying tactics are to be at all effective the very least which must be
demanded is that a continuous firing front can be formed. From Roermond to
Zwolle the length of this line is about 180 km. If it was held by sixteen
battalions, therefore, each battalion would have charge of a length of 10 to 15
km. Any further dilution of this cordon disposition would have made the entire
resistance worthless, because it would then have been a very simple matter to
roll it up. When once delaying tactics had been decided upon, therefore, the
number of sixteen battalions could not be reduced.
(e) The battalions intended for delaying action in the southern part of North
Brabant were, in case of an attack from the east, to be allocated to the defence
of the southern front of the Holland Fortress, and therefore can be left out of
account.
(f) With respect to Zeeland, it was essential in all circumstances to prevent an
important port, such as Flushing (Vlissingen?), being captured by an enemy by
surprise. Therefore, there was unquestionable justification for the battalions
allocated to the defence of this territory.
(g) Delaying action in the Raam - Peel position was strategically justified with a
view to the possibility of support being obtained from possible allies. The
presence of Franco-British forces in northern France made this a possibility.
In order to reach North Brabant, those units would have had to cover distances
of about 200 km., which requires a time of one to two days.
Therefore, the longer the troops in the Raam - Peel position could hold up an
enemy advance from the east, the more likelihood was there that the Allied
troops would reach North Brabant in time, and the farther east would be the
point at which they would perhaps be able to bring an enemy advance to a
standstill.
Every hour of additional delay might lead to the result that a larger portion of
North Brabant remained in our hands. This consideration was well worth the
allocation of fourteen battalions to the Raam - Peel position.
(h) Finally, the strength of thirty-two battalions as security guard for the Holland
Fortress, and for the interior, must be considered as a minimum. In particular
the anticipated use of air-borne infantry and paratroops made it absolutely
essential to retain a considerable number of troops in the interior for the defence
of vital points. The story of the campaign proves in actual fact that the number
of battalions allotted for this purpose was itself very far from sufficient.
Therefore, the disposition and the distribution of the Dutch forces at the outbreak
of the conflict can be fully justified.
VI. EVENTS SHORTLY BEFORE THE OUTBREAK OF THE CONFLICT
The Dutch Supreme Command necessarily possessed some data concerning the
strength of the German forces posted on the Dutch eastern frontier.
Shortly before the outbreak of the conflict it was estimated that there were -
(a) On the Dutch frontier in the territory north of the Rhine about ten German
divisions.
(b) On the Dutch frontier in the territory between Cleves and the line Munich –
Gladbach - Düsseldorf about nine divisions.
(c) Facing South Limburg in the area south of the line mentioned under (b) and
Monschau about thirty divisions.
From this disposition of troops it could be inferred that if an attack was to take
place from an easterly direction, it would presumably occur along the following
axes:
(1) A drive against the heart of the country in the territory north of the great
rivers, with subsidiary action, perhaps, against the northern provinces and the
outer dyke of the Zuider Zee.
(2) A drive through North Limburg and the eastern part of North Brabant,
directed against the Belgian positions on the Albert Canal, west of Hasselt, and
perhaps also against the westerly part of North Brabant and Zeeland. It was to
be expected that this drive would take place north and south along the Peel
territory.
(3) A main attack against the Belgian defensive system on the Meuse and the
Albert Canal, south and north of Liége respectively. The northern axis of this
attack would presumably run through the southern portion of the Dutch province
of Limburg.
Periods of tension had already occurred several times during the winter of 1939 -
1940, and had rendered it necessary to issue further standby orders. Such a
crisis occurred again on the 7th May. On that date, therefore, all leave (the
ordinary periodical leaves and the longer periods of leave given for purposes of
business and study) was cancelled, and at the same time order was given that all
frontier and coast troops were to occupy their fighting positions in full strength.
The result of this was that the strategic surprise at which the Germans aimed by
their sudden attack on Holland on the morning of the 10th May was unsuccessful.
VII. THE GERMAN PLAN OF OPERATIONS
In the eyes of the German Command Holland was a subsidiary field of
operations.
Nevertheless, it was of the utmost importance for that command to occupy
Holland as rapidly as possible when attacking in the west, in order to be covered
on the right flank in the operations against Belgium and France. Therefore, the
forces employed against Holland were considerable.
The German Eighteenth Army, which was to carry out the attack on Holland,
comprised the following forces:
About five infantry divisions,
One tank division,
One cavalry division,
The Twenty-Second Air-borne Division,
The Second Regiment of Paratroops,
The Seventh Air Division,
in addition to the necessary auxiliary troops. The entire force was under the
command of General von Küchler.
The German plan of attack comprised:
(a) An attack by air-borne infantry and paratroops on the heart of the country, in
order, if possible, to seize the centre of Government on the very first day of the
war, and in this way to paralyze the entire resistance (see Appendix II).
(b) An attack on the Valley position and the east front of the Holland Fortress
along the axis Arnhem – Rhenen - Utrecht.
(c) An attack through North Brabant with the intention of pushing on as quickly
as possible through Moerdijk – Dordrecht - Rotterdam, in order to make contact
with the airborne troops to be landed there.
(d) A subsidiary attack for the purpose of seizing the northern provinces and the
Zuider Zee dyke, in order to penetrate into the Holland Fortress by this way also.
Strategically, therefore, the operation presented the aspect of a frontal attack
combined with double outflanking, while the air-borne infantry together with the
paratroops were to give the stab in the back.
It would be of the utmost importance, especially if the attack mentioned under
(a) did not attain the desired success, that the troops operating in North Brabant
should make contact as rapidly as possible with the air-borne infantry to be
landed at Moerdijk, Dordrecht and in the environs of Rotterdam.
The German commander expected that this attacking group would have to
overcome the following resistances:
1. The obstructions east of the Meuse.
2. The Meuse itself.
3. The Raam - Peel position.
4. The Zuid Willemsvaart, and also
5. The Wilhelmina Canal.
Great rapidity of operation was therefore particularly desirable in the southern
outflanking group.
VIII. THE COURSE OF MILITARY EVENTS ON THE 10TH MAY
1. The Attack on the Heart of the Country.
On the evening of the 9th May, headquarters had already received reports from
various quarters, from which it was to be inferred that an attack on the early
morning of the 10th May was highly probable. Then shortly after midnight
reports came to hand from the aircraft spotters of great German air activity,
practically over the entire territory of Holland.
The question whether an air attack on England was contemplated or whether this
activity was the first phase of an attack on Holland was speedily settled, when
reports were received of air attacks on the airfields of Schiphol, Bergen,
Waalhaven, de Kooy, Soesterberg, Haamstede and Hilversum. In addition, a
number of the aircraft dropped mines in the outlets to the sea along the Dutch
coast, in order to prevent Dutch ships from running out and the possible arrival
of help from allies.
With the object of frightfulness, and in order to create confusion from the very
outset at the centre of Government, at 5 o'clock and at 10 o'clock air raids were
carried out on The Hague.
The Dutch air forces, which had, since the early morning hours been in a state of
complete readiness for action, took to the air wherever possible for their struggle
against the overpoweringly strong enemy. They succeeded in bringing down a
large number of German machines, but their own losses were necessarily heavy.
The Dutch anti-aircraft artillery also exacted a heavy toll at the outset from the
attacking German aircraft.
Three hours after the air raids had begun, however, the German Ambassador
handed a note to the Dutch Government suggesting that all resistance should
cease at once.
The Dutch Government, of course, rejected this suggestion, and declared that,
by reason of the German attacks which were taking place, a state of war existed
between Holland and Germany.
More serious than the air bombings themselves was the fact that paratroops
were dropped at various points in the hart of Holland, and succeeded in obtaining
control of a few airfields, in consequence of which German air-borne infantry
could be landed from transport aircraft.
Thus, the garrison of the Valkenburg airfield, consisting of parts of the Third
Battalion, Fourth Infantry Brigade, was, after air bombing at 3.30 a.m., partly
destroyed by paratroops, while the rest of the garrison was forced to retreat. At
7.30 a.m. this airfield was in German hands, and from that moment onwards
German reserves were continually brought up by Junkers transport aircraft.
Likewise the garrison of the Ypenburg airfield, consisting of the Third Battalion,
Brigade of Grenadiers, was forced to evacuate the airfield, and the airfield of
Ockenburg, where the garrison were taken by surprise, also fell into German
hands. At 6 a.m. this airfield was already occupied by 600 of the enemy.
In addition to the airfields mentioned above, swarms of paratroops were landed
near the Maaldrift, in the environs of Wassenaar, on the southern bank of the
Meuse at Rotterdam, near Dordrecht and Wieldrecht near the Moerdijk, in the
Westland, near Katwijk Binnen, and the Staalduinen.
At Rotterdam particularly, where the Germans were assisted by a strong fifth
column, consisting of the big German colony living in Rotterdam and a few Dutch
traitors, the position was serious. The Germans succeeded in gaining possession
of the two bridges over the Meuse and also the bridge over the Oude Maas. The
whole of Feyenoord and also the airfield of Waalhaven thus fell into German
hands. Rotterdam, as a supply depot, only had a very small garrison.
Notwithstanding the efforts made, in which a detachment of marines
distinguished themselves, the Dutch troops did not succeed in regaining the
bridges over the Meuse.
Torpedo boat Z5, and also the torpedo motor boat 51, both on guard at the Hook
of Holland, steamed up the Nieuwe Waterweg, and took part in the artillery
action against the German forces at Feyenoord, until the war vessels in question
had used up the whole of their ammunition.
Besides this, the Netherlands naval vessel Van Galen was summoned from Den
Helder to take part in the fighting at Rotterdam.
Although destroyers are necessarily not quite suitable for this sort of action, the
ship directed artillery fire on to the airfield of Waalhaven, but was finally
destroyed by repeated German air attacks.
The Germans also succeeded in gaining possession, by means of surprise, and
with the help of traitors, of the two bridges over the Moerdijk. In this way, in the
early morning of the 10th May, the island of IJsselmonde and also a large portion
of the island of Dordrecht were in enemy hands, while the troops landed around
The Hague had spread out and had seized the Deyl and the Haagsche Schouw, in
this way controlling the approaches to The Hague. Meanwhile the Dutch troops in
South Holland immediately began a counter-attack.
The remaining portion of the Third Battalion, Fourth Infantry Brigade, proceeded
to attack the airfield of Valkenburg, which airfield was also attacked from the
north-west and the north-east by the first and the second battalions of the same
brigade. The Third Brigade, Second Artillery Regiment, gave the necessary
artillery support in these attacks. Katwijk on the Rhine, where the Germans had
meantime also gained a footing, was recovered by Second Battalion, Fourth
Infantry Brigade. On the 10th May at 5.30 p.m. the airfield was again in Dutch
hands. The German garrison retreated to the village of Valkenburg, where it
maintained its position. The Third Brigade, Second Artillery Regiment, subjected
this village to heavy artillery fire.
The Haagsche Schouw and the Deyl were reconquered by young depot troops,
the First Motor Cyclist Hussar Regiment also taking part in this operation. The
German troops at these points also retreated to the village of Valkenburg.
First Battalion, Brigade of Grenadiers, which was on the southern outskirts of The
Hague, received orders to reconquer the airfield of Ockenburg by an attack from
the north. This battalion, strengthened by depot troops, succeeded in retaking
the airfield at 1.30 p.m. The attack, thanks to the excellent short-wave
communications, was effectively supported by the fire of First Brigade, Second
Artillery Regiment, which had taken up its position near its permanent station at
Poeldijk. The First Battalion, Brigade of Chasseurs, which was to attack the
airfield from the direction of Monster, encountered resistance, in the course of its
advance, near the estate of Ockenburg. When the battalion had wiped out this
resistance at 4 p.m. the airfield was already in Dutch hands. The German
garrison had retreated in a south-westerly direction.
Meantime, the airfield of Ypenburg had also been recovered by the Second and
the Third Battalion, Brigade of Grenadiers, and young depot troops from The
Hague.
In the latter city itself the fifth column had also displayed brisk activity. As early
as the night of the 10th May men of the depot troops had installed a powerful
guard service in the interior of the town. All action on the part of traitors was
energetically countered and there were several instances of exchange of fire with
fifth columnists inside houses.
Under the threat of the German paratroops who had landed outside The Hague,
the depot troops stationed at that place had occupied a position of defence on
the north and east borders of that city. The enemy, however, did not carry out
an attack on the city itself.
The Dutch troops in the Polder of the Hoeksche Waard and around Dordrecht
took up defensive positions in order to prevent any extension of the success of
the paratroops landed.
ln themselves, however, these units were not strong enough to undertake a
counter-attack. The batteries of artillery at Strijen, armed with the out-of-date
guns of 15 cm. 24 length, directed fire during the whole of the day against
Willemsdorp, the Moerdijk bridges and the Brabant shore. Unfortunately, the
bridges were so strongly built that even continuous fire with high-explosive shells
was not sufficient to render them unsuitable for traffic.
In the afternoon, the enemy landed reinforcements from aircraft on the shore
south of Katwijk. These troops were fired on effectively from the sea by the
Dutch naval vessel Van Galen, and they were also subjected to attacks by the
Dutch air force. Finally, these troops were destroyed by units of the First Army
Corps and depot troops.
An attack by German air-borne troops on the Staff Headquarters of The Hague
group of the west front of the Holland Fortress at Wateringen was also beaten off
with the aid of depot troops.
The Dutch air forces had meantime sustained heavy losses. What remained was
concentrated on airfields concealed from the enemy. From there they were
repeatedly sent out to attack, from the air, an enemy who continued to grow in
overwhelming strength.
2. The Struggle in the Southern Provinces.
After the Dutch had carried out the work of destruction east of the Meuse (which
was clone before midnight of the 9th-10th May), the German troops passed over
the Dutch frontier on a broad front in the early morning of the 10th May.
The main forces were directed on to the frontier section Lottum - Eysden, where
subsidiary troops were sent forward against the part of the Meuse lying between
Vierlingsbeek and Mook and the Meuse - Waal Canal.
The weak frontier guards east of the Meuse were speedily overpowered, after
they had performed their duty of reporting the passages over the frontier.
Apart from the railway bridge at Gennep, all bridges over the Meuse were
destroyed in time. The troops holding the bridge at Gennep, who were surprised
by a German shock force, did not succeed in destroying the bridge. Because of
this the structure lying in the second line, the railway viaduct at Beugen, the
destruction of which had also been prepared, likewise fell undamaged into
German hands. The consequence was that as early as 4 o'clock on the morning
of the 10th May a German armoured train, followed by a train filled with infantry,
passed over the Gennep bridge and the viaduct and steamed on to the railway
halt called Zeeland in the rear of the Raam - Peel position.
As early as 4 a.m. German infantry appeared on the east bank of the portion of
the Meuse between Sambeek, Boxmeer and Gennep, while the Dutch casemates
on the west bank were speedily subjected to machine-gun and artillery fire. As
the Dutch had no artillery at their disposal on the Meuse, the Dutch positions
were defenceless against this artillery fire.
Between 5 and 9 o'clock a.m. the attacker made five attempts to reach the west
bank on the Mook - Gennep section with infantry, but all these attempts were
repulsed by the well directed machine-gun fire from the casemates occupied by
troops of the Fifteenth Frontier Battalion and Second Battalion Twenty-Sixth
Infantry Brigade.
Between 9 and 9.30 a.m. the attackers succeeded in reaching the west bank in
the neighbourhood of Gennep. The same was the case at Sambeek at about 10
a.m. and at Mook at about 12 noon. After this the enemy was able to roll up the
Dutch cordon position. At about 3 p.m., therefore, the troops posted farther
south on the Meuse were withdrawn to the Raam - Peel position.
At Venlo the German attack had been directed against the positions of the Third
Battalion, Twenty-Sixth Brigade of Infantry, and the Second Frontier Battalion.
From 4 to 9 a.m. the enemy attempted to cross the Meuse in the vicinity of the
blown-up bridge, and similar endeavours were made on that part of the Meuse
lying south of Venlo and north of Kessel. At 9.15 a.m., under the protection of a
smoke screen, the enemy succeeded in putting over a pontoon bridge south of
Venlo, after which the Dutch position was rolled up there too. Some casemates,
however, continued to offer resistance right into the morning of the 11th May.
After Grubbenvorst and Lottum had been subjected to artillery fire a passage of
the river was also successfully effected at Lottum, which meant that the Dutch
positions at Broekhuizen could also be taken in the rear. In this section, likewise,
the troops remaining were ordered at 10.30 a.m. to fall back on the Raam - Peel
position.
In South Limburg, the first German tank division in action there had been able,
by means of its artillery, to clear up the isolated casemates on the approach
roads in a relatively short time, after which it pushed on towards Maastricht.
The orders of this division were:
(a) To gain mastery of the bridges at Maastricht, and
(b) After that, with the help of paratroops, to gain possession of the bridges,
west of Maastricht, over the Belgian Albert Canal.
The bridges at Maastricht were, however, destroyed, so that the armoured
division was only able to pass over to the other bank during the night of the 10th
- 11th May, after constructing a heavy pontoon bridge. The infantry troops had
already got across.
On the Meuse - Waal Canal the bridge at Hatert was only partly blown up, so that
the enemy was able to make his way over to the western bank into the positions
of the First Battalion, Twenty-Sixth Brigade of Infantry, and to roll up the
position on the west bank. On the afternoon of the 10th May the Dutch troops
stationed there began their retreat to Tiel.
In this way, notwithstanding the heroic defence and self-sacrifice of the various
troops occupying the casemates, the river line on the section Maastricht -
Nijmegen had been broken through at several points by about 12 o'clock, and
the enemy was able to continue his advance to the west.
Meantime troops belonging to the forces occupying the Raam - Peel position had
also come into action.
The sector lying between the railway line Gennep - Uden and the Meuse, having
a width of 10 km., was defended by there battalions belonging respectively to
the Third, the Sixth and the Fourteenth Infantry Brigade. The troops were not
equipped with up-to-date anti-tank guns, nor had they any mortars, or any
means of defence against attack from the air. The only artillery support available
was one brigade armed with guns of 8 cm. steel (out-of-date guns without
carriage brake and without gun-shields).
The German armoured train with the goods train following, which, owing to the
negligence at the bridge of Gennep, had been able to drive through as far as the
railway halt Zeeland, in the rear of the Raam - Peel position, landed German
infantry units there, who immediately began an attack on the rear of the
casemates lying north of the railway line and the casemates situated between
the railway line and the metalled road Volkel - St. Huber.
Local reserves were not available. The artillery brigade Third Brigade, Twentieth
Artillery Regiment, turned its guns round 180 degrees, however, and was in this
way able to repel the attack on the casemates north of the railway. It was,
however, not possible to prevent a number of casemates lying between the
railway and the metalled road from falling into German hands at 7.30 a.m.
As a result of these events the commander of the Third Army Corps, who also
had command of the light division, placed the Second Regiment of Motor Cyclist
Hussars at the disposal of the territorial commander in North Brabant, with the
object of recapturing the part of the position that had been lost.
The armoured train, which had meantime gone back, was derailed on the return
journey owing to obstacles placed upon the line. A fight lasting hours developed
between the occupants of this train and the casemates near the railway.
The counter-attack of the Second Motor Cyclist Hussars Regiment begun in the
open area between the railway and the Volkel - St. Huber road was brought to a
standstill by enemy machine-gun fire, and therefore did not attain the successful
result which had been hoped for.
Meanwhile the German troops who had crossed the Sambeek - Mook portion of
the Meuse had reached Mill, and at noon an attack developed from the environs
of this place on the front of the position. The attack, however, was repulsed by
the First Battalion, Third Brigade of Infantry, which battalion occupied this part of
the position.
Between 4 and 6 p.m. the German artillery then began violent fire on the Dutch
section west of Mill, and this fire was between 6 and 7 p.m. followed by bombing
by German aircraft. The village of Escharen lying farther north was also bombed
and set on fire.
Having regard to the fact that the part of the section of the First Battalion, Third
Brigade of Infantry, south of the railway line was in German hands, and that the
counter-attack by the Second Motor Cyclist Hussar Regiment had not produced
the desired result, while no reserves were available to carry out a fresh counterattack,
the whole of the troops occupying the Raam - Peel position were ordered
to withdraw to the Zuid Willemsvaart during the night of the 10th - 11th May. A
screening force which stayed behind in the position till 4 a.m. on the 11th May
concealed this operation from the Germans, who therefore did not press on
during the night.
Apart from certain troops who had not received the order of retreat, all the units
had, in the early morning of the 11th May, taken up the positions ordered behind
the Zuid Willemsvaart.
Meantime, as had been decided earlier, the Third Army Corps had moved from
the encampment area south of 's Hertogenbosch to the front allocated to this
unit behind the Waal between Ochten and Gorinchem.
The retreat was effected over the existing great connecting road between 's
Hertogenbosch and Zalt Bommel, and by way of a second road farther east, the
necessary pontoon bridges being constructed over the big rivers for this purpose.
Although the retreat had to be carried out by day and for the most part over
entirely open terrain, the operation took place without enemy air attack.
The retreat of the Light Division was not so simple an affair.
This unit, too, had received orders in sealed envelopes for the retreat, which was
to take place on the first night following an attack, if any. As in the case of the
Third Army Corps, however, the Commander-in-Chief decided that the retreat
was to start at once on the morning of the 10th May.
The two regiments of motor cyclist hussars had been withdrawn from the
division. The First Regiment of Motor Cyclist Hussars had already been placed at
the disposal of the commander of the Holland Fortress even before the outbreak
of hostilities. This was done in view of the danger from the air in the heart of the
country. The second regiment was, as described above, placed under the orders
of the territorial commander in North Brabant on the morning of the 10th May.
The Light Division now consisted, apart from the trains, of the two regiments of
cyclists and the motorized corps of horse artillery.
According to orders prepared beforehand, the retreat was to take place:
(a) With the motorized section along the line of march Moerdijk, Dordrecht,
Rotterdam, to the encampment point north of this place.
(b) With the First Cyclist Brigade along the axis Drongelen – Brakel - Herwijnen.
(c) With the Second Cyclist Brigade along the axis Keizersveer - Gorinchem.
As there was no bridge at this point, this brigade was to be transferred by ferry
to the other bank.
In the early morning the staff of the Light Division received the news that the
Moerdijk bridges were in German hands.
Orders were now modified, so that the motorized section, with the exception of
the Horse Artillery Corps, was to follow the line of march of the Second Cyclist
Brigade, while the Horse Artillery Corps was at first to do the same, but after
passing over the bridge at Keizersveer, was to diverge to the marching route of
the First Cyclist Brigade.
The Light Division was thus confronted with the difficult task of carrying out a
march by day over roads for the most part narrow and open, with units having
different marching paces. This, too, in a conflict with an opponent possessing air
supremacy, while the anti-aircraft defence consisted only of a few obsolete
batteries, set up at the bridges Keizersveer, Drongelen, and Brakel - Herwijnen,
and a few platoons of anti-aircraft machine guns. The ferry at Sleeuwijk, indeed,
had no protection whatever in the form of anti-aircraft defences.
Notwithstanding the fact that occasional hold-ups occurred, owing to the above
circumstances, and that the columns were exposed to the attack of German
aircraft, few losses were sustained.
At 10 a.m. the commander of the light division received orders from the
commander of the Third Army Corps to place himself, with the troops under his
command, at the orders of the commander of the Holland Fortress, to be used, if
necessary, for the occupation of the Merwede front lying between Dordrecht and
Gorinchem. A brigade of cyclists was to proceed as quickly as possible to
Gorinchem.
The commander of the light division thereupon gave orders for the occupation of
the Merwede section by the two brigades of cyclists attacking side by side.
In the evening, however, the said commander received fresh orders from the
commander of the Holland Fortress. These were to the following effect :
(a) To advance in the direction of IJsselmonde and attack the German troops
which had landed at Waalhaven. The airfield in question was to be bombed by
the R.A.F. during the night of the 10th - 11th May, but this bombing would have
ended by 2.20 a.m.
(b) To place one battalion at the disposal of the cantonment commander at
Dordrecht.
At 5.45 p.m. the commander of the Light Division issued fresh orders in this
connection, whereby the division was to proceed to the Noord in two marching
groups in order to cross this river at Alblasserdam.
On the River Noord itself the commander of the Light Division did not expect any
resistance.
For the attack against Waalhaven the commander of the Light Division still
disposed of five battalions of cyclists and two brigades of artillery (four batteries,
sixteen guns in all). The battalion of cyclists intended for Dordrecht was, after
crossing the bridge at Alblasserdam, to diverge towards Zwijndrecht.
The brigades of cyclists were meantime engaged in occupying the Merwede front,
and therefore it was some time before the troops could begin the movement in
execution of the new order. Not till 10.30 p.m. did the Second Cyclist Brigade
start the movement from Sliedrecht, while the First Cyclist Brigade was at that
moment marching forward near Laag Blokland.
Meantime it had become evident to the commander of the Light Division that the
west bank of the Noord at Alblasserdam was occupied by the enemy and that the
bridge had been swung open.
The battalion of cyclists intended for Dordrecht was therefore ordered to attain
its objective by way of Papendrecht. In view of the lateness of the hour, the
commander of the Light Division decided to postpone the attack on the German
troops on the west bank of the Noord at Alblasserdam till the morning of the
11th May.
3. The Events in the Valley Positions, in the Area East of the Latter, and in the
Northern Provinces.
In accordance with the orders given, the troops east of the IJssel carried out the
destructions and set up the obstructions which had been prepared. The only case
in which destruction was not successful was that of the bridge over the Twente
Canal at Diepenheim. In accordance with their instructions the troops operating
to the east of the IJssel withdrew thereafter behind the latten waterway.
All the bridges over the IJssel were then blown up.
In the early morning of the 10th May the German forces, operating chiefly along
the axis Emmerik – Zevenaar - Arnhem, had already crossed the frontier. The
frontier there being only a few kilometres away from the IJssel, this river was
already reached by the Germans early in the morning. Supported by
overwhelming artillery strength, the Germans succeeded at 10 a.m. in crossing
the IJssel at Westervoort and continuing their march along the axes Arnhem -
Ede and Arnhem - Wageningen.
Meanwhile the troops in the Valley position had fully occupied their lines at 3
a.m. on the 10th May. All the preparations for a prolonged defence had been
made. The artillery units had made their preparations for firing at all the
important points in the terrain facing them, from their normal position and two
reserve positions. Only the flood water in some depressions was lower than
during the preceding period, probably in consequence of weather conditions.
The light troops belonging to the two army corps which occupied the Valley
position were pushed forward — namely, First and Fifth Hussar Regiments in the
section of the Fourth Army Corps and Fourth Hussar Regiment in the section of
the Second Army Corps.
The task of the light troops in question was:
(a) To delay an enemy advance in the area west of the IJssel.
(b) To co-operate in, and to cover the execution of, the plan of destruction which
had been prepared for this area.
As the field army fighting in the Valley position did not possess large reserves,
the commander of the field army was very anxious, if possible, to get these
regiments back intact inside the position area, and for this reason particular
emphasis in the order was laid on its second part.
The delaying action by the said regiments was to begin in the line the IJssel from
Arnhem to Spankeren, and afterwards along the Dieren Canal. The main bodies
were to effect delay along the line Oosterbeek – Harskamp – Garderen – Ermelo
- Harderwijk.
When the troops on the canal had carried out the work of destruction on the
morning of the 10th May, they fell back on the main body.
The German troops who had broken through and passed over the IJssel at
Westervoort soon came into contact with the Fourth Hussar Regiment, which
regiment fought successive delaying actions at Oosterbeek, Heelsum, Renkum
and Ede, finally retreating on the evening of the 10th May before the
overwhelming strength of the Germans, behind the Valley position, and rallying
at Leersum.
In consequence of the forced retreat of the Fourth Hussar Regiment the right
wings of the First and Fifth Hussar Regiments were exposed, so that these
regiments were drawn back to the line Groote Hoef - Klaarwater – Nijkerkerveen
- Nijkerk.
Meantime, the events in the heart of Holland had prompted the Commander-in-
Chief to withdraw six battalions of the field army from the defence of the Valley
position. The large units in the front line were in this way deprived to a great
extent of their reserves, so that the commander of the field army considered it
necessary also to draw back the mounted squadrons of the First and Fifth Hussar
Regiments behind the position, in order to form new reserves from these after
their conversion into cyclist units. On the evening of the 10th May, therefore, all
that remained on the terrain in front of the Valley position was the unmounted
part of the First Hussar Regiment, which was in the line Klaarwater - Nijkerk.
While these events were in progress, the cordon disposition of the Dutch troops
in the northern provinces had also been broken through by the German troops
operating there. The port installations and the locks at Delfzijl were destroyed,
and the entrance to the harbour was blocked, with a view to depriving the
Germans of the use of the harbour as long as possible.
In the evening the troops which had operated in the northern provinces passed
through the Wons position at the head of the outer Zuider Zee dyke. From there
they were transported to Den Helder, where they were reorganized in order to
continue the fight.
4. The Situation at the End of the First Day of War.
Therefore the position at the end of the first day of war was as follows:
(a) The troops operating east of the great rivers, after carrying out the task
allotted to them — namely, safeguarding the destruction which had been
prepared in these regions had either retreated or been destroyed.
(b) The waterline formed by the rivers Meuse and IJssel, with the Meuse - Waal
Canal lying between, and the line of canals in the northern provinces had been
broken through, after they had, however, delayed the German advance for four
to six hours.
Apart from one single structure, all the bridges on the waterline were destroyed,
with the result that the German armies operating to the west of the rivers
experienced great difficulties in their supplies and rear communications.
A part of the troops occupying the line of the rivers had been able to withdraw
into the Valley position or the Raam - Peel position.
(c) The light troops east of the Valley position had been withdrawn into that
position except for a small number on the northern front. The enemy, however,
had not yet made contact with the advance posts.
(d) The Raam - Peel position had been broken through south of Mill, and the
troops occupying this position were to withdraw to the Zuid Willemsvaart on the
night of the 10th - 11th May.
(e) The German attack on the heart of the country, the object of which was to
gain possession on the very first day of the centre of government, The Hague,
had been repulsed, and all the airfields around The Hague had been recovered.
The small bodies of paratroops which were still north of the Meuse no longer
presented any real danger. Clearing them up was only a question of time.
Rotterdam, however, in so far as it lay south of the Meuse, with the airfield of
Waalhaven, had not been recovered. The entire island of IJsselmonde, and the
greater portion of the island of Dordrecht, with the two Moerdijk bridges, were in
German hands.
In addition, the entire First Army Corps was engaged with this enemy and was
therefore diverted from its proper task, that of forming the reserve for the field
army in the Valley position, and, in case of need, re-occupation of the eastern
front of the Holland Fortress. In addition, six battalions of the reserve of the
great units in the Valley position had been taken away from these units and
despatched to the Holland Fortress.
(f) The Third Army Corps and the Light Division had carried out the retreat
indicated above under difficult circumstances practically without loss. The said
army corps had taken up its positions on the Waal, while the Light Division had
marched forward for the attack on the Waalhaven airfield.
IX. THE MILITARY OPERATIONS ON THE 11TH MAY
1. The Fighting in the Heart of the Country and on the Southern Front of the
Holland Fortress.
On this day, too, the fifth column operating at The Hague proved very active.
The troops composing the first division were engaged for the most part in
destroying the last centres of resistance occupied by paratroops in the environs
of The Hague.
The First Battalion of the Brigade of Chasseurs for this purpose carried out
engagements at Belvedere in the neighbourhood of Ockenburg, while the Fourth
Brigade of Infantry, which was later on reinforced by the Ninth Brigade of
Infantry of the third division, was fighting for the possession of the village of
Valkenburg. The remaining troops continued to occupy the recovered airfields.
At Rotterdam and IJsselmonde the German forces had, however, meantime been
continually reinforced.
True, the airfield at Waalhaven had been made useless as such by the artillery
fire directed on it, but in its place the parking space of Feyenoord was used by
the German aircraft in order to land reinforcements.
As regards means of access to the southern front of the Holland Fortress, the
bridge at Heusden had meantime been blown up. The bridge at Keizersveer was
in Dutch hands, but was exposed to German air attack during the course of the
11th May, while the Moerdijk bridges were still in German hands.
Meanwhile mechanized parts of the seventh French Army, after marching
through Belgium, had reached North Brabant on the 11th May.
Request was made by the Dutch to the French Supreme Command to push on as
rapidly as possible with these forces in order to attack the Moerdijk bridges from
the southern side.
The expectation that German resistance on the island of Dordrecht and
IJsselmonde would be broken by the action of the French forces in question, and
also by the attack of the light division on the 11th May, was, however, not
fulfilled. It is true that a French mechanized squadron made its appearance on
the southern bank of the Hollandsch Diep opposite Strijen, but attacks by
German bombers compelled these troops to withdraw. The attack of the Light
Division over the Noord also made no progress.
According to the order of attack of the commander of the light division issued
during the evening of the 10th May, at 11 o'clock, the two brigades of cyclists
were to cross the Noord on the morning of the 11th May, north and south of
Alblasserdam respectively.
As one battalion of cyclists had been sent to Dordrecht and another was to form
the divisional reserve, four battalions were available for attack.
When day dawned, the Second Brigade of Cyclists succeeded in getting over a
few patrols by surprise. They were, however, unable to maintain themselves in
the area occupied by the enemy.
An attempt made later with bigger forces, 1 km. south of Alblasserdam, was
successful to the extent that a first echelon of sixty men reached the west bank.
The enemy having meantime received reinforcements, however, these troops
were unable to follow up the success they had secured, and it was likewise
impossible to reinforce the echelon which had crossed.
An attempt at crossing north of Alblasserdam was nipped in the bud by
murderous fire of enemy machine guns. No artillery support could, as yet, be
given on our side, because the Corps of Horse Artillery had not yet been able to
take up any position.
Therefore, on the morning of the 11th May, four battalions of cyclists lay
extended along the eastern bank of the Noord.
At 10.10 a.m. heavy German air attacks were made on these forces. In these
circumstances the commander of the Light Division felt that it was impossible for
him, with the means at his disposal, to carry out the order to advance to
Waalhaven.
The commander of the Holland Fortress, having been informed of this view,
changed his order to the following:
(a) A part of the Light Division was to clear the island of Dordrecht of the enemy
and afterwards to endeavour to move on to Waalhaven by way of Wieldrecht, the
ferry of 's Gravendeel, and Barendrecht.
(b) The rest of the Light Division were to hold the east bank of the Noord.
In addition, another battalion of cyclists was to be placed as speedily as possible
at the disposal of the cantonment commander of Dordrecht.
The execution of this last order was allocated to the First Battalion of the Second
Brigade of Cyclists, which was on the farthest southern wing of the position on
the Noord.
Meantime, the units in the foremost line were again subjected to violent air
bombing at 12.40, 12.50, 2 and 2.15 p.m. The Second Battalion of the Second
Brigade of Cyclists were in this way broken up and retreated to the east after the
First Battalion of the Second Brigade of Cyclists had marched off at 2 p.m. to
Papendrecht, and therefore there were only two battalions of cyclists left on the
east bank of the Noord.
Meantime, the Light Division had been reinforced by the Second Motor Cyclist
Hussar Regiment, which, having suffered very heavy losses in the fighting at Mill
on the 10th May, had returned once more to the division, while the commander
of the Third Army Corps also placed the First Brigade of the Eleventh Regiment of
Artillery (armed with 10 cm. medium artillery) at the disposal of the Divisional
Commander.
The new orders which were issued by the commander of the Light Division
directed that:
(a) A holding group on the Noord should be formed by the First Cyclist Brigade,
minus the Second Battalion and First Brigade of the Horse Artillery Corps.
(b) The principal group, which was to mop up the enemy in the island of
Dordrecht, and afterwards to push on to Waalhaven, would consist of the Second
Brigade of Cyclists, the Second Battalion of the First Brigade of Cyclists, and the
Second Brigade of the Horse Artillery Corps.
The battalions of cyclists already sent to Dordrecht could therefore be included in
this group.
Finally, the divisional reserve could be formed by the machine-gun squadron
belonging to the division and Second Motor Cyclist Hussar Regiment.
The air forces on that day bombed the German forces south of the Moerdijk. At
the same time they brought in reports of the presence of several hundred
paratroops, who were stated to be south and south-east of Dordrecht.
The remainder of the fighter aircraft squadrons, which had fought so bravely,
were grouped together. All together these units were left with no more than
twelve damaged machines.
2. The Military Operations in North Brabant.
After a night march during the night of the 10th - 11th May, the troops
occupying the Raam - Peel position, reinforced by some units, which had
remained intact, of the troops which originally held the Meuse, reached the Zuid
Willemsvaart on the early morning of the 11th May, and occupied the west bank
of this canal.
The retreat took place without interference by the enemy, who, probably misled
by the screening force left behind in the position till 4 a.m., did not discover until
the morning of the 11th May that the Raam - Peel position had been abandoned
by the Dutch troops.
In order to cover the retreat the First Battalion of the Forty-First Brigade of
Infantry had also taken up a position on the eastern border of Helmond.
Notwithstanding the fact that the troops had been in actual operations
uninterruptedly for nearly thirty-six hours, they immediately set to work to put
the west bank into a state of defence, and proceeded to destroy the bridges over
the canal.
As was already pointed out when dealing with Dutch geography from the military
point of view, the Zuid Willemsvaart is unfavourable as a position. Not only do
the dykes restrict the field of fire extremely and make it necessary to arrange the
guns in a straight line, without depth, but in addition to this there are extensive
built-up areas on the east bank.
A strength of about twelve battalions was still available to hold this position.
Here, just as in the Raam - Peel position, anti-aircraft defence and anti-tank
defence were entirely lacking, and again, as regards artillery, only a few
batteries of 8 cm. (steel) were available. If, in addition, it is taken into
consideration that the length of the section to be defended was about 70 km., no
great hopes could be entertained as regards the length of time the resistance
might last.
On the morning of the 11th May the Germans drew near chiefly along the axes:
Grave - 's Hertogenbosch;
Mill – Uden - Vechel;
Venlo – Helden – Meyel - Asten; and
Roermond - Weert.
At 11 a.m. German patrols appeared on the east bank.
Little by little the pressure increased, especially in that part of the position which
lay between Someren and Stiphout.
The Dutch troops tried to prevent passage of the canal with all the weapons at
their disposal. Several armoured cars were disabled by the 6 cm. light artillery.
The attackers, taking advantage of the very much greater strength of artillery
which they possessed, the fire of which they directed particularly to those parts
of the canal where there were conglomerations of tall buildings, were able shortly
after noon to reach the west bank at several points, among others at Someren
and south of Vechel, whereupon they began to roll up the Dutch position.
In these circumstances a retreat was again ordered, with a view to falling back
successively on the lines formed by the Dommel and the Wilhelmina Canal.
Meantime, conditions had become very unfavourable for the Dutch forces fighting
here.
The supply trains of several sections of the forces had fallen into German hands.
Other units, which reached the Zuid Willemsvaart at the moment when the
bridges over this canal had already been blown up, had thrown their vehicles into
the canal in order to prevent them falling into the hands of the enemy. Finally,
columns of vehicles belonging to the various units had been broken up by the
persistent German air attacks.
When it was found in the course of the retreat that the bridges over the
Wilhelmina Canal had already been blown up, while in addition there was no
longer any sense in taking up a position behind this canal, because the Germans
— having crossed the Zuid Willemsvaart near Vechel — were already in the rear
of the proposed new position, the orders were altered, and the line Tilburg –
Breda - Roosendaal was laid down as the general line of retreat.
The main roads were exposed to continuous attacks by German aircraft, and
were littered with burned and destroyed vehicles. The troops in question,
therefore, endeavoured as best they could to reach the western part of North
Brabant by moving in small numbers along the inner roads.
Motorized parts of the seventh French Army, which had reached the line Tilburg -
Best in the course of the afternoon, also fell back to the west on Breda.
In this way, on the evening of the 11th May, the way to Zeeland and the south
front of the Holland Fortress lay practically open to the attacker.
3. Events in the Valley Position and in the Northern Provinces.
German troops had already made their appearance before Renkum on the
evening of the 10th May, and on the 11th May an attack was made on the
advance posts of the most southerly regimental section of the fourth division.
The position of the Third Battalion of the First Brigade of Infantry, which occupied
this advance post area, was then pierced. Farther to the north the advance posts
were exposed to slight pressure only. The attacker, having forced in the advance
posts in the section of the Eighth Brigade of Infantry, shifted his artillery fire
forward, in consequence of which the principal area of resistance in the section
held by the Eighth Brigade of Infantry, in particular close to the Grebbeberg, was
exposed to heavy artillery fire during the whole of the afternoon and evening.
Enemy infantry pushing along the broad approach at Wageningen were able in
the evening to make fighting contact in this part of the position with the troops in
the principal area of resistance. Rhenen, lying farther to the rear, was also
subjected to enemy artillery fire, while our own artillery directed its fire to
Scherpenzeel, Wageningen and the metalled road Ede - Renswoude.
Meantime, the enemy opposite the front of the Fourth Army Corps showed not
the slightest activity. The First Regiment of Hussars, which was still in front of
the advance posts, passed behind these positions owing to a mistake. In the
evening, however, the regiment resumed its original position.
One point of weakness for the defence of the Valley position, however, was that
the Supreme Command of the land and sea forces, under the pressure of events
in the interior of the country, found it necessary to withdraw all armoured cars
from the field army, with the exception of one section. Coming in addition to the
withdrawal of the infantry battalions from this army, which had already taken
place, this meant a further weakening of the Valley army.
Notwithstanding the enemy air supremacy, reconnaissance aircraft carried out
their work successfully over the IJssel and the Veluwe.
In the northern provinces the German forces had meanwhile reached Harlingen
and Franeker, while on the night of the 11th - 12th May Stavoren was occupied.
After the breakthrough on the canal front, the attacker had here met with
practically no further resistance.
In the evening enemy reconnaissance detachments also appeared before the
Wons position, and fighting contact was made with that position.
4. The Military Position at the End of the Second Day of War.
Therefore, at the end of the second day of war, the position on the east front
gave no ground for anxiety.
Though the advance posts on the southern part of the Valley position had been
forced in, and contact had been made there with the main position, the
occupation of this area was still intact over the entire length and depth of the
position.
There still remained the difficulty that no large reserves were available in the
Valley position. Not only were the reserves which had been previously diverted
for the defence of the heart of the country still in operation there, and not only
was the First Army Corps fully engaged with the fighting in the province of South
Holland, but even on the second day of war forces were withdrawn from the
Valley army for the defence of the interior of the country.
Even the loss of the northern provinces, however regrettable, was no final
obstacle to the further conduct of the defence. The approaches to Holland,
running over the separating dyke, were still firmly in Dutch hands. The Wons
position, and also the work in the second line behind it on the Kornwerderzand,
were both still entirely intact.
The position in the south was more serious.
Attempts to drive the enemy from the island of IJsselmonde had failed at
Rotterdam and at Alblasserdam, while the Moerdijk bridges and the major part of
the island of Dordrecht were still in German hands. The forces of the enemy had
even received considerable additions in the course of the 11th May.
Furthermore, the resistance of the Dutch troops in North Brabant had collapsed.
If the French forces did not succeed in retaking the Moerdijk bridges on the 12th
May and
checking the German advance in the outermost line Breda - Moerdijk, it was
probable that the German troops operating in Brabant would make contact on
the 12th May with the German air-borne infantry and paratroops around
Dordrecht and at IJsselmonde.
An appeal for support addressed to our Allies could not be complied with by them
because they were themselves fully occupied with the struggle taking place in
Belgium and Northern France. Even from the British air force support could only
be obtained locally and on a very modest scale.
In these circumstances all the forces in the province of South Holland were fully
tied up there and the urgently necessary reinforcement of the troops occupying
the Valley position could not take place on that day either.
X. MILITARY OPERATIONS ON THE 12TH MAY
1. The Struggle in the Heart of the Country and on the Southern Front of the
Holland Fortress.
On this day, too, light fighting actions took place around The Hague against
paratroops and air-borne infantry, which were still holding out at a few points.
Near Leyden the Fourth Brigade of Infantry continued its attack on the village of
Valkenburg from the direction of Katwijk, where the German infantrymen who
had retreated from the airfield were still defending themselves.
In view of further possible German actions from the air, the First Army Corps still
had to carry on now with the task of holding important points and airfields in the
heart of Holland, and this army corps could not be employed for other fighting
actions.
In the fight at Rotterdam, German artillery now intervened for the first time. The
Dutch artillery in the Hoeksche Waard changed their position that they might
direct their fire on to the southern embankment of Rotterdam and Waalhaven.
The airfields of Waalhaven itself and Feyenoord were again attacked by the last
remnants of the Dutch air force.
The Dutch artillery stationed on the southern border of the Hoeksche Waard —
out-of-date 15 cm. guns — put out their full strength of fire in order to prevent
passage over the Moerdijk bridges. In this process they were, of course,
continually exposed themselves to the fire of enemy artillery and attacks of
German aircraft, considerable losses being sustained and heavy damage done to
the guns. They did not succeed in preventing the crossing from Brabant to the
island of Dordrecht, on the morning of the 12th May, of the advance portions of
the German armoured division, which had made its way through North Brabant,
and of units of the Waffen S.S.
In the meantime the group of the Light Division which had received orders to
clear the island of Dordrecht, and thereafter to advance towards Rotterdam, had
been fighting, successfully at first, in the environs of Dordrecht against the
German forces there, which were, moreover, continually strengthened by new
landings of parachute troops and air-borne infantry. When, however, on the
morning of the 12th May, the forces of the German tank division and the units of
the Waffen S.S. were able to throw their weight into the scales, the battalions of
cyclists were compelled to retire, and the German armoured troops were able,
shortly after noon, to make contact with the air-borne troops fighting on the
south embankment of Rotterdam.
In this way one of the decisive episodes of the campaign had been completed.
The Dutch troops in the Hoeksche Waard and the holding group of the Light
Division on the Noord maintained their defensive position, in order to prevent the
German forces on the island of Dordrecht and on IJsselmonde from extending
over the adjoining islands.
Above all, the troops of the Light Division on the Noord were in this case exposed
to air bombing and artillery fire, which was answered as effectively as possible by
the Dutch artillery.
Last of the Moerdijk the points of passage over the Bergsche Maas at the bridge
of Keizersveer, at the ferries of Kapelle and Drongelen, and at the bridge of
Heusden were still in Dutch hands.
2. The Military Operations in North Brabant.
In North Brabant practically no further fighting of importance took place on this
day. The remnants of the Dutch troops who had been the original troops
occupying the Meuse and the Raam - Peel position endeavoured in small bodies
to escape the grip of the Germans.
Since the night of the 9th – 10th May, these troops had practically not had a
moment of rest. For them these days of war had been a succession of taking up
positions, fighting delaying actions, and long and wearisome marches in retreat,
in which, owing to lack of anti-aircraft defence, they were exposed, practically
defenceless, to the attacks of the German air forces.
Part of them succeeded in escaping by way of the bridge at Keizersveer to the
Holland Fortress. Other bodies were able to reach the islands of Zeeland, where
they were reorganized to continue the struggle.
Some of them, by order of the officer in command of the French troops who had
taken up positions near Breda, were sent on to Antwerp and then despatched to
Zeeland Flanders.
A large number, including the staff of the Peel division, which met with this fate
at Tilburg, fell into German hands as prisoners.
The French, who had originally planned to resist the German advance along the
general line, the Mark as far as Breda, Oosterhout, Geertruidenberg, were
compelled to withdraw their left wing under German pressure, thus throwing
open to the Germans the way to Moerdijk.
For the present, however, they still maintained their plan of stubbornly defending
Breda. Consequently, on the evening of the 12th May, they sent the entire
population of that town, 40,000 persons, into Belgium.
3. The Fighting in the Valley Position and in the Northern Provinces.
On the morning of the 12th May the enemy artillery continued its fire against the
main position in the section of the fourth division. The firing was particularly
violent in the most southerly part, the environs of the Grebbeberg.
The artillery of the fourth division, supported by the army corps artillery and by a
part of the contiguous division to the left, endeavoured to answer this fire as
best they could, and to gain the upper hand over the attacking German artillery.
In this, however, owing to the superior artillery strength of the enemy, they were
not successful.
The attacks by the Dutch air force on the German artillery positions at
Wageningen were also ineffective in destroying this artillery.
Under cover of its artillery and supported by the air force, the German attacking
infantry was gradually able to penetrate as far as the Grebbeberg, and
subsequently to extend the success secured by infiltration. The battalions of the
Eighth Brigade of Infantry offered the fiercest resistance, sustaining heavy
losses. Local counter-attacks gave relief for a time, but the troops engaged did
not succeed in retaking the whole of the ground lost.
Therefore, when night fell the attackers had succeeded in penetrating as far as
the last defence line, and the chief resistance in this section had been practically
broken through.
Those troops of the Eighth Brigade of Infantry which had remained intact retired
and took up a new position behind the railway line, Rhenen - Veenendaal, lying
in a deep depression.
In the section of the second division, meanwhile, the advance posts and the
troops on the principal strip of resistance were exposed to heavy artillery action,
while there also the attacking infantry gradually gained ground. Consequently,
the advance posts in this section of the division were also drawn back to the
main ground of defence.
Opposite the section of the Fourth Army Corps the enemy on this day also
showed no activity whatever.
In order to gain a view of what was happening in the enemy lines in front of this
army corps, the army corps commander gave the First Regiment of Hussars,
which was still in the line Hoevelaken - Jan Plassesteeg, the order to carry out
reconnaissance towards the line Achterveld – Voorthuisen - Nijkerk.
The regimental commander thereupon sent out three reconnaissance
detachments in the directions mentioned.
The Achterveld detachment encountered the main body of an advancing German
division and was destroyed.
The Voorthuisen detachment likewise, at the last-mentioned village, came into
contact with strong enemy forces, which partly destroyed the detachment,
though a part of it escaped.
The Nijkerk detachment came into contact with the enemy at Nijkerk itself. As
meantime enemy troops coming from the south had reached the line of retreat of
this detachment, the whole of it was taken prisoner by the enemy.
Meanwhile, the reconnaissance by the First Regiment of Hussars had shown that
opposite the front of the Fourth Army Corps heavy German forces were
advancing and that their contact with the Fourth Army Corps could be expected
at any moment.
In the northern provinces, meanwhile, the attack on the Wons position had
begun.
The enemy had already made fighting contact with this position on the previous
evening, and in the morning he opened heavy artillery fire against the Dutch,
particularly against the northern and middle sections of the position. Violent air
bombing strengthened the effect of this artillery fire. Deprived of all artillery
support themselves and of anti-air defence, the small body of Dutch troops — a
reinforced infantry battalion — was exposed practically defenceless to this
hurricane of fire. The fighting positions consisted only of simple earthworks,
while the water in the flooding in front of the position had not been raised to the
right level.
Towards noon the enemy proceeded to attack in the north and middle sections,
and the enemy troops succeeded in penetrating into the position. A counterattack,
launched with the feeble local reserves available, did not produce the
result hoped for. When, in addition, German tank troops succeeded in making
their way over the dry parts of the ground to the rear of the position, it became
untenable and the troops began to retreat, some over the Zuider Zee dyke, while
the men occupying the southern section were transported by boat over the
IJsselmeer to Medemblik.
The enemy immediately continued his advance, and on the very same evening
made contact with the works on the Kornwerderzand. The German air force
began bombing these works, but the effect of the action against the heavily
concreted positions was slight.
On the IJsselmeer the guard flotilla was reinforced by British and French motor
torpedo boats.
As there was a train ferry at Stavoren, which had not been taken away to
Holland, the harbour was subjected to fire by the Dutch naval vessel Friso. This
warship, however, was then sunk by German bombers.
In order to strengthen the naval forces on the IJsselmeer, the Dutch naval vessel
Gruno was posted to the guard flotilla.
4. The Situation at the End of the Third Day of War.
On the third day of war the position had become considerably worse for the
Dutch forces.
Not only had the French troops operating in North Brabant failed to check the
German advance, but powerful German units had even reached the
neighbourhood of Rotterdam. This meant that it was no longer to be expected
that troops could be drawn from Holland — particularly the First Army Corps —
for the defence of the Valley position.
Matters were still more serious now that this position had been broken through,
though only locally and over a narrow width, while again only a few reserves
were available to close the breach and restore the original position.
The Fourth Army Corps was pinned down by the German forces reported to be
advancing against them, the Third Army Corps extended to cover a section of the
Waal, about 50 km. in length.
In the northern provinces the Germans had advanced as far as the head of the
Zuider Zee dyke. The works on the Kornwerderzand were, however, quite intact,
while the occupying troops awaited the enemy attack in full confidence and
courage. Therefore, this part of the front gave rise to no anxiety for the moment.
XI. THE EVENTS OF THE 13TH AND 14TH MAY
1. The Fighting in the Valley Position and the Retreat to the East Front of the
Holland Fortress.
The fact that the Valley position had been broken through over a narrow front
near Rhenen on the evening of the 12th May imposed upon the Dutch Army
Command the necessity of attempting to regain the lost ground by a counterattack,
if they wished to continue the defence in the Valley position.
As was already stated above, the struggle in the heart of Holland had deprived
the large units in the Valley position of their local reserves, and units of the First
Army Corps were likewise not available.
The only troops at the disposal of the Valley army for such an action were the
units of the independent Brigade Group B. The said brigade had originally been
stationed in the land between the Waal and the Meuse, in order to form with the
independent Brigade Group A the connecting link between the troops occupying
the Valley position and those in the Raam - Peel position. When the Raam - Peel
position was abandoned there was no longer any sense in the independent
Brigade Group B remaining south of the Waal, and therefore this unit was
withdrawn to the north of this river.
The brigade now had only a strength of four infantry battalions, while the brigade
artillery was not more than a few batteries of out-of-date guns. Nevertheless, the
forces available were got ready for an attack from the north-west against the
enemy, who had penetrated the position.
When day broke on the 13th May the attack was started, after artillery
preparation in which the artillery of the Second Army Corps also took part.
With Rhenen burning in the background the Dutch battalions endeavoured to
work their way forward through the covered terrain.
At first the attack was successful, but finally it broke down at Achterberg under
the overwhelming fire of the German artillery, violent bombing from the air, and
the fire of the automatic weapons.
The failure of this heroic attempt forced upon the Dutch Army Command the
difficult decision of ordering the whole of the troops occupying the Valley position
to withdraw to the east front of the Holland Fortress. If this retreat had had to
take place during the day, it would have meant the destruction of the Valley
army, owing to the absolute air supremacy of the German air force and the
narrow and largely open roads. Therefore, the Valley position had to be held in
any case till the evening of the 13th May. Notwithstanding the intense enemy
artillery fire and the aircraft racing overhead, the Dutch infantry were successful
in preventing the German attackers from developing their success during the
entire day.
In the afternoon of the 13th May the warning order was given respecting a
retreat which was to take place in a north-westerly direction, and the definitive
orders for retreat followed later. The Valley troops began their retreat at 9 p.m.,
leaving behind a screening force till the early morning of the 14th May.
The sectors of retreat indicated for the divisions were, in a general sense:
Seventh Division: Loenen - Muiden.
Eighth Division: Region north-east and east of Utrecht.
Second Division: Region south-east of Utrecht.
Fourth Division: Section between the Waal and Jutphaas.
The retreat was effected in the night under the most difficult circumstances.
Although the flooding on the eastern front of the Holland Fortress had not been
brought up to the full level, precisely with a view to the possibility of a retreat,
the ground off the roads was in many places impassable, so that all the columns
had to squeeze together on the few roads which passed through the flooded
territory. Obviously, confusion and hold-ups were inevitable under these
conditions.
Thanks to the screening troops left behind, the German troops remained entirely
ignorant of the retreat which had been carried out. If tank units had pressed on
along the roads during the night, the conditions would have been far more
difficult still for the Dutch troops.
Nevertheless, on the morning of the 14th May the main body of the troops had
reached the places where they were ordered to take up positions, and the utterly
weary men were able to set about occupying the eastern front of the Holland
Fortress.
One difficulty which arose in this connection was that, in considering the
possibility of a retreat, it had been expected that the First Army Corps would
occupy certain important parts of the terrain. But this corps was no longer
available for the fighting on the east front, and therefore fresh provision had to
be made in this respect also.
In spite of all these circumstances, the troops on the eastern front looked
forward with confidence to further fighting on the morning of the 14th May.
The flood locks, now fully opened, made the water level rise visibly. The
Germans, surprised by the retreat, required a pause before they could resume
their advance, so that the first troops did not appear before the position until the
afternoon.
The Dutch troops, however, were not given the opportunity of measuring their
strength against the attacker on this historic ground.
2. The Military Operations in North Brabant and at the Kornwerderzand.
Under the pressure of the German advance the French were compelled as early
as the 13th May to abandon the resistance offered on the line Turnhout - Breda,
and they fell back on Roosendaal. At the request of the local French commander,
portions of the Dutch troops from the Raam - Peel position, which were in the
environs of Bergen op Zoom, took up a position south of this place in order to
cover the French troops in the rear against a possible landing of parachute
troops.
On the 14th May the French were also compelled to abandon the position at
Roosendaal, and they fell back on the Antwerp Fortress, which at that time still
formed the left wing support of the Allied troops in the Dyle position: Namur –
Louvain - Antwerp.
Whatever Dutch troops still remained in West Brabant at that moment withdrew
into Belgium in order from there to be transported to Zeeland Flanders for the
continuation of the struggle.
In the northern provinces the Germans, after having made contact on the
evening of the 12th May with the defence works at Kornwerderzand, had begun
their attack on the last-mentioned fortifications.
The works in question were subjected to heavy air bombing again on the
morning of the 13th May, and in the afternoon the German artillery also opened
fire against the casemates. The works on the Kornwerderzand had no artillery
forces of their own, and therefore the Dutch air force was ordered to attack the
German artillery positions. Effective fire was also directed against this artillery by
the Dutch naval vessel Johan Maurits van Nassau, which had steamed up for this
purpose from Den Helder to the sea arm of Texel.
A German infantry attack over the dyke, launched in the afternoon, collapsed
under the fire of the automatic guns from the casemates.
The morning of the 14th May started with a renewed heavy air bombing, which
caused some damage to the casemates, but was in no wise successful in
breaking down the power of resistance of the occupying troops.
3. The Events in the Heart of the Country.
In the heart of the country the condition on the 13th May underwent no material
change. The German forces which had pressed on as far as the south bank of the
Meuse at Rotterdam did not succeed in extending their success and reaching the
north bank.
The Dutch forces were likewise not in a position to drive out the German troops
from the islands of IJsselmonde and the island of Dordrecht. They had to confine
themselves to preventing the Germans from deploying east and west by
maintaining their positions on the east bank of the Noord and in the Hoeksche
Waard.
If, as operations went on, the German troops were successful in reaching the
north bank of the Meuse, their further advance to The Hague would be held up
near Delft, for which purpose Dutch troops of the First Army Corps had taken up
a position there. An enemy advance in the direction of Gouda would be checked
in a similar way.
In order to be certain of retaining, in any case, the further conduct of the war
against the aggressors, if the struggle should later on take an unexpected turn
for the worse, the Dutch Government wisely decided to transfer itself to England.
The further command of the defence was then entrusted with full confidence to
the Commander of the Land and Sea Forces, General Winkelman, who had in the
preceding days proved himself fully competent to carry out the very difficult task
placed upon him.
In the morning of the 14th May again the state of affairs near Rotterdam
underwent no change. All that happened was that in the Hoeksche Waard the
Dutch troops were withdrawn to Strijen, and later to the west part of the island.
4. The Situation on the Morning of the 14th May, and the Capitulation.
If we look at the Holland Fortress into which the Dutch troops had withdrawn
completely on the morning of the 14th May (apart from Zeeland, which was still
intact in Dutch hands) the position was that:
(a) German efforts to penetrate into the Fortress over the Zuider Zee dyke in the
north had failed. The gateway giving access over this dyke — the works at the
Kornwerderzand - were completely in the possession of the Dutch.
(b) The east front of the Holland Fortress, from Muiden, by way of Utrecht, to
Gorinchem, was entirely intact. The troops of the Valley army had taken up their
positions on this front, and on the basis of the effect of the flooding the further
course of the struggle could be looked forward to with confidence at this point.
(c) The south front of the Holland Fortress had been broken through at the
Moerdijk, and the enemy had succeeded in advancing in this section to the south
bank of the Meuse at Rotterdam.
Nevertheless on this section there was still a continuous Dutch line of defence
along the north bank of the Merwede, the east bank of the Noord, and the north
bank of the Nieuwe Maas and the Nieuwe Waterweg. Furthermore, the islands of
Voorne and Putten, and likewise the Hoeksche Waard, were still in Dutch hands,
and the First Army Corps, strengthened by young depot troops, stood ready
north of Rotterdam to check a further German advance in that direction.
Though the conditions of the defensive forces did not constitute any immediate
ground for giving up the struggle, the position as regards defence against air
attack was different.
The Dutch air force had been wiped out for all practical purposes, while the antiaircraft
artillery, weak in itself, began to suffer from shortage of ammunition. In
these circumstances the German air force possessed practically complete
supremacy in the air.
The German Army command did not fail to take every advantage, without the
slightest scruple, of this decisive factor. Realizing that the German forces would,
in the most favourable circumstances, require some days yet to break down the
Dutch resistance, the German Army command had recourse to the most
barbarous of methods, terrorization of the civilian population.
On the morning of the 14th May the Dutch Commander-in-Chief of Land and Sea
Forces received the threat that, unless resistance were discontinued, Rotterdam
and Utrecht would be destroyed from the air, and this fate would be shared later
by other towns.
Everyone who knows Dutch towns, those rows of houses rising up from the
perfectly open polder land, intersected by canals and ditches, where all
protection in the form of woods or hills in the environs is lacking, will realize
what the execution of this threat on centres of population numbering from
400,000 to 800,000 people would have meant. The fate of Rotterdam, where the
threat was carried into effect by an attack of at least fifty bombing aircraft, is an
eloquent example of what would have ensued.
Nevertheless, this terrorization would perhaps have been defied if there had been
any likelihood whatever that at that moment, or during the following days,
support could have been received from our Allies. The latter, however,
themselves involved in the intense struggle in Belgium and northern France,
were unable to do anything to relieve the Dutch front. Not a single aircraft could
be expected to assist in the air defence of Holland; not a single soldier could be
landed on the Dutch coast.
In these circumstances the Dutch Supreme Command had only the choice
between:
(a) Continuation of the struggle, with the likelihood of being able to maintain the
defence for some time longer, but with the certainty that thousands of innocent
men, women and children would die a frightful death; or
(b) Agreement to the capitulation of the Dutch forces.
General Winkelman, fully conscious of his responsibility, decided on the latter
course (except as regards the troops in Zeeland). In so far as it was placed
under the "Commander of the Sea Forces," and therefore not under the Supreme
Commander of Land and Sea Forces, the navy was not included in the
capitulation. In order to enable as many ships as possible to continue the
struggle, on the 14th May all ships were withdrawn from the command of the
Commander of the Den Helder position and allocated to the Commander of the
Naval Forces, with orders to proceed to England.
The Commander of the Naval Forces himself left for that country on the 14th May
at 1 p.m.
In a speech delivered by radio, the Commander-in-Chief explained his decision
that same evening to the Dutch population, and in an order of the day of the
15th May thanks were expressed to the troops for what they had done during the
campaign (see Appendices III and IV).
On the afternoon of the 14th May the Dutch forces, their hearts filled with
despair and rage, laid down their arms.
For every man who had the honour to belong to this force this was the darkest
hour of his life.
XII. THE STRUGGLE IN ZEELAND
As far as concerns the defence of Zeeland, the Dutch preparations extended
chiefly to the island of Walcheren, with its important harbour of Flushing, and the
island of Zuid Beveland.
The seaward defence was in the hands of the Royal Navy, supported by coastal
batteries.
With a view to protecting Flushing from the land side, as has already been
stated, preparations for defence were made at Bath, along the Zanddijk and the
Sloedam. The Hansweert - Wemeldinge Canal was not included in the system of
defence except as regards preparing the destruction of the bridges, because
owing to the high dykes there and the extensive populated areas it was not quite
suited for defence.
The forces entrusted with the defence of Zeeland were weak. Apart from a few
battalions of infantry, the occupying forces consisted only of a few batteries of
artillery armed with out-of-date material. All that was available for anti-tank
defence were a few modern guns, and likewise some 6 cm. field guns.
There were some modern anti-aircraft guns at Flushing, but apart from these
there was only one battery, armed with out-of-date guns, near the railway bridge
at Vlake.
On the remaining Zeeland inlands there were merely a few companies of
infantry.
During the period preceding the attack, work was hastily carried out to put the
preparations for defence on the Bath and in the Zanddijk position into the most
effective possible condition. These positions were in fact practically ready, and
from the 10th May the flood waters in front of the Bath and the Zanddijk position
were raised to the highest possible level.
Except for an air attack on the airfield of Haamstede on the 10th May, there was
no enemy action against the Zeeland area.
As early as the 11th May French light troops, which had marched up through
Belgium and had been transported by ferry from Zeeland Flanders to Flushing,
reached Walcheren. It was agreed with the French commander that the French
engineers should cut through the Sloedam.
The harbour installations at Flushing were subjected on that day to German air
bombing.
On the 12th May the French continued their march to Zuid Beveland, where they
took up their positions behind the Hansweert - Wemeldinge Canal. The canal
possessed such attraction for the French as a tank obstacle that, notwithstanding
all the other disadvantages attaching to this canal position, they gave it
preference above the Zanddijk position lying farther westward.
On the 13th and 14th May the garrison of Zeeland received some reinforcements
in the shape of troops who had originally formed part of those occupying the
Meuse and the Raam - Peel position. In this way a new battalion was formed at
Serooskerke, which was sent on partly to Noord Beveland and partly to Zeeland
Flanders, where new companies were formed in addition from units which had
arrived there in their retreat from Brabant via Belgium. The difficulty was that a
considerable number of these troops no longer had any arms, because they had
had to leave them at the Belgian frontier, owing to a mistake on the part of some
local Belgian authorities. The idea of strict neutrality had taken such deep root
that even one's own allies were deprived of arms.
The Bath position was abandoned on the 14th May by the troops occupying it,
after having been bombed repeatedly from the air, and when it was reported that
the enemy had succeeded in reaching the rear of the position by means of a
march over the dyke farthest to the south.
It was planned later to reoccupy the position, but this plan could, unfortunately,
not be realized, because meanwhile the destruction in the land between the Bath
and the Zanddijk position had been carried out, and therefore it had become
impossible to use the roads.
The airmen in training at Flushing were meanwhile sent on to northern France.
This personnel was later for the main part attached to the Naval Air Force and
made an important contribution towards maintaining the strength of the Dutch
bomber squadron, which continued to take part in the European War as part of
Coastal Command of the R.A.F.
On the 15th and 16th May the enemy successively penetrated the positions on
the Zanddijk, the Hansweert - Wemeldinge Canal and the Sloe. Lack of artillery,
and more especially of anti-aircraft defence, left the Dutch and French troops
practically defenceless in the open terrain against the remorseless bombings of
the enemy. The town of Middelburg with its magnificent old buildings fell a victim
to this merciless mode of warfare.
When the enemy had, by securing possession of the Sloedam, opened up a road
for approach to Walcheren, further resistance on this island became impossible,
and as many Dutch and French troops as possible were, under continuous air
bombing, transported by ferry from Flushing to Zeeland Flanders. After
wandering around through west Belgium to northern France a number of these
Dutch units were able to reach England. It was from these troops, strengthened
by recruits from all parts of the world, that the Royal Netherlands "Prinses Irene"
Brigade was afterwards formed.
All the rest fell into German hands as prisoners, in consequence of the course of
events in Belgium and France.
XIII. FINAL REVIEW
If one looks back at the campaign in Holland, it is a mistake to give paramount
consideration to the fact that this campaign, except as regards Zeeland, lasted
only five days.
Of course, the time factor is important, and a period of five days is not much in a
war that lasts years. But more important is what was achieved during the five
days by the troops of the kingdom, and what harvest this period yielded for the
general conduct of the war, and for the Allied cause.
It must be put on record with satisfaction, furthermore, that the few troops
entrusted with the defence of South Limburg succeeded in carrying out the plan
of destruction there completely. The consequence of this was that the advance
through South Limburg of the German troops intended for the attack on the
Belgian positions on the Albert Canal was delayed. The German tank division,
which had to use the bridges over the Albert Canal west of Maastricht, was able
to cross the Meuse only on the morning of the 11th May.
The troops on the Meuse - IJssel front between Roermond and Zwolle imposed
on the German advance a delay which averaged four to six hours. Of course,
these few hours proved very important for the troops in the Valley position
farther back and the Raam - Peel position. They were thus enabled quite
undisturbed and during daylight to test for the last time the preparations made
for defence, and carry out the destructions prepared in the terrain of enemy
advance.
The consequence was that the enemy was only able to launch his attack on the
Raam - Peel position late on the first day of war, and consequently the troops
occupying this position, when the attack proved successful, had the opportunity
of withdrawing during the night and continuing resistance on the Zuid
Willemsvaart on the second day of war.
The enemy did not even succeed in making contact with the Valley position on
the first day. If it is borne in mind that the Raam - Peel position and the Valley
position are only 20 and 40 km. respectively from the German frontier, this is
certainly no mean result.
The defence of the Raam - Peel position, and the subsequent defence of the Zuid
Willemsvaart, together with the work of destruction carried out in Brabant, had
the result that the German troops required two and a half days to get into
contact with the air-borne infantry landed at Rotterdam and Dordrecht.
The consequence of the delay in North Brabant was that the French mechanized
troops of the seventh army were even able to advance to west of Tilburg. If
these troops had succeeded in arresting the German advance on the line
Turnhout - Tilburg or Turnhout - Breda, this contact would indeed never have
been made, and the campaign in Holland would have taken an entirely different
course.
It is stated on the German side that the German Army had calculated that, if the
attack on the heart of the country had not had the desired success in the course
of the first day, the German troops would have succeeded on the third day of
war in making contact with the air-borne troops at Dordrecht and Rotterdam.
This calculation, however, was based on the assumption that the Raam - Peel
position would be defended by three infantry divisions and one light division.
Instead of this, this line, 70 km. in length, was held by a single extended
division, and not even provided with a single modern gun.
It is to the credit of this division that nevertheless it was able to achieve the
same result.
As has already been stated, in view of the impossibility of forming a continuous
front with our Belgian Allies, it was a matter of absolute necessity for our Army
Command to withdraw the Third Army Corps and the Light Division from North
Brabant, in order to cover the south front. How the fighting in Brabant would
have gone if these troops had remained there remains an open question.
Judging, however, by what happened some days later in Belgium and northern
France, it would have had no influence on the final result.
The fact that the Third Army Corps and the Light Division were not withdrawn
before the first day of war is not entirely justifiable from the strategic point of
view, but was a matter of political necessity.
It is a source of great satisfaction to observe that the German attack on the
heart of the country, the object of which was to break down the resistance on
the very first day of war and to seize the centre of government, failed completely
owing to the heroic struggle of the First Army Corps and the young depot troops.
It is very regrettable, however, that the First Army Corps was in this way
diverted from its principal task, and was likewise unable to expel the enemy from
the island of IJsselmonde and the island of Dordrecht by a concentrated attack in
conjunction with the Light Division. It must, however, not be forgotten in this
connection that the military position in the heart of the country remained a
difficult one till the last moment. Not only was there a continuously active fifth
column, but, owing to the complete supremacy of the German air force, there
might at any moment have been a repetition of what had happened in the first
days of the war — namely, an attack by air-borne troops on the heart of the
country. Owing to this, considerable numbers of the First Army Corps were tied
down there, though these forces were so badly needed for the struggle on the
southern front of the Holland Fortress and the Valley position.
The defence of the Valley position lasted from the morning of the second day of
war to the evening of the fourth. The absence of reserves was the reason why
the position had to be abandoned after a local break-through. It is simply a
matter of impossibility to carry on a defence without reserves. Notwithstanding
this, the defence of the Grebbeberg will remain a proud memory in the history of
the Dutch Army.
The fight for the fortifications at the Kornwerderzand was successful to the last
moment, and once again, too, it was seen that Dutch troops provided with
modern material need fear no antagonist.
Finally, the defence of Zeeland was a less successful episode. Here, however, it
must not be forgotten that it is not feasible for a small number of troops crowded
together in narrow defiles in open country, without artillery support and
practically without air cover, to maintain itself against a modern opponent who
has complete command of the air.
The Dutch forces, owing to the relative strength of the armies, were compelled
from the outset to limit themselves to defence. Though it may be true that as a
form of warfare defence is stronger than attack, it is no less true that the
initiative lies with the attacker, and that the will of the defender is from the
outset subordinated to that of the attacker.
Thus the attacker has the advantage of the choice of the place and the time of
the operation, and can take care to be the stronger at the decisive fighting points
which he selects. Consequently the attacker, notwithstanding the fact that the
total force employed by him was less than the total strength of the Dutch forces,
was by far the stronger at the points where the decision was sought: the
southern part of the Valley position, North Brabant, and the south front of the
Holland Fortress. The defender must keep troops in readiness everywhere,
because parts of the front where nothing happens to-day may to-morrow be the
scenes of powerful attacks. It is inevitable, therefore, especially when the
campaign is of such short duration as was the case in Holland, that large
numbers of defending troops do not even come into action. This is what
happened in the case of the troops of the Fourth and Third Army Corps and the
battalions in the delaying lines, whose sectors lay outside the German axes of
march.
That is the drawback inherent in every defence.
Nevertheless — and let this be the harvest which the Dutch defence yielded for
our Allies — the struggle in Holland produced the result that for five days, plus
the time required for regrouping and transfer to the fighting areas in Belgium
and northern France — another four days at least — a German force of not less
than 250,000 men remained fully engaged, and this force sustained heavy
losses, particularly as regards its aircraft.
If we bear in mind that between the 10th and the 19th May the following events
took place in Belgium:
(a) the battle for the Albert Canal,
(b) the battles for the Dyle position,
(c) the battle on the Sedan – Namur - Meuse front,
(d) the retreat from the Dyle to the Scheldt -
the Dutch resistance really made a substantial contribution to the relief of our
Allies fighting farther to the south.
More important than these positive facts, however, is the spirit which was
displayed in the defence. A nation which, even after a long period of peace, is
ready and willing to make every sacrifice called for to maintain its independence
cannot perish.
The Dutch forces gave all that was in their power to give.
Let us hope that in future the fighting forces of the Netherlands will be supplied
with all the material means they may require, so that their splendid fighting
qualities will not be wasted.
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THE APPENDICES
Note. — The term Regiment in Dutch is equivalent to Brigade in English except in
the case of mounted units, including those which have since been mechanized.
In the text the English equivalent has been used throughout. In the appendices,
however, initials referring to the Dutch military terminology have had to be
retained.
A.A Anti-aircraft guns.
A.C Army Corps.
A.C.T Army Corps Train.
A.R Artillery Regiment.
C. Commander.
C.C.L.S.F. Commander-in-Chief Land and Sea Forces.
C.M.A. Corps of Horse Artillery.
C.P. Company of Pioneers.
Com. A.A.M.G Company of Anti-aircraft Machine Gunners.
C.R. Cyclists Regiment.
Ch.R. Chasseurs Regiment.
D.C. Divisional Commander.
Div. Division.
Div. Tr. Divisional Train.
F.B. Frontier Battalion.
Gr.R. Grenadier Regiment.
H.Q. Headquarters.
H.R. Hussars Regiment.
I.R. Infantry Regiment.
L. Long (applied to guns)
Lt. Div. Light Division.
M.H.R. Motor Cyclist Hussars Regiment.
M.M.G. (C) Medium Machine Gun Company.
M.M.G. (Sq.) Medium Machine Gun Squadron.
Mot. Bat. Battalion of Motor Trains.
Mot. Com. Company of Motor Trains.
Mot. Reg. Motor Train Regiment.
Signals Signals Unit.
St. H.Q. Staff Headquarters.
Army Corps, Divisions, Battalions of Infantry, Brigades of Artillery and Army
Corps Troops are denoted by Roman figures, Regiments by Arabic figures.
APPENDIX I: DISTRIBUTION OF THE PRINCIPAL DUTCH FORCES OVER
THE VARIOUS THEATRES OF OPERATION
A. Troops intended for Subsidiary Strategic Duties.
Troops intended
for delaying action
in the land east of
the IJssel.
Troops intended
for territorial
defence in the
northern
provinces.
Troops intended
for delay in the
southern part of
North Brabant
(later posted to
the southern front
of Holland
Fortress).
Troops for
delaying action in
the Raam – Peel
position.
5 F.B.
9 F.B.
16 F.B.
19 F.B.
22 F.B.
1 F.B.
12 F.B.
33 I.R. (min. I)
36 I.R.
F.B.—Ch.R.
3—F.B.
6—F.B.
I— 3 I.R.
I— 6 I.R.
III—14 I.R.
II— 2 I.R.
I—13 I.R.
II—17 I.R.
4 F.B.
27 I.R.
30 I.R.
II—41 I.R.
20 A.R. (8 cm. st.)
Troops for
territorial defence
of South Limburg.
Troops for
delaying action on
river line Meuse -
Meuse-Waal Canal
- IJssel.
Troops for
territorial defence
of Zeeland.
13 F.B.
37 I.R.
2 F.B.
8 F.B.
11 F.B.
15 F.B.
17 F.B.
26 I.R.
35 I.R.
41 I.R. (min. II)
43 I.R.
14 F.B.
38 I.R.
17 A.R. (8 cm. st.)
Coast Artillery
B. Troops intended as Security Forces on the Fronts of the Holland Fortress, for
Occupation of the Den Helder Position and of Important Objectives in the
Interior. (Six battalions of these troops were embodied in the strength of the III
A.C. in order to replace the units left behind in the Raam - Peel position.)
F.B.—Gr.R.
7 F.B.
10 F.B.
18 F.B.
20 F.B.
21 F.B.
23 I.R.
25 I.R.
28 I.R.
31 I.R.
32 I.R.
I/33 I.R.
34 I.R.
39 I.R.
40 I.R.
42 I.R.
45 I.R.
I M.H.R. 14 A.R. (L. 12)
22 A.R. (15 L. 24)
23 A.R. (7 field)
Coastal Artillery
C. Troops intended for the Principal Struggle.
THE FIELD ARMY
(a) Troops in Valley Position:
II A.C. Staff; Signals. IV A.C. Staff; Signals.
II Div. Staff
Signals.
IV Div. Staff
Signals.
VII Div. Staff
Signals.
VIII Div. Staff
Signals.
10 I.R.
15 I.R.
22 I.R.
2 M.M.G.
4 A.R.
2 C.P.
8 I.R.
19 I.R.
11 I.R.
4 M.M.G.
8 A.R.
4 C.P.
7 I.R.
18 I.R.
20 I.R.
7 M.M.G.
1 A.R.
7 C.P.
5 I.R.
16 I.R.
21 I.R.
8 M.M.G.
5 A.R.
8 C.P.
Corps Troops. Corps Troops.
12 A.R.
II A.C.T.
2 Supply, etc., Tr.
4 H.R.
II Mot. Bat.
Brigade A.A. guns
3, 7, Com. A.A.M.G.
9 A.R.
IV A.C.T.
4 Supply, etc., Tr.
1, 5 H.R.
IV Mot. Bat.
Brigade A.A. guns
4, 8, Com. A.A.M.G.
(b) Defence of Area between Meuse and Lek:
Independent
Brigade Group A
Staff
Signals.
Independent
Brigade Group B
Staff
Signals.
44 I.R.
46 I.R.
16 A.R. (8 cm. st.)
24 I.R.
29 I.R. *
21 A.R. (8 cm. st.)
6 Com. A.A.M.G.
Army Troops in Valley Position.
* Of this regiment (29 I.R.), two
battalions were stationed on the
Brabant shore of the Meuse between
Grave and Appeltern.
13 A.R. (12 L.)
15 A.R. (15 L. 15)
18 A.R. (12 L.)
19 A.R. (12 L.)
Mot. Reg.
(c) Defence of the Waal to South Front of Holland Fortress:
III A.C. Staff; Signals.
V Div. Staff
Signals.
VI Div. Staff
Signals.
Lt. Div. Staff
Signals.
2 I.R. (min. II)
13 I.R. (min. I)
17 I.R. (min. II)
5 M.M.G.
3 A.R.
5 C.P.
3 I.R. (min. I)
6 I.R. (min. I)
14 I.R. (min. III)
6 M.M.G.
7 A.R.
6 C.P.
1 C.R.
2 C.R.
2 M.H.R.
M.M.G. Sq.
C.M.A.
Div. Tr.
5 Supply, etc., Tr.
Mot. Com.
Corps Troops.
11 A.R.
III A.C.T.
3 Supply, etc., Tr.
2 H.R.
III Mot. Bat.
Brigade A.A. guns
5, 9, Com. A.A.M.G.
(d) General Reserve (under Orders of C.C. L.S.F.):
I A.C. Staff; Signals.
I Div. Staff
Signals
III Div. Staff
Signals
Cr.R.
Ch.R.
4 I.R.
1 M.M.G.
2 A.R.
1 C.P.
1 I.R.
9 I.R.
12 I.R.
3 M.M.G.
6 A.R.
3 C.P.
Corps Troops.
10 A.R.
1 A.C.T.
1 Supply, etc., Tr.
3 H.R.
I Mot. Bat.
Brigade A.A. guns
1, 2, Com. A.A.M.G.
APPENDIX II: ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF A GERMAN ORDER CAPTURED
NEAR THE HAGUE IN THE COURSE OF OPERATIONS
OPERATION ORDERS
II BN. INF. REGT. 65.
IN THE FIELD, 16th April, 1940.
1. Information with regard to the enemy will be issued under separate cover.
2. XXII Inf. Div. with I Bn. 2 Parachute Rifle Regt. under command will surround
and occupy The HAGUE, the capital of Holland. The division will land from the air
on ____ (Note by the General Staff. — The date was not given in the order. It
was, however, 10th May 1940.) on the following landing grounds:
Landing Ground No. 1 (about 10 km. north of The Hague) — reinforced
Inf. Regt. 47.
Landing Ground No. 2 (sports field about 2 km. south of The Hague) —
reinforced II Bn. Inf. Regt. 65.
Landing Ground No. 3 (about 2 km. south-east of The Hague) — reinforced
Inf. Regt. 65 (less 2 Bn.).
The Air Force will attack enemy aerodromes, landing grounds and installations
and will cover the landing of the division.
3. II Bn. Inf. Regt. 65 (less 6 and 8 Coys.) supported by 13 Coy. (infantry guns)
of the regiment and I Pl. 6 Coy. 2 Parachute Rifle Regt. will occupy and hold the
landing ground so that landing can be continued thereon until M+1 day. It will
also block all roads leading from The Hague towards the south-west and will stop
all traffic in both directions. The battalion will also carry out continuous
reconnaissances towards the line MONSTER-POELDIJK and the south-western
edge of The Hague.
1 Pl. 6 Coy. 2 Parachute Rifle Regt. (Lieut. Gungelmahn) will jump 32 minutes
before the battalion is landed, seize the landing ground and expel the enemy
from the sand dunes around KIJKDUIN.
4. To perform this task units will carry out the following orders:
(a) One Pl. 5 Coy. immediately after landing will occupy LOOSDUINEN and will
stop all traffic in both directions on:
- Roads leading south-east from POELDIJK and WATERINGEN (1).
- North-eastern exits from The Hague (HOUT-WEG) (2).
- LOOSDUINSCHE street (3). (Sec attached sketch.)
An elevated observation post will be located and occupied (a church tower, if
possible).
Continuous reconnaissance will be carried out as far as POELDIJK, WATERINGEN
and the south-eastern edge of The Hague.
At the latter point contact will be established with Inf. Regt. 65.
(b) One Pl. 5 Coy. will block the south-eastern exits of The Hague at VAN
MEERDERVOORT-LAAN (4) and SPORT-LAAN (5) and stop the traffic in both
directions. It will also occupy and hold KIJKDUIN (6), paying particular attention
to the sea front.
An elevated observation post will be established.
Continuous reconnaissance (two patrols) will be carried out through the sand
dunes in a northerly direction, as far as the south-western edge of
SCHEVENINGEN and in a south-westerly direction as far as TERHEIDEN.
(c) One Pl. 5 Coy. will remain at my disposal. Its initial task will be the A.A.
defence of the landing ground. Subsequent tasks will probably be:
(i) Requisitioning of transport and bicycles for 5 and 7 Coys.
(ii) Erection of a P/W cage.
(iii) Erection of a salvage dump.
(iv) Attack towards the harbour of SCHEVENINGEN.
Continuous reconnaissance (a bicycle patrol) will be maintained along the road
LOOSDUINEN – TERHEIDEN - MONSTER as far as those villages.
(d) H.Q. 5 Coy. Inf. Regt. 65 will be in LOOSDUINEN at road junction towards
POELDIJK.
(e) 1 Pl. 6 Coy. 2 Parachute Rifle Regt. will withdraw detachments holding the
landing ground on relief by 5 Coy. Inf. Regt. 65, and will then reinforce and
widen road blocks on the road LOOSDUINEN - MONSTER towards the south-west.
(f) H.Q. II Bn. Inf. Regt. 65 will be established in the VAN MEERDERVOORT-LAAN
(probably some 300 metres north-east of landing ground No. 2). It will also
establish an observation post with a scissors telescope. W/T communication will
be established with Div. H.Q. and 5 Coy.
(g) The M.O. will establish a R.A.P.
(h) 7 and 13 (infantry gun) Coys. will arrive by air four and seven hours
respectively after the initial landing. They will be given their tasks on arrival at
Landing Ground No. 2.
5. The boundary between the battalion and the remainder of reinforced Inf. Regt.
65 for holding the landing ground, reconnaissance and encirclement of The
Hague will be as follows:
NAALDWIJK (incl. Inf. Regt. 65) — UITHOFSPOLDER (incl. II Bn. Inf. Regt. 65)
centre of the southern edge of The Hague.
6. A civilian representative will be attached to every commander and second-incommand
in the battalion, who will be kept informed as to the situation and the
task of the battalion.
Lieut. Lingner, 5 Coy. Inf. Regt. 65, is detailed as representative of the battalion
commander until the latter arrives.
7. Constant watchfulness against air and ground attacks will be maintained at all
times. Captured enemy weapons will be utilized for A.A. defence. Troops will
remain dispersed. The landing ground will be kept free of personnel.
8. Trenches with splinter-proof covering will be constructed immediately for
outposts and reserves for protection against aerial bombardment.
9. For blocking roads, any material which can be found should be used, including
carts, motor-cars and trams. Drawbridges will be raised.
10. Short situation reports will be rendered at frequent intervals.
(Signed) MAJOR, O.C. BATTALION.
Distribution:
O.C. II Bn.
5 Coy.
7 Coy.
13 Coy.
6 Coy. 2 Parachute Rifle Regt.
APPENDIX III: SPEECH DELIVERED BY RADIO BY THE COMMANDER-INCHIEF
OF THE LAND AND SEA FORCES TO THE PEOPLE OF HOLLAND ON
THE EVENING OF THE 14TH MAY
We have had to lay down our arms because no other course was open to us. We
were all firmly resolved to defend our country to the utmost. I, however, who in
my capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Land and Sea Forces received all
reports, knew with complete certainty that this utmost had to-day been reached.
Our soldiers have fought with a courage which will never be forgotten. The
contest, however, was too unequal. Our troops had to face technical methods
and contrivances against which the highest human courage is of no avail. They
fell in their thousands for the freedom of Holland.
The air forces which we still have at our disposal are so small that they are
practically unable any longer to support our troops in ground operations. Against
the German air supremacy, moreover, our other means of defence, such as our
anti-aircraft guns, had only a limited effect, notwithstanding the bravery and skill
with which the A.A. batteries performed their task. Thus our troops were exposed
to destructive bombing by German aircraft.
And not they alone. Among the civil population, the women and children, the air
war claimed innumerable victims. In our densely populated country, with its
many towns, it is difficult in bombing from the air to distinguish between military
and non-military objectives. Rotterdam, which was this afternoon bombed by the
German air force, has suffered the wretched fate of total war. Utrecht and other
great centres of population would have to share the fate of Rotterdam within a
very short time.
Left almost entirely to ourselves for our defence, we were not in a position to
safeguard our country and our civil population against his violence. It was hard
facts which compelled me to come to my very grave decision; we have
discontinued the struggle.
I quite realize that this decision will come as a shock to many of our people. Let
them understand, however, that at this moment I represent the Netherlands
Government in this country, and that therefore I was not only entitled, but also
bound to decide in the manner required by the interests of the Dutch people in
these circumstances.
It is to me absolutely undeniable that this interest necessitates the
discontinuance of the utterly unequal struggle, in order that the latter may not
claim still more innocent victims. All who are able to grasp the full extent of my
responsibility will understand how hard it must be for me to come to this
decision. Yet it could not be otherwise.
APPENDIX IV: ORDER OF THE DAY OF THE DUTCH COMMANDER-INCHIEF
OF LAND AND SEA FORCES ON THE 15TH MAY
I find myself impelled once more to give expression to the very great gratitude
and admiration which I feel for the devotion, faithfulness and bravery which have
been evidenced by all the forces of the Royal Netherlands Army and the Royal
Navy in the struggle which we finally had to abandon in view of the overpowering
weapons of our opponent.
I have in mind first and foremost the many members of the Dutch forces who
have laid down their lives in performance of their duty to Queen and country.
Officers, non-commissioned officers and men of the Netherlands Forces, you
have proved that you were prepared to make the last sacrifice for the righteous
cause of your country. I know that you would have been ready to continue the
struggle if I had demanded this. I did not demand it, however, because I did not
wish to expose my troops any longer, without defence, to destructive bombings
and machine gunning from the air, and because I desired to safeguard our towns
against destruction.
The sacrifices made by our people have certainly not been in vain, for Holland
has shown the world that she is willing to sacrifice her wealth and her blood for
the high ideal of her independence.